Vol. 70, no. 4: Full Issue by Law Review, Denver University
Denver Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 19 
January 2021 
Vol. 70, no. 4: Full Issue 
Denver University Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
70 Denv. U. L. Rev. (1993). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 













The Judges of the United States Court of





Martin Marietta v. Lorenz:












Lands and Natural Resources
Securities Law
Taxation
United States Supreme Court Review of
Tenth Circuit Decisions















THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE
MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brig-
ham Young University in 1957 with high
honors. Judge McKay then received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago in 1960
and was the law clerk for Justice Jesse A.
Udall of the Arizona Supreme Court for the
1960-61 term. From 1961 to 1974, Judge
McKay practiced with the law firm of Lewis
and Roca in Phoenix, Arizona; however, he
did take a two year leave to serve as Direc-
tor of the United States Peace Corps in
Malawi, Africa. Judge McKay was a law
professor at Brigham Young University
from 1974 until 1977. In 1977, he was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge McKay
currently resides in Provo, Utah.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Huxman and subsequently practiced with
the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher. Judge Logan became a profes-
sor at the University of Kansas Law School
in 1957 and was selected in 1961 as Dean
of that school. He served in that capacity
until 1968. Since 1961, Judge Logan has
been a visiting professor at Harvard Law
School, the University of Texas Law
School, Stanford University School of Law,
and the University of Michigan Law School.
He lectures at Duke University Law School.
He was a special commissioner for the
United States District Court for the District
of Kansas from 1964 until 1967 and was a
candidate for the United States Senate in
1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate
planning, administration and corporate
law. In 1977, he was appointed to the




Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Smith College in
1962, and from Harvard Law School in
1965. After graduating from law school,
Judge Seymour practiced law in Boston,
Massachusetts from 1965 until 1966, in
Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1967 and in Houston,
Texas from 1968 until 1969. From 1971 to
1979 she practiced with the Tulsa law firm
of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & An-
derson. In 1979, she was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa
and the American and Oklahoma County
Bar Associations. Additionally, Judge Sey-
mour served as a bar examiner from 1973
through 1979; she served on the United
States Judicial Conference Committee on
Defender Services, 1985-87, and as chair,
1987-90.
JUDGE JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Col-
orado in 1934. He received his B.A. from
the University of Denver in 1956 and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of
Denver College of Law in 1959. Judge
Moore then practiced law with the Denver
firm of Carbone & Walsmith until 1962.
From 1962 until 1975, he worked in the
Colorado Attorney General's Office. Spe-
cifically, Judge Moore served as Assistant
Attorney General from 1962 until 1967, as
Deputy Attorney General from 1967 to
1972, and as Attorney General for the State
of Colorado from 1972 until 1975.
In January, 1975,Judge Moore was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Moore was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from
1949 to 1951, and Brigham Young Univer-
sity from 1955 to 1956 when he graduated.
Judge Anderson then attended the Univer-
sity of Utah College of Law where he re-
ceived his LL.B. degree in 1960. He was
Editor in Chief of the Utah Law Review,
Order of the Coif, and Phi Kappa Phi. He
then served as a trial attorney in the tax di-
vision of the United States Department of
Justice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in
Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he prac-
ticed until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen
states, and in the United States Supreme
Court. He has served as President and
Commissioner of the Utah State Bar. Addi-
tionally, Judge Anderson has been a mem-
ber of the Utah Judicial Counsel and the
Utah Judicial Conduct Commission, and he
has served as Chairman of the Utah Law
and Justice Center Committee. Judge An-
derson's civic activities include lectures at
the University of Utah College of Law,
member of the Executive Committee of the
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce, and
director of numerous corporations. He is a
Master of the Bench, American Inn of
Court Number VII.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia,
Kansas. She received her B.A. in American
Studies from the University of Kansas in
1968 and was a member of Mortar Board
and Phi Beta Kappa. Judge Tacha then
attended law school and received her J.D.
from the University of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House Fellow, Judge Tacha was sent on
official trips to southeast Asia, east and
central Africa, and the European Economic
Community. After her fellowship, Judge
Tacha was an associate with the law firm of
Hogan and Hartson in Washington, D.C.
In 1973, she returned to Kansas and
entered private practice in Concordia,
Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the
faculty of the University of Kansas Law
School in 1974. In 1979, she became
associate Vice Chancellor of Academic
Affairs, and in 1981, she became the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in
1985.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky,
Oklahoma, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.
Judge Baldock attended the New Mexico
Military Institute, where he graduated in
1956. He received his J.D. from the Uni-
versity of Arizona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. In 1983,
he became a federal district judge in Albu-
querque, New Mexico and was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1985. In 1988, Judge
Baldock received an Outstanding Judge
Award from the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934
in Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in
Upton and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge
Brorby attended the University of Wyo-
ming and received a B.S. in Business. He
graduated with a J.D. with Honor from the
University of Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United
States Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He
engaged in the private practice of law in
Gillette, Wyoming from 1961 to 1988.
Judge Brorby was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
Wyoming Judicial Supervisory Commis-
sion. He has served on numerous Bar
committees.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kan-
sas in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas.
He received his B.A. in economics from
Northwestern University in 1962 and re-
ceived hisJ.D. from the University of Michi-
gan Law School in 1965, where he
graduated first in his class. While at the
University of Michigan Law School, he was
elected to the Order of Coif, the Barrister
Society, and he was Editor-in-Chief of the
Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked for Justice By-
ron R. White of the United States Supreme
Court during the 1965-1966 term. From
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial law-
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, Gra-
ham & Stubbs. In 1988, Judge Ebel was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct pro-
fessor at the University of Denver College
of Law, teaching Professionalism and Eth-
ics at Duke University School of Law, teach-
ing the confirmation class at the St. James
Presbyterian Church and participating in
numerous Bar Association activities. He
has served as vice-president of the Colo-
rado Bar Association and is a fellow of the
American College of Trial Lawyers, a se-
nior judge of the Doyle Inns of Court, and
a member of the Town & Gown Society.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in 1915 and grew
up in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale University in
1940. During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. In 1962, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He served
as Chief Judge from 1977 until 1984. In
1984, Judge Seth assumed senior status.
Judge Seth has served as director of
the Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of
the Legal Committee of the New Mexico
Cattlegrowers' Association, Regent of the
Museum of New Mexico and as a director
of the Santa Fe Boy's Club.
SENIOR JUDGE
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to
Oklahoma City in 1927. During World
War II, he served as a First Lieutenant in
the Army. After the war, Judge Holloway
returned to complete his undergraduate
studies at the University of Oklahoma, re-
ceiving his B.A. in 1947. Judge Holloway
then attended Harvard Law School, where
he graduated in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and
became ChiefJudge in 1984. He is a mem-




Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the Uni-
versity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded
an Honorary Doctor of Law degree from
the University.
During World War II, Judge McWil-
liams served in the United States Army and
was with the Office of Strategic Services.
He has served as a Deputy District Attorney
and as a Colorado District Court Judge. In
1961, Judge McWilliams was elected to the
Colorado Supreme Court where he served
until he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1970. In 1984, he assumed senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi
Delta Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIOR JUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late
Frank A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's
Congressman, Governor and United States
Senator. Judge Barrett attended the Uni-
versity of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War
II. Following the war, he attended Saint
Catherine's College at Oxford University
and Catholic University of America and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of Wy-
oming Law School in 1949. In 1973, he
received the Distinguished Alumni Award
from the University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for
the towns of Lusk and Manville and attor-
ney for the Niobrara County Consolidated
School District. From 1967 until 1971,
Judge Barrett served as Attorney General
for the State of Wyoming. In 1971, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In 1987, he
assumed senior status.
Judge Barrett was a member of the Ju-
dicial Conference Subcommittee on Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review,




This Issue is dedicated to the memory of Thurgood Marshall. What
a difficult thing for those of us a generation removed from his lionized
years. We are indebted to the vivid essay provided by Pace Jefferson
McConkie, Assistant General Counsel for the NAACP. Justice Marshall,
we are reminded, accomplished much in the area now called civil rights.
So much perhaps that current law students are offered specialized
courses in the matter as if civil rights were a severable discipline from
corporate law, for example. Of course, in practice, Marshall's legacy
and the tax code are both so great that rarely could a single attorney
understand both closely. But we, a generation removed, may be guilty
of categorizing Marshall's role on the Court too quickly. We lack the
cultural experience of vast sweeping change as Marshall's cohort incited
in education, voting, housing, employment, transportation, public ac-
commodation, etc. We sometimes accept the boundaries others place
on civil rights.
Justice Marshall hardly lacked vision beyond the change he helped
accomplish in the 1950s and 1960s. While he is most often associated
with school desegregation, affirmative action, and rights of the accused,
a review of his decisions arising from the Tenth Circuit reveal a rarely
examined concern with Native American Rights. In his first review of a
Tenth Circuit decision, Marshall displayed characteristic concern with
criminal procedure. Barber v. Page,1 a 1968 decision, declared that
before the transcript of a co-perpetrator's preliminary hearing testimony
can be used against the defendant, the right of confrontation requires
that prosecutorial authorities make a good faith effort to obtain the pres-
ence of the witness at trial.
During the 1970s and 1980s, however, Marshall handed down a se-
ries of important decisions as to the sovereignty of tribal affairs. In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,2 the Court rejected an attempt to expand federal
review of tribal court decisions beyond the limited availability of writs of
habeas corpus, preserving the authority of tribal courts to resolve issues
based on tribal tradition and custom. In Merrion v. icarilla Apache Tribe,
3
the Court upheld the Tribe's power to assess a severance tax on oil and
gas production on reservation land as an essential attribute of Native
American sovereignty, and a necessary instrument of self-government
and territorial management. In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
4
state hunting and fishing regulations of non-tribal members on reserva-
tion land conflicted with tribal ordinances regulating both members and
nonmembers. The Court concluded that New Mexico's regulations
1. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
2. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
3. 455 U.S. 130 (1981).
4. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
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were preempted by both the Tribe's authority to regulate the use of its
resources and the federal objective of encouraging tribal self-govern-
ment and economic development. 5
These decisions reveal a broader view ofJustice Marshall's activism,
or rather, his wise restraint. Many of us now in law school have never
lived without Justice Marshall's influence on the Supreme Court, much
less understand the breadth of knowledge exerted in his twenty-four
years of service there. We may see his generation as serving an agenda
unrelated from our economic doubts in the 1990s. But if Thurgood
Marshall was, as Pace McConkie's Dedication persuades, a man of sim-
ple justice, his work did not stop with single causes. His memory, in
epitome, holds every relevance for young lawyers today.
ABOUT THIS ISSUE
With the emergence of several looseleaf services focused on Tenth
Circuit decisions, the broad ranging attempt to report on every decision
that has characterized previous Tenth Circuit Survey Issues of the Uni-
versity of Denver Law Review has become less useful. Returning to its ori-
gins, the current Issue focuses on analysis of Tenth Circuit opinion in a
narrow group of federal topics. When the Review began its Survey Is-
sues nearly 20 years ago, our objectives were to critically comment on
significant court of appeals decisions and to inform federal practitioners
in a limited number of areas. Now Senior Judge McWilliams wrote in a
1977 Foreword: "Of course at the heart of any successful survey of this
type is the scholarship and objectivity of the reviewer. As might be well
imagined, the members of the Tenth Circuit look forward to the annual
survey with great interest, and perhaps a slight degree of trepidation!
' 6
The following thirteen Surveys take an admirable first step toward re-
storing this spirit.
The Issue begins with a student-written piece on the Colorado
Supreme Court decision in Martin Marietta v. Lorenz. With the court's
unusual formulation of public policy protection for at-will employees,
the Comment should easily be considered a definitive resource for attor-
neys preparing for employment litigation in this area. The Review plans
to continue its narrower analysis in future Tenth Circuit Survey Issues,
hopefully to the advantage of federal practitioners and to the benefit of
the court of appeals. We extend our special thanks to Survey authors
and members of the Review who endured the additional burden of a
campaigning Issue editor.
Christopher Payne
5. Id. at 338-40.
6. Judge Robert H. McWilliams, Foreword, 54 DENv. U.L. REV. 1-2 (1977).
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DEDICATION To THURGOOD MARSHALL
PACE JEFFERSON MCCONKIE*
Volumes have been written on the life and works of Thurgood Mar-
shall. Still, his twenty-four year tenure on the United States Supreme
Court, his courageous and remarkable career with the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People and the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc., and his private commitment to family
and human dignity far exceed whatever has been penned by deeply
grateful admirers and objective observers alike. He was a giant of a man
in both stature and character. His works fall nothing short of heroic. In
the end, however, his accomplishments stand for one solid conclusion -
simple justice.
It is fitting that this issue of the Denver University Law Review is dedi-
cated to one whose influence upon the developments of federal law has
already proved to be lasting and profound. The term "developments" is
carefully chosen, for ours is a legal system of growth, maturation and
improvement. Understanding this, Thurgood Marshall decided early to
be a social engineer rather than merely a lawyer and he used the law
itself to develop and gravitate a legal society in the direction it was re-
quired, by Constitutional mandate, to go. In turn, he did "not believe
that the meaning of the Constitution was forever 'fixed' at the Philadel-
phia Convention."' Instead he looked to the Constitution's "promising
evolution through 200 years of history" and recognized that the foun-
ders who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 "could not have imagined,
nor would they have accepted, that the document they were drafting
would one day be construed by a Supreme Court to which had been
appointed a woman and the descendant of an African slave."
'2
Since his retirement from the high Court in 1991, and again follow-
ing his death on January 24, 1993, many have paid tribute to Justice
Marshall. These tributes, all eloquent and appropriate, have come in
various forms and from a diversity of sources including those at the
highest levels of government. Perhaps none, however, can match in
simplicity and dignity the tribute paid by a young teenage girl who, on a
historic September morning in Little Rock, Arkansas, stood alone
against the Arkansas National Guard and a beastly cruel white mob
outside Central High School in 1957.
Elizabeth Eckford, one of the black students known as the "Little
Rock Nine" chosen to integrate Central High, had excitedly pressed the
Ass't General Counsel, NAACP; B.A. University of Utah, 1984; J.D. University of
Arkansas at Little Rock, 1987.
1. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
2. Id. at 5.
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black and white dress she made for the first day of school. Unaware that
the other eight children were gathered at the home of Ms. Daisy Bates,
president of the Arkansas State Conference of NAACP Branches, for a
police escort to Central, Elizabeth set off for school alone. Refusing to
be turned away by the large crowd which had gathered on the school
grounds, Elizabeth walked on towards the guardsmen in hopes of both
protection and admission to the school. With steely bayonets raised, the
guardsmen only served to turn her back, unprotected, to the jeering
mob.
As the crowd closed in around Elizabeth, she endured indignities
and hurt unimaginable to most of us but unforgettably familiar to some.
She was spat upon and scorned. Unrelenting racial slurs were hurled
against her. Cries of "lynch her," "nigger bitch" and "drag her over to
this tree" numbed her until she could only sit down in despair on a bus
stop bench, tears streaming down her cheeks from under her sunglasses.
Finally, she was whisked away by a Pulitzer prize winning editor of The
New York Times and a compassionate woman crying shame at the crowd.
Daisy Bates later wrote:
In the ensuing weeks Elizabeth took part in all the activities
of the nine - press conferences, attendance at court, studying
with professors at nearby Philander Smith College. She was
present, that is, but never really a part of things. The hurt had
been too deep.
On the two nights she stayed at my home I was awakened by
the screams in her sleep, as she relived in her dreams the terri-
fying mob scenes at Central. The only times Elizabeth showed
real excitement were when Thurgood Marshall met the chil-
dren and explained the meaning of what had happened in
court. As he talked, she would listen raptly, a faint smile on her
face. It was obvious he was her hero.
3
Thurgood Marshall was a hero to many, but especially to those such
as Elizabeth Eckford and the countless "freedom fighters," young and
old, who have served in the trenches of this nation's civil rights battles.
In this regard, a former law clerk and personal friend eulogized Justice
Marshall in these words:
From poor sharecroppers in Mississippi who sought the right
to vote, to frightened parents in Little Rock who asked only for
the right to a decent education for their children, the clarion
call of hope sounded when Americans oppressed by racial de-
termination heard the words - "The lawyer is coming."
Justice Marshall's arrival at the Supreme Court in 1967
changed more than the complexion of the men sitting around
the Friday conference table. He changed the nature and focus
of the debate - both because he was at the table and because
he spoke from the heart for the humble people who could not
3. DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LrrrLE ROCK 72 (1962 ed.).
[Vol. 70:4
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be there to speak for themselves.4
Though twenty-four years an associate justice of the United States
Supreme Court, two years the Solicitor General of the United States and
four years a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Thurgood Marshall's most significant triumphs came as a NAACP law-
yer. The landmark opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 5
culminated years of NAACP litigation to eradicate the separate but
equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,6 with its massive inequalities, and
abolished this country's segregated and discriminatory system of public
education at all levels.
In the mid 1930s, under the direction of his legal mentor and for-
mer law professor, Charles Hamilton Houston, Marshall and the
NAACP represented Donald G. Murray, a black graduate from Amherst
College, in his successful suit to gain admission to the University of
Maryland Law School, the same institution which had earlier denied a
legal education to Marshall solely because of his race. 7 Two years later,
Houston and Marshall challenged a Missouri Supreme Court opinion
which held that because law schools in surrounding states accepted
black students, a black citizen of Missouri was not denied his constitu-
tional rights to equal protection under the law upon exclusion from the
state supported law school in Missouri. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Can-
ada,8 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that black students constitutionally
could not be put to the burden of having to leave the state to attend
graduate or professional schools and that Missouri could not furnish
white students educational opportunities and deny the same to black
students solely upon the grounds of race or color. During Houston's
oral argument of this case, Justice James McReynolds turned his back on
the NAACP attorney and stared at the wall of the courtroom.
In 1946, Ada Lois Sipuel was denied admission to the University of
Oklahoma Law School because of her race. Thurgood Marshall led the
NAACP efforts to secure her a legal education afforded by a state institu-
tion.9 Today, Ms. Sipuel sits as a distinguished member of that institu-
tion's Board of Regents. Marshall continued with such cases as Sweatt v.
Painter 10 outlawing segregation by way of a separate and unaccredited
law school for blacks in Texas, emphasizing equality in the educational
opportunities offered white and black law students by the state; McLau-
rin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education"1 banning segregation
and differential treatment at the graduate school level, where G.W.
McLaurin had been "required to sit apart at... designated desks] in an
4. Karen Hastie Williams, Inspired Those He Touched... Every American, WASH. POST,
Jan. 29, 1993, at A15.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
8. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
9. Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
10. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
11. 339 U.S. 637, 640 (1950).
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anteroom adjoining the. classroom ... [and] on the mezzanine floor of
the library.., and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different
time from the other students in the school cafeteria"; and Florida ex re.
Hawkins v. Board of Control m2 where Virgil Hawkins was entitled to
prompt admission to graduate professional school under the rules and
regulations applicable to other qualified candidates.
By 1950, Thurgood Marshall and hiscadre of NAACP lawyers had
logistically turned their full attention to state-imposed racism and segre-
gation at the elementary and secondary levels of public education. Of
the five cases later to become known as Brown v. Board of Education, four
were handled and sponsored by the NAACP (the South Carolina, To-
peka, Ka., Virginia, and Delaware cases). The fifth case, out of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, was financed by a local organization known as the
Consolidated Parents, Inc. Its attorneys, however, were all members of
the NAACP legal committee. After years of meticulous planning, strat-
egy and litigation, the NAACP had finally engineered its cases to the
crushing defeat of the Plessy doctrine.
The significance of Thurgood Marshall's triumph in Brown cannot
be overemphasized. It shook the very moral fibre of this country and its
public institutions. It crumbled the foundation of segregation. It finally
established as the supreme law of the land that in the field .of public
education, the doctrine of separate but equal has no place, that separate
is inherently unequal, and that the segregation complained of deprived
the black plaintiffs and those similarly situated of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by.the Fourteenth Amendment. It established the
constitutional basis for the democratic ideal of equal opportunity for all
Americans regardless of race or color and guaranteed protection from
the highest court in the .land in the pursuit of those opportunities and
rights.
On May 22-23, 1954, NAACP representatives, met with Thurgood
Marshall in Atlanta, Georgia to develop a legal program "to meet the
vital and urgent issues arising out of the historic United States .Supreme
Court decision of May 17 banning segregation in public schools." 13
The NAACP there rededicated itself to the removal of all racial segrega-
tion in public education "without compromise of principle" and stated
that "[t]he total resources of the NAACP will be made available to facili-
tate this great project of ending the artificial separation of America's
children on the irrelevant basis of race and color."1 4 From that point in
time, the NAACP legal program swept through the officially segregated
South with extensive litigation in that region's school districts. Its atten-
tion was then turned northward and westward with successful and far
reaching litigation in cities such as Dayton and Columbus, Ohio and De-
troit, Michigan.
The impact of Brown extended well beyond the field of public edu-
12. 350 U.S. 413 (1956)..




cation. For the first time, the long and unremitting sti-uggle for civil
rights had reached the possibility of eliminating "separate but equal"
from all phases of society; including voting, reapportionment, housing,
employment, transportation and public accommodations. Certainly, the
aftermath of Brown also led to the major Civil Rights, Voting Rights,
Equal Employment and Equal Housing statutes of the 1960s.
To link these civil rights milestones to the legacy of Thurgood Mar-
shall and Brown is entirely appropriate. After years of successful civil
rights litigation not limited to public education alone, Brown served to
open the floodgates. Thurgood Marshall's other significant victories in-
cluded, among others: Smith v. Allw1ight, 15 which invalidated the voting
practice of "white primaries" and gave blacks the right to vote in Demo-
cratic party primary elections; Morgan v. Virginia,16 outlawing segrega-
tion in interstate travel; and the combined cases of McGhee v. Sipes and
Shelley v. Kraemer,17 declaring racially restrictive covenants in housing
unconstitutional. Another eulogy delivered atJustice Marshall's funeral
service effectively reminds us of how he influenced and shaped the
whole of America's society. Looking directly at the President of the
United States who was seated on the front row, William T. Coleman, Jr.
asked whether a "son of Arkansas" would be in that position today if
Thurgood Marshall had not been successful in his efforts to make south-
em institutions equal:
Please do not think us ingracious when we wonder how a
son of Arkansas would be here if Thurgood Marshall in that hot
summer of 1958 had lost, not won, the Little Rock school case?
Would you be here if Marshall had lost, not won, the important
voting rights cases? Could there be a Cabinet reflective of the
American people if Marshall had lost Brown v. Board of Education
or the voting rights case?18
On the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall was no less distinguished.
This is particularly true with regard to his commitment to the rights of
the individual and the especial protection of the rights of minorities, wo-
men, the poor, the powerless and the disadvantaged. On various issues,
he wrote over 300 majority opinions for the Court and never relented in
the face of apparent retrenchment by the Court of the civil rights
agenda. "This retrenchment . . .caused Justice Marshall's dissents to
escalate from a total of 19 in his first five years, while Earl Warren was
Chief Justice, to a total of 225 in the [first] five years [after] William
Rehnquist became Chief Justice."' 19
Some of Justice Marshall's key decisions include Aaalgamated Food
15. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
16. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
17. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
18. Joan Biskupie, One 'Whose Career Made Us Dream Large Dreams, 'WASH. POST, Jan. 29,
1993, at Al (eulogy delivered by William T. Coleman, Jr.).
19. A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr., A Tribute toJustice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV.
55, 65 n.55 (1991).
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Employees Union Local 540 v. Logan Valley Plza,20 where he wrote for the
majority to secure the rights of union organizers to picket in front of a
supermarket; Stanley v. Georgia,2 1 where the Court recognized the state's
broad power to regulate obscenity but refused to extend it to the mere
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home; Gregg v.
Georgia,22 dissenting from the Court's reinstatement of the death penalty
following its four year ban after Furman v. Georgia;23 Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,2 4 writing separately to applaud the Court's
judgment that a university may consider race as a factor in its admission
process but expressing dissent and irony that, after hundreds of years of
class-based discrimination against blacks, the Court was unwilling to
hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible;
and Rostker v. Goldberg ,25 dissenting from the decision that upheld the
discriminating rule requiring men, but not women, to register for the
draft, thereby excluding women from a fundamental civic obligation.
Perhaps most representative of Justice Marshall's career on the
bench and at the bar is his dissent in Milliken v. Bradley.26 The Court
there overturned a ruling that required suburban school districts to par-
ticipate in a cross-district plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools
that were 80% to 90% black. In essence, the Court retrenched from the
"all out," "root and branch" desegregation remedial standard of Brown
and its progeny to instigate a "nature and extent of the violation deter-
mines the scope of the remedy" principle. The result, however, would
leave many schools segregated. Justice Marshall wrote:
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy
task. Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation's childhood and
adolescence are not quickly thrown aside in its middle years.
But just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed to
stand in the way of the rights of others, so public opposition,
no matter how strident, cannot be permitted to divert this
Court from the enforcement of the constitutional principles at
issue in this case. Todays holding, I fear, is more a reflection of
a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in en-
forcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is
the product of neutral principles of law. In the short run, it
may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropoli-
tan areas to be divided up each into two cities-one white, the
other black-but it is a course, I predict, our people will ulti-
mately regret. I dissent.2 7
Americans of all races and from all walks of life owe a great debt to
Thurgood Marshall. His vision, courage and competence established a
20. 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
21. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
26. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
27. Id. at 8 14-15.
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legacy in law and justice that touches us all. His legacy will continue, but
only as long as those of us who cherish the Constitution and its guiding
principles recognize the end for which it was established-equal justice
under law-and use the power of the law as effectively and judiciously as
he did to ensure that this "end" is a reality for those who have long been
denied the dignity of both equality and justice.

MARTIN MARIETTA V. LORENZ: PALPABLE PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE SUPERFLUOUS SIXTH ELEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, I recog-
nized on first impression a public policy exception in tort to the at-will
employment doctrine. 2 "[I]n keeping with the majority of jurisdic-
tions," and "within the framework" of prior Colorado case law,3 the
court adopted and extended the standard to establish a primafacie case
of wrongful discharge under the public policy exception as originally set
out by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural
Electric Association.4 Cronk I stated that an employee must prove a five
step prima facie case to qualify for an exception to the at-will employment
doctrine: (1) the employee refused to perform an action; (2) ordered by
the employer; (3) which would violate a specific statute; whose terms are
more than a broad general statement of policy; and (5) the employee's
termination resulted from the refusal to perform such action.5 Adding
to this Cronk I standard, the Lorenz court required an additional, sixth
element to establish a prima fade case-evidence showing that the em-
ployer was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that the em-
ployee's refusal to perform the employer's directive was based on the
employee's reasonable belief that the employer's directive was illegal,
contrary to clear statutory policy relating to the employee's duty as a
citizen, or violative of the employee's legal rights or privileges as a
worker. 6 By adding this new employer knowledge element, the Lorenz
court ventures into a virtual frontier. No authority is cited by the court
1. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
2. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108.
3. Id
4. 765 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied (Cronk I), appeal after remand,
140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2149 (Colo. Ct. App. April 2, 1992), cert. denied (Cronk II).
5. Cronk I, 765 P.2d at 622. The Cronk I court interpreted Farmer v. Central Bancor-
poration, 761 P.2d 220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), which set a two-step test for exception to
the at-will employment doctrine, restricted to the facts of the case. The Farmer court held
that to gain employee protection of the public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine, the employee must establish that (1) the refusal to carry out the employer's di-
rective would constitute a statutory violation; and (2) the employee's discharge was a result
of the refusal to violate the statute. Farmer, 761 P.2d at 221.
6. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109. Under the new primafacie standard set out by the court,
the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the employer di-
rected the employee to perform an illegal act; (2) as part of the employee's work related
duties; or (3) prohibited the employee from performing a public duty, privilege or right;
(4) the employer's directive would violate a specific statute relating to the health, safety, or
welfare or undermine clearly expressed public policy relating to the employee's rights or
privileges as a citizen or worker; (5) the employee was terminated as the result of refusing
to perform the act directed by the employer; and (6) the employer was aware, or reason-
ably should have been aware, that the employee's refusal was based on the employee's
reasonable belief that the action ordered by the employer was violative of any of the above
circumstances. l
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for this proposition, as noted by the dissent.7 Currently there is no
clear, accurate way to predict how the Colorado courts will apply this
new standard at the trial level,8 or how the parties will satisfy or defend
against this additional employer knowledge element. 9
This Comment will describe some of the historical legal background
of the at-will employment doctrine, case law leading to this decision, the
court's rationale in recognizing the public policy exception, an analysis
of terminology, and an examination of the employer knowledge element
as set forth in Lorenz. Lorenz is also compared with other jurisdictions'
causation elements in similar fact patterns, as well as compared with cur-
rent federal and state legislative trends.
This Comment concludes that the employer knowledge element, as
an element of causation, is implicit within nearly all prima facie cases of
retaliatory discharge. An employee alleging retaliatory discharge cannot
prove causation without the inference of employer knowledge because
an employer must have a reason to retaliate. The employer who retali-
ates must know what event concerning the employee's conduct is the
source of the employer's desire to "get even." Thus, if retaliation is
proved in connection with the adverse employment action taken against
the employee, the employer knowledge element is implicitly proven as
well. To require separate proof on the employer's knowledge of the em-
ployee's state of mind concerning the employee's act or refusal to act is
superfluous once retaliation itself has been proven.
7. Id. at 118 n. 1 (Erickson, J., dissenting). Justice Erickson states in part, "Today's
test includes a sixth prong that substantially changes Cronk [I].... Indeed, the majority cites
no authority for requiring employer knowledge of an employee's reasonable belief that a
refused order was illegal." Id. (emphasis added). Authority does, in fact, exist for the
majority's proposition. lnfra notes 161-177 and accompanying text.
8. The trial date on remand has been set for January 24, 1994. Statement of Maxine
Foster, Denver District Court Division Clerk for Courtroom 19 (April 16, 1993) (No. 81
CV 6488). Twelve years after the suit was first filed, and eighteen years after Lorenz's
discharge, the parties will start over again with a new trial in accordance with the Lorenz
holding.
9. Because the Lorenz rule will apply retroactively, potential recovery still exists for
Lorenz. DavidJ. Jung and Richard Harkness, in The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, 4 LAB. LAw.
257 (1988), discuss and criticize various surveys of jury awards in wrongful discharge
cases. They note that averages are dubious at best because of their inherent sensitivity to
unusually high or low awards. Id. at 259. Based on Jung and Harkness' review of pub-
lished cases, California employees prevail in only 45% of judicially resolved cases with
estimated average awards at over $200,000. Id. at 260-61. Their research demonstrates
that the type of wrongful discharge affects jury awards. Of the three types of wrongful
discharges recognized in California as exceptions to the at-will doctrine (retaliatory,
breach of implied-in-fact contract, and violation of the implied law of good faith and fair
dealing in contracts), retaliatory and bad faith cases average much higher awards than do
breach of implied-in-fact contract cases. Intentional infliction of emotional distress cases,
a fourth cause of action in some jurisdictions also receive lower jury awards. Id at 262-64.
For other examples documenting large jury verdicts see Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241 (1984) ($100,000 compensatory and
$200,000 punitive damages award relating to a wrongful termination upheld); James N.
Adler & Mark Daniels, Managing the Whistleblowing Employee, 8 LAB. LAw. 19, 19-20 (1992)
(noting multi-million dollar jury verdicts for damages in several wrongful discharge cases);
James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U. COLO. L. REv.
91, 113 n.80 (1989) (noting that, in one survey, employees were victorious 60-90% of the
time with verdicts averaging $400,000).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview
Early English common law recognized that a general hiring of a ser-
vant, in the absence of a contrary agreement, was presumed to be a one-
year hiring, and no master could "put away his servant" during that year
without "reasonable cause."' 0 Early colonial American law generally
followed the English common law regarding employment contracts, but
America "did not apply criminal law to employee breaches of con-
tract."'' By the late 19th century, New England textile industry employ-
ers were able to discharge employees without notice, yet still demand
notice from the employees when they quit. 12 After 1877, the American
courts adopted a doctrine known as "Wood's Rule" of at-will employ-
ment which, in the absence of a specific duration of employment, al-
lowed either the employer or the employee to terminate the
employment contract at any time for good cause, bad cause or no
cause.1 3 Controversy exists over whether the cases cited by Wood' 4 ac-
10. Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of
the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 721 (1991) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 425-26 (2 1st ed. 1847)) [hereinafter Peck, Pene-
trating Doctrinal Camouflage]. The Statute of Labourers provided this language attempting
to protect employees hired for menial labor from termination without "reasonable cause,"
or without "reasonable notice," while also requiring certain classes of persons to accept
employment. Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481,485 (1976). See also Lynn D. Feiger, "Employment At Will" and the
Discharged Employee in Colorado, 12 COLO. LAw. 733 (1983). Even after the Statute of
Labourers was repealed, English common law continued to presume employment con-
tracts as one-year terms, and by the 19th century the general rule was that "unless other-
wise explicitly agreed, employment could be terminated only after a notice period
determined by the custom in the trade, and if there were no custom, only after a reason-
able notice, unless cause existed[.]" Summers, supra at 485; Fieger, supra at 733. For more
detailed information on the Statute of Labourers, see Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will Em-
ployment: Going, Going .. , 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 187, 188 & n.5 (1990).
Charles Smith states that when no express or implied duration of time exists in a
contract of hiring (in England), the hiring is considered a general hiring for one year which
extends not only to servants, but also domestics and clerks. CHARLES M. SmiTH, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LaW OF MASTER AND SERVANT *84-*85. A contract must exist for the rule to
apply, and a contract will not be presumed when circumstances show that a pauper has
come "to live with their relatives or others out of charity, or where the agreement was for
cohabitation and not merely for service." Id. at *85-*86. Additionally, the presumption of
a one-year hiring could be "greatly strengthened" by trade, business or occupational cus-
tom. Id. at *86. In the proper circumstances, an employee wrongfully dismissed before
the end of the one-year term could seek a recovery of damages in the amount of wages he
would have earned had he been allowed to serve to the end of the year. Id. at "91. If,
however, the servant wrongfully quit his master's service, then the servant forfeited all
claim to wages for the remainder of that year. Id at *92.
11. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10, at 721.
12. Id.
13. H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 133, at 272-77
(2d ed. 1886). According to Wood, when the term of service in a contract of hiring is left
discretionary in any way with either party, then either may "put an end thereto at any
time." Id at 272-73. Wood also explained that an annual rate of pay does not imply a
definite term of employment where a term of employment is not otherwise stated, but
merely a contract to pay a certain rate for services actually rendered. Id. § 136, at 284-85.
Wood recognized that exceptions exist to the at-will employment doctrine, such as when
the employer requires the employee to perform illegal or immoral services, or acts that
would damage the employee's reputation. Id. § 148, at 297-98.
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tually support his "at-will" theory. 15 Nevertheless, many American
courts continued to follow the general doctrine of Wood's Rule in the
final years of the 20th century.
16
14. Id. § 133, at 272-73.
15. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv.
428, 432 (1964) (describing how the rigorous and restrictive application of Wood's rule
spread rapidly throughout the country); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employ-
ment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1979) [hereinafter Peck, Unjust
Discharges] (noting Blumrosen's demonstration that American courts followed this "erro-
neous" statement of law); Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10, at 722 (in
accord with his earlier article, but also crediting Field's New York Civil Code and 1 CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1999 (1872) with contributing to Wood's proposition in codified form); Sum-
mers, supra note 10, (none of Wood's four cases used as authority supported his theory);
Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983) (Wood's rule was unsupported by authorities upon which the
author relied, but was ideally suited to the United States' rapidly industrializing economy);
see also James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U. COLO. L
REv. 91 (1989) (arguing from an economics viewpoint that the at-will doctrine promotes
allocative efficiency in the free flow of labor, but employers should be held accountable
when the at-will doctrine is used to coerce employees to commit perjury or a tort); Peter S.
Partee, Reversing the Presumption of Employment At Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689 (1991); Jill S.
Goldsmith, Comment, 1986 ARIz. ST. L.J. 161, 164 (1986); Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341-45 (1974).
Some commentators have endorsed Wood's rule as having been properly supported.
See generally Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood s Rule"
Revisited, 22 ARIz. ST. LJ. 551 (1990). Others have endorsed the at-will employment doc-
trine. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHi. L. REV. 947 (1984);
Hubbell, supra; Larry S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption That Employment
is Terminable At- Wil 23 IDAHO L. REV. 219 (1986-87); Richard W. Power, A Defense of the
Employment At Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 881 (1983).
For a sampling of the frequently cited commentaries criticizing the at-will doctrine,
see Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, supra; Donald H.J.
Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights in One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employment-at-
Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763 (1982); Donald G. Kempf, Jr. & Roger L. Taylor, Wrongful Dis-
charge: Historical Evolution, Current Developments and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 28 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 117 (1991); Massingale, supra note 10; Peck, Unjust Discharges, supra; Peck,
Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10; Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates:
Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988); Clyde W. Sum-
mers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7 (1988);
Summers, supra, note 10; Paul H. Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The
Plaintiff's Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV. 178 (1988); Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for
a just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 510 (1989); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980);
Note, Contracts-Termination of Employment at Will-Public Policy May Modify Employer's Right to
Discharge, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 624 (1960).
In contrast to the common law at-will doctrine, South Dakota statutes provide that the
length of time which an employer and employee adopt for the estimation of wages is rele-
vant to a determination of the term of employment. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-1-3
to -5 (Supp. 1992). In the absence of an agreement or custom as to rate of pay, an em-
ployee is presumed to be hired by the month at a monthly rate of reasonable wages, to be
paid when the service is performed. Id. § 60-1-4. If the parties continue the employment
relationship after the expiration of an agreement, they are presumed to have renewed the
agreement for the same wages and term of service. Id. § 60-1-5. This sets South Dakota
apart from all other U.S. jurisdictions by statutorily recognizing circumstances in the over-
all contractual relationship between employer and employee as factors to weigh against
the strict application of the at-will doctrine. Montana, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
also provide statutory exceptions to at-will employment, having enacted specific wrongful
discharge legislation which supersedes common law claims. See infra notes 195-201 and
accompanying text.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958):
[Vol. 70:4
MARTIN MARIETTA V. LORENZ
B. Precedent in Other States
In 1959, California became the first jurisdiction to expressly recog-
nize the public policy exception to at-will employment in Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396.17 In Peternann, an em-
ployee of the union, was instructed by the union's secretary-treasurer to
make untrue statements, under oath, to a California legislative commit-
tee. Instead, the employee truthfully answered all questions. He was
discharged by the union the following day.' 8 The court first acknowl-
edged that the plaintiff was an at-will employee subject to termination
for any reason at the will of either party. The court stated, however, that
such an at-will contract may be limited either by statute or by considera-
tions of public policy. 19 The court observed that the term "public pol-
icy" was imprecise, and noted that few cases could arise where the
expression is not disputed. 20 The court reasoned that in order to "fully
[Period of Employment] Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and
agent to employ and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are
terminable upon notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employ-
ment, it may terminate by lapse of time or by supervening events.
Id § 442. Comment b states that salary paid proportionally to units of time does not,
of itself, indicate that the parties have agreed that the employment is to continue
for the stated unit of time[,]... [but] merely indicates the rate at which the salary
... is to be paid, and either party is privileged to terminate the relationship at any
time unless further facts exist.
Id. at cmt. b. The RESTATEMENT also recognizes that when the principal directs the agent
contrary to an interest which he is privileged to protect, the agent's remedy is not to
violate the principal's orders but to obtain relief for breach of the principal's implied
agreement not to give unreasonable directions. Id. § 385 cmt. d and illus. 4 (1958). Fur-
ther, the RESTATEMENT provides that the agent has no duty to commit a tort or a minor
crime at the command of the principal, and that such a contract is illegal. Id § 418, cmt. a.
Finally, the RESTATEMENT repeats the content of § 385, stating that a servant may be justi-
fied in disobeying an unreasonable rule or order which the master is not privileged to
impose on him. Id. § 526, cmt. c. Thus, the RESTATEMENT both supports Wood's Rule and
at the same time recognizes that certain exceptions exist when the principal instructs the
agent to commit a tort or illegal act.
17. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). See Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra
note 10 at 723; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Ter-
minate Only in Good Faith, supra note 15, at 1822.
18. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 26.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. "Public policy" indeed escapes precise definition. For example, one interest-
ing and poignant definition of "public policy" is: "[a] will-o'-the-wisp of the law which
varies and changes with the interests, habits, needs, sentiments, and fashions of the day."
BALLENTINE'S LAw DiCTiONARY 1023 (3d ed. 1969) (quoting Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d
553 (Va. 1954)). One often cited definition of "public policy" in retaliatory discharge
cases appears in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1980).
The Pierce court, in defining "public policy," stated:
[W]e must balance the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public.
Employees have an interest in knowing they will not be discharged for exercising
their legal rights. Employers have an interest in knowing they can run their busi-
nesses as they see fit as long as their conduct is consistent with public policy. The
public has an interest in employment stability and in discouraging frivolous law-
suits by dissatisfied employees.
Id.
See also Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983) (ex-
panding and explaining the same definition without citing to Pierce, the court explains that
(1) employees are safeguarded against employer's acts that undermine fundamental poli-
cies, (2) employers retain flexibility to make needed personnel decisions during changing
economic conditions, and (3) society benefits from a stable job market and the protection
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effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury" employers must be
denied the unlimited right to discharge at-will employees when the rea-
son for dismissal was the employee's refusal to commit perjury.2' As a
result, violations of "public policy" should be defined as whatever con-
travenes good morals or any established interests of society, and "that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good." 92 2 In reversing the trial court, the Petermann court found that the
employee sufficiently alleged a cause of action.23
Fourteen years later, in 1973, a series of trend setting cases began
to lay out a framework of the types of employer actions that violate
"public policy." The Indiana Supreme Court in Frampton v. Central Gas
against frivolous lawsuits since discharged employees who do not allege a clear expression
of public policy violation will be dismissed on summary judgment or failure to state a
claim); BLAcK's L.Aw DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "public policy" as "that
general and well-settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fel-
lowmen, having due regard to all circumstances of each particular relation and situa-
tion."); Elletta S. Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule Comes of
Age: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 486 & n.32 (1991) (noting
inconsistencies in the articulation of the interests involved in various case law definitions
of "public policy").
21. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27. The employer advised the employee on the day before
the legislative committee hearing that the employee's work was "highly satisfactory," and
that the employee's discharge the day following the hearing was to "punish [the employee]
for testifying truthfully." Id. at 28. This case thus anticipates Blades' argument that em-
ployees should be permitted to bring a tort action rather than a contract action. Blades,
supra note 15, at 1422.
22. Id.
23. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27. In 1980, the California Court of Appeals sustained a
wrongful discharge cause of action in tort brought by an employee who refused to violate
the Sherman Antitrust Act by participating in his employer's price fixing scheme. Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). The court noted the factual similarity
to Petermann and the fact that wrongful acts committed in the course of a contractual rela-
tionship may afford both tort and contractual relief; thus the existence of a contractual
relationship does not bar the pursuit of redress in tort. .Id. at 1334. The court found that
an employer's authority over its employee precludes the right to order the employee to
commit a criminal act or coerce compliance with unlawful directions by discharge or
threat. In the same year, the same court decided Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443 (1980). Here, the court held that the employee's termination without legal
cause, after 18 years of satisfactory performance violated the implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 455-56. The longevity of the employee's service com-
bined with detrimental reliance on the employer's express employment policies operated
as estoppel precluding discharge without good cause. Id
For a chronological survey of recent California wrongful discharge cases, see Dabbs v.
Cardiopulmonary Management Servs., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437 (1987) (hospital respiratory
therapist was not required to allege violation of a specific statute to state a wrongful dis-
charge cause of action, but since the employee quit voluntarily, no constructive discharge
could be pleaded without alleging violation of a specific statute or actual termination);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (public policy questions must
involve a matter that affects society at large rather than a personal or proprietary interest
of employee or employer, and the policy must be well established or substantial); Gantt v.
Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (recognizing violations of employment public policy
as falling into four categories: (1) refusing to violate a statute, (2) prohibiting the perform-
ance of a statutory obligation, (3) discharge for exercising a statutory right or privilege,
and (4) discharge for reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance; af-
firming employee's cause of action without federal law preemption for termination in re-
taliation for testifying truthfully on behalf of a co-worker's sexual harassment claim). For a
more detailed discussion of California wrongful termination law, see Kempf and Taylor,
supra note 15.
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Co. 2 4 analogized retaliatory discharge with retaliatory eviction in land-
lord-tenant law, holding that termination of an employee in retaliation
for filing a Workers' Compensation claim "undermines a critically im-
portant public policy." 2 5 The court held that the employee stated a
cause of action as an exception to the general at-will employment rule
because the retaliatory discharge by the employer was an intentional,
wrongful act entitling the employee to compensation.
2 6
Retributive tort concepts of bad faith blended with contract princi-
ples in several subsequent cases. In 1974, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 2 7 held that a breach of employ-
ment contract occurs when an at-will employee's discharge is motivated
by bad faith, malice, or retaliation.2 8 The court stated that employment
contracts must be balanced between the interests of both parties.2 9 In a
similar application of precedent, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 30 held that an employee of over
35 years articulated a public policy cause of action when he was termi-
nated as a store manager for a burglary that occurred in his store on his
day off, because he was "at all times" responsible for the cash in the
employer's store.3 ' The Cloutier court held that to articulate a public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the employee must
24. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
25. Id. at 428. Interference with a citizen's rights, such as filing for worker's compen-
sation or serving on a jury, represent clearly defined examples of "public policy" viola-
tions. See supra, note 20 (definitions of "public policy").
26. Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 428. In addition to implying that this action sounds in
tort, the court hypothesized that if an employee has no remedy for retaliatory discharge,
"[w]hat then is to prevent an employer from coercing an employee?" Id.
27. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 551. In Monge, when an employee needed more materials to do her job,
which were refused, she was manipulated into a "no-win" situation and was fired that eve-
ning for refusing a foreman's order. The employee alleged that, in reality, she was
harassed by her foreman because she refused to go out with him. His anger, condoned by
the personnel manager, resulted in her termination. Id. at 550. She was reinstated after
complaining to the union, but became ill a few days later requiring a hospital stay. The
employer then terminated the employee for allegedly failing to "call-in" for a three day
period. Id. at 550-51. The court set forth a concise formula for evaluating employment
contracts:
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the employer's
interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the inter-
est of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in
maintaining a proper balance between the two.
Id. at 55 1. The court reasoned that the decision would create a "certain stability of em-
ployment," yet would not interfere with the reasonable business judgment to discharge
employees freely so as to operate efficiently and profitably. Id. at 552. See Blades, supra
note 15; Blumrosen, supra note 15.
30. 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981).
31. Id. at 1143-45. The court noted elements of bad faith: the employer discontin-
ued police protection for employees making deposits late at night in an unsafe area and
condoned leaving the cash in the safe overnight for deposit the next day; the employer
later claimed the employee violated company policy; immediately after a burglary, the em-
ployer resumed police accompaniment. Id. at 1144. Additionally, the employee was sus-
pended after a five minute meeting and was discharged in a similar manner after thirty-six
years of employment for the employer, while the assistant manager on duty when the bur-
glary occurred was not discharged. Id. The court noted that employees are entitled to a
day off, and cannot be responsible to their employer "at all times." Id. at 1145.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
first show that the employer was motivated by bad faith, malice, or retali-
ation.3 2 Secondly, the employee must demonstrate that he was dis-
charged because he performed an act encouraged by public policy, or
refused to perform an act that public policy would condemn.
3 3
The definition and scope of "public policy" was substantially broad-
ened to include general societal interests in another important precur-
sor to the Lorenz case, Nees v. Hocks.3 4 Here, the Oregon Supreme Court
held that the employer was liable, by exception to the at-will employ-
ment rule, for discharging the employee because she wanted to serve on
a jury.3 5 The court recognized certain circumstances in which an em-
ployer may commit a public policy tort by discharging an employee for a
socially undesirable motive.3 6 Thus, the Nees court created a right of
recovery for employees when "substantial societal interests" had been
violated.37 Similarly, in 1978, West Virginia recognized, in Haress v.
First Nat ' Bank in Fairmont,3 8 a cause of action in tort when the em-
ployer's motivation for discharge contravenes substantial public pol-
icy.3 9 The Harless court held that discharging an employee in retaliation
for attempts to bring state and federal consumer credit law violations to
the attention of the employer was a violation of public and statutory pol-
icies when the employee was protected by the statute.
40
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1143-44. The employee in Cloutier argued that the employer violated the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1988), by not
providing police protection and endangering employees with recognized hazards at the
place of employment. But the court stated that regardless of OSHA, the facts supported
the conclusion that the employee was discharged for furthering the public policy objective
of protecting the employees under him. Cloutier, 436 A.2d at 1145. But see Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). In Geary, the employee was an at-will sales-
man. When the employee complained to his employer that new tubular casings designed
for high-pressure use were dangerous to anyone using it, and that the testing was inade-
quate, the employee was ordered to "follow directions," which the employee did. Id. at
175. The employee persisted in taking his case to the "top" of the company, eventually
resulting in the product being reevaluated and withdrawn from the market. The employee
alleged his dismissal without notice violated general public policy and was malicious and
abusive. Id. The court declared Pennsylvania an at-will state, denying the employee's
cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at 174-80.
Here, in contrast to the Lorenz case, the employee was not an expert in matters of
public safety, and the court stated that mere good intentions would not overcome the
employer's legitimate right-to discharge him at will. Id. The court hinted that a high rank-
ing employee or expert might be treated differently, but here the employee bypassed his
immediate superiors trying to use "inside contacts." Id. The court concluded that balanc-
ing the interests of both parties weighed in favor of the employer, and the discharge was
not a "spiteful retaliatory gesture designed to punish" the employee. Id. at 180 n..15. The
court added in dictum that it was not necessary to reject other jurisdiction's public policy
exceptions, but this employee failed to show "clear and compelling" mandates of public
policy. Id. at 180.
34. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
35. Id. at 516.
36. Id. at 515. See also Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114 (Or. 1984)
(holding employer liable for discharging the employee after the employee refused to sign
tortious and defamatory statements concerning another employee).
37. Nees, 536 P.2d at 516.
38. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
39. Id. at 275.
40. Id. at 275-76.
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Harless and Nees were influential in developing a public policy excep-
tion to at-will employment because they recognized that strict adherence
to the at-will doctrine could bring potential harm to society in general,
such as degradation of the jury system or unchecked dishonest banking
procedures. In addition, other states contributed to the wealth of cases
representing the expansion of public policy exceptions to the at-will rule
doctrine influential to the Lorenz decision.4 1 While Colorado never ex-
pressly rejected the possibility of recognizing a tort cause of action for
41. For example, in a chronological sampling, see Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton R.R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing exceptions to the
at-will employment rule when actions contravene public policy when, as here, the em-
ployee was discharged for refusing to manipulate pollution control reports to be filed with
the state pursuant to statute); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn.
1980) (dismissing an employee for ensuring that the employer's products comply with
state law violates public policy when the employee must choose between risking criminal
sanction or jeopardizing continued employment); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127
(Mont. 1980) (recognizing public policy exceptions as refusal to self-perjure, retaliation
for employee's filing of Workers' Compensation benefits, refusal of sexual relations, and
possibly others in the future, but denying a cause of action to the employee for failure to
state a substantial or specific violation of public policy; common law now superseded by
MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-903 to 914); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876 (II1. 1981) (employee stated cause of action when he was discharged in retalia-
tion for helping gather information to give to a local law enforcement agency concerning a
co-worker's possible criminal misconduct); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441
(Tenn. 1984) (holding that an exception to the at-will rule exists when an employee is fired
in retaliation for exercising Workers' Compensation rights); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (rejecting the "good faith" contract argument, but en-
dorsing breach of implied-in-fact contracts of employment when certain policies in the
employee manual have been detrimentally relied on by the employee, and recognizing a
tort cause of action for employee discharge in violation of clear mandates of public policy);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (recognizing a
"bad cause" exception to the at-will doctrine, which serves society's interest in preventing
employers from discharging employees for morally wrong reasons, such as here, where the
employee was fired by her supervisor in retaliation for refusing to "moon" the audience
along with the other participants in a campsite skit); Allen v. Safeway Stores Inc., 699 P.2d
277 (Wyo. 1985) (recognizing that a wrongful discharge tort action as a public policy ex-
ception requires (1) that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and (2)
there be no pre-existing remedy available to the employee);Johnson v. World Color Press,
Inc., 498 N.E.2d 575 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (employee discharged for disclosing violations of
federal security and fraud laws). For an insightful view of the Washington wrongful dis-
charge law, see Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10. For an analysis of
Wagenseller, see Goldsmith, supra note 15.
But see, e.g., Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (de-
nying employee's request to modify the at-will rule when the employer failed to comply
with broad claims of available work made in the employee manual, and recognizing the
likelihood of frequent and vexatious lawsuits if the doctrine is changed). Note that Ten-
nessee does not recognize an exception in contract actions, only in tort as public policy
exceptions. See Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984). Examples of
other cases denying an exception to the at-will doctrine include Muller v. Stromberg Carl-
son Corp., 427 So.2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to modify the at-will doc-
trine) and Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (no
implied obligation of good faith exists in employment contracts, and that rather than make
new judicial law, the legislature should interpret public policy).
For a detailed state by state analysis of the acceptance of the public policy wrongful
discharge cause of action, see Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 106-7 nn.2-5. Some clarification of
jurisdictional categories should. be noted. Delaware is listed as declining the public policy
exception. Id. at 106 n.4. But in March 1992, a lower court recognized a public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule. The employee's cause of action for wrongful
termination was sustained after he was terminated in retaliation for refusing to carry out
criminal acts which would have set prices in a government contract in excess of federal
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wrongful discharge, several years would pass before the Colorado
Supreme Court was presented with the right combination of a strong
claim and supporting opinions of the Colorado Court of Appeals and.
other populous jurisdictions.
C. Prior Colorado Cases
In 1974, well before the recognition of a tort public policy excep-
tion, the Colorado Court of Appeals decided Justice v. Stanley Aviation
Corp. 42 This contract case involved a discharged employee claiming that
his confirmation letter of employment from the employer at $12,000 per
year was for a definite period of one year, and that his discharge three
and a half months later constituted a breach of employment contract.
43
Applying the at-will doctrine, the court rejected this argument but did
not eliminate possible exceptions in contract, such as special considera-
tion. 44 The late 1980's brought a new era of expansion in Colorado
contract employment law,' recognizing reasonable expectations of em-,
ployees that employers should also be bound by their own promulgated
disciplinary and termination procedures. For example, in Continental'
Airlines v. Keenan,4 5 the Colorado Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee's reliance upon the specific procedures set out in the employee
handbook may be enforceable under contract theories of promissory es-
toppel or unilateral contract supported by the employee's continued:
performance.4 6 This principle remains sound in subsequent contract
employment law decisions in Colorado.
4 7
The issue of whether a tort cause of action could be sustained for,
regulations. Henze v. Alloy Surfaces Co., No. 91C-06-20, 1992 WL 51861, at 02 (Del.
Super. Ct. March 16, 1992).
Maine, Iowa and Utah are listed as not having ruled on the issue. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at
107 n.4. While Maine has not yet determined what type of public policy exceptions might
qualify for an exception to the at-will doctrine, the Maine Supreme Court hinted that a
wrongful discharge cause of action might exist if the record shows a clearly defined contra-
vention of public policy. Wilde v. Houlton Regional Hosp., 537 A.2d 1137 (Me. 1988). In.
1989, the Iowa Supreme Court in Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451'
(Iowa 1989), noted two exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine: (1) tort liability
when a discharge is in clear violation of a well recognized and defined public policy, and
(2) detrimental reliance by an employee on a contract created by the employer's policy
manual. In 1990, the Iowa Supreme Court expanded the scope of exceptions to include.
intimidation of employees into foregoing benefits entitled to them or risk losing their jobs.'
Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1990). In Hodges v. Gibson'
Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that employment at-
will is limited by public policy exceptions, although the court declined to indicate whether
such a wrongful discharge would be in tort or contract. In Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d
1280 (Utah 1992), the court held that violations of statutes clearly expressing Utah public,
policy are an exception to at-will employment sounding in tort. Id. at 1283-85.
42. 530 P.2d 984 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
43. Id. at 985.
44. Id. at 986.
45. 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
46. Id. at 711-12.
47. See, e.g., Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988) (employer's
failure to follow its own employment policies to be evaluated under the Continental Airlines
standard); Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat'l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (af-
firming jury verdict finding employer in breach of implied contract or promissory estoppel
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wrongful discharge was first addressed by the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals in Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center.48 Here, a nurse was dis-
charged after she attempted to comply, contrary to the supervisor's
instructions, with her own interpretation of Colorado statutory regula-
tions regarding adequate nursing shift-coverage. Faced with the issue of
retaliatory termination, the court declined to expand tort law to limit the
employment at-will doctrine. Significantly, however, the court left open
the possibility of future wrongful discharge actions in tort if employees
relied on specifically enacted statutory rights or duties,4 9 as opposed to
a "broad, general statement of policy" 50 similar to the statute relied on
by the employee in Lampe.
5 1
In 1988, the Colorado Court of Appeals recognized a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination in Montoya v. Local 3 of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 5 2 Here, the employee was discharged for
refusing to assist in illegal practices by management of the union. 53 The
for failure to follow termination procedures in an employment manual relied upon by the
employee). See also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
Traditional contract causes of action in employment cases continue to be an available
alternative to tort actions. See Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1986) (issue of fact existed as to whether the employee's employment contract as a
salesman was terminable at will, or "permanent" employment supported by special con-
sideration such as lower pay, experience or customer contacts); Magnuson v. Smith and
Saetveit, P.C., 722 P.2d 1020 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (employee's refusal to obey em-
ployer's reasonable instructions constitutes a material breach of employment contract);
Feiger, supra note 10, at 734-35.
48. 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
49. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (employee termi-
nated for filing Workers' Compensation claim stated a public policy exception to the at-
will rule). Supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. In Stivers v. Stevens, 581 N.E.2d
1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the court expanded on Frampton holding that the discharge of
an employee for merely suggesting that a Workers' Compensation claim would be filed,
was an even stronger rationale for the Frampton exception to the employment at-will doc-
trine. See Barbara J. Fick, 1991 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law: Labor and Em-
ployment Law, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 1311, 1315 (1992) (the Indiana Supreme Court recognizes
coercion of an employee as a public policy exception).
50. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-38-201 to -217 (1973) (current version at COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 12-38.1-101 to -119 (1988)).
51. Lampe, 590 P.2d at 515. See Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1984). Corbin was similar to Lampe. The employee in Corbin claimed wrongful dis-
charge in violation of the Colorado Minimum Wage Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-3-
1086(2)(a) and OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a), when his employer directed him to perform
certain hazardous tasks. The Corbin court upheld the Lampe decision, holding that the stat-
utes relied on by the employee were broad general statements of policy similar to those
held to be inadequate in Lampe to justify adoption of an exception to the employment at-
will rule. Corbin, 684 P.2d at 267. In answer to the employee's argument that his termina-
tion was in violation of the company's own policy manual and thus a breach of contract,
the court upheld the at-will rule for employment contracts. Id. at 267. But see Continental
Airlines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987) (Colorado now recognizes promissory es-
toppel actions resulting from employment handbooks distributed to the employees).
Supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
52. 755 P.2d 1221 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). The court neither laid out the necessary
elements required for a prima facie case, nor the necessary causation analysis. The court
simply reversed and remanded the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the wrong-
ful discharge claim.
53. Id. at 1224-25. The court held that federal law did not preempt the employee's
state court action of wrongful discharge, and an issue of fact existed as to whether the
employee was wrongfully discharged for refusing to assist in illegal activities. Note that
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Montoya court -did not reach the issue of whether or not the action
sounded in tort. Later that same year, however, the Court of Appeals, in
Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Association (Cronk /),54 recognized the
tort of wrongful discharge and defined the five steps necessary to estab-
lish a primafacie wrongful discharge exception to the employment at-will
doctrine later adopted and modified by the Lorenz court. 55 In Cronk I,
the employees alleged wrongful discharge for refusing to engage in ille-
gal and irregular practices prohibited by Colorado public utility stat-
utes. 56 The Cronk I decision represented a major step toward
establishing solid exceptions to Colorado's employment at-will doctrine.
Nevertheless, the court did not expressly hold that the action sounded
in tort. In 1989, the Court of Appeals augmented Cronk I with its deci-
sion in Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc. ,57 allowing a wrongful discharge claim
for retaliation against the employee who exercised Workers' Compensa-
tion benefits. 58 The court expressly recognized an exception to the at-
will termination rule, and expanded the scope of the Cronk I public pol-
icy exception.
59
Federal courts in Colorado have closely paralleled Colorado deci-
sions recognizing exceptions to the at-will doctrine. In 1989, the U.S.
District Court, in Miedema v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Colorado,6° fol-
lowed Colorado's determination that an employee discharged for exer-
cising specific statutory rights or duties supports a cause of action for
wrongful termination. 6 1 More recently, in Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co. ,62
this case is factually similar to California's Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (employee discharged for refusing
to commit perjury to a legislative committee); supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
See also Farmer v. Central Bancorporation , 761 P.2d 220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (suggesting
that employee's discharge for refusal to violate federal banking laws could fall within a
public policy exception to at-will employment, but the employee was unable to prove a
violation); Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co., 759 P.2d 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied,
782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989) (employee's claim for wrongful discharge, if available, is not
available at common law when wrongful discharge remedies are provided for by statute).
54. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied (Cronk 1) appeal after remand, 140
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2149 (Colo. Ct. App. April 2, 1992); cert. denied (Cronk I1).
55. Id. at 622 ((1) the employee refused to perform an action; (2) ordered by the
employer; (3) which would violate a specific statute; (4) whose terms are more than a broad
general statement of policy; and (5) that the employee's termination resulted from the
refusal to perform such action). See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
56. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 40-6-103 to -106 (1984).
57. 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 778 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1989).
58. Id. at 1371-73.
59. Id. at 1373. The Lathrop court relied heavily on, Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co.,
297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; Martin Marietta
v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108 (Colo. 1992) (discussion of Lathrop and Frampton).
60. 716 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Colo. 1989).
61. Id. at 1371. The court, relying on Lathrop, 770 P.2d at 1367, held that Colorado
law precludes discharging an employee for filing a Workers' Compensation claim. See
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. See also Vaske v. DuCharme, McMillen & As-
socs., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Colo. 1990) (recognizing Colorado retaliation claims
when employees exercise statutorily protected rights or obligations, or are discharged for
refusing to commit a criminal act directed by the employer but refusing to expand existing
Colorado tort law).
62. 773 F. Supp. 248 (D. Colo. 1991), aft'd, 971 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying
the modified prima facie standards of Lorenz and affirming Chief Judge Finesilver's District
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the U.S. District Court declined to apply the public policy exception in
the earlier 1990 Colorado appellate decision in Lorenz v. Martin Mari-
etta 63 because the employee failed to allege that she was directed to vio-
late a criminal law. 6 4 The court ruled, 6 5 and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, 66 that a federal court should not expand the existing wrongful
termination law or create a new category of exceptions to the general at-
will employment rule. The court held no action may be maintained
based solely on the employee's allegations that she was fired for exercis-
ing statutory rights under Colorado's physician/patient testimonial priv-
ilege by refusing to complete a medical form as part of the employer's
drug testing policy, when the employee did not contend the testing itself
to be illegal.6 7 In the 1992 post-Lorenz case of Smith v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 68 the U.S. District court acknowledged that current Colorado
law recognizes several public policy exceptions to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine, and allowed the employee's claims under these excep-
tions.6 9 Although the Tenth Circuit has followed state law closely, 70 not
all the federal courts have done the same.
7 1
Court ruling that summary judgment for the employer was proper as the employee "never
contended that she was being asked to perform an illegal act").
63. 802 P.2d 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), aff'das modified, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
64. Mares, 773 F. Supp. at 252.
65. Id.
66. 971 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1992). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's reasoning, despite the application of the recently announced 1992 Martin Marietta
v. Lorenz decision. id. at 494-96.
67. Id. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1) (1973).
68. 794 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1992).
69. Id. at 1040-42. The court based its decision partially on both Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100
(Colo. 1992), and Continental Airlines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
70. See, e.g., Cooper v. Schneider Metal Mfg. Co., 945 F.2d 411, No. 90-1158 (10th
Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion of Table Decision) (District of Colorado court applying
Oklahoma law in the absence of applicable Colorado public policy exception law, but rec-
ognizing the Lathrop decision recognizing retaliatory discharge for filing Workers' Com-
pensation claims); White v. American Airlines, 915 F.2d 1414 (10th Cir. 1990) (employee
alleged a retaliatory discharge for refusing to commit perjury on behalf of American Air-
lines concerning the 1979 DC-10 crash in Chicago, and the court followed Oklahoma law);
Polson v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990) (following Kansas law); Home v.J.W. Gib-
son Well Serv. Co., 894 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying Wyoming law); Zaccardi v.
Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1988) (employee's refusal to sign polygraph consent
form did not violate any clear mandate of New Mexico public policy); Howcroft v. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Utah 1989) (applying Utah law).
71. Several well known federal cases have denied recovery for wrongful termination
based on retaliation or public policies: Guy v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir.
1987) (employee discharged for refusing to falsify records required by the Food and Drug
Administration did not state an exception to the North Carolina at-will doctrine); Percival
v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (executive alleging a malicious
discharge by colleagues did not state a cause of action for wrongful termination); Fulford
v. Burndy Corp., 623 F. Supp. 78 (D.N.H. 1985) (employee alleging a retaliatory discharge
for having filed suit against his employer for injuries incurred by the employer's dog did
not state a cause of action under New Hampshire law).
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III. THE INSTANT CASE: MARTIN MARIETTA V. LORENZ7 2
A. Facts
Prior to accepting employment from Martin Marietta in 1972, Lo-
renz worked for Boeing Aircraft Co. on defense and aerospace projects
for 16 years 73 as a specialist in fracture mechanics. 74 Lorenz was well
educated at the time he accepted employment with Martin Marietta. 7 5
As a "principal investigator" 7 6 for Martin Marietta, Lorenz was respon-
sible for quality control of projects contracted for with the National Aer-
onautics and Space Administration (NASA). Lorenz complained to his
supervisors on several occasions about' inadequate testing and poor
workmanship on three separate projects.
77
Lorenz advised his supervisor that "NDI '" 7 8 contract proposals
made to NASA involved unrealistic cost assessments resulting in a false
contract price. 79 Lorenz advised his supervisors that the data was not
being communicated to the appropriate NASA personnel. 80 When no
action was taken by Martin Marietta, Lorenz contacted the NASA project
manager to relay the data.8 ' As a result of Lorenz's actions, a technical
review session was held by Martin Marietta with NASA and significant
technical issues about the Shuttle's safety were discussed.82 Lorenz,
who accurately drafted the minutes of the meeting,8 3 was instructed by a
superior to make modifications to them. Lorenz claimed the requested
modifications would not accurately reflect the course of the meeting.
84
Lorenz refused to make the changes, and instead issued a memorandum
stating that the modifications to the minutes were inaccurate. Lorenz
72. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
73. Id. at 102.
74. The study of stress resistance and tolerances for materials used in the construc-
tion of defense and aerospace equipment. Id.
75. Lorenz held a Bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from Polytechnic In-
stitute of Brooklyn, a Master's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of
Washington, and a doctoral candidate in metallurgy at Colorado School of Mines. See
Brief Amicus Curiae by the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) for the
Respondent at 1, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90 SC 583).
76. The Principal Investigator is accountable for technical objectives. Id.
77. The "NDI Contract" was for the purpose of producing data regarding the quality
of Space Shuttle external tank designs, the "Mixed Mode Contract" involved building a
testing machine to be initially researched and developed with a $25,000 NASA contribu-
tion, and the "Tug Irad Contract" was for a space "tug" vehicle. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103.
78. The words which correspond to "NDI" are not spelled out in any of the Lorenz
appellate briefs or opinions. Although one possible definition of "NDI" is former Presi-
dent Reagan's "National Defense Initiative," it is not clear whether the "NDI" Contract in
Lorenz has any connection with Reagan's "National Defense Initiative" defense policy.
79. Respondent's Answer Brief at 5, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
80. Id.
81. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103.
82. Respondent's Answer Brief at 5, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
83. Id.
84. Martin Marietta claimed that Lorenz never accused his superior of making false
statements; that Lorenz considered the changes to be "new statements" of "new informa-
tion;" and that Lorenz was really concerned with pride of authorship of the minutes. Fur-
ther, "even if [the] additions were inaccurate, they were trivial." Petitioner's Reply Brief
at 19-20, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90 SC 583).
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was subsequently warned by management to start cooperating.8 5
On another occasion, Lorenz was pressured to attest to the ade-
quacy of a material for the Mixed Mode Contract.8 6 Lorenz discovered
that the machine could not perform its function due to shoddy work-
manship.8 7 He further learned that Martin Marietta had instructed em-
ployees to construct the machine for $10,000 instead of the $25,000 that
NASA allocated.88 When Lorenz complained to his supervisors, he was
ridiculed.8 9 A similar incident occurred concerning the Tug Irad Con-
tract. Despite the "enormous pressure levied against him", Lorenz re-
fused to attest to the adequacy of the material selected for the Tug,90
and refused to write the final report because the testing was, in his opin-
ion, inadequate. 9' Shortly thereafter Lorenz was terminated.
9 2
B. Case History
After the presentation of Lorenz's case, the trial court granted Mar-
tin Marietta's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, stating that
Colorado did not recognize common law tortious wrongful termina-
tion. 93 The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing a tort claim for
wrongful termination based upon a public policy exception, 94 and ap-
85. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Respondent's Answer Brief at 7, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
89. Respondent's Answer Brief at 7, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583); Brief Amicus Curiae at 4,
Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
90. Respondent's Answer Brief at 8, Lorenz (No. 90 SC 583).
91. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 103. Lorenz stated in testimony that "these types of issues
could not be compromised without compromising . . . [his] professional integrity," or
without "jeopardizing the very purpose of... [his] involvement" with safety in Martin
Marietta's projects, and to do so would amount to "a downright fraud[.]" Id.
92. Id. at 104. Lorenz was notified of his lay-off status on July 22, 1975, and his last
day of work was July 25, 1975. Lorenz filed this action on July 24, 1981. Id. at 115. Lo-
renz filed his action one day short of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
For a discussion of the application of the statute of limitations, see infra notes 93-94, 113.
93. Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., 802 P.2d 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd as
modified, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992). Colorado does have limited statutory relief for
"whistleblowers:" COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-101 to -107 (1973) ("whistleblower" stat-
ute for protection of state employees); COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-5-106 (1973) (prohibiting
termination of employees with garnered wages); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-2-104, -107 (1973)
(prohibiting fraudulent procurement of employees); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (1973)
(prohibiting political firings); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (1)(h) (1973) (prohibiting termi-
nations for testifying under the Labor Peace Act); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-118 (1973)
(prohibiting terminations of employees on jury duty). See Respondent's Answer Brief at
30, Lorenz, (No. 90 SC 583) (listing Colorado statutes restricting employer's ability to ter-
minate their employees). The court also based the dismissal on the fact that the six-year
statute of limitations started on the day Lorenz was notified of his lay-off, thus barring the
action. Lorenz, 802 P.2d at 1148. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973); supra note 92;
infra notes 94, 113.
94. Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., 802 P.2d 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), af'd as
modified, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo 1992). The appellate court also stated that the statute of
limitations began to run on the day after Lorenz was terminated-the day his "injury"
occurred. Id. at 1148-49. The court rejected Martin Marietta's argument that the statute
began to run on the day Lorenz was notified. Martin Marietta's argument was based on
authority involving discharges covered by state or federal statutes which provided specific
filing requirements. Id. See also Quicker v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 747 P.2d 682
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plied the Cronk I standard. 9 5 Lorenz had also alleged a violation of
U.S.C. § 1001,96 which the court held was specific enough to cover the
fraud which Lorenz alleged led to his wrongful termination.9 7 Applying
the Cronk I standard retroactively,9 8 the court determined that claims
arising out of the state's public policy did not preempt federal labor
laws.99
C. The Colorado Supreme Court Opinion
As a matter of first impression, the Colorado Supreme Court recog-
nized a tort-based wrongful discharge cause of action. 10 0 However, the
court modified the Cronk 10 1 standards by adding a sixth prima facie ele-
ment requiring the employer's knowledge, or unreasonable lack thereof,
that the employee refused to perform the employer's directive because
of the employee's reasonable belief that the directive was illegal or con-
trary to public policy.' 0 2 Under the new prima facie standard set out by
the court, the employee must present evidence:
[1] that the employer directed the employee to perform an
illegal act;
[2] that the directed act be part of the employee's work re-
lated duties; or
[3] that the employer prohibited the employee from exercis-
ing either a public duty or an important job-related right
or privilege;
[4] that the action directed by the employer would violate a
specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy
relating to either the employee's basic responsibility as a
citizen or the employee's right or privilege as a worker;
[5] that the employee was terminated as the result of refusing
to perform the act directed by the employer; and
[6] that the employer was aware, or reasonably should have
been aware, that the employee's refusal to comply with the
(Colo. App. 1987) (explaining COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-403 [statute of limitation] as ap-
plied to a discrimination claim filed with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission; adopting
the federal rule in the absence of Colorado case law that notice of discharge begins run-
ning the statute, but improper notice equitably tolls it).
95. Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622; see supra note 5.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (originally enacted as the Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 645,
§ 1001, 62 Stat. 749). 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides that:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document know-
ing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
97. Lorenz, 802 P.2d at 1149.
98. Id. at 1150.
99. Id. at 1150-51.
100. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 108-10 (Colo. 1992).
101. Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622. For the Cronk I elements, see text accompanying notes 4-
5.
102. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
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employer's order or directive was based on the employee's
reasonable belief that the action ordered by the employer
was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory policy
relating to the employee's duty as a citizen, or violative of
the employee's legal right or privilege as a worker.1
0 3
The court acknowledged that Colorado has refused to enforce con-
tracts violative of public policy.10 4 Following this rationale, the court
reasoned that it was "axiomatic" that a condition in an employment con-
tract also be unenforceable when it is violative of public policy.
10 5
Neither an employer nor an employee should be allowed to perpetrate a
fraud on the government. Moreover, an employee should not be forced
to choose between keeping her job or committing a crime, or foregoing
a duty or privilege protected by law. 10 6
The court then evaluated Martin Marietta's contention that 18
U.S.C. § 1001 was too broad and general to support a wrongful dis-
charge claim. 10 7 The Lorenz court relied on United States v. Tobon
Builes, 108 United States v. Diogo,10 9 and Johnson v. World Color Press 10 as
guides to the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and determined that
the statute was designed to protect the government and innocent peo-
ple, such as Lorenz, from fraud.' The court was divided in a four to
three decision on the issue of applying the new standard prospectively
or retroactively; the majority holding that retroactive application ap-
plied."12 The Lorenz case was remanded for a new trial in accordance
103. Id.
104. Russell v. Courier Printing & Publishing Co., 95 P. 936 (Colo. 1908); Wood v.
Casserleigh, 71 P. 360 (Colo. 1902); Pueblo & Ark. Valley R.R. v. Taylor, 6 Colo. 1 (Colo.
1881).
105. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
106. Id. at 109-110. The court relied upon Lathrop, Cronk, Frampton, and Nees, in offi-
cially recognizing this cause of action. Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989); Cron* 1, 765 P.2d at 619; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425 (Ind. 1973); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
107. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13-16, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo.
1992) (No. 90 SC 583). Martin Marietta claimed that Lorenz offered no evidence that any
of the statements Martin directed of him were 'factually false," and that Lorenz's "self-
serving... opinion" was that the work was inadequate. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
108. 706 F.2d 1092 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
109. 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963).
110. 498 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
111. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 111; supra note 96 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 1001). The Lorenz court
relied on Diogo, where the Second Circuit found 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to contain two distinct
offenses: (1) concealment of a material fact; and (2) false representation, in which "both
offenses may be the same, to create or foster on the part of a Government agency a misap-
prehension of the true state of affairs." Diogo, 320 F.2d at 901-02.
The Lorenz court also adopted the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in Johnson, which
declared the purpose behind 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as "establish[ing] a clearly mandated public
policy against deceptive practices aimed at frustrating or impeding legitimate functions of
government departments or agencies." Johnson, 498 N.E.2d at 577-78. For Tenth Circuit
interpretations of this statute and its criminal elements and proof, which is beyond the
scope of this Comment, see United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 405 (1991); United
States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). See also
United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941) (interpreting the purpose prior to codifica-
tion of the Act of June 25, 1948).
112. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 116-20 (Erickson,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with the court's newly pronounced standards."13
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Unanswered Questions
Although Colorado has now joined the majority of jurisdictions
114
in adopting the public policy exception in tort to the at-will employment
doctrine, new questions arise. The Lorenz court provided little guidance
as to what will satisfy the additional causation element of employer
knowledge in the newly recognized common law tort. Proving the first
five elements of a prima facie case under the Cronk I standard' '5 as
adopted by the Lorenz court, will implicitly prove the employer knowl-
edge element. Yet the Lorenz court added a "mens rea" requirement of
employer knowledge in a civil action."16 A wrongfully discharged em-
ployee must show that his employer knew, or should have known, that the
reason the employee refused to comply with the employer's order was
due to the employee's reasonable belief that the act directed by the em-
ployer was illegal, statutorily protected activity, or in clear contravention
of public policy relating to an employee's rights or privileges."l 7 It is
unclear whether these enumerations are exclusive, or whether "the pub-
lic policy exception encompass[es] an employee's 'whistleblowing' activ-




These questions are only partially answered by judicial opinions
subsequent to the Lorenz decision. Attorneys, to date, have no clear and
accurate precedent to determine what evidence sufficiently meets the ad-
The intent behind this Comment is a discussion and survey of the public policy exception
to the employment at-will doctrine, and how Colorado may be affected by the Lorenz deci-
sion. Because the court was split only on the issue of retroactive application of the new
standard, and also because of the limitations in the scope of this writing, the issues of
retroactive application and running of the statute of limitations will not be analyzed.
The underlying issue behind the dissent was whether the newly adopted standard
should apply to the parties before the court, as well as those on the docket for appeal. The
dissent claimed that the standard in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), for
determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively, was improperly
applied by the majority. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 117-20.
113. Supra notes 5-6. The court also unanimously agreed that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run on a tort wrongful discharge claim until the employee had been in-
jured by being separated from his employment. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 115-16; supra notes 92-
94 & 112.
114. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 108. For a state-by-state comparison chart of the status of at-
will employment see 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (July, 1992).
115. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
116. 823 P.2d at 108-10. The court calls the added element an "additional evidentiary
requirement." Id. at 110. While this may indeed be an additional evidentiary require-
ment, it also acts as a mens rea requirement of the employer's state of mind.
117. Id.
118. Outline of Gilbert M. Romin, Esq., Tort of Wrongful Discharge Against Public Policy in
Colorado, at 6, used for a National Employment Lawyers Association [NELA] meeting
(April 24, 1992) and as part of the materials accompanying a Colorado Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation ("CTLA") CLE seminar, "Hot Topics in Employment Law" (Nov. 20, 1992), sec-
tion contributed by Darold W. Killmer, Esq., Developments in the Common Law of Colorado (on
file with author). Mr. Killmer is a partner, and Mr. Romfin currently practices with Feiger,
Collison & Killmer, in Denver, Colo. The author wishes to thank Mr. Killmer, Mr. Romn,
and Feiger, Collison & Killmer for their generous assistance.
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ded element of employer knowledge of the employee's reasonable belief
of illegality, or how the courts will construe the language set forth in
Lorenz.' 1 9 This section of the Comment will focus on the employer
knowledge requirement in Lorenz as it has been interpreted by subse-
quent courts, what additional case law may apply to satisfy the element,
and parallel legislative means of controlling wrongful discharge and
whistleblowing.
The Lorenz court reasoned that the additional evidentiary element
will result in providing the employer an opportunity to distinguish be-
tween conscientious employees truly concerned about the legality of
their employer's directive, and merely subordinate employees. 120 The
court further declared that the employer knowledge element provides
the employer with fair notice, prior to making a termination decision, of
the circumstances supporting the employee's reasonable belief that the
directed act was wrongful, against public policy, or prohibiting the em-
ployee's rights or lawful privileges. 12 1 In recognizing a tort cause of
action for wrongful discharge with an additional scienter element, the
court rationalized the Lorenz decision as not only limiting the employer's
discretion in discharging at-will employees, but also as (1) accommodat-
ing the employer's interest in worker efficiency and loyalty; (2) accom-
modating the employee's interest in not being coerced into having to
choose between almost certain termination of employment or engaging
in illegal conduct or conduct contrary to the employee's civic rights and
duties; and, (3) society's interest in maintaining a balance between the
two. 122
The goals of the Lorenz court are relevant to today's less than satis-
factory economic situation, and the ever-increasing big business control
119. Romin, supra note 118, at 4. This requirement means that, if nothing else, Colo-
rado plaintiff's lawyers can predict an additional hurdle in proving a prima facie case of
wrongful discharge in tort in relation to the public policy exception to at-will employment.
Lorenz is "not a model of clarity," leaving open other questions. For example, what types
of cases may arise under the claim of "wrongful discharge" out of the nearly infinite pos-
sibilities? Is an employee protected under Lorenz for merely opposing her employer's
wrongdoing without the protection of a specific statute or enumerated public policy?
Darold W. Killmer, Esq., Remarks at CTLA Seminar: "Hot Topics in Employment Law"
(Nov. 20, 1992).
The Lorenz court conceded that this evidentiary requirement will place on the em-
ployee an extra "burden" not articulated in Cronk 1, but claimed that the added element
will "not alter in a fundamental way the basic nature of the tort claim for wrongful dis-
charge outlined in the Cronk [I] decision." Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 110. The court did not state
any reasoning to show this extra requirement as beneficial to the public, excluding em-
ployers, or to the wrongfully discharged employee, who is already suffering an economic
loss.
Martin Marietta, on the other hand, feared that recognizing a public policy exception
to at-will employment would result in an "insubordinate employee [who] could hold man-
agement hostage by immediately threatening a claim under the generality of many statutes,
leaving management to choose between maintaining industrial discipline and predicting
how a jury might apply the statute." Brief for Petitioner at 27, Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992) (No. 90 SC 583) (emphasis added).
120. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 110.
121. Id.
122. Id. It is interesting to note that the Pierce public policy definition, supra note 20,
seems to appear in Lorenz.
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over much of the population's everyday lives and careers. The court,
however, potentially biased its own public policy decision in favor of em-
ployers by making the causation elements in a retaliatory discharge
under the public policy exception more difficult to establish (at first
glance) in Colorado than in other jurisdictions recognizing the excep-
tion.12 3 The Lorenz court further complicated the legal analysis by de-
claring the public policy exception a tort action, yet including contract
principles as part of the rationale that public policy exceptions sound in
tort. 124
. In employment cases, the element of employer knowledge is also
closely related to the proximity in time between the employee's refusal
to act or participation in a statutorily protected activity and the time of
the employee's discharge, and the burden of proving causation. If one
looks only for state case law (and federal case law interpreting state law)
duplicating the Lorenz court's specific employer knowledge element, lit-
tle will be found. 125 Analogies are plentiful, however, if one examines
other jurisdictions' interpretation and causation analyses of similar fact
patterns, federal and state wrongful discharge statutes, and whistleblow-
ing statutes. Many of these either expressly or implicitly require em-
ployer knowledge. 12 6 To make the connection between the Lorenz
court's "public policy exception" and "whistleblowing," one must em-
brace the view that, in effect, they are one and the same; both falling
under the broader common law category of "retaliatory discharge."
The difference is a matter of semantics.
B. Terminology and Plausible Implications
Under the broad category of common law wrongful discharge both
contract and tort actions exist.1 2 7 Retaliatory discharge is synonymous
with wrongful discharge. Both are synonymous with the public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule, and it may be argued that the
term "whistleblower" is likewise synonymous with all of these terms.'
2 8
123. See Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 118 n. I (Erickson, J., dissenting) (noting that "the majority
cites no authority for requiring employer knowledge of an employee's reasonable belief
that a refused order was illegal").
124. Id. at 109. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. The court rationalized
that since Colorado has a long-standing rule that contracts violative of public policy are
unenforceable, it is "axiomatic" that contractual terms in employment, such as "at-will,"
should "be deemed unenforceable when violative of public policy." Lorenz, 823 P.2d at
109. The court does not expand on or define their use of the word "axiomatic." The
court seems to presume this particular relationship between contract and tort employment
law to be so evident that no additional proof or reasoning is required. That is a debatable
issue beyond the scope of this Comment.
125. See infra notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 160-83 and accompanying text.
127. See 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (July, 1992) (state-by-state comparison
chart illustrating which states recognize the contract action, which states recognize the tort
action, which states recognize both, and which states recognize neither).
128. See Callahan, supra note 20, at 485 n.26 (using the terms "public policy exception
claim," "wrongful discharge," and "retaliatory discharge". interchangeably); see also
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1612-13 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "wrongful discharge" as "an
at-will employee's cause of action against his former employer, alleging that his discharge
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Both "retaliatory discharge" and "whistleblowing," if proven, infer a
motive of the employer's desire to "get even" with the employee for the
employee's words, acts, refusals or omissions to act. Yet, pursuant to
the at-will employment rule, such retaliatory behavior by the employer is
only actionable by the employee when a public policy exception to the
at-will rule exists.' 2 9 The synonymous relationship among the terms
"public policy exception," "wrongful discharge," "retaliatory dis-
charge," and "whistleblowing" is further supported in the facts of the
Lorenz case.'
30
Lorenz's refusals to (1) falsify reports to NASA, and his subsequent
disclosure to NASA of Martin Marietta's directive to him to change con-
ference minutes; (2) participate in Martin Marietta's scheme to misapply
NASA appropriations; and (3) submit to inadequate testing of Space
Shuttle components easily fall within the accepted definitions of all four
previously discussed terms. First, providing that Lorenz proves each
primafacie element of the tort as set out in Lorenz, an action exists as a
"wrongful" or "retaliatory discharge." Second, Lorenz's refusal to inac-
curately modify conference minutes and his subsequent disclosure of his
dispute with Martin Marietta to NASA, as well as Lorenz's allegation that
Martin Marietta defrauded the United States in violation 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001131 clearly fits the definition of a "whistleblower." 13 2 Finally, Lo-
renz's refusal to falsify reports to NASA, misapply NASA appropria-
was in violation of state or federal anti-discrimination statutes.... public policy.... an
implied employment contract .... or an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;"
[with supplemental reference to "whistleblower acts"]); Id. at 1596 (defining "whistle
blower" as "an employee who refuses to engage in and/or reports illegal or wrongful
activities of his employer or fellow employees[;] . . . [e]mployer retaliation against whistle
blowers is often statutorily prohibited" [with reference to "wrongful discharge"]); Id. at
463 (defining "constructive discharge" as occurring "when an employer deliberately makes
an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into involun-
tary resignation.") (emphasis added); 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:21, 25-26 (May, 1987)
(comparing federal and state whistleblower protection statutes, and comparing conflicting
state case law decisions as to the inclusion of "whistleblowing" within the public policy
exception).
Other definitions of "constructive discharge" besides that in BLACK'S LAw DicTxON-
ARY, supra, are applicable. COLO. CIVIL JURY INs'rsUcrloNs 3d § 31:8 (Cum. Supp. 1993),
defines "constructive discharge" as occurring when "an employer deliberately makes or
allows an employee's working conditions to become so intolerable that the employee has
no reasonable choice but to quit or resign and the employee does quit or resign because of
those conditions," based upon a reasonable person standard. Other jurisdictions have
recognized the legal possibility of constructive discharge. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc., v.
Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988); Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 232 Cal. Rptr. 490
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (factually similar to the Lorenz case); Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.,
554 A.2d 757 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
For a detailed treatment on the definition of "whistleblowing," see James N. Adler &
Mark Daniels, Managing the Whistleblowing Employee, 8 LAB. LAw. 19, 21 & n.8 (1992). Adler
and Daniels define whistleblowing as "an elusive concept" that includes an employee's (1)
opposition internally or externally to their employer's conduct; (2) refusal to commit an
illegal act for the employer; (3) reporting a perceived impropriety to the supervisor, gov-
ernmental agency or media; or (4) bringing an action against the employer alleging the
employer submitted false claims to the government. Id
129. Each jurisdiction has their own definition of public policy. See supra note 20.
130. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 96.
132. See supra note 128.
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tions, and participate in inadequate testing clearly fit the Lorenz
definition of the public policy exception, as these acts force Lorenz to
choose between committing an illegal act or losing his job. Further-
more, Lorenz was directed to inadequately test Space Shuttle compo-
nents, paid for by taxpayers, which would be trusted with the lives of
astronauts who, presumably, do not know of the inadequate testing. In
light of the Space Shuttle "Challenger" tragedy, it is difficult to describe
a public policy more compelling than the protection of human lives.
13 3
If one accepts the view that "public policy exceptions,"
"whistleblowing," "wrongful discharge" and "retaliatory discharge" are
synonymous, and therefore are all really the same cause of action in tort,
it is but one short step further to infer that any primafacie case of retalia-
tory discharge under the Lorenz standard inherently implies employer
knowledge if the first five elements in Lorenz have been shown. 134 Once
the employee, by a preponderance of the evidence, shows the first five
Lorenz elements, the sixth employer knowledge element will be satisfied
by implication. An analysis of the first five individual elements in the
Lorenz standard reveals the inherent employer scienter element.
Using the Lorenz fact pattern, when Lorenz was directed by Martin
Marietta to approve inadequate component testing, participate in a pro-
ject in which NASA funds were misappropriated, and materially change
the contents of official minutes of a meeting in which NASA addressed
Lorenz's personal complaints of wrongdoing,' 3 5 the first four Lorenz ele-
ments were satisfied.' 3 6 Lorenz successfully showed that he refused to
do something ordered by Martin Marietta which would be either against
the law or against public policy. The fifth Lorenz element, termination of
employment for refusing the employer's directive (retaliation), was satis-
fied when Lorenz was laid-off shortly after refusing to write the final
evaluation report endorsing the Tug-Irad project.' 3 7 At this point, the
prima facie case is complete because the retaliation has been shown. By
showing the employer's retaliation, the employee has also shown the im-
plicit scienter element. No primafacie case will occur if the ordered act is
not against a specific statute or a clear public policy. Realistically, how
can an employer retaliate against an employee without knowing or believ-
ing the employee to have committed an act against the employer's inter-
est, or that the employee refused to act in favor of the employer's
interest? Retaliation simply cannot "exist" in the absence of a reason to
retaliate.
Thus, since the Lorenz employer knowledge element is inherent
within the first five Lorenz elements of a primafacie retaliatory discharge,
there is no need for a separate employer knowledge element. In effect,
the additional scienter element added by the Lorenz court is unneces-
133. See supra note 20 for public policy definitions.
134. See Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109. See supra text accompanying note 103.
135. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text (factual summary of the Lorenz case).
136. See supra text accompanying note 103 (the Lorenz elements).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
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sary.' 38  Cases subsequent to Lorenz, other jurisdictions' case law, and
federal and state legislation may now be examined in a different light
when the issue of causation is compared to the Lorenz standard. A Colo-
rado plaintiff's attorney may find more persuasive authority available
than a first impression would otherwise indicate.
C. Cases Subsequent to Martin Marietta v. Lorenz
The first Colorado appellate decision13 9 to use the Lorenz standard
with the additional employer knowledge element was the appeal after
remand of Cronk J.140 The Colorado Court of Appeals in Cronk II,
adopted the Lorenz standard and applied the additional employer knowl-
edge element. 14 1 The Cronk H decision identified Lorenz as a case con-
templating explicit employer directives. Conversely, expanding on the
Lorenz standard, the Cronk H court concluded that Lorenz "also embraces
situations in which an employee is so directed implicitly, resulting in a
retaliatory termination."'
142
The employer in Cronk H contended that the Lorenz standard had
not been met because the employees were not directed to violate the
law, nor were they fired for refusing to violate any law or public pol-
icy. 14 3 The employer also alleged that the "actual or constructive [em-
ployer] knowledge" element set out in Lorenz 144 had not been met by
the employees. 14 5 The former employees countered that (1) they had a
statutory duty to oppose their employer's intentional concealment of
138. From a non-legal perspective, the additional evidentiary requirement of employer
knowledge equates to proving: "I know that you know that I know." If, of course, the
employee fails to show evidence of a prima facie case, the employee is nothing more than an
out-of-luck and out-of-court former at-will employee. If the employee cannot prove
"wrongfulness" on the part of the employer in discharging the employee (retaliation),
then the employer knowledge element is irrelevant.
Support for the theory that the employer knowledge element is inherent when the
employer's retaliation is proven may be found in Crank 11, see infra notes 140-48 and ac-
companying text. See also Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575, 582 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (the employer knowledge element is "simply a factor to consider in determin-
ing the principal question of causation").
139. Crank II is the only Colorado appellate decision, to date, to use the Lorenz stan-
dard. At least one Colorado district court has adopted and applied the Lorenz standard.
See Stuart v. St. Anthony Hosp. Systems, No. 91 CV 2809, slip op. 2-3 (Denver Dist. Ct.
Feb. 21, 1992) (applying the Lorenz standard, and finding issues of fact existed as to
whether the employee was discharged in retaliation for reporting specific violations of
both statutes and regulations concerning medication disbursement, patient privacy, and
mandatory emergency procedures) (emphasis added); Romin, supra note 118, at 6.
140. Crank 1, 765 P.2d at 622. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
141. Crank II, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2153.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 2-4, Crank II (No. 90 CA 0666).
144. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 102.
145. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Crank 11 (No. 90 CA 0666). The em-
ployer alleged that the Crank I and Lorenz courts "wisely chose to limit such claims to those
brought by employees with a direct stake in an issue, who presumably are knowledgeable of the
circumstances and in a position to assess the validity of their employer's actions." Id. (emphasis
added). This represents an extreme interpretation of the use of the terms "actual or con-
structive knowledge" quoted from Lorenz. "Constructive knowledge" is defined as: "[i]f
one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a fact, he is deemed to have had
constructive knowledge of such fact." BLAcKs LAw DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990).
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public utility statute and safety violations; (2) they refused to aid and
abet these illegal practices by their employer; and (3) they were fired in
retaliation for refusing to conceal these illegal practices. 14 6 The em-
ployees further alleged that the employer knowledge element was satis-
fied because the jury was required to find that the employees' exercise of
a statutorily protected right or duty be a substantial or a motivating fac-
tor in the employer's decision to discharge the employees. 147 Thus, em-
ployer awareness was implied because "the jury could not have found that
the [employees] were discharged for opposing illegal acts without finding
that the [employers] knew they were opposing illegal acts."'
4 8
The Cronk II court agreed with the former employees, affirming the
trial court jury verdicts finding that the employees' exercise of statutory
duties were implicitly prohibited by the employer, thereby "comport-
ing" with the Lorenz standard.149 The Cronk II court concluded that the
Lorenz employer knowledge element was satisfied because "the jury was
required to consider and find that [the employer] knew or should have
known that [the employees] opposed [the employer's] practices because
they believed that such conduct was illegal."' 150 The three former em-
ployees were each awarded an average of $535,580.00 in economic dam-
ages, punitive damages and pre-judgment interest. 15 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
adopted the Lorenz standard, including the employer knowledge ele-
ment, in Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co. 152 The employer knowledge ele-
ment was not applied by the court, however, because the employee
never contended that the employer's drug testing policy was illegal, but
instead objected to filling out an accompanying medical form.1
5 3
D. Applicable Case Law From Other Jurisdictions
Few decisions from other jurisdictions dealing with the public pol-
icy exception "give explicit consideration to the elements of the claim,"
146. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 2-3 nn.2-5, Cronk II (No. 90 CA
0666). Many of the former employees' allegations were supported in the record, and
Plaintiff Cronk was discharged "just two days after the [Public Utilities Commission] an-
nounced publicly it was going to investigate [the employer] for illegal activity," thus infer-
ring that the time interval regarding Cronk's discharge implied retaliation. Id. at 2 n.4.
147. Id. at 4-5.
148. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
149. Cronk H, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2153.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2150. For a discussion on high jury verdicts, see supra note 9.
152. 971 F.2d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1992); see supra notes 62-67 and accompanying
text. In another recent case, the Lorenz standard was adopted, but the employer knowl-
edge issue was precluded by the granting of the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment. Meehan v. Amax Oil & Gas, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 461, 468 (D. Colo. 1992) (granting
the employer's summary judgment motion because the employee was never directed to act
in a certain way, never prohibited from exercising a job-related right or privilege, and did
not support his allegation that his discharge violated a clearly expressed public policy, but
instead articulated only a generalized public policy). See also Lampe v. Presbyterian Med.
Ctr., 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (broad, general statements of public policy held
inadequate to state a cause of action).
153. Mares, 971 F.2d at 496.
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or "address the allocation of the burden of proof.' 154 In the few opin-
ions discussing the appropriate elements at common law, as few as one,
to as many as six elements (as in the Lorenz case), are described with very
little consistency in the approaches taken.' 55 One commentator has
154. Callahan, supra note 20, at 488. Normally, the employee will have the burden of
proving a prima facie case, and the employer will have the risk of nonpersuasion in cases
where there is a factual dispute over the employer's motive in discharging the employee.
Id. at 507-12 (cases involving "employer pretext" or "mixed motives). In situations where
the termination is alleged by the employer to be unrelated to the employee's protected
acts or refusal to act, or the employer's reasons for discharge are enumerated in statutes as
exceptions, a "mixed-motive" situation exists. Id. Ordinarily, following the employee's
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the "same decision" would
have been made notwithstanding the employee's protected activity. At this point many
courts will allow a shift back to the employee (who maintains at all times the ultimate
burden of persuasion) to show that the employer's proffered reason was "mere pretext."
Id. Employment discrimination cases are, however, "arguably distinguishable from public
policy exception cases because most terminations litigated pursuant to that statute are...
based on [the plaintiff's] membership in a protected class, as opposed to protected con-
duct." Id. at 484 n.19.
The United States Supreme Court has set out a skeletal framework for discrimination
cases. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 256 (1981) (in
an employment discrimination case the employee retains the ultimate burden of persuad-
ing the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against her, and that the
employer's proffered reason was pretext), explaining and modifying McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (in a discrimination case the employee has
the initial burden of establishing a primafacie case of discrimination; the burden then shifts
to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection;" and the employee again bears the burden to prove that the employer's
reason for rejection was a "cover-up," or pretextual).
The federal and state courts have not, however, been consistent in the application of
the employment discrimination burden shifting in retaliatory discharge cases. Compare
Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1991) (following Burdine
and McDonnell Douglas) with Swearingen v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 968 F.2d 559,
562 (5th Cir. 1992) (one shift; employee bears the initial burden of establishing a causal
link between the discharge and the protected activity [worker's compensation claim],
which need only be proof that the employee's protected activity was a "determining fac-
tor" and not necessarily the sole factor in the discharge; the burden then shifts to the
employer who then must rebut this presumption by showing a legitimate reason for the
discharge).
State decisions also reflect a variety of burden-shifting analyses as applied to the cau-
sation element in the common-law public policy exception in tort. See, e.g., Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (employee alleging retaliatory
discharge bears the burden of proving that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public
policy); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc., v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1985) (employee has
burden of proof and persuasion; the fact finder decides if the employer sought to have the
employee commit an illegal act); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089
(Wash. 1984) (employee has the burden of proving his dismissal violates a clear mandate
of public policy; burden shifts to the employer to prove that the dismissal was for reasons
other than those alleged by the employee); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d
834, 840-41 (Wis. 1983) (employee has the initial burden of proving that the dismissal
violates a clear mandate of public policy; the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
the dismissal was for just cause). For a detailed discussion of burdens, shifts of burdens
and employer "privileges," see Callahan, supra note 20, at 507-14.
155. Callahan, supra note 20, at 488-89 nn.39-42. See, e.g., Kennard v. Louis Zimmer
Communications, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 635, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (one element: primafacie case
made when employee proves the discharge was for conduct protected by the public policy
of the state); Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (two
elements: the employee must establish that (1) a public policy of the state of New York
exists, (2) which was violated by the employer); Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington,
Inc., 519 N.E.2d 909, 911 (111. 1988) (three elements: (1) the employee must show a dis-
charge occurred; (2) the discharge was in retaliation for her activities; and (3) that the
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proposed that when an employee is discharged for exercising a statutory
right or public duty, refusing to participate in wrongful or illegal activity,
or "blowing the whistle" on others' harmful conduct, few distinctions
are necessary between these categories. 15 6 Rather, the following ele-
ments are suggested: (1) an act or refusal to act by the employee; (2)
which was supported by public policy, (3) bearing a causal relationship
to (4) the employee's discharge.' 5 7 The element of causation, then, ap-
pears central to understanding the employer knowledge and temporal
elements. Because "an employer cannot fire an employee in retaliation
for actions of which the employer is unaware," the employee, in proving
a causal relationship, "must show that the employer was aware of the act
or refusal to act in question prior to the discharge," and relate this to
the temporal proximity of the employee's act or refusal to act, and the
subsequent discharge.
158
Although there is a dearth of case law explicitly saying so, it is rea-
sonable to find that when an employee is discharged almost immediately
after the employer becomes aware of the employee's act or refusal to
act, a retaliatory motive may reasonably be inferred. The chain of causa-
tion is relatively short, and often blatant. First, the employee does or
says something (or refuses same) that the employee perceives is illegal
or clearly violative of "public policy."' 59 Next, the employer finds out
(awareness of the act must occur for retaliation), and, after what is often a
short duration of time, the employee is either discharged, psychologi-
cally pressured by supervisors and peers to quit, or simply "laid-off."
When the fact-finder determines retaliation has occurred, a demonstra-
ble interrelationship to societal concerns must be shown, which should
discharge violated a clear mandate of Illinois public policy); Hicks v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622 (five elements:
the employee must prove (1) that he refused to perform an action, (2) ordered by his
employer, (3) which would violate a specific statute, (4) whose terms are more than a broad
general statement of policy, and (5) that his termination resulted from his refusal); Lorenz,
823 P.2d at 109 (six elements).
156. Callahan, supra note 20, at 490.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 497-98. Callahan notes that evaluation of the timing of the employee's act
or refusal to act, and the employer's response (discharge or constructive discharge) "is
highly relevant to the characterization of a possible connection between them." Id. at 498.
One recent common-law decision combines these two elements in a retaliatory discharge
action under the "whistleblowing" label. See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing
Co., 795 S.W. 2d 723, 732-33 (Tex. 1990) (to establish causation, the employee must
demonstrate that (1) the employer had knowledge of the whistleblowing prior to the retali-
ation; (2) the discharge must be shown to have occurred within a reasonably short time
after one or more complaints were lodged; and (3) the burden then shifts to the employer
to refute the causation element by proving dismissal occurred for reasons other than the
act of whistleblowing).
For examples of cases referring to the temporal element, see Hamann v. Gates Chev-
rolet, Inc., 910 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990) (employee failed to prove relevant timing
between her refusal to act and her discharge, despite the court's recognition that rapidity
and proximity in time between refusal and discharge, when considered with other circum-
stances, may create the necessary inference of the employer's prohibited motive); House v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 556 A.2d 353, 357-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (three month
interval between the employee's whistleblowing activity and discharge prevented inference
of retaliatory motive). See supra note 138.
159. See supra note 20.
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be given superior weight in the balancing process. 16 0
As the following cases demonstrate, some authority exists support-
ing an employer knowledge element within a prima facie case of retalia-
tory discharge. While Mares v. Conagra Poultry Co. 161 follows Lorenz, two
Tenth Circuit cases pre-dating Lorenz required employer knowledge as
proof of causation. In White v. American Airlines, Inc., an employee was
discharged for refusing to commit perjury in litigation that followed the
disastrous 1979 crash of an American Airlines DC-10 jetliner over Chi-
cago's O'Hare Airport. 16 2 The court held that jury instructions which
included a required finding that the employer knew of the employee's
refusal to commit perjury prior to the employee's discharge sufficiently
satisfied the causation requirement. 163 In Stuart v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 164
the court applied Kansas precedent 165 and required employer knowl-
edge in a whistleblowing case. In Stuart, the employee was required to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a reasonable person
would conclude that the employer was engaged in wrongful or illegal
activity; (2) the employer had knowledge of the employee's act or refusal
prior to discharge; (3) the employee was discharged in retaliation for
such act or refusal; and (4) the employee's act or refusal was due to a
good-faith concern about the employer's wrongful activity, and not out
of spite. 1
6 6
Prior to Colorado's wrongful discharge tort standard described in
Cronk 1, 167 and expanded by Lorenz, 1 6 8 the Kansas Supreme Court rec-
ognized the tort of retaliatory discharge in the whistleblowing case of
Palmer v. Brown. 169 While the Palmer standard, like the Lorenz standard, is
not a model of clarity, it does require clear and convincing evidence of
the employee's good faith belief that the employer's activity was con-
trary to public policy or illegal, and that "the employer had knowledge of
160. Callahan, supra note 20, at 486-87.
161. 971 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1992).
162. 915 F.2d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 1422. The White court affirmed the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma regarding instructions to the jury that included among the
essential elements of wrongful discharge: (1) the employee was requested to commit per-
jury; (2) the employee refused to commit perjury and the employer knew of the employee's
refusal; and (3) the employee was terminated because of his refusal to commit perjury. In
order to find the employer liable, "the jury had to conclude that American knew about
White's refusal to commit perjury and terminated his employment because of that re-
fusal." Id. Further, the jury could find liability "only if the American officials responsible
for [White's] termination were in fact aware that [White] refused to commit perjury." Id.
(emphasis added).
164. 753 F. Supp. 317 (D. Kan. 1990), aff'd, 936 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1991).
165. See Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 1988).
166. Stuart, 753 F. Supp. at 324. See also Wolff v. Berkley Inc., 938 F.2d 100, 103 (8th
Cir. 1991) (holding that "[iun order to succeed on a claim for retaliatory discharge, the
[employee] must prove a causal relationship between statutorily protected activity and her
termination . .. [which] does not exist if the employer is not aware of the employee's
statutorily protected activity") (emphasis added).
167. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, appeal after remand, 140 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied (Cronk II).
168. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
169. 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 1988). Palmer was decided in March, while Cronk I was
decided in July.
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the employee's reporting of such violation prior to discharge." 170 The
Palmer standard requires clear and convincing evidence, rather than a
"presentation" of evidence as in Lorenz.1 7 1 Palmer was applied in Pi/cher
v. Board of County Commissioners, 172 in which the Kansas Court of Appeals
interpreted the Palmer standard liberally by not limiting retaliatory dis-
charge claims to violations of law pertaining to public health, safety, and
the general welfare, 173 but instead indicated that First Amendment free-
dom of speech violations may support a whistleblowing retaliatory dis-
charge claim. 17 4 These cases suggest the employer knowledge element
170. Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The Palmer standard provides that:
To maintain such action, an employee has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence, under the facts of the case, a reasonably prudent person
would have concluded the employee's co-worker or employer was engaged in ac-
tivities in violation of rules, regulations, or the law pertaining to public health,
safety, and the general welfare; the employer had knowledge of the employee's
reporting of such violation prior to discharge of the employee; and the employee
was discharged in retaliation for making the report. However, the whistleblowing
must have been done out of a good faith concern over the wrongful activity re-
ported rather than from a corrupt motive such as malice, spite, jealousy or per-
sonal gain.
Id.
171. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
172. 787 P.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
173. Id. at 1209. In Pikcher, the court ruled that the employee may be entitled to dam-
ages upon proof that her employer fired her because the employer believed the employee
to be the source of an uncomplimentary newspaper article. Id at 1208. The court also
concluded that the employee, a public employee, was discharged in contravention of pub-
lic policy when she was discharged for exercising her right to free speech, as long as her
speech regarded a matter of public concern. Id. See also O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d
149, 150 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (dicta) ("There are many facts which would be
pertinent . . . includ[ing] whether the [employer] knew or should have known the act in
question was illegal, the extent of (the employee's] training and qualifications[,] . . . and
generally, the reasonableness of the acts by all of the parties.").
Cases involving truck drivers who were discharged after reporting matters of safety
offer analogous fact patterns to that in Lorenz, and although employer knowledge is not
stated as an element in these common law tort actions, the employer's knowledge may
easily be implied. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390
(Ind. 1988) (at will truck driver stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge after he was
terminated for refusing to illegally transport an overweight load); Pooler v. Maine Coal
Prod., 532 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1987) (trucker failed to state a cause of action by not pointing
to a violation of motor vehicle law, only a potential violation of law); Coman v. Thomas
Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1989) (at-will trucker stated cause of action after he was
terminated for refusing to operate his truck in violation of Dept. of Transportation regula-
tions, and for refusing to falsify the logs of travel). But see Burrow v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 363 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (at-will trucker failed to state a cause of action
after being discharged for refusing to drive under allegedly unsafe conditions, because
holding every discharge for failure to perform an allegedly unsafe act as actionable "would
create a prolific and unwarranted source of trouble in the workplace"); see also Todd v.
Frank's Tong Serv., Inc., 784 P.2d 47 (Okla. 1989) (former truck driver stated a cause of
action when he was discharged for refusing to operate his truck in violation of Oklahoma
statutes prohibiting operation of motor vehicles with defective brakes, headlights and turn
signals).
174. Pitcher, 787 P.2d at 1208. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 283, 287 (1977) (Supreme Court directed the district court on remand to
apply the "same decision" test regarding whether an untenured schoolteacher was entitled
to reinstatement due to denial of First Amendment rights by the school board in its deci-
sion not to rehire the teacher). See supra note 154 (brief discussion of burden-shifting).
The burden shifting test used in discrimination cases is an alternate type of causation
test to that used in typical tort actions for wrongful discharge in state jurisdictions, but the
respective results obtained are similar: the finding of discrimination or the finding of retal-
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exists in several jurisdictions explicitly. They do not, however, provide a
sound argument to counter the proposition that employer knowledge is
inherent within a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, and that most
jurisdictions presumably treat such knowledge as implicit within the cau-
sation framework of a prima facie case of retaliatory termination.'
7 5
Once retaliation is established, it is unnecessary to prove, as the Lorenz
decision requires, that the employer knew or should have known of the
employee's belief that the directed act was illegal, fraudulent or against
clear public policy. An employer must know what she is retaliating
against the employee for. Therefore, only the first five elements of the
retaliation claim itself, as set out in Cronk 1, 176 and modified in Lorenz,1
7 7
need be proven by the employee.
Nevertheless, employment law attorneys cannot afford to overlook
the employer knowledge element simply because it is implied in the cau-
sation analysis of a retaliatory discharge. This "additional evidentiary
requirement"178 of employer knowledge of the employee's belief that a
directed act was illegal or contrary to clear public policy should not pro-
vide any unusual difficulties evidentially. Issues of hearsay should not
present serious problems regarding proof of the employer's knowledge
of the employee's act or refusal, and the subsequent retaliatory dis-
charge. The employer's business records, reports and memoranda, or
unusual absence thereof, made at or near the actual occurrence, by a
person with knowledge, in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity may disclose employer knowledge. ' 79 Likewise, depositions and
interrogatories may be used to impeach inconsistent statements by wit-
nesses or the employer.' 8 0 Because employer knowledge is a required
element of Colorado's common law tort of retaliatory discharge, hearsay
as to the employer's state of mind and motive is admissible.' 8 ' More-
over, well prepared cross-examination will also bring out employer
knowledge which may have otherwise remained undisclosed.1
8 2
E. Legislation
One solution to this common law problem may lie in legislation
containing specific definitions of protected (employee) and prohibited
(employer) conduct. Federal discrimination and whistleblowing legisla-
tion is broad in diversity, yet at the same time limited in coverage to
iation. Many times both are present in a successful and well pleaded plaintiff's case.
Thus, some valuable analogies exist in federal discrimination cases which may prove influ-
ential in state common law wrongful discharge actions.
175. Retaliatory termination, as a term of art, should include the legal and semantic
synonyms, "wrongful discharge," "whistleblowing," and "public policy exceptions" to the
at-will employment doctrine. See Callahan, supra note 20, at 485 n.26. See supra notes 127-
138 and accompanying text.
176. Cronk 1, 765 P.2d at 622.
177. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109.
178. Id. at 110.
179. COLO. R. EVID. 803(6) & 803(7).
180. CoLo. R. EVID. 801(d)(l) & 801(d)(2).
181. COLO. R. EVID. 803(3).
182. See, e.g., 7 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §§ 10, 20, 24-26 (1975 & Supp. 1992).
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specialized or protected classes. The employee who is not in a recog-
nized class or represented by a union has analogous federal law only as
secondary authority.' 8 3 While federal "whistleblowing" statutes may
183. See Callahan, supra note 20, at 484 & n.19. Callahan notes that termination is a
common element between federal statutes which provides "useful insights" in reasoning,
but is distinguishable because common law wrongful discharge involves litigation gener-
ally based on protected conduct rather than membership in a protected class. Id.
Adler & Daniels, supra note 128, at 23 & n.16, have collected (for the convenience of
those doing such research) a list, augmented in this Comment, of federal statutes which
protect employees who report violations from employer retaliation under the following
federal legislation. These statutes include: Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, 2
U.S.C. § 1212 (Supp. III 1991) (unlawful employment practices include any intimidation
of, or reprisal against, employees of the Senate by any Member, or an employee of the
Architect of the Capitol by the Architect of the Capitol, because of the employee's exercise
of a right under this Act); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1222
(1988 & Supp. III 1991) (providing protection to certain federal employees who disclose
information regarding government mismanagement, fraud, violations or dangers to the
public); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (for
"whistleblowing" civil service employees disclosing agency violations, fraud, gross mis-
management or dangers to the public); Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984,
10 U.S.C. § 1587 (1988) (for disclosures by civilian employees); Department of Defense
Authorization Act of 1987, 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (1988) (for disclosures by employees of de-
fense contractors); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1991) (for commenc-
ing or participating in a proceeding); Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986,
15 U.S.C. § 2651 (1988) (for reporting asbestos in schools); Asbestos School Hazard De-
tection and Control Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (1988) (for school employees publiciz-
ing an asbestos problem); Jurors' Employment Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878
(1991) (for federal jury service); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988) (for filing or participating in a proceeding); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988) (filing or participation in proceedings); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (for participating in proceed-
ings); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (for filing or par-
ticipating in a proceeding); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1140-1141 (1988) (for providing information or participating in proceedings); Migrant,
Seasonal and Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1991) (for ex-
ercising rights pursuant to § 1855); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 815(c) (1988) (for commencing or participating in proceedings); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293 (1991) (for filing or participation in a proceeding);
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730-3733 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (for employees disclos-
ing false claims or participating in proceedings); Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1991) (for filing or participating in a proceed-
ing); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988) (for commencing or
participating in a proceeding); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300z-10 (1991)
(for refusal to participate in sterilization, abortion or research on religious or moral
grounds); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-309 (1991) (for commencing or par-
ticipating in a proceeding); Equal Employment Opportunity Act [Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964], 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2003 (1988) (for employee opposition and for
participation in proceedings); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851
(1988) (for participating in proceedings); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971
(1991) (for commencing or participating in a proceeding); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622
(1988) (for participating in proceedings); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1988) (for providing information
or participating in proceedings); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1988)
(for providing information regarding the death or injury of an employee); Railroad Safety
Authorization Act of 1978, 45 U.S.C. § 441 (a) (1991) (for complaining, participating in a
proceeding, or refusing to work under hazardous conditions); International Safe Contain-
ers Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1991) (for reporting of unsafe containers); Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 2305 (1991) (for refusing to operate
an unsafe vehicle, complaining, or participating in a proceeding).
For more information on federal statutes, see DONALD W. BRODIE, INDIVIDUAL EM-
PLOYMENT DispuTrEs: DEFINrrE AND INDEFINrrE TERM CoNTtc'rs 231-40 (1991); Peck,
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not answer questions concerning state common law tort causation, a few
analogies are available, especially if one agrees with the argument that
any retaliatory or whistleblowing cause of action contains an implicit
employer knowledge element of causation which is proven when the re-
taliatory termination itself is proven.1
84
Colorado has a whistleblower statute to protect state employees
who disclose information regarding state agency actions which are not in
the public interest.' 85 This protection does not extend to private em-
ployees. An exception, however, exists when the employer is under con-
tract or agreement with any agency, department or entity of the State of
Colorado.' 8 6 There are, however, a significant number of states which
Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage, supra note 10, at 728-30; Summers, supra note 15, at 11-12.
See also 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:21-26 (May, 1987) (overview of federal whistleblow-
ing statutes).
184. See e.g., Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174, 180 n.4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 990 (1986) (if jury finds that the employee refused to sign what he believed to be a
false affidavit, and the employer knew the information in the affidavit was false, neverthe-
less directing the employee to sign, and then discharges the employee for refusal to sign,
such retaliation "may well be" a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act),
aff'g 573 F. Supp. 1055, 1062 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (employee asserting a wrongful discharge
cause of action must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer knew it
was requesting the employee to commit perjury or falsification).
See also Oliver v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R. 465 (1987),
aff'd, 847 F.2d 842 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In Oliver, the Merit Systems Protection Board held
that to establish a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), the employee must show that:
"(1) a protected disclosure was made; (2) the accused official knew of the claimant's disclo-
sure; (3) the adverse action under review could, under the circumstances, have been retali-
ation; and (4) after careful balancing of the intensity of the accused official's motive against
the gravity of the misconduct, a neus is established between the adverse action and the
motive." Id. at 470 (emphasis added) The board found the "official's knowledge" ele-
ment was satisfied because the employee had repeatedly transmitted memoranda to [the
employer], but the employee failed to establish the required nexus. Id. at 471. Cf Mass v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1530, 1541 (D. Colo. 1992) (in a Title VII case, the
employee failed to prove the two elements of a retaliation claim: (1) that the employee
reported the illegal conduct; and (2) that the employer retaliated; additionally, the em-
ployee's retaliation claim was not "reasonably related" to the discrimination and harass-
ment claims contained in the underlying charge).
185. COLO. REV. STAT §§ 24-50.5-101 to -107 (1988). See Ward v. Industrial Comm'n,
699 P.2d 960, 967-68 (Colo. 1985) (for Freedom of Speech violations, the Mt. Healthy
"same decision" test is applicable; see supra note 174). See also Indiv. Empl. Rights Manual
(BNA) at 546:5-7 (June, 1991), supra note 93 (other Colorado statutes prohibiting em-
ployer retaliatory discharge).
186. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-114-101 to -103 (1988 & Supp. 1992). A "private enter-
prise under contract with a state agency" is defined as:
[A]ny individual, firm, limited liability company, partnership, joint ven-
ture,corporation, association, or other legal entity which is a party to any type of
state agreement, regardless of what it may be called, for the procurement or dis-
posal of supplies, services, or construction for any department, office, commis-
sion, institution, board, or other agency of state government.
Id. § 24-114-101(4).
An "employee is defined as any person employed by a private enterprise under con-
tract with a state agency. Id. § 24-114-101(3). "Disciplinary action" includes threat of any
such discipline or penalty" (coercion) Id. § 24-114-101 (1). "Disclosure of information" is
defined as written evidence to any person, or testimony before any committee of the gen-
eral assembly regarding acts, omissions, policies, procedures or regulations by a private
enterprise under contract with a state agency "which, if not disclosed, could result in the
waste of public funds, could endanger the public health, safety or welfare, or could other-
wise adversely affect the interests of the state." Id. § 24-114-102(2). No supervisor or
appointing authority of a private enterprise under state contract "shall initiate or adminis-
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have whistleblower statutes protecting private employees. 187 Michigan
is the only state which includes a judicially supplied employer knowl-
edge "element" in a whistleblower statute which is otherwise silent as to
causation.18 8 The employer knowledge element is, however, "simply a
factor to consider in determining the principal question of causa-
tion,"'18 9 It is not a distinct element of a prima facie case, as Colorado,
along with other jurisdictions have recognized. 190
Several states require an employee to bring the alleged violation,
illegality, or unsafe condition to the attention of the employer first, al-
lowing for a reasonable opportunity to correct the situation before the
employee gains the statutory protection. 19 1 New Hampshire allows the
ter any disciplinary action against any employee on account of the employee's disclosure
of information concerning said enterprise." I § 24-114-102(1). Exceptions are provided
where the employee discloses (1) information the employee knows to be false; or (2) infor-
mation which is confidential under any other provision of law. Id. The employee seeking
protection under this statute is obliged to "make a good faith effort" to provide the infor-
mation to be disclosed to the employee's supervisor, appointing authority, or member of
the general assembly prior to disclosure of the information. Id § 12-114-102(2) (emphasis
added). Any aggrieved employee may bring a civil action under this statute in district
court. Id. § 24-114-103. The prevailing employee may recover damages, costs and "such
other relief as [the court] deems appropriate." Id.
It is arguable that had Martin Marietta been under contract in any way with the State
of Colorado, and had this statute been in existence when Lorenz was discharged (CoLo.
REV. STAT. 24-114-101 became effective on July 1988 for acts committed on or after that
date), Lorenz would have been protected under this Colorado "whistleblower" statute,
and he also would have avoided the six-step public policy tort standard set out in Lorenz,
823 P.2d at 109. To date, there is no published Colorado case law construing COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-114-101 to -103.
187. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West
1987 & Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-61 to 378-69 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (West
1988); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 181.932 (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275-E:1 to -E:7 (Supp. 1991);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 34:19-8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. LABOR LAw § 740
(McKinney 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4113.51-4113.53 (Anderson 1991); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 36-15-3 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN.
H 101.595(2), 111.322(2), 111.34(2)(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). For a thorough treat-
ment and discussion of state whistleblower statutes and their pros and cons, see Adler &
Daniels, supra note 128, at 55-68 app. A. See generally Martin W. Aron, Whistleblowers, Insub-
ordination, and Employee Rights of Free Speech, 43 LAe. L.J. 211 (1992) (comparing New Jersey
and New York statutes); John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 19 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 585 (1992) (detailed analysis of N.Y. LABOR LAw § 740 and suggestions for an
improved "model").
188. Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369 (West
1981 & Supp. 1992). Section 15.362 of the act states:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an
employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of
the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of
this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public
body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee
is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or in-
quiry held by that public body, or a court action.
189. Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575, 582 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
190. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 109; Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988).
191. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932
(West Supp. 1993); N.Y. LABOR LAw § 740 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (Anderson 1991).
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employee to bypass advising the employer if the employee specifically
believes that such reporting would not result in the employer promptly
remedying the violation.' 9 2 Likewise, New Jersey allows the employee
to forgo disclosure to the employer in an emergency, when the em-
ployee is reasonably certain that the policy or practice is known by one or
more supervisors, or when the employee fears physical harm as a result
of the disclosure.' 9 3 In cases where the employee is required to first
advise the employer to gain later statutory protection, and the employee
does so, the employer knowledge element at common law is patently
satisfied.' 9 4 Thus, a few state whistleblowing statutes provide guidance
towards a conclusion that requiring proof of employer knowledge, as in
Lorenz, is redundant; proving the causation element just by the em-
ployer's retaliatory act will suffice.
Only Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have a compre-
hensive wrongful discharge statute preempting common law actions. 19 5
Montana currently has the most comprehensive legislation in the area of
retaliatory discharge, including retaliation for the employee's refusal to
violate public policy.' 9 6 Lack of good cause and violation of the em-
ployer's own express provisions in its written personnel policies are cov-
ered as well. 19 7 There is no need for a specific chain of causation to be
proven, as all common law remedies are preempted.' 9 8 Discharges for
retaliation for refusing to violate public policy, whistleblowing, and con-
tractual breaches are statutorily covered by a one year statute of limita-
tions, and mutually agreed dispute resolution through arbitration is
provided for procedurally.199 The Virgin Islands Code sets out detailed
definitions of what is "just cause" for discharges; anything else is
deemed to be a wrongful discharge.2 0 0 Likewise, Puerto Rico legislation
contains a list of examples of "good cause." Wrongfully or construc-
tively discharged employees may recover one month's salary plus one
week's salary for each year of service.
20 1
192. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (Supp. 1991).
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
194. Providing the employee, in good faith, advises the employer as to her reasonable
belief that the employer's directed act was unlawful or against common public policy, the
employer may be said to "have notice" or "knowledge" of the employee's point of view.
Ignorance or an adverse employment decision by the employer after this notice may be
described as deliberate, intentional, or at the least, done with obvious knowledge of the
employee's perception of the disputed circumstances. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West
1988 and Supp. 1992); supra note 190-92 and accompanying text.
195. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 10, at 680 n.90 (1992).
196. MoNor. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1991).
197. Id. § 39-2-904.
198. Id. § 39-2-913.
199. Id. §§ 39-2-904, 39-2-911, 39-2-914. Proof of fraud or actual malice is necessary
to recover punitive damages. Emotional distress and pain and suffering recoveries are
eliminated. Id. § 39-2-905. For a detailed historical analysis of case law construing Mon-
tana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, see Leonard Bierman & Stuart A.
Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's Pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 53 Mowr. L. REV 53 (1992).
200. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 77-79 (Supp. 1987).
201. BRODIE, supra note 183, at 231-32 (describing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185(a)-
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While the Montana, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands statutes do not
provide insight into causation analysis, due to their preemption of com-
mon law wrongful discharge claims, they do offer valuable models of
how future statutory employment law may typically operate. With com-
mon law claims eliminated, as well as "add-on" claims of emotional dis-
tress, interference with contract, etc., the penalty for firing employees in
retaliation for their unwanted lawful behavior may become nothing more
than a minor inconvenience or a "slap-on-the-hand" fine accompanied
with a relatively low dollar figure in back pay. $500,000jury verdicts will
become as ancient a concept as a 50 cent gallon of gas. In effect, this
type of legislation represents an at-will situation, because the employer
no longer has a serious deterrent to prevent retaliatory terminations. It
may also indicate a renewed sense that the average worker is no more




Colorado's pronounced adoption of the public policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine represents a major step forward in pro-
tecting the rights and interests of the public by protecting employees
who have been terminated out of spite or lawfully protected activity, yet
leaves a potential "loophole" in the requirements for evidentiary proof
202. The Model Uiiform Employment-Termination Act, reported in 9A Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 540:21 (Dec. 1991), is also highly controversial. The final version was approved on
August 8, 1991, but a motion to draft the Act as a uniform law, which would have a uni-
form measure introduced in each state legislature was defeated. Id. See also Callahan, supra
note 20, at 516-17 (noting that the Model Law was met with much dissatisfaction from
both the plaintiff and defense groups represented). The Act, which in many ways is similar
to Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, see supra notes 196-99 and ac-
companying text, calls for either severance pay upon termination, or "good cause" to dis-
miss an at-will employee who has been employed by the same employer at least one year.
9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at § 3, 540:32-33. See also id. § 10, 540:42 (prohibiting retaliatory
discharges in connection with protected activity under the Act).
Adoption by state legislators of the Model Uniform Employment Termination Act in
the near future is unlikely. See Randall Samborn, At- Will Doctrine Under Fire; Model Act Di-
vided Employment Bar, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 14, 1991, at 1. Proponents claim the Act will level the
playing field by providing a balance between the extreme of arbitrary dismissal and costly
litigation, thus allowing for a cheap and fast remedy for being fired without just cause, and
also allowing employers to exercise business judgment in good faith in adjusting their
workforce. Other advantages include financial predictability for employers with a poten-
tial for future insurance coverage for claims like that currently found with Workers' Com-
pensation statutes. Opponents complain that mandatory arbitration, damage caps and
preemption of common law tort and contract actions will take much of the motivation away
from plaintiff's attorneys. Further, an easily insurable risk may be viewed apathetically by
the employer, and the judicial systems within a state may become flooded with claims. See
generally Kempf & Taylor, supra note 15 (proposing their own version of a Model Termina-
tion Act, similar in many respects to Montana's); Glenn D. Newman, The Model Employment
Termination Act in the United States: Lessons from the British Experience with Uniform Protections
Against Unfair Dismissal, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 393 (1990) (commentary and criticism of the
Model Uniform Employment Termination Act, and an insightful comparison with the
U.K.'s Employee Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978); 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Dis-
charge § 10, at 680-81 (1992).
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of the employer's bad conduct. 20 3 The lack of precise language in Lorenz
may be an indication that the Colorado Supreme Court wishes to retain
an equally balanced test for determining whether a prima fade case has
been met by the employee, allowing for case by case interpretations
which are particularly fact driven.
2 ° 4
An at-will employee in Colorado supposedly now has protection
from being terminated for refusing to violate specific laws for an em-
ployer, or for being denied the rights and privileges that come with citi-
zenship or the job itself. The complication in this "pro-plaintiff"
decision, is that the employee is now theoretically farther away from es-
tablishing a primafacie case then was the employee previous to this deci-
sion. While the standard expressed in Lorenz20 5 is carefully worded so
as to potentially include yet untried fact patterns, the Cronk I standard 20 6
was a "cleaner," more well-defined standard that carried a certain de-
gree of predictability in the law.
On the other hand, it seems more likely that the employer knowl-
edge element will be easily proven when the motive for the employee's
discharge is proven to be retaliatory. This is due to the theory that once
the retaliatory act itself is proven, the employer knowledge element has
been implicitly proven as well. If Colorado appellate courts accept the
argument that distinctions in wrongful discharge, public policy and
whistleblower terminology are unnecessary because they are all forms of
retaliatory discharge, the inevitable result would be agreement with the
proposition that the employer knowledge element is implicitly proven,
notwithstanding other evidence presented, whenever a retaliatory dis-
charge itself is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the
employer knowledge element is unnecessary in proving causation in a
retaliatory discharge because when a retaliatory discharge occurs, and
the reason for the employer's retaliation can be traced and proven, then
the employer either should have known, or must have known of the em-
ployee's act or refusal to act which prompted the employer's retaliation.
203. Namely, the uncertainty of how the Lorenz employer knowledge element must be
satisfied.
204. COLO. CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS 3d §§ 31:9 & 31:10 (Cur. Supp. 1993) follow the
Lorenz decision requiring the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the
elements set out in Lorenz including that the "defendant was aware or reasonably should
have been aware, that plaintiff's refusal to comply with the defendant's directive was based
on plaintiff's reasonable belief that to do so would have been (illegal) (contrary to plain-
tiff's duty as a citizen) (a violation of plaintiff's legal right or privilege as a worker)." Id.
§ 39:9. The Notes on Use for §§ 31:9 & 31:10 indicate, however, that "it is not clear
whether the requirements set forth in Lorenz were intended to apply to a situation in which
an employer discharges an employee for exercising a specific statutory right or duty with-
out any prior order or directive not to do so." Id. at 264.
The author wishes to thank the Hon. Charles Pierce, Colorado Court of Appeals, and
his staff, for the opportunity to inspect and copy these jury instructions and accompanying
notes in the "working-manuscript" form. Judge Pierce is on the Colorado Supreme Court
Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil. Thanks are also extended to Robert
Truhlar, Esq., of Truhlar & Truhlar, Denver, Colorado, for advice regarding the existence
of these recently proposed and adopted jury instructions.
205. Lorenz, 823 P.2d. at 109.
206. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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In such a situation, the employer's knowledge, whether actual or con-
structive, must be present or the discharge would not be retaliatory in
nature. Once the first five prima facie elements in Lorenz are satisfied,
then the sixth element of required employer knowledge is also proven
by implication. Should the courts in Colorado, however, continue to
maintain that the employer knowledge element is both required and im-
portant, then the courts should construe this element liberally on mo-
tions for summary judgment, and allow the jury to make this combined
factual and legal decision.
Another potential solution lies in the chambers of the Colorado
Legislature. Other states and territories have enacted legislation to pro-
tect non-unionized employees from wrongful discharge by describing
the definition of what is either "good cause" or "bad cause," and pro-
viding remedies for discharges without good cause, as well as remedies
for whistleblowing.2 0 7 Since the Lorenz court has not provided a predict-
able standard or solution to the public-policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine, it would be in the best interests of public policy and
the tax-paying voters of Colorado, for the legislature to thoroughly ad-
dress this issue, but not necessarily by following the examples of Mon-
tana or the Model Employment Termination Act. Legislation may
provide a workable long-term answer. Careful consideration, however,
will be necessary to draft a statute with the deterrence factor equal to
that of an unpredictable jury verdict.
Michael D. Wulfsohn
207. See supra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
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The majority of federal agency decisions reviewed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit during the survey period exhibited significant deference to agency
decision-making. Although judicial review of agency decision-making
was pervasive, deference to agency decisions permeated all areas of ad-
ministrative action. Part I of this Article examines the Tenth Circuit's
adherence to the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine of deference to an
agency's interpretation of its own statute. Part II discusses the distinc-
tion between substantive and interpretive rulemaking. Part III discusses
the ability of administrative agencies to create rules through adjudicative
hearings, rather than informal rulemaking procedures under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.
I. DEFERENCE To AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS: WYOMING V. ALEXANDER
A. Background
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),I numerous organic stat-
utes and the Supreme Court's non-delegation doctrine provide the basis
for judicial review of administrative decisions. 2 In devising the appro-
priate standard of review the APA does not address the level of defer-
ence accorded agency interpretation. Prior to 1984, the courts did not
take a consistent approach toward the issue of deference.3 Even the
Supreme Court seemed incapable of developing a consistent position.
Although one line of cases demonstrated deference to agency deci-
sions, 4 in a separate and equally distinct line of cases the Court con-
strued statutes and gave little or no deference to administrative agency
decisions.
5
Much of the uncertainty ended in 1984 with the Court's decision in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.6 Without ex-
plicitly overruling or disapproving of a single case, the Court defined the
level of deference the judiciary should grant administrative agencies
practicing rulemaking functions. In Chevron, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) defined the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 - 706 (1988).
2. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
307-08 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 971 (1992); Claude T. Coffman,Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes,
6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983).
4. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389
(1984); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965);
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
5. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982);Jewett v.
Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
6. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Act 7 to permit operators of polluting facilities to treat all polluting de-
vices as if they were in a single "bubble."18 The Natural Resources De-
fense Council (NRDC) and several other groups challenged the
"bubble" definition as contrary to earlier rulings of the EPA. 9 In invali-
dating the rule, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reasoned that the Clean Air Act did "not explicitly define
what Congress envisioned as a 'stationary source' "10 and that the legis-
lative history was "at best contradictory."" 1 The court then substituted
its own interpretation of the statute for that of the agency.'
2
On review, the Supreme Court reversed and set forth a two-step
framework for analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute. First,
courts must determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue."1 3 If Congress addressed the precise question
in an unambiguous fashion, the agency and the court have no choice but
to give full effect to the plain meaning of the statute. 14 Should the in-
tent of Congress be ambiguous, however, a court may only determine
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute."' 5 In devising the test, the Court relied on congressional
intent. An ambiguous statute, the Court reasoned, should be consid-
ered as an implicit legislative delegation to the administrative agency
giving it the discretion to decide which of several permissible interpreta-
tions of the statute to adopt. 16 Under Chevron there is no longer a sin-
gle, correct meaning on every point in a statute, and agencies are the
preferred gap fillers.17
Although the decision appeared to succinctly resolve much of the
confusion over agency deference, the Supreme Court's failure to con-
sistently utilize Chevron's two-step framework raised questions about its
precedential value.' 8 Likewise, an analysis of appellate court decisions
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1988).
8. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. This lenient definition of "stationary source" exempted
replacements of individual pieces of equipment from the EPA's standards so long as the
total emissions level of the facility did not increase above a certain level. Id.
9. Id. at 841.
10. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
i1. Id. at 726 n.39.
12. Relying on the "purposes of the non-attainment program" and two earlier deci-
sions, ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court of appeals found the bubble definition
inconsistent with the statute's purpose of ameliorating, rather than merely maintaining, air
quality. NRDC, 685 F.2d at 726-27.
13. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
14. Id. at 842-43.
15. Id. at 843.
16. Id. at 844.
17. With this newly devised two-step analysis, the Court concluded that the D.C. Cir-
cuit should not have addressed whether the "bubble" definition was inappropriate or in-
consistent with the policies underlying the statute. Id. at 845. Instead, the inquiry should
have been "whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this
particular program is a reasonable one." Id.
18. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-448 (1987) (limiting Chevron to
those situations where an agency must apply a legal standard to particular facts); Merrill,
supra note 3, at 981 (suggesting the Supreme Court has applied the Chevron framework to
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reveals a similar lack of consistency in following the Chevron frame-
work. 19 In its most recent term, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two admin-
istrative agency decisions and specifically addressed the question of
deference. 20 In both cases, the court applied the Chevron analysis in
reaching its decision.
B. Agency Action
In Wyoming v. Alexander 2 l the state sought review of the final deci-
sion of the United States Department of Education (DOE) requiring Wy-
oming to refund federal vocational education funds received under the
Vocational Education Act Amendment (VEA).22 The state obtained the
funds pursuant to a federal "grant-in-aid" for vocational education ad-
ministered by the DOE under the VEA,2 3 which allowed states to draw
from predetermined grants for local schools on an as-needed basis.24 A
key condition of the VEA, and the subject of the suit, was the require-
ment that Wyoming, as the receiving state, set-aside ten percent of the
total funds it utilized for handicapped students and twenty percent for
disadvantaged and non-English speaking students.
25
The DOE audited Wyoming's use of funds allocated under the VEA
in 1984 and found violations of the set-aside requirements. 2 6 Based
upon this report, the Assistant Secretary for Vocational and Adult Edu-
cation required the state to return $201,922.27 Although the state ad-
mitted to the misapplication of $16,363, it sought review of the Assistant
Secretary's ruling before the agency's Education Appeal Board (EAB).28
only half of the cases presenting questions of deference); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern
Jurisprudence And The Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 646, 688-703
(1988) (discussing the failure of Chevron to effectuate significant changes in the relation-
ship between courts and agencies).
19. See Continental Training Servs., Inc. v. Cavazos, 893 F.2d 877, 885-86 (7th Cir.
1990) (reiterating the Cardoza-Fonseca view that Chevron does not apply to every case involv-
ing agency deference); Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (statutory construction issues dictate courts use "traditional tools of statutory
construction to ascertain congressional intent"); UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 765 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (courts need not defer to agency opinions on ambiguous statutory provisions if
the issues involve "a pure question of statutory construction"); Peter H. Schuck & E. Don-
ald Elliott, To The Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 984, 1040-41, 1059 (providing an analysis of decisions which have followed or di-
verged from the Chevron framework); see also Hon. Patricia M. Wald et al., The Contribution of
the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 530 (1988) (discussing the D.C.
Circuit's increased use of Cardoza-Fonseca).
20. In addition to Wyoming v. Alexander, 971 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1992), discussed
immediately below, the Tenth Circuit also addressed deference towards an agency in
Furr's/Bishop's Cafeterias, L.P. v. INS, 976 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1992).
21. 971 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1992).
22. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301 - 2471 (1988 & Supp. II 1992).
23. Alexander, 971 F.2d at 533.
24. Id. at 534. Pursuant to the VEA, Wyoming was allotted $1,110,314 in 1979 and
$1,062,848 in 1980. Of these funds, Wyoming withdrew all but $61,304 in 1979 and with-




28. Id. at 534-35.
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The EAB reviewed the Secretary's decision and, while finding some
rulings untenable, held DOE was entitled to a refund of $87,859 for
misapplication of funds.2 9 The Secretary of Education refused to alter
this decision and the state petitioned for review by the Tenth Circuit.30
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Wyoming did not dispute the facts, but did contest the calculation
of the refund. The state contended that the proper interpretation of the
set-aside requirement called for thirty percent of every dollar utilized to
be applied to the targeted student groups.3 ' Wyoming also argued that
thirty percent of any remaining, unspent funds at the end of the year
should be offset or "credited" against any shortages in the required ap-
plication to the targeted groups.
3 2
In contrast, the EAB interpreted the set-aside restriction to require
states to spend allocated funds only on targeted students until the mini-
mum per centum of the total grant was reached. 33 Only then could Wy-
oming spend the remaining funds on other approved, untargeted
student groups.
3 4
These two conflicting, although rational, interpretations of the set-
aside restriction resulted from the absence of express congressional lan-
guage on the question.3 5 In resolving the dispute, the Tenth Circuit
found no previous judicial interpretation of the statute.3 6 The court
found that, while sparse, the legislative history supported EAB's deci-
sion.3 7 The court specifically relied on: (1) the title to the VEA section
that read "National Priority Programs"; 3 8 (2) a Senate Committee state-
ment that "[t]hese particular set-asides were established to provide a
base amount each State must use for programs for students with special needs
. . .";s9 and (3) a Senate Committee statement that, "given the limited
amount of federal assistance available, it is the Committee's intent that scarce
dollars will be first devoted to those with greatest needs."' 40 Recognizing the
inconclusiveness of the statements, the court noted that "the rationale
supporting the EAB's initial decision is not as well developed as it might
29. Id. at 535.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 536-37 n.7.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 537.
34. Id. Technically, the order in which these funds were spent did not matter, but the
EAB's rationale directly affected the computation of the refund. In theory, the EAB's in-
terpretation held that if the total grant equaled $100 and at least $30 was spent on
targeted groups, how much more of the remaining $70 the state spent on any approved
program was not relevant. However, if the state spent only $80 in total, allocating thirty
percent, or $24 to targeted students, it had misapplied $6 and would be penalized accord-
ingly. The EAB's interpretation accounted for fines totaling $25,633 more than the inter-
pretation Wyoming asked the court to accept. Id.
35. See e.g., S. REP. NO. 882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
36. Alexander, 971 F.2d at 537 n.9.
37. Id.
38. Id. (emphasis in original case) (referencing 20 U.S.C. § 2310 (1988)).
39. Id. (emphasis in original case) (referencing S. REP. No. 882, supra note 40, at 57).




Aside from the legislative history, the court acknowledged that
Chevron dictated a "narrow and deferential" standard of review.
4 2
Although it upheld EAB's interpretation, the court expressed uncer-
tainty as to whether the interpretation was a permissible construction of
the VEA statute. The court acknowledged that, absent an unreasonable
agency interpretation of a statute, its own view of the proper equitable
outcome was irrelevant. 43 The court thus concluded "that the EAB ac-
ted within the intent of Congress by holding Wyoming liable for its fail-




The various circuit courts inconsistently apply the Chevron doc-
trine.4 5 Despite the court's uncertainty with the EAB's actions, the ap-
plication of the doctrine in Alexander illustrates the prevalence of Chevron
in the Tenth Circuit.
The court alluded that its own view of the best interpretation of the
statutory language was not the same as that adopted by the EAB. 46 The
court's statements that "[t]he EAB has made a reasonable interpretation
of the VEA, to which we must defer" 4 7 and that "[t]he EAB interpreta-
tion reasonably and permissibly comports with the apparent intent of
Congress" 4 8 may be a veiled indication that, in the court's eyes, the EAB
did not make the most correct reasonable interpretation. A court fol-
lowing the Chevron doctrine could just as easily have found the EAB's
interpretation an unreasonable construction of the statute. For exam-
ple, the court could have held the state unambiguously requires the in-
terpretation advanced by Wyoming and that, therefore, EAB's
interpretation was unreasonable. Such a finding would have justified re-
versing EAB's decision.
The rationale for a finding of an unreasonable construction of the
statute is supported by subsequent congressional action. Prior to 1985,
Congress did not specifically outline the process for calculating set-aside
refunds. 49 In 1988, however, Congress amended the statute prospec-
tively to address the specific issue presented in Alexander. The amend-
ment, as codified, holds that states misappropriating funds "shall be
required to return funds in an amount that is proportionate to the ex-
tent of the harm its violation caused to an identifiable Federal interest
associated with the program under which the recipient received the
41. Id. at 537.
42. Id. at 536.
43. Id. (citing Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 646 (1985)).
44. Id. at 536-37.
45. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
47. Alexander, 971 F.2d at 539 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
49. Id. n.8.
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award." 50 Wyoming's 1984 violation date precluded application of the
1988 amendment to this case. The purpose of the amendment was pre-
sumptively to rectify EAB interpretations that were inconsistent with
congressional intent or simply viewed by legislators as unfair or irra-
tional. Regardless of remedial congressional acts regarding the EAB,
Alexander illustrates the pervasiveness of the Chevron doctrine in the
Tenth Circuit.
II. SUBSTANTIVE V. INTERPRETIVE RULEMAKING: ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTERS, INC. V. FAA
A. Background
In Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 51 the Tenth Circuit had no
difficulty deciding whether a rule promulgated by an agency was sub-
stantive or interpretive. The court's ease in making this decision, how-
ever, should not downplay the confusion that often surrounds this
question and the important ramifications of interpretive rules on af-
fected parties.
In the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress recognized a differ-
ence between substantive and interpretive rules.5 2 Substantive rules are
those that create or change rights, duties or obligations. 53 Interpretive
rules, in contrast, simply explain and clarify existing laws. They repre-
sent an agency's statement of its construction of the rule. 54 Although
substantive rules, prior to adoption, require notice and comment proce-
dures defined by the APA, 55 interpretive rules do not.5 6 The notice and
comment requirement allows interested parties to express their views to
the agency and to influence the decision-making process. This require-
ment adds the "elements of openness, accountability, and legitimacy" to
the rulemaking process.
5 7
An interpretive rule requires only that the agency publish its deci-
sion in the Federal Register after adoption. 58 An interested party has no
right to participate in the decision-making process. The difference in
procedural approach between substantive and interpretive rules arises
out of practical necessity. Congressional delegation of the administra-
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1234b(a)(1) (1988).
51. Id.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). See also 2 KENNETH C. DAViS, Ar)MINiSTRATiVE LAW TREA-
TISE §§ 7.8-.13 (2d ed. 1978).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking And Regulatory
Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 383; PeterJ. Henning, An Analysis Of The General Statement Of
Policy Exception To Notice and Comment Procedures, 73 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1009 (1985).
54. Asimow, supra note 53, at 383; Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretive Rules With Legislative
Effect; An Analysis And A Proposal For Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 346.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) - (c) (1988).
56. The APA specifically exempts "interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1988).
57. Asimow, supra note 53, at 402; see Henning, supra note 53, at 1012.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1988).
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tion of statutes to agencies implicitly requires gap-filling measures. 59 In
theory, this interpretive power does not create difficulties for interested
parties because agency findings merely clarify existing law and unfavora-
ble interpretations can be challenged in court. 60 Under Chevron,6 1 both
types of rules receive equal deference 62 and, as a result, they often have
the same practical impact.63 Although not. legally binding on parties, an
interpretive rule generally represents the agency's final position, invok-
ing deference by the courts. 64 The importance of the distinction be-
tween substantive and interpretive rules arose last year in the Tenth
Circuit.
B. Agency Action
Rocky Mountain Helicopters operates an emergency medical evacu-
ation service on call both day and night.6 5 In 1989, Rocky Mountain
notified the FAA of its intent to use night vision enhancement devices
(night vision goggles) in its operations. 66 Night vision goggles are used
primarily in military operations. 6 7 The local Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO) of the FAA prohibited use of the goggles and notified
Rocky Mountain that its operations specifications would be amended ac-
cordingly. 68 Upon Rocky Mountain's protest, the FSDO reaffirmed its
position after consulting both regional and national FAA personnel. 69
Rocky Mountain submitted written arguments about the amendment but
contended that the FAA impaired its ability to respond by failing to be
specific about the grounds for the decision. 70 Rejecting the arguments,
the FSDO amended Rocky Mountain's operating specifications as
proposed.
7 l
In response, Rocky Mountain filed for reconsideration with the
59. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974); see also Asimow, supra note 53, at
385; Saunders, supra note 54, at 350.
60. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Saunders, supra note 54, at
346 n.5.
61. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(see supra text accompanying notes 16-21 for reiteration of the Chevron test); Saunders,
supra note 54, at 356.
62. Asimow, supra note 53, at 389. The author states "[b]ecause both legislative and
interpretive rules frequently explain the meaning of language, there is no obvious way to
determine whether an agency with legislative rulemaking power has made 'new law' or
interpreted 'existing law.' " Id. at 394 (citation omitted). See also Note, A Functional Ap-
proach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act to Agency Statements of
Policy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 434-35 n.24 (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the distinction between interpretive and substantive
rules is "enshrouded in considerable smog"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985).
63. Asimow, supra note 53, at 384.
64. Id. at 385. See also supra the text accompanying notes 7-20 discussing Chevron test
of deference to agency decisions.








DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
FAA's Director of Flight Standards Service, 72 asserting that the FAA had
violated the notice and comment requirement of the APA because the
amendment constituted substantive rulemaking. 73 Citing safety con-
cerns regarding night vision goggles, the Director denied Rocky Moun-
tain's request for reconsideration. 7 4 Rocky Mountain appealed the
decision.
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit had to decide whether the FAA's rulemaking
procedure regarding Rocky Mountain Helicopters was substantive or, as
the FAA argued, interpretative and a "reasonable interpretation of...
existing statutes."' 75 Specifically, FAA argued that since the APA does
not require notice and comment procedures when an agency promul-
gates interpretive rules, it was under no duty to allow Rocky Mountain
the opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process. 7 6 Rocky
Mountain argued that it was entitled to the benefit of notice and com-
ment procedures because the FAA has substantive rulemaking
authority.
7 7
The Tenth Circuit utilized definitions of substantive versus inter-
pretive rulemaking drawn from its earlier holding in Knutzen v. Eben Ezer
Lutheran Housing Center.78 The court began its analysis by defining a sub-
stantive rule as one "promulgated pursuant to a direct delegation of leg-
islative power by Congress [that] changes existing law, policy, or
practice."'7 9 An interpretive rule is one which either is "made by an
agency having no authority to issue a substantive rule" 80 or, if issued by
an agency with the requisite authority to issue a substantive rule, "at-
tempts to clarify an existing rule but does not change existing law, pol-
icy, or practice." 8 1 The court noted, however, the existence of other
approaches: "whether [the] rule affects individual rights and obliga-
tions," 82 "whether [the] rule depends on a statute for substantive mean-
ing or is in itself substantive,"' 83 "whether [the] rule will create new law,
72. Id. FAA agency decisions may be appealed to the agency director. 14 C.F.R.
§ 135.17(d) (1992).
73. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d at 546; see supra text accompanying notes 52-
57.
74. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d at 546. The FAA based its decision on 14
C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (1989) prohibiting the careless or reckless operation of an aircraft, and
14 C.F.R. § 135.17(d) (1989) allowing the amendment of a licensee's operations specifica-




78. 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987).
79. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d at 546 (citing Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran
Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir. 1987)).
80. Id. at 547.
81. Id. at 546-47.
82. Id. at 547 n.2 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
83. Id. (citing Rochna v. NTSB 929 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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rights, or duties,"8 4 "whether [the] rule [is] issued in [the] form of an
explanation," 85 and "whether [the] rule has substantial impact on those
it affects."
'86
The court acknowledged the viability of Rocky Mountain's claim by
noting that the FAA's substantive rulemaking authority was "undis-
puted."' 87 Given the FAA's powers, the court reasoned that the "deter-
minative question here is whether prohibiting the use of night vision
goggles constitutes a change in existing law, policy, or practice."8 8
Rocky Mountain asserted that the FAA's determination changed ex-
isting law, policy, or practice since the FAA had not previously prohib-
ited the use of night vision goggles in civil aviation.8 9 Rocky Mountain
relied on the fact that, although night vision goggles were not previously
used in civil aviation, the FAA had not specifically prohibited them.90
Spending little time analyzing Rocky Mountain's rationale, however, the
court simply stated that "[n]ight vision goggles . . .have never been
allowed in civil aviation." 9 1 Surprisingly, this brief conclusive statement
comprised the court's entire rationale. The court thus held that the
FAA's actions did not change existing law, policy, or practice.
92
D. Analysis
Although it had little difficulty reaching a decision, the court ac-
knowledged that the confusion afflicted not only agencies and parties
affected by agency rulemaking, but also the courts. The court recog-
nized numerous variant styles of judicial determination of the substan-
tive-versus-interpretive question and noted that "[t]his lack of a uniform
approach may attest to the difficulty of the determination."
'93
The court's recognition of the confusion surrounding the determi-
nation of a rule's substantive or interpretive nature reflects the view that
"the distinction between the two types of rules is 'enshrouded in consid-
erable smog.' 94 Moreover, the APA provides no explicit solution.9 5
That substantive and interpretative rules often have the same practical
effect on the public compounds the problem. 96 The original justifica-
84. Id. (citing General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1074 (1985)).
85. Id. (citing Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
86. Id. (citing 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.16 (2d ed.
1979)).
87. Id. at 547. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1421 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).




92. Id. The Tenth Circuit vacated the FAA's decision and remanded the case back to
FAA, however, for its failure to demonstrate that the factual findings underlying its inter-
pretation were supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 547-48.
93. Id. at 547 n.2; see supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
94. La Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1177 (1st Cir. 1992) (quot-
ing General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied
471 U.S. 1074 (1985)).
95. Henning, supra note 53, at 1008.
96. Asimow, supra note 53, at 384.
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tion for allowing interpretive rulemaking-that it does not affect one's
rights, duties or obligations-is often a moot point. Since courts are
inclined to give deference to agency decisions, a challenge of an inter-
pretive rule, such as Rocky Mountain's, is likely to be fruitless.
The Tenth Circuit's deference to agency proclamations of a rule as
substantive or interpretive is unlikely to change in the future. The im-
position of notice and comment requirements on all rulemaking would
discourage agencies from making any interpretive rules. The argument
that the additional workload and costs and decreased efficiency would
encourage agencies to proceed only in an ad hoc manner is well rea-
soned.9 7 Although some interested parties will be detrimentally ex-
cluded from participation in agency decision-making, the overall
efficiency of interpretive rules and the expected undesirable agency re-
action to mandatory notice and comment requirements argues for the
continuance of interpretive rulemaking. The Tenth Circuit's brief analy-
sis in Rocky Mountain illustrates courts' continuing acceptance of inter-
pretive rules.
III. RULEMAKING THROUGH ADJUDICATION: NUNEz-PENA v. INS
A. Background
An administrative agency's ability to make rules flows from a con-
gressional delegation of legislative power.9 8 In the landmark 1947 rul-
ing SEC v. Chenery Corp. ,99 the Supreme Court held that a federal
administrative agency may announce new rules of law in an adjudicatory
hearing and apply those rules to the parties before it.l°° Chenery became
the first Supreme Court case to expressly validate the development of
rules in what resembled a common law approach.
Under the APA agencies make rules through either quasi-legislative
or adjudicatory procedures.' 0 ' The APA, however, does not provide
detailed guidelines for the specific use of either set of procedures. 102 In
Chenery, the Supreme Court held that the choice of utilizing rulemaking
or adjudicative procedures "lies primarily in the informed discretion of
the administrative agency. ' 10 3
Adjudicatory and quasi-legislative rules differ significantly. Quasi-
legislative rulemaking promulgates rules of "general or particular appli-
cability and future effect" 104 and requires an agency to follow notice and
97. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 48 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (agencies often have the choice of proceeding in an ad hoc manner or by issuing
policy statements); Asimow, supra note 53, at 386; Henning, supra note 53, at 1013; Saun-
ders, supra note 54, at 369.
98. Ron Beal, Ad Hoc Rulemaking In Texas: The Scope Of Judicial Review, 42 BAYLOR L.
REV. 459, 463 (1990).
99. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
100. Id. at 202-04.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553, 554 (1988).
102. Edward R. Leahy, Comment, Rule-Making And Adjudication In Administrative Policy
Making: NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 64, 69 (1969).
103. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
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comment procedures. 105 Adjudicative procedures require an adversary
proceeding, including notice of the issues, responsive pleading, a hear-
ing and a decision. 10 6 Adjudicatory rules do not require notice and
comment procedures.' 0 7 Standing requirements and the lack of notice
and comment prohibit other interested parties from affecting the deci-
sion-making process. Theoretically, an adjudicative rule binds only the
parties to the action.' 0 8 Since agencies are likely to follow past deci-
sions in a stare decisis manner, however, these "adjudicative decisions
take on the status of rules."' 0 9 Although adjudicative rules are consid-
ered precedent without specific application to nonparty individuals,
"there will be many instances when compliance is expected without fur-
ther order."' " 0 Individual case decisions may create either narrow or
broad precedential effects. " I
Quasi-legislative rules have the force of law,' 12 while adjudicative
rules have the effect of precedent." 3 Agencies may use precedent to
distinguish, modify or overrule prior decisions."l 4 Subsequently, a non-
party to an agency hearing may be penalized for failing to comply with a
prior adjudicative rule.' 15 In 1992, the applicability of an adjudicative
rule to a nonparty arose in the Tenth Circuit.
105. Id. § 553(b) - (c); see supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
106. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 554 grants to private
parties the right to adjudication and outlines the required elements of notice to such hear-
ings and the opportunities for presentation provided to the parties. Section 556 outlines
government representation and the powers of agency employees at such hearings and as-
signs the burden of proof. Section 557 addresses initial decisions, agency review of deci-
sions and the record. Id.
107. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 745 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (discussing when ad hoc rulemaking is a justifiable exception to the general
requirement of notice and comment rulemaking); Ron Beal, Ad Hoc Rulemaking: Texas Style,
41 BAYLOR L. REV. 101, 128 (1989); Russell L. Weaver, Cheney I1: A Forty-Year Retrospective,
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 161, 167 (1988). The ability of agencies to create rules without notice
and comment procedures has evoked much criticism. See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Federal
APA And State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 326-34 (1986); J. Skelly Wright, The
Courts And The Rulemaking Process: The Limits OfJudicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 376
(1974).
108. Leahy, supra note 102, at 71-72; Beal, supra note 98, at 464.
109. Weaver, supra note 107, at 200; see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
765-66 (1969) (ad hoc rules serve as a guide for future agency decisions); Beal, supra note
101, at 464. But see, James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation Is Viewed As A
Legal Institution, 3 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 191-93 (1966).
110. Weaver, supra note 107 at 204; see Mehta v. INS, 574 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1978)
(relief denied because petitioner should have been aware of previous agency decision and
responded accordingly); Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. United States, 648 F.2d 1305,
1311 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (previous agency interpretation of regulation applies to present case).
111. Weaver, supra note 107, at 200-01.
112. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d
1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1984).
113. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969); Ruangswang v. INS,
591 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1978); American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1329-30
(5th Cir. 1970).
114. Weaver, supra note 107, at 202-03; Beal, supra note 98, at 464.
115. Weaver, supra note 107, at 202-03.
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B. Facts: Nunez-Pena v. INS 116
In 1987 Ruben Nunez-Pena, a resident alien of the United States,
was convicted of illegally using a telephone for drug trafficking and falsi-
fying tax returns to hide drug profits.'" He was paroled after serving
almost two years in prison."i8 The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) moved to deport Nunez-Pena. 119 Found deportable by an
immigration judge, his application for waiver of deportation was de-
nied.120 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed the peti-
tioner's claim under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationalization Act (INA).121 Pursuant to this section, the BIA balanced
"'the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a perma-
nent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in
his behalf.' "122 The BIA required the petitioner to " 'introduce addi-
tional offsetting favorable evidence, which in some cases may have to
involve unusual or outstanding equities,' " in support of his petition to
remain in the United States. 123 The BIA affirmed the INS decision or-
dering Nunez-Pena deported.'
24
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Nunez-Pena argued that the BIA improperly required him to meet
the "unusual or outstanding equities" test.' 25 Normally, the BIA bases
its deportability decision on a balance between the alien's undesirability
as a resident and the humanistic hardships of deportation.126 The BIA
also uses the unusual or outstanding equities test in cases involving seri-
ous criminal acts. 12 7 Nunez-Pena claimed he was not subject to the out-
standing equities rule because the INS had devised it through
adjudication and not rulemaking. 128 The court acknowledged that,
although other circuits had recognized the outstanding equities princi-
ple,129 the precise argument had not been previously considered.'
30
The Tenth Circuit, by deferring to the agency's application of the
outstanding equities rule, upheld the use of adjudicative rules by the
116. 956 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 224.
118. Id.
119. Id. The INS acted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1 1) (1988).
120. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 224.
121. Id. at 225. This portion of the INA has been utilized for both exclusion and depor-
tation proceedings. Id.
122. Id. (quoting In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978) (interim dec.)).
123. Id. (quoting In re Buscemi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 628, 633 (BIA 1988) (interim dec.)).
124. Id. at 224.




129. See Cordoba-Chaves v. INS, 946 F.2d 1244, 1246-47 (7th Cir. 1991); Blackwood
v. INS, 803 F.2d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 1986).
130. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 225.
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INS. The court reiterated the Chenery 131 holding that an agency has the
discretion to proceed by general quasi-legislative rule or by individual
ad hoc rulemaking through adjudication.13 2 Additionally, the court
noted that " '[a]djudicated cases may and do.. . serve as vehicles for the
formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced
therein.' -133 The court upheld the outstanding equities standard since
"[a]n agency 'is not precluded from asserting new principles in an adju-
dicative proceeding.' "34
The Tenth Circuit did note that the agency's use of adjudicative
rulemaking could violate an individual's rights where the INS added an
element to a regulation which had been specifically eliminated during
prior rulemaking, 13 5 or where undue hardship resulted to those relying
on previous rules when the INS had abruptly changed its rule.136 The
court reasoned that Nunez-Pena had adequate notice of the outstanding
equities standard since it had been formulated and applied in adjudica-
tions well before his petition.1
3 7
D. Analysis
Criticism of adjudicative rulemaking centers on the lack of public
participation in the rulemaking process and on the lack of notice of new
rules. Adjudicative proceedings, like their judicial counterparts, only
permit parties to the action to participate.' 38 This precludes other in-
terested parties, although affected by a new rule, from participating in
the decision-making process. The lack of a requirement for APA notice
and comment procedures in adjudicative rulemaking insulates agencies
from public participation.
A party's lack of notice of what specific adjudicative precedent may
be applied to its particular case is troubling. Since adjudicative rules are
easily distinguished and amended, a party may have difficulty preparing
their case since "black letter" law does not arise from adjudicative pre-
cedent.' 3 9 Subsequently, a party to an adjudicative hearing may find
itself in violation of an amended rule that previously did not encompass
its operations.
Judicial review of agency action also encourages agencies to use ad-
131. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see supra text accompanying notes 98-
103.
132. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 225. The Tenth Circuit has generally followed Chenery.
See, Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 927 (10th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. American
Can Co., 658 F.2d 746, 758 (10th Cir. 1981). But see First Bancorp v. Board of Governors,
728 F.2d 434, 438 (10th Cir. 1984).
133. Nunez-Pena, 956 F.2d at 225 (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 765
(1969)).
134. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)).
135. Id. (referring to Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980)).
136. Id. (referring to Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 43-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
137. Id.
138. Weaver, supra note 107, at 165. See generally NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969) (agencies should balance the positive and negative attributes of quasi-
legislation and adjudication in selecting a decision-making process).
139. Beal, supra note 98, at 473.
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judicative rulemaking. Agencies find that: (1) rules promulgated
through quasi-legislative procedures are more susceptible to judicial
scrutiny; (2) adjudicative rules can be amended or overruled more easily,.
than quasi-legislative rules; and (3) adjudicative rules can be retroactive
in application.14 0 Simply stated, adjudication offers a safer means of
rulemaking for an agency.
The Tenth Circuit, or any other court for that matter, is unlikely to
restrict application of adjudicative rules, notwithstanding the criticism
aimed at the rules. Ad hoc rulemaking allows flexibility, responsiveness
and creativity in solving the daily intricacies of administration. The
drafters of quasi-legislative rules cannot practically anticipate all possi-
ble circumstances. Ambiguity and vagueness in statutes allows agencies
to mold decisions under varying circumstances to effectuate fairness.
The Supreme Court has stated that "not every principle essential to the
effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately
into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own
development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unfore-
seeable situations."'' 1 Nunez-Pena illustrates the Tenth Circuit's defer-
ence to an agency's choice of rulemaking procedures and the force of
law given to adjudicative rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
During 1992, the Tenth Circuit favored judicial review of adminis-
trative agency decision-making. Although judicial review provided
checks against agency discretion, deference to agency decision-making
dominated. This deference permeated all areas of administrative deci-
sion-making, including an agency's interpretation of its own statute, an
agency's determination of whether it was creating substantive law or
simply interpreting it and the relatively unfettered ability of agencies to
create rules through adjudicative hearings.
John C. Haas
140. Leahy, supra note 102, at 75.




This Survey examines three recent Tenth Circuit opinions that in-
terpret and apply the federal antitrust laws. These cases were selected
either because they contained unclear analysis or because the standards
articulated were contrary to decisions reached in other courts.
In the first case, Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc.,I the court of appeals
held that employees of an airline allegedly driven into bankruptcy by a
competitor lacked standing to assert antitrust claims against the compet-
itor. The court determined that the employees did not establish anti-
trust injury by their loss of employment and that any possible injury was
indirect.
The second case, City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co.,2 ad-
dressed tying arrangements and the essential facilities doctrine as a
means of showing antitrust violations in the retail natural gas industry.
The Tenth Circuit held that several cities, which had purchased natural
gas from the defendant gas company, failed to show a "severe handicap"
for purposes of recovery under the essential facilities doctrine. Also, the
cities could not prevail on a theory of an illegal tying arrangement be-
tween the use of the pipeline and the purchase of gas since they did not
show that the gas company had acted in concert with any other entity.
The third case, TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Tele-
vision, Inc. ,3 analyzes the proper definition of the relevant market in the
monopolization context. The court of appeals held that a cable televi-
sion programmer could not violate the Sherman Act by virtue of the
natural monopoly that it held over its own product. The court refused
to accept the plaintiffs characterization of the relevant market as one
cable television channel.
This Survey also discusses the implications of the Supreme Court's
recent decision, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,4 for
these Tenth Circuit cases. In particular, the Survey will focus on the
impact of the Kodak decision on the standards articulated in Chanute re-
garding tying arrangements, and in TV Communications Network regarding
the relevant product market.
1. 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 464 (1992).
2. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV). This case
was part of a series of cases between these parties, which included: City of Chanute v.
Williams Natural Gas Co., 678 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Kan. 1988) (Chanute I); City of Chanute
v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,967 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 1990)
(Chanute II); and City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan.
1990) (Chanute 111). Chanute IV affirmed Chanute II and Chanute IlI.
3. 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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II. ANTITRUST STANDING
In Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc. ,5 the Tenth Circuit analyzed the ability
of employees to obtain relief under the antitrust laws for alleged illegal
behavior directed at their employer by a competitor. The court rejected
such a suit against the competitor primarily because the employees were
unable to show antitrust injury, and therefore, lacked standing. 6
Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits the recovery of damages by any
person "injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws." '7 Section 16 of the Clayton Act entitles any
person threatened with "loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws" to obtain an injunction.8 These sections confer on private parties
the power to enforce the federal antitrust laws, which primarily consist
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.9
Despite the broad language of the Clayton Act, a plaintiffs standing
to sue for monetary damages is subject to several limitations. First, the
plaintiff must show injury to his business or property.10 Second, the
plaintiff must establish an antitrust injury. 1 I Third, the plaintiffs injury
must not be too remote.' 2 The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit
have incorporated these general limitations into a multi-factor standard.
Courts should consider: the causal connection between the alleged anti-
trust violation and the harm; the defendant's intent or motivation;
whether the claimed injury is one sought to be redressed by antitrust
laws; the directness of the connection between the plaintiffs injury and
the market restraint resulting from the alleged antitrust violation; the
speculative nature of the damages claimed; and the risk of duplicative
recoveries or complex damages apportionment.' 3 These requirements
are questions of law the court must analyze before determining that a
plaintiff has standing to sue for antitrust damages.' 4
5. 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 464 (1992).
6. Id. at 407.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
8. Id. § 26.
9. The term "any person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and as-
sociations. Id. § 12(a). A successful plaintiff may recover treble damages, costs, reason-
able attorney fees, and possibly prejudgment interest. Id. § 15(a).
10. Id. § 15(a). The Court has construed the term "business" broadly to mean "com-
mercial interests or enterprises." See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264
(1972).
11. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 406-07; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122
(1986) (showing of damage or loss "due merely to increased competition does not consti-
tute" antitrust injury); Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 544 (1983) (risk of duplicative recoveries and the complexity of
apportionment of damges); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 (1982) (injury
must not be too remote); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (plaintiff must show more than the alleged injury's causal link to the market
violation).
14. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV). Antitrust
standing differs from Article III standing, which requires an injury in fact sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional jurisdictional requirements. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 502-08 (1975) (a plaintiff seeking to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must
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Although the Tenth Circuit has recently begun to consider the
multi-factor standards, it still essentially utilizes a two-prong test to de-
termine standing in antitrust cases. 15 To meet the first prong, the plain-
tiff must allege an antitrust injury, 16 which is an "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful.' 17 Injury requires a reduction in com-
petition. Thus the Supreme Court has denied relief to plaintiffs whose
claimed injury resulted from heightened rather than lessened competi-
tion.18 Courts have found antitrust injury lacking in cases where the
plaintiff's injury was deemed to be wholly unrelated to the alleged anti-
trust violation,19 or where the defendant's conduct injured the plaintiff
but had no effect on competition.2 0 Moreover, a violation of antitrust
laws without injury to the plaintiff has not been sufficient to confer
standing.
2 '
Even with the requisite injury, a party may still not be a proper
plaintiff under section 4 of the Clayton Act if the injury is too remote.
22
Thus, under the second, prong of the Tenth Circuit's antitrust standing
test, the plaintiff must show that the antitrust injury resulted directly from
defendant's violation of antitrust laws.2 3 This standard has mainly
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that such practices actually harmed the plain-
tiff). See generally William E. Mooz, Jr., Tenth Circuit Antitrust Law: Recent Developments and
Possible Future Trends, 69 DENv. U. L. REV. 807, 807-08 (1992) (Article III standing require-
ments must be satisfied before court can address antitrust standing).
15. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 652; see also Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2 (the multi-factor
standard validates, but gives more specificity to, the inquiry of the Tenth Circuit's two-part
test).
16. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2. Professors Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp
state that requiring antitrust injury serves two important functions:
[First, it] forces the parties and the court to reason closely about the nature of the
antitrust violation alleged in order to test whether the injury and damages
claimed by the plaintiff match the rationale for finding any violation in the first
place .... The second, and more particular, function of the antitrust injury re-
quirement is to make clear that injuries resulting from [increased] competition
will not support either damage or equity actions by private parties under the anti-
trust laws.
PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 334.2a (Supp. 1992).
17. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489. The Court reiterated this requirement in a later
decision in which it held that the antitrust injury requirement must be satisfied in private
equity suits as well as in damage actions. Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 110-12.
18. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1891-92
(1990); Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 116; Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488.
19. See, e.g., Fischer v. NWA, Inc., 883 F.2d 594, 600 (8th Cir. 1989) (losses resulted
from elimination of schedule redundancy, not Northwest Airline's acquisition of market
power), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
20. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTrRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 652 (3d ed. 1992)
(hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST SECToN).
21. Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1983).
22. Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 110 n.5.
23. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2; see also Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 899
F.2d 951, 962 n.15 (10th Cir.) ("An injury which is merely causally linked in some way to
an alleged antitrust violation is insufficient."), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990). The req-
•uisite causality requirement has customarily been analyzed under either of two alternative
tests: (1) was the plaintiff's injury direct or (2) was the plaintiff within the target area of
the defendant's violation. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 334a. The target area
test required the plaintiff to show that he was within the area of the economy which was
endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. Confer-
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served to deny standing to a plaintiff whose injury was indirect; for in-
stance, when the injury was to a separate party, who was the more imme-
diate victim of the defendant's violation.
24
Given the Supreme Court's multi-factor considerations for antitrust
standing, the Tenth Circuit has recently begun' to consider, in addition
to the two-prong test, the potential for duplicative or speculative dam-
ages and the complexity of apportioning damages. 25 However, while
these criteria have been listed and evaluated separately, most decisions
turn on the question of antitrust injury,26 and to a lesser extent, the
directness of the injury.




A group of former pilots, flight attendants, and other employees of
Frontier Airlines brought antitrust claims, alleging that United Airlines
drove Frontier into bankruptcy. The plaintiffs argued that United had
engaged in anticompetitive behavior which caused Frontier to fail,
thereby injuring plaintiffs.
28
Frontier and United were competitors in the volatile airline indus-
try. Each had hub operations at Stapleton International Airport in Den-
ver, Colorado. As part of its operations, United maintained a
computerized reservation system (CRS), which enabled travel agents to
book and sell tickets on various airlines. 2 9 Frontier participated in
United's CRS, which was one of a number of such systems used in the
airline industry.
3 0
The employees alleged that United had monopoly power in the
Denver CRS market, overcharged Frontier for its participation in the
system, and caused the CRS to operate unfairly in its ticket sales to the
ence of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 919 (1952); see also Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.
1970) (plaintiff who sold films to defendant for percentage of subsequent distribution rev-
enues had standing under target area test), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). The Sixth
Circuit abandoned both the direct injury and target area tests and instead required that
the plaintiff allege injury in fact and that "the interest sought to be protected by the com-
plainant was arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d
1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has yet to adopt any one of the tests. See
McCready, 457 U.S. at 476 n. 12 (noting the varying standing tests developed by the circuits,
including "directness of injury," "zone of interests" and "target area" tests, but declining
to evaluate or adopt any particular approach); Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 536
n.33 (noting different standing tests but refusing to adopt any of them).
24. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 334c.
25. See Sharp, 967 F.2d at 409-10.
26. ABA AN'rITRusT SECTION, supra note 20, at 663.
27. 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 464 (1992).
28. Id. at 405.
29. Id. This particular system consisted of computer terminals located in subscribing
travel agencies, was available to these travel agents for a fee and permitted ticket sales on




detriment of Frontier."' Plaintiffs also alleged that the decision of
United to buy Frontier's assets and to renege on its purchase of Frontier
stock3 2 caused the airline to fail, costing the plaintiffs their jobs. The
plaintiffs asserted that United's conduct violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act.s" The trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
3 4
2. Majority Opinion
On appeal, United argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pur-
sue their antitrust claims. The Tenth Circuit agreed, concluding that
the employees failed to satisfy the two-prong test, primarily the injury
requirement, as well as the other factors associated with antitrust
standing.
In attempting to show antitrust injury, the plaintiffs relied on Adams
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 3 5 In that case, former employees of a
defunct airline, Laker Airways, brought antitrust claims alleging that a
group of airlines and an airline manufacturer conspired to drive Laker
out of business, thereby depriving them of theirjobs.36 The Adams court
concluded that plaintiffs had alleged an antitrust injury; however, it held
that the other relevant factors compelled a finding of no standing.
3 7
In Sharp, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow the portion of the
Adams decision supporting the finding that similarly situated airline em-
ployees had suffered antitrust injury.38 The Adams decision conflicted
with Tenth Circuit precedent. In Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,39 the
Tenth Circuit decided that salaried employees were "not within the area
of competitive economy protected against unlawful mergers". 40 In Jones
v. Ford Motor Co.,41 the Tenth Circuit indicated that it was settled law
that employees did not have standing to sue for antitrust violations
31. Id. at 405-06.
32. Id. at 406. In particular, plaintiffs argued that the asset sales were distress sales
made by Frontier at less than fair market value, and that United purposefully failed to
fulfill the stock purchase agreement. Id.
33. Plaintiffs also asserted state antitrust claims, breach of contract claims, and a claim
that United had intentionally interfered with plaintiffs' prospective business by diverting
passengers away from Frontier to United through improper manipulation of the Apollo
CRS system. Id.
34. Id.
35. 828 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
36. Id. at 24.
37. Id. at 26-27. The Adams court noted that not only were the employees' injuries
one step removed from those of Laker, the immediate victim of the antitrust violation, but
that Laker was a superior plaintiff and had in fact brought and settled its own antitrust suit
against the same defendants. Id. at 29-30.
38. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407.
39. 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). In Reibert, an employee
sought treble damages under the Clayton Act for his loss of employment following an
allegedly unlawful merger between his employer, Sinclair Oil, and Atlantic Richfield. Id. at
727-28.
40. Id. at 732.
41. 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979).
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
which had injured their employer. 4 2
The plaintiffs in Sharp tried to distinguish these cases, arguing that
they applied only to employee suits against an employer. The court of
appeals rejected this proposition, however, indicating that no such limi-
tation existed. Instead, they stood for the broad proposition that em-
ployees could not establish an antitrust injury when they lost their
employment "as a result of some allegedly anticompetitive activity di-
rected at or involving their employer." 43 The court concluded that, due
to the tangential nature of the injury, the plaintiffs had not established
an antitrust injury based on their loss of employment.
4 4
Even had the employees established antitrust injury, the Sharp court
determined that the other factors relevant to standing were not present.
Under the second prong of the antitrust standing test, the court ana-
lyzed the directness of the connection between the plaintiffs' injuries
and the market restraint which had resulted from the alleged antitrust
violations.4 5 Relying on Adams, in which the D.C. Circuit held that the
injury the employees suffered was indirect because it was one step re-
moved from the harm to Laker,4 6 and prior Tenth Circuit 4 7 and
Supreme Court4 8 decisions, the Sharp court decided that the plaintiffs'
injuries were at most indirect.
4 9
Finally, the court analyzed several of the other factors relevant to
42. Id. at 397.
43. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 408. The court recognized that a different result-may have been
reached if the plaintiff-employees were "in essence 'quasi-businessmen operating in a mar-
ket carved out by their own aggressiveness and salesmanship qualities. Thus when their
employers engaged in anti-competitive practices, the employees were directly injured by
these violations.' " Id. at 408 n.4 (quoting Reibert, 471 F.2d at 730). The court concluded
that this exception did not apply since plaintiff's injury was "tangential to the direct injury
allegedly suffered by Frontier." Id. Areeda and Hovenkamp state that they would support
antitrust standing where the right of employment is a protected interest within the sub-
stantive antitrust violation. "The employment interest is protected by the substantive
rules concerned with competition in the plaintiff's labor market but not necessarily by, say,
antimerger or price-fixing rules addressed to a product market that is not very closely
linked to the plaintiff's labor market." AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, $ 338a.
44. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 408 n.4.
45. Id. at 407 n.2, 408-09.
46. Adams v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988). The Adams court observed that the conspirators allegedly
forced the firm to its knees. "Whenever that happens to a firm, the web of contracts and
relationships which form the essence of the firm will be dismantled. Astute counsel should
not be able, merely by feats of characterization, to confer standing on all participants in
that web." Id.
47. See Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1979) (direct injury
does not include the loss of a job with a corporation or a reduction in an investment in
stock); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.) ("If there is any
antitrust violation, it is directed toward the petroleum industry .... The first element,
causal connection between violation and injury, is lacking because [plaintiff] cannot show
that any antitrust violations directly injured him."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
48. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct.
913,920 n.5 (1991) ("Employees have generally been denied standing to enforce competi-
tion laws because they lack competitive and direct injury."); Associated Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 541 n.6 (1983) (Court ob-
served that "a number of decisions have denied standing to employees with merely deriva-
tive injuries.")
49. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 409.
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antitrust standing: the potential for duplicative or speculative damages
and the complexity of apportioning damages. In the exceptionally vola-
tile airline industry, characterized by frequent mergers and bankrupt-
cies, an airline's survival or the continued employment of employees was
too. indefinite to calculate damages. 50 In addition, allowing employees
to have standing would risk duplicative recoveries or the necessity of
apportioning damages. 5 1 In summation, the Sharp decision indicated
that employees, who lost their employment as the result of some an-
ticompetitive activity directed at or involving their employer, lacked
standing in the Tenth Circuit to assert federal and state antitrust claims
against their former employer's competitor.
3. Analysis
In Sharp, the court correctly rejected plaintiffs' claim that antitrust
injury resulted from their loss of employment. Although not explicitly
articulating its rationale, the court apparently decided that the alleged
antitrust violation occurred in the air transportation and CRS markets,
but that the alleged injury was in the employment market. As members
only of the employment market, the plaintiffs were unable to establish
antitrust injury because the violation occurred in the air transportation
and CRS markets, not the employment market. Rather than broadly
holding that employees never have standing, this decision actually indi-
cates that as long as the alleged antitrust violation occurred in another
market, employees will not be able to establish antitrust injury, regard-
less of the severity of their actual injury. If in fact the violation occurred
in the employment market, it is probable that employees would have
standing.
The motivating factor behind the court's decision appears to be a
concern for unlimited plaintiffs and rampant litigation. The court noted
that if it were to permit standing in this case, "there would be no princi-
pled way to cut off a myriad of other indirect claimants, such as suppliers
of Frontier Airlines or creditors, each of whom could claim that their
business was somehow impacted or adversely affected by Frontier's de-
mise." 52 Moreover, the court's outcome is consistent with other deci-
sions, which generally deny standing to employees, officers or
stockholders of a corporation injured by an antitrust violation. 53 Since
the injury to the plaintiffs was merely derivative of the injury to their
50. Id. The wholeness of each plaintiff would have depended on the length of their
employment, future salary level, and ability to obtain comparable employment in the air-
lines industry. Adams, 828 F.2d at 30.
51. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 410. In addition, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that,
despite dismissal of their complaint for lack of standing under the federal antitrust laws,
the court should permit their state law antitrust claims to proceed. Id.
52. Id. at 409.
53. See, e.g., Southwest Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n,
830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (officer of corporation); Eagle v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
812 F.2d 538, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1987) (employees); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.
704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (stockholder); Weatherby v. RCA Corp., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,078 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986) (shareholders, employees).
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employer, the court correctly held that such employees lacked standing
to sue their employer's 'competitor for an alleged antitrust violation.
III. REFUSALS TO DEAL AND RESTRAINTS OF TRADE
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the elements of tying arrangements and
the essential facilities doctrine in City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas
Co. 54 The court held, in a proposition unique to the Tenth Circuit, that
a contract involving only a customer and the seller cannot constitute an
illegal tying arrangement. 5 5 In addition, the court applied the essential
facilities doctrine and concluded that the natural gas purchasers did not
suffer a "severe handicap" since the gas company offered the gas at fed-
erally approved prices.
5 6
Congress enacted the Sherman Act as a means of safeguarding gen-
eral competitive conditions rather than protecting specific competi-
tors. 57 This concern was reiterated in the language of the Sherman Act.
Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint
of trade.5 8 Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes certain monopolies,
attempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize. 59 These two
sections focus on different problems: section 1 deals with concerted ac-
tivity; section 2 concerns unilateral activity.
60
54. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV).
55. Id. at 650.
56. Id. at 648-49.
57. See, e.g., Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 370 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). The Supreme Court has succinctly stated the pur-
pose of the Sherman Act:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivo-
cally laid down by the Act is competition.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
58. 15 U.S.C § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, in relevant part, "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
Id. Both criminal and civil sanctions may be imposed for § 1 violations. In addition, viola-
tions of § 1 may be enjoined pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1988),
and persons injured in their business or property by reason of a violation may recover
treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
59. Id. § 2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not ex-
ceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
60. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
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A. Restraints of Trade: Tying Arrangements
Section 1, read literally, would prohibit all concerted activity in re-
straint of trade.6 1 The Supreme Court, however, has construed this sec-
tion to condemn only those restraints that unreasonably restrict
competition.
62
Tying arrangements represent one form of restraint that can violate
section 1. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one
product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier."' 6 3 A form of exclusive
dealing, a tying arrangement restricts the purchaser's freedom to buy
products from sources other than the seller.64 Usually the seller re-
quires the buyer to purchase or lease a different product as a condition
of the purchase. The product may be complementary or supplementary
to the originally supplied item or may be completely unrelated.
65
An element of an illegal tying arrangement requires proof of two
separate and distinct products. 6 6 The availability of one product or ser-
vice must be conditioned upon the purchase of another.67 The seller
must also have the market power to "force" the purchaser to act differ-
ently than it would in a competitive market.6 8
61. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978).
62. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
63. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5-6. This decision has met with recent approval
by the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2072, 2079 (1992).
64. The Northern Pacific court articulated the competitive harm resulting from tying
arrangements:
[Tying arrangements] deny competitors free access to the market for the tied
product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market.
At the same time buyers are forced to forgo their free choice between competing
products.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6.
65. 2 Louis ALTMAN & RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 10.18, at 104 (4th ed. 1985 & 1992 Supp.). Often tying arrange-
ments are employed to boost the sales of a particular product that lacks demand. Id.
66. Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984) (it is "clear that a tying
arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been linked."). Alt-
man lists four criteria used in determining the relation or distinction of two products: (1)
trade usage or practice in the field; (2) sale of a consistently homogeneous combination of
the two products; (3) lump sum billing for the combination; and (4) existence of other
related products not included in the unit. 2 ALTMAN & CALLMAN, supra note 65, § 10.18, at
106.
67. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); see Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356
U.S. at 6 n.4 ("where the buyer is free to take either product by itself there is no tying
problem.").
68. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 13-14; see also Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at
2079 (noting that a violation occurs "if the seller has 'appreciable economic power' in the
tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in
the tied market") (citations omitted); Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distributors, Inc., 806
F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that tying arrangement violates the antitrust laws
when a dominant seller exploits his control over a market to force buyers to purchase an
unwanted product).
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Generally, courts will decide that a tying arrangement violates the
antitrust laws if: (1) the probable effect is to "substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce;" 69 (2) if
it results in an unreasonable restraint that effects a substantial amount of
interstite commerce; 70 or (3) if it is shown to be "in conflict with the
basic policies" of the antitrust laws. 7 1 Courts have generally found an-
ticompetitive tying arrangements unlawful per se.
7 2
B. Refusals To Deal: Essential Facilities Doctrine
While section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only contracts, combi-
nations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, section 2 prohibits unilat-
eral monopolization and attempted monopolization, as well as
monopolization by combination or conspiracy. 73 To enforce this prohi-
bition in refusal to deal cases, courts have looked to the essential facili-
ties doctrine. 7 4 Established by the Supreme Court only twenty-two
.1
69. A violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). Section 3, in
relevant part, forbids any person:
[T]o lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, ma-
chinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented... or
fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect
of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or under-
standing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
Because § 3 of the Clayton Act only applies when both the tying and tied products are
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities," tying arrange-
ments involving such intangibles as medical services, credit, business and personal serv-
ices, and trademarks or franchises cannot be challenged under § 3, although they still may
be challenged under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the FTC Act. ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, supra note 20, at 133-34.
70. A violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
71. A violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1988). Section 5, in relevant part, provides: "(1) Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful." Id.
72. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)
(tying arrangements "generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be
achieved in some less restrictive way."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
305-06 (1949) (such arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."); International Salt Co. V. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ("it is
unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.") The Ameri-
can Bar Association Antitrust Section notes that while tying arrangements are classified as
per se illegal, "the test used to determine whether the per se rule should be applied to a
particular arrangement is in practice very similar to a rule of reason inquiry, because a
number of market related inquiries must be conducted before the per se rule is applied."
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 134.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
74. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV). A second,
unrelated test that courts use in refusal to deal cases under § 2 of the Sherman Act is the
intent test, which states that a "business is free to deal with whomever it pleases so long as
it has no 'purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.'" Byars v. Bluff City News Co:, 609
F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
(applying the intent test when considering the circumstances under which a firm with mo-
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years after Congress enacted the Sherman Act,75 the essential facilities
doctrine acknowledges that a business controlling a scarce resource has
a duty or obligation to allow reasonable access to the facility, even for
competitors. 76 Monopolists must make their facilities available on a
nondiscriminatory basis where a competitor cannot, in an economically
feasible manner, duplicate the facility.
77
The Tenth Circuit and other courts of appeals have adopted stan-
dards to determine whether a monopolist's action violates the essential
facilities doctrine. An antitrust plaintiff must show: "(1) control of the
essential facilities by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically
or reasonably to duplicate the facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
essential facilities to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility." 78 The plaintiff must demonstrate the presence of each ele-
ment; if even one element is missing, the doctrine is unavailing. 79 This
test differs from traditional monopolization analysis by de-emphasizing
intent and instead focusing on the surrounding market conditions.80
C. The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Tying Arrangements in the Natural
Gas Industry: City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co.8 1
1. Facts
The plaintiffs, eight cities in Kansas (Cities) that operate their own
natural gas distribution systems, sued the defendant, Williams Natural
Gas Company, asserting antitrust violations. Specifically, the Cities pro-
tested Williams' termination of a temporary program that allowed the
purchase of gas from third-party suppliers, which Williams transported
over its pipeline.
8 2
Williams owned and operated the only interstate pipeline serving
the Cities. Each of the Cities had "full requirements" contracts with the
pipeline company. These contracts required the Cities to purchase all of
their natural gas from Williams, which in turn agreed to ensure the avail-
nopoly power has a duty to continue a joint marketing arrangement with a smaller
competitor).
75. See United States v. St. Louis Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 410 (1912). The
Court found the practice of fourteen railroads, which denied access to certain railway
bridges crossing the Mississippi, violated the antitrust laws as a restraint of trade. The
defendants were required to allow competing railroads use of their facilities which were, as
a practical matter, impossible to duplicate. Id.
76. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519 (10th
Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
77. McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 369 (10th Cir. 1988).
78. Id. (citing MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983)).
79. McKenzie, 854 F.2d at 370; see id. at 371 (essential facilities doctrine unavailing
since doctor failed to demonstrate the first element: that hospital controls facilities essen-
tial to his medical practice).
80. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 678 F. Supp. 1517, 1531 (D. Kan.
1988) (Chanute I).
81. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV).
82. Id. at 645.
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ability of a sufficient supply to meet the Cities' demands.8 3 Initially, Wil-
liams only transported its own gas over the pipeline, pursuant to the full
requirements contract. In December 1986, however, the gas company
sought regulatory approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) to permit the transportation of gas from third-party
suppliers on a permanent basis. While awaiting approval, Williams initi-
ated a temporary program to transport third-party gas for the Cities,
which then negotiated with, and entered into agreements for, gas from
other suppliers. The temporary program was allowed by FERC.
8 4
While the temporary program was in effect and the Cities were
purchasing third-party gas, Williams experienced difficulty paying its
suppliers.8 5 Williams ended the program and closed its pipeline to the
alternate suppliers in August 1987, although it continued to transport
certain third-party gas.8 6 In July 1988, FERC approved Williams' per-
manent plan, which enabled the Cities to purchase gas from any third-
party supplier. Thereafter, the Cities negotiated with other suppliers to
obtain gas, which Williams transported over its pipeline.
The Cities brought suit under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
alleging that Williams' conduct in closing its pipeline was an exercise of
its monopoly power, which injured the Cities by preventing them from
receiving transportation of a long-term, dependable supply of low-cost
natural gas from third-party suppliers over the pipeline.8 7 The Cities
sought antitrust damages for the time period, from August 1987 until
July 1988, during which Williams had closed its pipeline to the transpor-
tation of third-party gas until approval of the permanent plan.
Specifically, the Cities claimed that Williams' refusal to transport
gas unless the Cities purchased Williams' gas constituted an illegal tying
arrangement. 88 The Cities asserted that the requirements contracts tied
natural gas transportation (tying product) to natural gas sales (tied
product). 89 They also contended that Williams had the market power to
83. Id. at 646. The Cities purchased natural gas at wholesale and resold it to custom-
ers located in or near the Cities. Id.
84. Id. Otherwise the full requirements contracts would have precluded the Cities
from purchasing gas from third party suppliers even if Williams agreed to transport the
gas over its pipeline. The waiver did not release Williams from its obligation to serve the
Cities' full requirements on demand. Id.
85. Id. Apparently Williams had take-or-pay provisions in its contracts with the natu-
ral gas suppliers. These provisions obligated Williams to pay for certain volumes of gas
even though it was unable to sell that amount to its customers. Id. at 646 n.4.
86. Id at 646. The Cities presented evidence concerning Williams' decision to close
the pipeline. One expert testified that Williams closed its pipeline to control access to the
pipeline, to maintain a large portion of its sales function, and to increase profits. Another
economist stated that Williams experienced a significant erosion in its sales of natural gas
as customers converted to transported gas, that Williams earned a higher margin on sales
than it did on transportation, and that Williams ended its open access "in order to prevent
this loss of market share, and in order to prop up the price that it received for its product."
Id. at 654. Even though Williams ended the temporary program, FERC required Williams
to transport certain third-party gas that was still available to the Cities. Id. at 646 n.5.
87. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (D. Kan.
1990) (Chanute III).
88. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 649-50.
89. Id. at 650.
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"force" the Cities to do something they would not have done in a com-
petitive market.90 The district court granted summary judgment for
Williams, deciding that the Cities failed to show any agreement between
two or more parties and that Williams did not force the Cities to buy its
natural gas. 9 1
The Cities also alleged that Williams' decision to close the pipeline
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act under the essential facilities doc-
trine.9 2 The Cities contended: that Williams was a monopolist in con-
trol of the pipeline that was essential to competition in the retail natural
gas market; that the Cities were unable to duplicate, practically or rea-
sonably, the pipeline access; that Williams denied the Cities use of the
pipeline; and that it was feasible for Williams to have provided the Cities
with access to the pipeline. 93 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for Williams, holding that the Cities were unable to establish the
second and third elements: the Cities' inability to duplicate the facility,
and Williams' denial of use of the facility to the Cities.
9 4
2. Majority Opinion
The Cities appealed the district court's granting of summary judg-
ment. In particular, the Cities alleged that Williams' actions violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act as an illegal tying arrangement and section
2 of that act under the essential facilities doctrine.
9 5
With respect to the tying claim, the Cities asserted that the district
court erred by not finding the existence of the necessary agreement be-
tween parties. They contended that the requirements contracts between
Williams and the Cities constituted the necessary agreement. The Cities
also argued that the approved third-party suppliers' gas did not provide
a defense to Williams forcing the sale of its natural gas.
9 6
The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments. Rather, the court of
appeals reaffirmed its decision in McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital,9 7 that sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act did not prohibit a tying arrangement imposed
by a single entity.9 8 In McKenzie, the plaintiff asserted that an arrange-
ment which linked two separate and distinct product markets together
was sufficient proof of a tying arrangement. The McKenzie court dis-
agreed, deciding that the plaintiff must make a preliminary showing of a
90. Id.; see Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984).
91. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 68,967,
63,206 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 1990) (Chanute II).
92. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 647.
93. It
94. Id. at 648.
95. Id. The Cities also contended that the full requirements contracts themselves vio-
lated the antitrust laws, thereby entitling the Cities to treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act. See id. at 651-53. In addition, the Cities asserted a monopolization claim
under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 653-56.
96. Id. at 650.
97. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988). In McKenzie, the court acknowledged that a single
entity could establish a tying arrangement; however, the court decided that such an ar-
rangement was not proscribed by section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 368.
98. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 650.
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conspiracy between two persons.99 The Tenth Circuit applied this stan-
dard and indicated that the Cities needed to show that the alleged tying
arrangement resulted from concerted activity between separate
parties.' 0 0
The Cities did provide evidence to establish that Williams tied its
natural gas to its transportation facilities. They did not, however, show
that Williams acted in concert with any other entity. In fact, the Cities
named only themselves as the other party to the alleged conspiracy.
Therefore, the court of appeals decided that summaryjudgment was ap-
propriate because the Cities failed to make the requisite preliminary
showing of a conspiracy necessary for their section 1 tying claim.' 0 '
With respect to the essential facilities doctrine, the court of appeals
held that the Cities failed to meet their burden since they failed to estab-
lish the second and third elements of the test. 10 2 They did not show
that Williams provided access to the pipeline on such unreasonable
terms as to constitute a denial of access.10 3 The Cities did not suffer a
severe handicap as a result of Williams having provided the Cities' full
requirements of natural gas rather than transporting third-party gas.10 4
The court reasoned that Williams' supply of gas at FERC approved
prices provided the Cities with reasonable access to the pipelines. Such
reasonable access defeated the second element of the test since reason-
able access was equivalent to practical duplication.10 5 Reasonable ac-
cess also defeated the third element - denial of use of the facilities.
Since the Cities failed to prove the second and third elements, they did
not meet their burden of presenting evidence that Williams denied or
limited access to its pipeline solely to gain a competitive edge. Thus the
Tenth Circuit upheld the decision to grant summary judgment for Wil-
liams on the section 2 claim.
10 6
99. McKenzie, 854 F.2d at 367-68. According to the McKenzie decision, a violation of
section 1 required " 'unlawful conduct by two or more parties pursuant to an agree-
ment.... Solely unilateral conduct, regardless of its anticompetitive effects, is not prohib-
ited by Section 1.' " Id. at 367 (quoting Contractor Utility Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed
Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1074 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985)).
100. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 650.
101. Id. at 650-51.
102. Id. at 648. The Cities asserted as error that the district court ignored its own
findings made at the preliminary hearing, that the evidence showed the facility could not
be physically duplicated and that the approved third-party suppliers' gas was not a feasible
substitute for other third-party gas. The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments. The fact
the Cities prevailed at the preliminary injunction stage was not determinative in a sum-
mary judgment proceeding. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 649.
106. Id. In addition, the court of appeals granted summary judgement in favor of Wil-
liams on all other causes of action. The court determined that: (1) the Cities failed to
establish a monopolization claim in light of Williams' showing that its action was the result
of a legitimate business decision, id. at 653-56; and (2) the Cities failed to show antitrust
injury for purposes of standing, since Williams was not obligated to provide access to the




Judge Seymour, in her concurrence, disagreed with the majority's
reliance on McKenzie as support for the proposition that section 1 did
not apply to a tying arrangement imposed by a single entity.' 0 7 Rather,
under the case law of the Tenth Circuit and other circuits, a buyer alleg-
ing that he had been coerced or forced by a seller into an illegal tying
arrangement stated the requisite combination or conspiracy under the
Sherman Act.' 0 8 The concurrence pointed to several cases to support
this position. In Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industry, 10 9 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that a plaintiff who contended that a seller un-
lawfully refused to deal as a means of enforcing an anticompetitive prac-
tice, such as tying or price-fixing, could have established the requisite
combination or conspiracy by showing that he himself unwillingly com-
plied with the practice." 0 On rehearing, where the defendant urged the
court to reconsider its conclusion that the record contained evidence of
a tying conspiracy, the court indicated that a combination occurs be-
tween a seller and buyers whose acquiescence in the seller's firmly en-
forced restraints was induced by "the communicated danger of
termination." I I
The concurrence noted that the Cities alleged that Williams illegally
tied the purchase of natural gas to its transportation and that they were
forced to accept the arrangement because they had no alternative
source. However, since Williams' gas was sold at FERC approved
prices, and given that the Cities could have obtained cheaper third-party
gas throughout this period, Williams could not have forced the Cities to
acquiesce. 12 Only because the Cities failed to state facts from which
the trier could have found forcing did the concurrence conclude that
summary judgement was appropriate on the tying claim.
4. Analysis
In rejecting the Cities' tying claim, the majority held that a tying
arrangement imposed by a single entity did not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act since there was no conspiracy between independent par-
ties. This statement misinterprets the section 1 contract, combination
or conspiracy requirement. Most courts that have considered the issue
have found agreement between the seller and the buyer sufficient to es-
107. Id. at 658 (Seymour, J., concurring). Judge Seymour indicated that McKenzie was
factually distinguishable, and therefore not controlling, because in that case the plaintiff
himself did not and could not agree to the illegal arrangement. Id. at 658 n.l. Judge
Seymour agreed with most of the majority opinion, including the decision reached under
the essential facilities doctrine. However, she disagreed with the majority's analysis of the
antitrust standing and antitrust injury issue. See id. at 659-60.
108. Id. at 658-59.
109. 729 F.2d 676, 686 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. Id The Black Gold court relied on United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S.
29 (1960), for this statement.
111. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 659.
112. Id.
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tablish the requisite conspiracy." l 3 They have not required evidence
that a separate third party conspired with the seller. As the concurring
opinion noted, even Tenth Circuit precedent indicated that a single en-
tity could prove the requisite combination or conspiracy "by showing
that he himself unwillingly complied with the practice, or by showing that
although he refused to acquiesce, other buyers agreed to the arrange-
ment under threat of termination."
' 1 4
A subsequent district court opinion underscored the problem with
Chanute and McKenzie. By requiring proof of the "archetypical conspir-
acy to maintain a Section 1 claim ... [these' cases] seemingly erase the
words 'contract' and 'combination' . . . from Section 1. Contracts in
restraint of trade [between a customer and seller] are thereby effectively
removed from Section l's reach, even though embraced by its express
terms." 1 15
Applying the more recognized standard could have resulted in a dif-
ferent outcome if the Cities had alleged sufficient facts to support the
finding of a tying arrangement. Whereas the plaintiff in Black Gold re-
fused to buy goods under the alleged unlawful tying arrangement, and
could not base the requisite combination or conspiracy on any agree-
ment it had with the defendant," 6 the Cities potentially bought goods
under the alleged tying arrangement and, therefore, could base the req-
uisite combination or conspiracy on an agreement they had with
Williams.
The recent Supreme Court decision, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.,' 17 supports the conclusion that a buyer who al-
leges that he has been forced by a seller into an illegal tying arrange-
ment has stated the requisite combination or conspiracy under section 1
of the Sherman Act." 8 The Supreme Court determined that a reason-
113. Black Gold, Ltd., 729 F.2d at 686; see Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d
1290, 1294 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that although a dealer refused to accede to manufac-
turer's request, the dealer could have shown an agreement between manufacturer and
other dealer), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990); see also Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968) ("petitioner can clearly charge a combination
between Midas and himself, as of the day he unwillingly complied with the restrictive
franchise agreements .. "); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968) ("peti-
tioner could have claimed a combination between respondent and himself, at least as of
the day he unwillingly complied with respondent's advertised price."); Will v. Comprehen-
sive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that "unwilling compli-
ance" between franchisees and franchisor satisfied the joint action requirement of section
1), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986). But cf. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Lab., Inc., 787 F.
Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1992) (court constrained to follow Tenth Circuit's erroneous require-
ment of concerted action between separate parties).
114. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 659 (Seymour, J., concurring) (citing Black Gold, Ltd., 729
F.2d at 686) (emphasis in original).
115. Systemcare, Inc., 787 F. Supp. at 182.
116. Black Gold, Ltd. 729 F.2d at 686.
117. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
118. See Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 658-59 (Seymour, J., concurring). In Eastman Kodak Co.,
after independent service organizations began servicing copying and micrographic equip-
ment manufactured by Kodak, Kodak adopted policies to limit the availability to the in-
dependent service organizations of replacement parts for its equipment and to make it
more difficult for those companies to compete with Kodak in servicing such equipment.
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able trier of fact could find, first, that service and parts were two distinct
products in light of evidence indicating that each had been, and contin-
ued in some circumstances to be, sold separately; and second, that Ko-
dak tied the sale of the two products in light of evidence indicating that
it sold parts to third parties only if they agreed not to buy service from
the independent service organizations. 19 The Court rejected Kodak's
characterization of the sale as a unilateral refusal to deal.120 Implicit in
the analysis, third-party conspirators could bring a tying claim based on
an agreement between Kodak and themselves. Eastman Kodak Co., there-
fore, supports the proposition that a buyer who was forced into an ille-
gal tying arrangement can state the requisite combination or conspiracy
by showing that he himself complied with the practice.
With respect to the essential facilities claim, the Chanute court pur-
ported to apply the four-part test. However, the court actually relied on
a separate severe handicap standard to analyze both the second and
third elements: the Cities' inability to reasonably duplicate the pipeline
access; and Williams' denial of access to the pipeline. Since the Cities
suffered no severe handicap they failed to establish both the second and
third elements. 12'
The court's analysis, and the four-part test itself, would have been
more accurate if the severe handicap standard had been applied to the
second element only, not the third. The first element, the monopolist's
control of the essential facility, and the third element, the denial of ac-
cess to the essential facility, focus on the nature of the conduct itself.
Under the second element, the competitor's inability to duplicate access
to the facility, and the fourth element, the feasibility of providing the
competitor access to the facilities, the court analyzes the effect of that
conduct on competition. As a practical way to analyze the detrimental
effect on competition, the severe handicap standard asks whether the
inability to duplicate the facilities imposed a severe handicap on compe-
tition. 12 2 Because it focuses on the effect the described conduct has on
competition, not on the nature of the conduct itself, the severe handicap
standard really only answers the questions posed in the second and
fourth elements. By limiting its use of the severe handicap standard to
these elements, the Tenth Circuit would clarify its analysis under the
essential facilities doctrine.
The independent service organizations brought suit, alleging that Kodak had unlawfully
tied the sale of service for its machines to the sale of parts, in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2077-78.
119. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2079-80.
120. Id. at 2080 n.8.
121. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 648-49.
122. Other circuits have applied a severe handicap standard to determine the effect of
denial of access. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (1991)
(holding that a successful essential facilities plaintiff must prove that denial of access
caused it "severe handicap"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992); Twin Laboratories, Inc. v.
Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2nd Cir. 1990); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
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IV. MONOPOLIZATION - THE RELEVANT MARKET
In TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc. ,123
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff could
not establish section 2 monopolization claims because of its failure to
define properly the relevant market. Because it defined the relevant
market as a single product, the plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to
allege a relevant market that the defendant was capable of
monopolizing. 1
2 4
The Supreme Court usually defines the offense of unlawful monop-
olization as the possession of monopoly or market power, plus deliber-
ate conduct intended to acquire, use, or preserve that power.' 2 5 The
primary dilemma facing courts is that many of the same methods that
may be used to acquire or maintain monopoly power, such as charging
lower prices, exercising discretion when choosing customers, and intro-
ducing new products, are also the kinds of competitive strategies that
the antitrust laws are designed to encourage.'
2 6
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has defined monopoly or market
power as "the power to control market prices or to exclude competi-
tion." 12 7 In the Tenth Circuit, however, monopoly power requires both
control over prices and the ability to exclude competition. 12 8 Since the
ability to control prices ultimately depends on the absence of competi-
tion, the distinction is probably more theoretical than real. 1
29
An essential step to determining a company's market power is to
define the relevant market in which the power over prices or competi-
tion is to be appraised. '3 0 The relevant market is the "area of effective
competition" within which the defendant operates. 13 1 The purpose in
defining the relevant market is "to identify the firms that compete with
each other in a given product and geographic area in order to determine
123. 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992).
124. Id. at 1025.
125. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19
(1985).
126. ABA ANTITUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 196.
127. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); see'also
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) (stating that
market power is the "ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a compet-
itive market").
128. Shoppin' Bag, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 164 (10th Cir. 1986); accord
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 966-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1005 (1990). The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and D.C. Circuits have also required both
elements. See ABA Antitrust Section, supra note 20, at 196-97 n.8 (citing Borough of Lans-
dale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 1982); Deauville Corp. v. Feder-
ated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1985); Richter Concrete Corp. v.
Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982); National Reporting Co. v.
Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1985); Neumann v. Reinforced
Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 430 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986)).
129. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 196-97.
130. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 654 (10th Cir.) cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV); see also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.
& Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) ("Without a definition of that market there is no
way to measure [an alleged monopolist's] ability to lessen or destroy competition.")
131. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961).
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whether other firms can effectively constrain the price of the alleged mo-
nopolist."13 2 A properly defined relevant market normally identifies
both the relevant product market and the relevant geographic
market. 
3
The relevant product market includes those products that are "rea-
sonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes."' 3 4 In
determining the reasonable interchangeability of products, courts con-
sider the cross-elasticity of demand, which measures "the responsive-
ness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other."' 3 5 For
example, a relevant market defined in terms of user substitutes includes
"producers of identical products, of products with physical or brand dif-
ferences entirely disregarded by consumers, and of products regarded
by consumers as such close substitutes that a slight relative price change
in one will induce intolerable shifts of demand away from the other."'
3 6
The latter products have a high cross-elasticity of demand and are pre-
sumptively in the same relevant product market.'
3 7
Relevant product markets generally cannot be limited to a manufac-
turer's own products, or to a single class of purchasers.138 In United
132. ABA ArrRusT SECTION, supra note 20, at 198. Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp indicate that courts generally define the relevant market in terms of the legal
issue before the court: whether a defendant firm possesses monopoly power; whether a
merger of competitors creates a substantial risk that the resulting firm will either acquire
power over price or may be able to coordinate prices with its rivals at non-competitive
levels; or whether a transaction will reinforce any such threats to competition. AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 518.1.
133. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 654.
134. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 893 (10th Cir. 1991); see
E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 404 ("That market is composed of products that
have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced - price,
use and qualities considered.")
135. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 400; see also Westman Comm'n Co. v.
Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 1986) (analyzing cross-elasticity of
demand), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988). Elasticity and inelasticity of demand relate to
the freedom of demand within the relative product market. In an elastic market, buyers
are able to chose freely what products they wish to buy. In an inelastic market, buyers are
limited in their choices due to inadequate selections and excessive prices. These factors
are important with respect to the court's determination of the relevant product market and
the optimum cross-elasticity of demand, which is the extent to which a consumer is able to
shift freely between two or more products. 16AJuLIAN 0. VoN KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS OR-
GANIZATIONS: ANrTRUST TRADE LAWs AND TRADE REGULATION § 6G.04[1], 6G-37 (1991).
136. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 525a.
137. Id.
138. Many courts have determined that the relevant market cannot consist of a single
manufacturer's product. See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir.) (finding that in an alleged tying arrangement, the relevant
market was all automobiles manufactured in the United States, not merely the automobile
manufacturer's own brand), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992); International Logistics
Group v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1989) (Chrysler's own brands not relevant
market), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Telex Corp. v. IBM, Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th
Cir.) (relevant market was all peripheral computer equipment, not merely those that were
plug-compatible with IBM central processing units), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 766 F. Supp. 670 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (M16 as-
sault rifle not a relevant market since there were numerous competing products); Sun
Dun, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1990) (rejecting claim that defend-
ant could be guilty of monopolizing the distribution of its own brand of soft drink); Car-
lock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989) (manufacturer's own brand of ice
1993]
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States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Court indicated that manufac-
tures should not ordinarily be deemed to have monopolized their own
products.' 3 9 However, some courts have found the relevant product
market to be limited to, the products of a single supplier where they are
so unique as to have no reasonably interchangeable substitutes.
140
The relevant geographic market is defined as "the narrowest market
which is wide enough so that products from adjacent areas ... cannot
compete on substantial parity with those included in the market."'
4'
This fact-intensive determination involves an analysis of how far con-
sumers are willing travel to obtain the product at a lower price.1
4 2
Both the relevant geographic and product markets "can be deter-
mined only after a factual inquiry into the 'commercial realities' faced by
consumers."' 43 It is the plaintiff's burden to prove the relevant market,
and the evidence must set forth some basis to support the plaintiff's defi-
cream not a relevant market); Disenos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Work, 714 F. Supp.
46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (manufacturer's brand of porcelain figurines could not be relevant
market); Theatre Party Assocs. v. Shubert Org., 695 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Broad-
way theatre's own popular show not a relevant market; relevant market likely included all
Broadway shows, ballet, and perhaps even sporting events); Hendricks Music Co. v. Stein-
way, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (refusing to recognize "concert and artist"
pianos, in which only Steinway and Yamaha pianos participated, as a distinct market).
139. 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956). The du Pont Court noted that:
[O]ne can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every non-
standardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and
production of his own product. However, this power that, let us say, automobile
or soft-drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the
power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms
of the competitive market for the product.
Id. (citations omitted).
140. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992);
see also Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding market power in own brand of electric motors for tie-in purpose), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 847 (1989); National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Lab., 850 F.2d 904
(2d Cir. 1988) (suggesting that a particular branded drug, Inderal, could be a relevant
market); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant's own
differentiated products can constitute a relevant market if they are "so unique or so domi-
nant in the market in which they compete that any action by the manufacturer to increase
his control over his product virtually assures that competition in the market will be de-
stroyed."); cf. Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1991) (although a
single brand could conceivably be a relevant market, plaintiff did not meet burden of
showing that Ford tractors were not reasonably interchangeable with the tractors of com-
petitors), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992).
141. Westman Comm'n Co., 796 F.2d at 1222 (citations omitted). The outer boundary of
the relevant geographic market is reached, "if one were to raise the price of the product or
limit its volume of production, while demand held constant, and supply from other sources
beyond the boundary could not be expected to enter promptly enough and in large
enough quantities to restore the old price or volume." Satellite Television & Assoc. Re-
sources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that: "The
geographic market selected must.., both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the
industry and be economically significant. Thus, although the geographic market in some
instances may encompass the entire Nation, under other circumstances it may be as small
as a single metropolitan area." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37
(1962) (citations omitted).
142. See Westman Comm'n Co., 796 F.2d at 1222.
143. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2090 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 572 (1966)). Each market is defined from the perspective of the buyer, not the
seller. See Westman Comm'n Co., 796 F.2d at 1221.
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nition of the relevant product market. 14 4 The proper definition is gen-
erally a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment is typically
inappropriate because the pertinent economic facts are usually disputed.
In some instances, however, the relevant market may be determined as a
matter of law, particularly in cases where the relevant economic facts are
not in dispute.14 5 Properly defining the relevant market is often the key
to a plaintiffs case under the Sherman Act.
146
A. The Relevant Market in Denver Cable Television: TV Communications
Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc.1
4 7
1. Facts
Plaintiff, TV Communications Network (TVCN), provided cable tel-
evision for a fee to subscribers in metropolitan Denver, Colorado.
While most cable television operators distributed their programming
through coaxial cable, TVCN was a wireless cable operator that utilized
microwave transmission technology.' 4 8 Defendant Turner Network
Television (TNT) manufactured, produced and supplied video pro-
gramming, including National Premium Sports Programming. 149 Since
1988, TNT has refused to allow TVCN to receive its programming in
order for TVCN to offer it to its subscribers. 150 TVCN discovered that
144. See Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558, 1568 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2996 (1992).
145. See, e.g., Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 643 (10th
Cir. 1987); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir.
1984).
146. ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION, supra note 20, at 197-98. Over the past two decades, the
courts have expanded the requirement that an antitrust plaintiff engage in a proper market
power analysis, which means that virtually all antitrust cases now require some proof of
market power. Mooz, supra note 14, at 811. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1985) (market power analysis
required for rule of reason analysis in horizontal group boycott); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984) (market power analysis required for tying
arrangements); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)
(non-price vertical restraints analyzed under rule of reason, which requires a determina-
tion of market power); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (sec-
tion 2 monopolization and attempt to monopolize claims require a properly defined
relevant market). However, market power analysis is not required for per se violations of
the antitrust laws. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 968 n.24 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
147. 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992).
148. Id. at 1023. Cable Television was "deregulated" in 1984. Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988). For an article regarding cable industry
franchise agreements, see Daniel L. Brenner, Was Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED.
COMM. L.J. 365 (1989).
149. TV Communications Network, Inc., 964 F.2d at 1023. There were several other origi-
nal defendants, including ESPN, Capital Cities/ABC, Tele-Communications, United Art-
ists Entertainment Co., American Television and Communications Corp., Scripps Howard
Cable Company, Scripps Howard Communications, and Mile High Cable Co., all of which
settled out of court. Id. at 1023 n.1.
150. Id. at 1024. TVCN alleged that TNT refused to let it carry TNT programming
because the wireless system posed a competitive threat to conventional cable systems.
TVCN claimed cable programmers and system owner conspired to squeeze it out of busi-
ness because it encroached on some systems' franchise areas. Adriel Bettelheim, High
Court Rejects Cable TV Lawsuit, DENV. POST, Dec. 1, 1992, at C1.
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many potential subscribers would not subscribe until TVCN made the
TNT channel available. In addition, existing subscribers threatened to
terminate their subscription if the TNT channel was not made
available. 15'
TVCN filed the complaint to force TNT to make its programming
available to TVCN. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
15 2
2. Majority Opinion
TVCN appealed, asserting monopolization, attempt to monopolize,
and conspiracy to monopolize claims under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 153 To establish a monopolization claim, TVCN must have shown
"the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market" and "the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historic accident."' 54 An actionable attempt to monop-
olize claim required a properly defined relevant market, a dangerous
probability of success in monopolizing the relevant market, the specific
intent to monopolize, and conduct in furtherance of such an attempt.'
55
A conspiracy to monopolize required the existence of a combination or
conspiracy to monopolize the relevant market. 156 Therefore, all three
of the section 2 claims required a properly defined relevant market. .
57
In defining the relevant market, TVCN's complaint alleged that
TNT monopolized the market for the TNT channel in Denver. TVCN
claimed that TNT had complete control and a 100% market share of the
TNT market. 158 The Tenth Circuit rejected this market definition. Re-
lying on E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,159 the court of appeals deter-
151. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1024.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1024-27. The plaintiff also sought relief under § I of the Sherman Act for
the alleged conspiracy between TNT and other cable operators. Id. at 1027. The court
rejected the § 1 claim, holding that TVCN could not establish § I claims against TNT
based on price fixing, a group boycott, or refusal to deal. Id. at 1027-28. In addition, the
court dismissed the plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice following the dismissal of
the federal claims. Id. at 1028.
154. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
155. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1025.
156. See id. at 1026. In addition to proving the existence of a combination or conspir-
acy to monopolize, a plaintiff must prove three other elements in order to establish a claim
for conspiracy to monopolize: overt acts done in furtherance of the combination or con-
spiracy; an effect upon an appreciable amount of interstate commerce; and a specific intent
to monopolize. Id.
157. In addition to defining a relevant market for section two claims, a section one
plaintiff, utilizing the rule of reason standard, who cannot prove actual detrimental effects
on competition must properly define the relevant market. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 968 n.24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) ("there must
be sufficient evidence supporting the jury's finding of an agreement which unreasonably
restrained trade in the relevant market") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Kaplan
v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Proof that the defendant's activi-
ties had an impact upon competition in a relevant market is an absolutely essential element
of the rule of reason case."), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980).
158. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1025.
159. 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956). The court also relied on Key Fin. Planning Corp. v.
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mined that TVCN failed to allege a relevant market which TNT was
capable of monopolizing because "a company does not violate the Sher-
man Act by virtue of the natural monopoly it holds over its own
product."1 60
TVCN's definition of the relevant product market as one cable
programmer's channel was defective as a matter of law.16 1 Because it
did not allege a relevant market that TNT was capable of monopolizing
in violation of the antitrust laws, TVCN could not prove that TNT had a
dangerous probability of success of monopolizing the relevant market.
Based on the improperly defined market, the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and
conspiracy to monopolize claims.
162
3. Analysis
While the TV Communications Network court's holding that a relevant
product market cannot be a single manufacturer's product is consistent
with many other decisions, a recent Supreme Court decision indicates
that a single brand of a product can constitute a relevant product market
in certain circumstances.16 3 In Eastman Kodak Co., the Court disagreed
with Kodak's contention that, as a matter or law, a single brand of a
product or service could never be a relevant market under the Sherman
Act.164 Rather, the relevant market "is determined by the choices avail-
able to Kodak equipment owners," 1 6 5 who were the consumers. The
Supreme Court concluded that, since services and parts for Kodak
equipment were not interchangeable with those of other manufacturers,
the relevant market from the Kodak equipment owner's perspective was
ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 643 (10th Cir. 1987), in which the Tenth Circuit held
that the defendant's life insurance policies did not constitute a relevant market, even
though the defendant paid higher advances to its agents than other insurers. The Key
Financial Planning Corp. court reasoned that nothing restrained competing insurers from
increasing their advances, if they needed to do so in order to retain good agents or make
more sales. Id.
160. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1025; see Key Fin. Planning Corp., 828 F.2d at
643.
161. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1025. On appeal and contrary to the alle-
gations in its amended complaint, TVCN asserted that the market for the TNT channel
was not the relevant market to consider. Rather, TVCN alleged that the relevant product
market was subscription television programming or sports programming. However, the
court, stating that the amended complaint must stand or fall on its own, rejected this asser-
tion as a futile mischaracterization of the allegations in the amended complaint. Id.
162. Id. at 1028. Although not specifically rejecting the section 2 conspiracy to monop-
olize claim for failure to properly define the relevant product market, the court mentioned
the improperly defined market as a factor in the dismissal of the conspiracy to monopolize
claim. Id. Under its conspiracy to monopolize claim, TVCN alleged that the overt acts and
specific intent to monopolize were evidenced by denial of access to essential facilities for
the relevant TNT channel market in Denver, fixing prices, a group boycott, unreasonable
territorial allocations and exclusionary measures. Id. at 1026. The court decided that
TVCN failed on its conspiracy claim since the compliant did not provided facts to support
a conspiracy claim and did little more than recite the relevant antitrust laws. Id. at 1026-
27.
163. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citations omitted).
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composed of only those companies that serviced Kodak machines. 166
Moreover, Eastman Kodak Co. essentially repudiated the TV Communi-
cations Network court's reliance on E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. as justifi-
cation for invalidating a relevant market comprised of a single brand of a
product. In a footnote, the Court implicitly discouraged such use of:du
Pont. It pointed out that the du Pont Court did not reect the notion that a
relevant market could be limited to one brand. "The Court simply held
in du Pont that one brand does not necessarily constitute a relevant market
if substitutes are available. Here respondents contend there are no sub-
stitutes." 16 7 Thus the recent Supreme Court decision invalidated the
basis for part of the TV Communications Network holding and likely abro-
gated the Tenth Circuit's decision that a single product cannot, as a mat-
ter of law, constitute a relevant market.'
6 8
Factually, TV Communication Network would be similar to Eastman Ko-
dak Co. if TVCN, like the respondents in Eastman Kodak Co., provided
sufficient evidence that there were no substitutes for the TNT channel.
But unlike Eastman Kodak Co., where Kodak equipment owners were
forced to purchase only Kodak replacement parts, TVCN was not forced
into a situation where it had to buy TNT. Moreover, there was no evi-
dence that other sport programming was unavailable or unsatisfactory
to potential subscribers. Therefore, the two cases are factually distin-
guishable and, although the Tenth Circuit's broad statement that a sin-
gle product cannot as a matter of law constitute the relevant market is
clearly not true, summary judgment was probably still appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
In Sharp, the Tenth Circuit determined that employees of an airline
allegedly driven into bankruptcy by another airline lacked standingto
assert antitrust claims against the competitor. In evaluating antitrust
standing, the Tenth Circuit utilized its two-part test, which required an-
titrust injury resulting directly from the antitrust violation, and for the
first time, analyzed the other elements mentioned in the Supreme
Court's multi-factor standard. The court held that the employees fdid
not establish antitrust injury by their loss of employment because any
injury was indirect, the damages were speculative, and there was risk of
duplicative recoveries if the employees were allowed standing. Essen-
tially the case indicated that as long as the alleged antitrust violation
occurred in a market other than the employment market, the employees
could not establish antitrust injury.
The Chanute case addressed the use of the essential facilities doc-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2090 n.30 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
168. Cf. Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1992)
(recognizing that a single product might constitute the relevant product market, but de-
clining to extend Eastman Kodak Co. to allow a single product sold to a single customer,




trine and tying claims in the natural gas industry. The court held that
several cities which purchased natural gas from the gas company failed
to show "severe handicap" and therefore could not recover under the
essential facilities doctrine. To make its analysis of the four-part essen-
tial facilities test less confusing, the court should have only applied the
severe handicap standard to the second element of the test: the inability
to duplicate reasonably access to the facility.' 6 9
The majority in Chanute also stated that section 1 of the Sherman
Act did not prohibit a tying arrangement imposed by a single entity.
However, as the concurrence noted, the requisite conspiracy, or combi-
nation could exist between the seller and a buyer when the buyer was
forced to agree to the arrangement. The Tenth Circuit needs to
reevaluate its position and recognize the possibility that acquiescence by
the buyer establishes the requisite conspiracy.
Finally, in TV Communications Network, the Tenth Circuit invalidated
the plaintiffs definition of the relevant product market. Section 2 mo-
nopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize
claims require the plaintiff to properly define the relevant markets,
which include both product and geographic markets. The plaintiff de-
fined the relevant product market as a single cable television channel.
The court rejected such a narrow definition as a matter of law, holding
that "a company does not violate the Sherman Act by virtue of the natu-
ral monopoly it holds over its own product."'170 However, a recent
Supreme Court decision that a single brand can constitute a relevant
product market if there are no available substitutes limits this broad
Tenth Circuit precedent. While the result in the TV Communications Net-
work decision would probably have been the same after Eastman Kodak
Co., the Tenth Circuit should allow for the possibility that a single prod-
uct could constitute the relevant product market under the right
circumstances.
Mark D. Williamson
169. This standard should also be applied to the fourth element, however, the court
did not analyze this element.
170. TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 964 F.2d





The Tenth Circuit decided three timely and significant cases in the
course of calendar year 1992. In Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Thomas,"
the Tenth Circuit, in light of the increasing number of pro se litigants
and the problems they create, held a pro se litigant to the same require-
ments of an ordinary litigant in regards to raising error on appeal. Dis-
playing its diminishing tolerance for the growing number of discovery
abuses, the court also levied the harsh, but increasingly more common,
sanction of dismissal for a party's non-attendance at his own deposition
in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds. 2 Finally, recognizing the popular defendants'
tactic of tying up litigation through endless venue transfer motions, the
court upheld a venue transfer motion denial in Scheidt v. Klein, 3 despite
factors that closely suggested transfer might have been appropriate.
Part I discusses the growing number of pro se litigants and the con-
cerns they raise with special attention given to their duties on appeal.
Part II looks critically at the options a court has available in order to deal
with discovery abusers, most specifically the harsh sanctions of default
and dismissal. Part III reviews the methods by which defendants seek
changes in venue and the difficult burdens they must bear in order to
effect a change or appeal a refusal of change.
I. PRO SE LITIGANTS AND THEIR BURDEN ON APPEAL: SECURITIES AND
EXCH. COMMISSION v. THOMAS
A. Background
1. Pro Se Litigants Generally
With legal services quickly becoming priced beyond the reach of
potential litigants, many plaintiffs are deciding to enter the courtroom
pro se, or unrepresented. These plaintiffs suffer many disadvantages,
procedurally and otherwise. Legal necessities like causation and dam-
ages are frequently beyond their thoughts. One who possesses no legal
knowledge not only faces problems but also creates problems for others
wrestling with his or her inadequacies, which may be significant at the
pre-trial, trial and appellate stages. 4 Pro se litigants' pleadings may be
filled with examples of technical ignorance, sometimes purposeful, of
the rules governing their pleadings, motions and deadlines. 5 Many pro
se plaintiffs are litigation seekers, shopping for a favorable forum, im-
1. 965 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1992).
2. 965 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. 956 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. Paul B. Zuydhoek, Litigation Against a Pro Se Plaintiff, 15:4 LITIGATION 13 (1989).
5. For an overview of the rules governing a party's conduct in the federal court sys-
tem, see Title 28, United States Code - Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
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posing numerous filings for improper purposes such as harassment and
remaining blissfully unconcerned with opponents' discovery requests.
More than one court has grown plainly indignant with the number of
frivolous pro se filings. 6 These litigants have been able to get away with
conduct that the court would not have tolerated from a represented
party.
This conduct manifests itself most strongly in the appellate arena.
The number of pro se appellate filings has increased substantially 7 and
many of these are filed without proper support in the form of procedural
requirements or substantive accompaniments. One federal court of ap-
peals has voiced its concern over the large number of frivolous pro se
appeals. 8 But at the same time, the judiciary is cognizant of the difficult
and often lengthy appellate process that a pro se litigant faces. 9 Schol-
ars recognize the handicapped status of such an appellant' 0 and to this
end, the Clerk for the Federal Circuit publishes and distributes a hand-
book entitled "Guide to Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants.""l l
Courts evaluate a pro se litigant's conduct in a light dependent
upon the stage of litigation. At the complaint stage, the Supreme Court
holds pro se complainants to "less stringent standards" than attorneys
and that dismissal at the pleading stage is inappropriate unless it is "be-
yond [a] doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 2 The judiciary recognizes
that dismissals for pleading rule violations threaten both a pro se liti-
gant's constitutional right of access to the courts and their statutory
right of self-representation in civil cases' 3 and will liberally construe
complaints in their favor.
A layman cannot be expected to realize as quickly as a lawyer
would that a legal position has no possible merit, and it would
be as cruel as it would be pointless to hold laymen who cannot
afford a lawyer ... to a standard of care that they cannot attain
even with their best efforts.'
4
This liberal view does not end with the filing of a complaint, as the
6. See, e.g., Bombalski v. United States, No. 91-285, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16854,
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1991), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992).
7. See Statistical Report of the Sixth Circuit as of June 30, 1990, Table 4a (covering
specifically the Sixth circuit), cited in Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of
Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 928 (1990).
8. Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1988).
9. Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 122 F.R.D. 281 (1989).
10. Allen R. Prunty and Mark E. Solomons, Note, Federal Black Lung Update, 92 W. VA.
L. REV. 849, 880 (1990).
11. Federal Circuit Rules of Practice Before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (1990). For further discussion on the difficulties pro se litigants face,
see Burton R. Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in
Criminal Court, 2 Dug. L. REV. 245 (1964); Maurice M. Garcia, Comment, Defense Pro Se, 23
U. MIAMI L. REV. 551 (1969).
12. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
13. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1981).




courts allow pro se complainants to amend their pleadings "fairly
freely." 15
Notice and service are treated differently by the courts. In a case
brought by a pro se litigant, twice failing to serve certain defendants
forced dismissal of his suit. The court stated:
[W]hile we are not unmindful of the special difficulties which
confront pro se litigants, [Plaintiff], like all parties to litigation,
cannot rely on his pro se status as a shield from all mistakes but
must at some point bear the consequences of his procedural
errors. 
16
Once filing is completed, the pro se plaintiff's status is not yet se-
cured-the D.C. Circuit holds that a pro se party must receive special
notice that failure to oppose a summary judgment motion will result in a
judgment being entered against the pro se, 17 but the Ninth circuit dis-
agrees.1 8 Courts have dismissed pro se cases for failure to prosecute,
but in one case only after the pro se failed to appear for deposition four
times and was sternly warned of the pending dismissal. 19
Courts may sanction the pro se litigant in any number of ways.
2 0
They are more likely to sanction a pro se litigant's misconduct when the
litigant had actual notice of the meaning of procedural rules.2 ' Even
absent notice, however, a pro se litigant is still subject to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 requiring that the party's pleadings be signed, certi-
fying that the pleading is not interposed for any improper purpose. 2 2
The court is obligated to sanction any violations of Rule 1 1 "whether
plaintiff is represented by counsel or, as here, brings his action pro
se." 2
3
The threshold the litigant must cross before being sanctioned var-
ies. A court recently did not impose sanctions on a complaint even
though it was "utterly frivolous", because no court had previously sanc-
tioned the pro se plaintiff before. 24 Another court suspended a sanction
order and gave the pro se complainant a chance to explain why she rea-
15. Holmes v. Godin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980). Any jury demand must gener-
ally be made within ten days of service of the last pleading that addresses an issue for
which trial by jury is sought. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b). A pro se plaintiff, however, is not held
to strict compliance with that rule. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 766 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
16. Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 727, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
17. Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
18. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
19. Hepperle v. Johnson, 590 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1979). At trial, pro se litigants are
treated the same as any other with no relaxation of evidentiary rules. Andrews v. Bechtel
Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 140 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986).
20. One should note that in civil rights actions at least one court has declined to im-
pose sanctions because "[m]any people not trained in the law believe the Constitution
provides broader civil rights protection than it in fact does." Redfield v. Wood, No. 1:90-
CV-61, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16176 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 1990).
21. Mitchell v. Inman, 682 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982).
22. Nixon v. Phillipoff, 615 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
23. Sparrow v. Reynolds, 646 F. Supp. 824, 839 (D.D.C. 1986).
24. Scheck v. General Elec. Corp., No. Civ. A. No. 91-1594, 1992 WL 13219 (D.D.C.
Jan. 7, 1992).
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sonably believed that her complaint had merit. 2 5 One court goes so far
as to require a "showing of malice" before sanctioning a pro se liti-
gant. 26 Sanctioning is universal and not restricted to the federal district
court system.
27
2. Pro Se Litigants in the Appeals Process
Appellate courts give a great deal of scrutiny to a pro se litigant's
filing of actions. Courts require pro se petitioners to take full responsi-
bility for the propriety of their appeals.2 8 A pro se's claim that the trial
court allowed "a gang of criminals" to prevail was met with sharp criti-
cism from the appellate judge who required the offender to show why
double costs and reasonable attorney fees should not be assessed. 29
It is federally mandated that a party be sanctioned for frivolous ap-
peals.3 0 One circuit court cast a jaundiced eye upon a pro se plaintiff's
second attempt at their tax protest appeal, since the earlier claim had
been rejected and plaintiffs had received a stem warning from that cir-
cuit to "throw in the towel."''s "In the second round of what the [pro se
party] apparently would like to make a fifteen round bout, we affirm and
impose further sanctions which will hopefully result in a knockout punch
to the litigation."'3 2 The stakes in the appellate process are also higher.
Appellate courts uphold sanctions in amounts ranging upward of
$100,000,33 despite the pro se's proceeding informa pauperis.34 In addi-
tion to fees and costs, sanctions range from loss of commissary privi-
leges for prisoners35 to outright dismissal of the claim.
3 6
Pro se appellants are afforded somewhat greater protection than at-
torney-represented appellants, but this protection is not free-ranging
25. Louisville v. Armored Transp. of California, No. C-90-0266 RCP, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2523 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1991).
26. Cooper v. Adair, 1989 WL 50805 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1991).
27. See, e.g., Casper v. Commissioner of I.R.S., 805 F.2d 902, 906 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Tax Court upheld sanctions against unrepresented party).
28. Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring pro se to
sign notice of appeal).
29. Mullen v. Galati, 843 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1988).
30. FED. R. App. PROC. 38. See, e.g., Lefebvre v. Commissioner, 830 F.2d 417,420 (1st
Cir. 1987). For additional examples of federal courts imposing sanctions on unrepre-
sented parties under this rule, see Eric J.R. Nichols, Note, Preserving Pro Se Representation in
an Age of Rule 11 Sanctions, 67 TEX. L. REv. 351 (1988)
31. Stelly v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968)
32. Id.
33. Searcy v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 907 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1990) (af-
firming $109,335.30 sanction). But see Chitta v. Nueces County, 816 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (refusing to impose sanctions).
34. Day v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (S.D. Tex.) (awarding
$10,000 in fees), appeal dismissed, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086
(1985). Informa pauperis is defined as "In the character or manner of a pauper." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990). Claims that they were poor will be met with the same
response. McAfee v. 5th CircuitJudges, 884 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1141 (1990) (thirty-dollar sanction upheld).
35. Wideman v. McKay, 132 F.R.D. 62, 66 (D. Nev. 1990) (sanction for wholly
groundless complaint).
36. Haugen v. Sutherlin, 804 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1986).
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and pro se petitioners appear to have worn out their welcome at the
appellate level. Courts currently impose sanctions without any prior
warning3 7 and the fact that a plaintiff proceeds pro se does not provide
him an "unfettered license to wage an endless campaign of harassment"
against his opponents.3 8 The fact that a pro se party's error was quite
possibly "[a] product of lack of legal sophistication" does not prevent
the imposition of sanctions.
3 9
One circuit states that "judges should adopt a posture of assisting
pro se appellants whenever possible to ensure a just resolution on the
merits." 40 Courts of appeal also have a duty to insure that pro se parties
do not lose their vested right to an appellate hearing based on an igno-
rance of the procedural requirements. 4 1 The right to the appellate pro-
cess and due process in general is an inherent one and courts must be
cautious that when the pro se litigant is vested with these duties, he is
not simultaneously stripped of his due process rights.
42
This mandate, though, has its limits. Failure to file a timely notice
of appeal will not be excused merely because of an appellant's pro se
status. 43 The fact that a pro se appellant used business days rather than
calendar days in calculating the time available for an appeal did not
force one agency to bend the rules and view the filing as timely. 4 4 Er-
rors have been occasionally forgiven, however, as where a pro se litigant
filed a notice of appeal without the correct address but attempted pres-
ervation of his right to appeal by means of a letter to the district court, 4 5
and when an appellant filed her appeal with the wrong forum.46 Errors
are less fatal when they occur in brief preparation. The formal appellate
brief requirements are not construed so strictly as to make a violation
fatal to a pro se litigant's case.4 7 At least one court has held that a pro
se appellate brief filed by a plaintiff in a different action is admissible.
48
What of the case, then, where the appellant files a notice of appeal
and does not make any arguments of error? The duties of a represented
37. See, e.g., Simmons v. Poppell, 837 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1988) (implying that district
court's finding of frivolousness provided ample warning).
38. Pfeifer v. Valukas, 117 F.R.D. 420, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Lack of knowledge is no
excuse. A pro se litigant may not argue ineffective assistance on appeal based on his lim-
ited resources for meaningful research. United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, - U.S.-, 111 S. Ct. 521 (1990).
39. Texas v. Gulf Water Benefaction Co., 679 F.2d 85, 87 (5th Cir. 1982)
40. Bryant v. United States Postal Serv., 837 F.2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (table, text
available in Westlaw).
41. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 696.
42. For a further discussion of this issue, see Julie M. Bradlow, Comment, Procedural
Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 659 (1988).
43. United States v. Merrifield, 764 F.2d 436, 437 (5th Cir. 1985).
44. Gostomski v. Commodity Trading Corp., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) t 23,784
(C.F.T.C. 1987).
45. Myers v. Stephenson, 781 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (4th Cir. 1986).
46. Reece v. Veteran's Admin., 862 F.2d 321 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
47. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 696.
48. Kassel v. Gannet Co., Inc., 875 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1989). But see Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 851 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1988) (statements from appellate briefs in
another action not admissible).
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litigant on appeal as they govern the raising of arguments are clear. The
appellant must raise issues in the brief and press these issues. 49 The
resulting arguments must be distinct and specific in the opening brief.50
These arguments must give the appellee an opportunity to address
them.5 ' Ultimately, any argument not raised in the brief to a court of
appeals has not been preserved for appeal. 52 One exception to this is
when a public interest is involved. 53 Another exists for the issue of ripe-
ness, which need not be argued to have a court of appeals consider the
issue on appeal. 5 4 Proceeding pro se does not seem to create a third
exception as courts are unanimous in their rejection of any kind of a
duty to manufacture arguments for the appellant, whether that appellant
is represented 55 or appearing pro se.
56
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Thomas.
5 7
1. Facts
Roger Houdek, a defendant and appellant in the case, was enjoined
by the district court from future violations of specific antifraud and:re-
gistration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.58 Houdek appealed, claiming nonviolation of the
Act.59 Even though he was represented by counsel, he filed his brief pro
se and entered the appellate process as a pro se litigant. 60 Houdek
failed to provide a table of contents with page references, a table of
cases and other authorities with page references, a statement of subject
matter and appellate jurisdiction and a standard of review. 6 1 Most
troublesome, though, was his failure to provide the court with any refer-
ences to the voluminous record.
6 2
2. Holding
The court found several violations of Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 28 and the local 10th Circuit Rule 28.2.63 The court recognized
49. Pearce v. Sullivan, 871 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1989).
50. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1986), appeal after remand,
876 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1989), opinion amended and superseded, 885 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990).
51. Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991).
52. Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1990).
53. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
54. Chemical Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
55. Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1987).
56. National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir.
1989); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1987).
57. 965 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1992).
58. Id. at 825-26. Houdek was the appellant in this case and was named as a defend-
ant along with Thomas, who did not appeal.




63. l0TH CIR. R. 28.2 states that "[Wlith respect to each issue raised on appeal, the
party shall state where in the record the issue was raised and ruled upon.". F. R. App. P.
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its general lenience with pro se appellants but was unwilling to extend
this to the immediate defendant's "total disregard" for the rulesr'4 The
court characterized the Appellant's argument as one that complains of
district court wrongs without specifying the errors the court is now
called upon to right6 5 and then relies upon authority which holds that
the court is not required to manufacture a party's argument when the
party has not drawn attention to the lower court's errors.6 6 The court




The Tenth Circuit recognized the court's policy of leniency towards
those appellants acting pro se.68 At the outset, however, it made clear
the lack of forgiveness toward an attorney's total disregard for the
rules6 9 and was similarly not impressed by defendant's argument of er-
ror and refusal to point out the offending sections.
Looking to its prior decision in National Commodity and Barter Ass 'n. v.
Gibbs,70 the court reiterated that it is "not required to manufacture a
party's requirement on appeal when it has failed in its burden to draw
our attention to the error below." 7 ' It should be noted that other cir-
cuit courts hold the same to be true, regardless of the appellant's repre-
sentation status.
72
The court reminded the appellant of his obligation to provide the
court with the essential references to the record in order to carry his
burden of proving the error. 73 This obligation is cited from its decision
in SilFlo, Inc., v. SHFC, Inc.74 and comports with other circuits' hold-
ings. 75 At least one other court recognizes that this obligation is also
owed to the Appellee in order to give that party an opportunity to ad-
dress the arguments of error.76 The Thomas court then ruled that it
would not "sift through" the record in search of defendant's conten-
tions of error.
7 7
The court relied on Tenth Circuit caselaw, deferring to the trial
28 states that "[tihe brief of the appellant shall contain . . .appropriate references to the
record."
64. Thomas, 965 F.2d at 826.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th
Cir. 1989)).
67. Id. at 827.
68. Id. at 825-26.
69. Id. at 826.
70. 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989).
71. Thomas, 965 F.2d at 826 (quoting National Commodity, 886 F.2d at 1244).
72. See, e.g., Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1991); Pearce
v. Sullivan, 871 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1989).
73. Thomas, 965 F.2d at 827.
74. 917 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990).
75. See, e.g., Pearce, 871 F.2d at 61.
76. Rivera, 921 F.2d at 692.
77. Thomas, 965 F.2d at 827.
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court's ruling. 78 The court also provided support for their deference by
stating that even if they reviewed the brief, they "were of the firm opin-
ion" that Defendant's arguments would be without merit. 79
II. HARSH SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY:
EHRENHAUS v. REYNOLDS
A. Background
Many articles have been published dealing with the abuses of dis-
covery and court reactions to these abuses.8 0 A court has several ave-
nues available to them for dealing with the abuses.
1. Protections Against Abuse
Rule 26 (g) applies Rule 11 certification requirements to discovery
requests, responses and objections. Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative
duty on counsel to engage in pretrial discovery in a responsible man-
ner.8 1 The fact that a discovery request, response, or objection is infor-
mal will not remove it from Rule 26(g)'s scope. 8 2 Sanctions under this
Rule are mandatory when the request, response or rejection is improper
or interposed for an improper purpose.83 These sanctions can range
from attorney's fees8 4 to dismissal and default.8 5 Rule 26(g) provides
that "[t]he nature of the sanction is a matter of judicial discretion to be
exercised in light of the particular circumstances."-8 6
78. Pearce, 871 F.2d at 78 (relying on United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 319
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); SilFlo, 917 F.2d at 1514).
79. Thomas, 965 F.2d at 827.
80. See, e.g., Michael Forrester, Note, Dismissals for Discovery Abuse - Toward a New Stan-
dard in the District of Columbia, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 761 (1987); Richard W. Engel, Jr., Note,
Rule 61.01: Discovery Sanctions in Missouri, 47J. Mo. B. 275 (1991).
81. Chapman & Cole v. Itel Containers Int'l B.V., 116 F.R.D. 550, 557 (S.D. Tex.
1987). The rule mandates the signing of each request for discovery or response or objec-
tion therto constituting that the signer has "read the request, response, or objection, and
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after areason-
able inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or need-
less increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or
expensive."
82. Cf. Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 657 F. Supp. 1102 (W.D. N.Y. 1987) (letter seeking
recusal, effectively treated as motion, held subject to Rule 11).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note (1983) ("Because of the asserted
reluctance to impose sanctions on attorneys who abuse the discovery rules... Rule 2 6(g)
makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanctions and requires
them to use it.").
84. Hopei Garments, Ltd. v. Oslo Trading Co., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 0932, 1988 WL
25139 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 1988).
85. Perkinson v. Houlihan's/D.C., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 667, 677 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in
relevant part, 821 F.2d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). Note, however, that this rule does not generally apply to
discovery motions. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(g), advisory committee's note (1983). Rule 11 is
generally not applicable to discovery papers. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d
823, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1986). It does, however, apply to discovery motions. See, e.g.,
Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1989). In addition, false discovery
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Another option to curtail discovery abuse is 28 U.S.C. § 1927.87
Where rules are not being technically violated, but the proceeding is
conducted in bad faith so as to delay or increase costs, § 1927 sanctions
will properly be levied.8 8 One example involved an attorney who pro-
longed a non-technical deposition for more than eight full days by im-
proper objections, instructing his client not to answer and by injecting
substantive testimony on his client's behalf. Counsel was properly sanc-
tioned under § 1927.89
A court may also invoke its inherent powers to curb abuse that is
otherwise not punishable under the Federal Rules. 90 Application of a
court's inherent power is strongly indicated when counsel destroys po-
tentially discoverable documents, regardless of their specific responsive-
ness to outstanding discovery requests. 9' Dilatory discovery tactics are
also grounds for inherent power sanctions. 9 2 Inherent powers which
include the powers to request silence and decorum in the courtroom are
to be used sparingly and not as a substitute for the express powers of the
court.
9 3
Rule 37 affords courts a great deal of power that should not be di-
luted by resorting to inherent powers. 94 Rule 37 has essentially the
same goals as inherent powers invocation - general deterrence and just
compensation for violations. 9 5 It authorizes the court to penalize four
specified categories of misconduct: (1) non-compliance with a discovery
order;9 6 (2) failure to admit in response to a request for an admission;
9 7
(3) specified misconduct in connection with depositions, interrogatories
and requests for inspection; 98 and (4) failure to participate in framing a
Rule 37(f) discovery plan.9 9 This Rule, like Rule 26(g), is aimed
squarely at preventing discovery abuse and is applied equally to winner
and loser. 100
responses that later cause other court documents to be false will be sanctionable under
Rule 11. Murray v. Dominick Corp. of Can., Ltd., 117 F.R.D. 512, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
87. This statute provides, in pertinent part, that "[any attorney... who so multiplies
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred be-
cause of such conduct." 29 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
88. Yagman v. Baden, 796 F.2d 1165, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986).
89. Brignoli v. Balch, Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 462, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
90. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). See also, Roadway
Express, Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (sanctions for discovery abuse upheld under
both Rule 37 and the court's inherent powers).
91. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 554 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
92. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
93. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
94. Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480,
496-97 (1958).
95. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
97. Id at 37(c).
98. Id. at 37(d).
99. Id. at 3 7 (g).
100. See, e.g., Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 657 F. Supp. 319, 328 (E.D. La. 1987)
($25,000 sanctions imposed against defendant and in favor of plaintiff, whose claims were
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The four categories of misconduct operate with certain conditions
attached. Rule 37(b) sanctions may be imposed only for disobeying a
valid discovery order. 10 1 One court took a very hard-line approach to
discovery deadlines, holding that a hurricane was no excuse for failure
to make discovery. 10 2 Many courts do not look for the deterrent effect
and will accept a plausible excuse set forth by the party under sanc-
tion.' 0 3 A party's unreasonable failure to admit the truth of any matter
requested under Rule 36 gives rise to a remedy only applicable to the
client, not counsel.l°4
Sanctions may be sought for three types of discovery abuse, even
without a court order: (1) failure to appear at his or her properly no-
ticed deposition; (2) failure to serve answers or objections to properly
served interrogatories; and (3) failure to respond in writing to a prop-
erly served request for production or inspection. ' 05 Failure to appear is
strictly construed and only causes sanctions to issue when a deponent
"literally fails to show up for a deposition session."' 10 6
Another category sanctionable is a party's failure to serve answers
or objections to interrogatories under Rule 33. The sanctions require a
"total failure to respond." ' 0 7 A partial failure must be remedied with a
motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a). 10 8
Rule 37(d) also specifies that a failure to respond to production or
inspection request is sanctionable.' 0 9 A response that denies a response
is sanctionable,110 as is a response containing misrepresentations deny-
ing the existence of requested materials." '
Failure to frame a discovery plan under Rule 37(f) may also be
separately dismissed with prejudice), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 849 F.2d 179 (5th
Cir. 1988).
101. Holcomb v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 774 F.2d 398, 400-01 (10th Cir. 1985). The
order in question does not need to be written, and may be oral. Professional Seminar
Consultants, Inc. v. Sino Am. Tech. Exch. Council, Inc., 727 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.
1984). Even an attorney's promise in open court to produce has been held to be the
equivalent of an order. Charter House Ins. Brokers, Ltd. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 667
F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1981). An order, however, cannot otherwise be implied from the
district judge's perceived intent. Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (2d Cir.
1986).
102. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 42-43 (Tex. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).
103. See, e.g., Fjelstad v. American Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985).
104. Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., 855 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1988).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
106. Salahuddin, 782 F.2d at 1131 (quoting S.E.C. v. Research Automation Corp., 521
F.2d 585, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1975)). In an exceptional situation, however, a bad faith refusal
to answer a question at a deposition could be construed as a non-appearance. Plevy v.
Scully, 89 F.R.D. 665, 666-67 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
107. Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 604 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1979).
108. Fox v. Commissioner, 718 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1983). The response to the
discovery request must be a meaningful one and a simple letter stating that the party is
"unable to respond" is sanctionable. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem., Inc.,
757 F.2d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
109. FED R. Civ. P. 37(d).
110. Minnesota Mining, 757 F.2d at 1260-61.
111. Fautek v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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sanctionable,"12 even though these discovery plans do not appear fre-
quently."13 Once set out, a failure to participate in the plan fully is
sanctionable. 114
2. Sanctions Against Abuse
Federally prescribed rules exist in order to procure compliance with
requests for discovery and to sanction, often harshly, those who fail to
comply." 5 Once an action or failure to act has become sanctionable,
the decision then is what sanction is applicable, if one is at all. This
decision is entrusted to the trial court 1 6 and the discretion vested with
the courts is broad," i7 yet restrained by the requirement that the sanc-
tion be "just"' 18 and "specifically related to the particular claim or de-
fense at issue in the discovery order." 119
To determine the justness of sanctions, the appellate court will con-
sider the trial judge's weighing of appropriate factors before imposing
sanctions and whether the severity of the sanction is warranted by the
conduct. 120 The Supreme Court provided guidance in holding that dis-
covery sanctions are not to be imposed when the violation is due to a
real inability to comply. 12 1 Other courts have made it clear that the
inability may not be self-imposed. ' 22 The test for dismissal is not partic-
ularly harsh and only determines whether the district judge abused his
discretion and whether the discovery abuse was in bad faith, deliberately
intentional or willful. 123 Even the fact that a less strenuous sanction
than dismissal could have been more appropriate will not make dismis-
sal an abuse of the court's discretion.
12 4
The types of sanctions provided for are numerous.12 5 Fees and ex-
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g).
113. See Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129, 134 (5th
Cir. 1987) (noting fewer than 50 reported cases of courts implementing 26(f) discovery
plans).
114. Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567 (C.D. Ill. 1988).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), 37. For a general discussion of the application of these
rules, see GREGORY P. JOSEPH, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse
§§ 25(e)(3), 40(a) (1989 & Supp. 1991); Maurice Rosenberg, supra note 94 at 485-86.
116. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 110 F.R.D. 363, 367
(D. Del. 1986).
117. Fonseca v. Regan, 734 F.2d 944, 947 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984).
118. Professional Seminar Consultants, Inc. v. Sino Am. Technology. Exch. Council,
Inc., 727 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984).
119. Id.
120. In re Rubin, 769 F.2d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 1985).
121. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 640 (1976)
(per curiam). For an example of strict enforcement of this rule, see Searock v. Stripling,
736 F.2d 650, 653-54 (11 th Cir. 1984).
122. Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 799 F.2d 1510, 1521-22 (11 th Cir.
1986).
123. Boogaerts v. Bank of Bradley, 961 F.2d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 1992).
124. Id.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 37. These sanctions may be: (1) an order specifying that desig-
nated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action; (2) an order precluding
litigation of certain issues; (3) an order precluding the introduction of certain evidence; (4)
an order striking out pleadings or part thereof; (5) an order staying further proceedings
pending compliance with an order that has not been obeyed; (6) dismissal of the action in
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penses, common sanctions, may be awarded against both clients 126 and
attorneys' 2 7 . Preclusion awards, those that bar a litigant from court,
however, are carefully imposed by the courts. 128 They may either pre-
clude a party from asserting their otherwise valid claim or defense, 129 or
they may preclude a party from introducing a piece of evidence.'5 0 A
court may also deem matters at issue admitted. 131 Another sanction
available is that of contempt of court, which is a harsh measure and
available only when a showing can be made that an order has been vio-
lated.' 3 2 Contempt is often used by the courts as an alternative to entry
of a default or dismissal.
133
The most severe sanctions, and the ones of import here, are those
of dismissal or default. These are draconian sanctions,1 3 4 properly im-
posed only as last resort.' 3 5 The Tenth Circuit holds that dismissal is a
severe sanction applicable only in extreme circumstances and should be
used as a weapon of last, rather than first, resort. 1 3 6 These sanctions are
not appropriate when the violation "has been due to inability, and not to
willfulness, bad faith or any fault of [the party]."' 3 7 Courts construe this
to require a showing of willfulness or bad faith before imposing the
harsh sanctions of dismissal or default.' 3 8 It must also be shown that
less drastic alternatives will not achieve the necessary deterrent ef-
fect. 139 Dismissal or default are to be imposed only when there have
been blatant, deliberate violations of orders or an established pattern of
discovery abuse. 140 A single wilful violation or patterned noncompli-
ance that does not cause serious prejudice is unlikely to sustain these
full or in part; (7) entry of a default judgment on some or all claims; (8) an order treating
as contempt of court the failure to obey any discovery order except an order to submit to a
physical or mental examination; (9) an award of reasonable expenses incurred in (i) mak-
ing a successful, or opposing an unsuccessful motion to compel; (ii) proving at trial any
matter which an opponent failed to admit in response to a request; (iii) moving for sanc-
tions. Id.
126. J.D. Marshall Int'l, Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 830, 838 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
127. Home-Pack Transp., Inc. v. Donovan, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghn) 1063, 1064-
65 (D. Md. May 21, 1984) (magistrate's opinion).
128. Ferrara v. Balistreri & DeMaio, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 147, 151 (D. Mass. 1985).
129. See, e.g., Libbi. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 107 F.R.D. 227, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(party who refused to answer interrogatory concerning claim precluded from asserting
that claim).
130. See, e.g., Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 466 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987) (court excluded statistical experts).
131. Rogers v. Chicago Park Dist., 89 F.R.D. 716, 719 (N.D. Il1. 1981).
132. Schlepper v. Ford Motor Co., 585 F.2d 1367, 1371 (8th Cir. 1978).
133. See, e.g., Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 545, 551-52 (D. Me. 1984) (as-
sessing a $10,000 contempt fine).
134. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643.
135. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68, 870 (3d Cir. 1984).
136. Gocolay v. New Mexico Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 968 F.2d 1017, 1021 (10th Cir.
1992).
137. National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 640.(quoting Societe Internationale v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958)).
138. See, e.g., Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1986); Pressey v. Patterson, 898
F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring showing of bad faith).
139. See, e.g., Batson v. Neal Spelce Assoc., Inc., 805 F.2d 546, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1986).





In 1991, however, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit con-
vinced everyone that a new age of sanctioning had arrived. Sustaining a
default judgment entered for tardy production of documents, he
warned:
For a long time courts were reluctant to enter default judg-
ments, and appellate courts were reluctant to sustain those that
were entered. Courts emphasized that litigants are entitled to
decisions on the merits, and that default is a harsh sanction.
Those times are gone . . . [D]istrict judges have become more
aggressive in using their ultimate weapon to promote the effi-
cient conduct of litigation. More power to them.
14 2
A caution should be given here that the terms "dismissal" and "default"
are not interchangeable. A plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery
orders is properly sanctioned by dismissal of the suit and a defendant's
failure is sanctioned by entry of a default judgment.1
43
A discovery decision or sanction propounded under any of the
above powers is generally not appealable because it is not a final order
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and any party wishing to appeal
such a decision must first defy the trial court's order and suffer con-
tempt.' 44 While discovery orders are generally not reviewable by man-
damus, one court has issued a writ of mandamus to review a discovery
order. 14 5 The collateral order doctrine 146 is normally not brought into
play by a discovery order as these orders can generally be reviewed ef-
fectively on appeal from a final judgment.
14 7
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds
14 8
1. Facts
Appellant Reynolds filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado alleging securities fraud. 14 9 The ap-
pellees, as part of pre-trial discovery, deposed Ehrenhaus for three days
during which he repeatedly attempted to invoke the attorney-client priv-
141. See, e.g., Fjelstad v. American Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985).
142. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Cammon, 929 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir.
1991).
143. Newman v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 962 F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.).
144. See, e.g., Sedlock v. Bic Corp., 926 F.2d 757-59 (8th Cir. 1991).
145. In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1987). But see In re Weisman, 835 F.2d
23, 27 (2d Cir. 1987) (refusing to issue writ of mandamus).
146. This doctrine permits an appeal from an interlocutory order, one that determines
an issue completely separate from the merits of the action and which could not be given
effective review on appeal from a final subsequent judgement. See Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
147. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). But see Corporation of
Lloyd's v. Lloyd's, 831 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying collateral order doctrine to
allow appeal from order denying discovery).
148. 965 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1992).
149. Id. at 918.
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ilege.' 50 Ehrenhaus then alleged disagreement with his counsel and
counsel moved to withdraw. 15 1 This motion was never ruled upon. 152
The remainder of Ehrenhaus's deposition was rescheduled and prior to
the deposition the district court ordered that the deposition take place
in the federal courthouse so that the judge could contemporaneously
rule on any attorney-client privilege assertions. 153 A warning was also
given to Ehrenhaus through his counsel that if he failed to attend the
deposition, a motion would be expected from appellees for dismissal. 154
Ehrenhaus moved unsuccessfully for a protective order, once again de-
laying discovery. 15 5  The ruling magistrate warned counsel for




Ehrenhaus did not appear at the deposition and appellees moved to
have the complaint dismissed with prejudice. 15 7 The motion was
granted and survived a hearing on the motion. 1 58 An order was ulti-
mately issued dismissing the complaint with prejudice, with specific find-
ings that Ehrenhaus had willfully violated the court's discovery order.1
59
The Tenth Circuit found that the deciding judge had given appropriate
thought to the factors necessary to affirm the district court's dismissal.
The court set the framework for the case by holding the dismissal of a
case to be within the court's discretion if it concludes that dismissal
alone would satisfy the interests of justice.
16 0
3. Analysis
The trial court relied upon Rule 37(b)(2) as grounds for dismissal of
an action if one party fails to obey a discovery order under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(c).' 6 ' Because the trial court had this per-
mission, the court applied the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing
the district court's ruling. 16 2 The court did, however, recognize that
dismissal is an extreme sanction appropriate only where the offense has
been willful. 16 3 Additionally, the necessity of using dismissal only as a
last resort and the attendant defeat of a litigant's rights that goes with




153. Id. at 918-919.






160. Id at 918.
161. Id. at 920.
162. Id.
163. Id
164. Id. (citing Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988)). This
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The court then applied caselaw restricting the trial judge's discre-
tion in imposing a sanction to requiring imposition of one that is both
"just" and "related to the particular claim at issue in order to provide
discovery."1
6 5
The court established five factors to be considered in determining
justness, relying on past Tenth Circuit established conditions. 166 The
first factor is the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant. 16 7 The
court deferred, as it did with all factors, to the trial court's finding of
prejudice in the form of delay and increasing attorney's fees. 16 8 An-
other factor examined is the amount of interference with the judicial
process that arose from the violation.169 The court found Ehrenhaus's
willful noncompliance a flouting of the court's authority and properly
supporting sanctions under this factor. 170 The third factor is the culpa-
bility of the litigant. '7' The court found the explicit consideration given
this factor by the trial judge noted the bad faith and willfulness of
Ehrenhaus's conduct.17 2 These three factors were previously applied by
the Tenth Circuit in Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Industries.
173
A fourth factor was imported from Wiliner v. University of Kansas, 174
an earlier case decided by the Tenth Circuit. This factor was advance
warning given that dismissal was a likely sanction for noncompliance
with the order.175 Here Ehrenhaus was put on notice that his failure to
attend would likely lead to a motion for dismissal.' 76 The court explic-
itly found this sufficient to satisfy the fourth factor. 1
77
The final factor, again gleaned from Ocelot, is the efficacy of lesser
sanctions. 178 This factor was not satisfied as persuasively as the court
would prefer. In dicta, the court construed the district judge's com-
ments, equating them with the judge's belief that less than the full range
of sanctions was available to him.' 79 Of some satisfaction to the Tenth
Circuit, however, was the belief that the dismissing judge knew he had
the opportunity to deny the motion.1 80
Though the satisfaction of these factors does not equal the passing
of a threshold test, the court should attempt a recording of this evalua-
caution is alive and well in the Tenth Circuit. See Gocolay v. New Mexico Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n., 968 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1992).
165. Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 920-21 (citing Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Campagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)).







173. Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458 (10th Cir. 1988).
174. Willner v. University of Kan., 848 F.2d 1023, 1030 (10th Cir. 1988).
175. Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (applying Ocelot, 847 F.2d at 1465).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 921-22.
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tion.' 8 1 This test is thorough as relating to private interests in the litiga-
tion at hand. At least one circuit, the Ninth Circuit, has adopted a three-
part test looking only to prejudice, warning and consideration of other
sanctions.' 8 2 The Tenth Circuit may wish in the future to look at these
situations similar to the manner of the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit
looks to public interest factors such as the expeditious resolution of liti-
gation and the courts' need to manage the docket, but also to the public
policy of favoring disposition of cases on their merits.'
8 3
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS DECISIONS, 1404(a) TRANSFERS AND
THEIR APPEALABILrrY: SCHEIDT V. KLEIN
A. Background
A forum non conveniens claim is different from one of transfer. Under
the doctrine offorum non conveniens, a court dismisses the case rather than
transferring it, allowing the plaintiff to simply refile elsewhere. A mo-
tion may also be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer.' 8 4 "For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a dis-
trict court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought."' 8 5 Cases are no longer subject to
dismissal underforum non conveniens if there is an alternative forum within
the United States Federal Court System.
Forum non conveniens dismissals are harsher than § 1404(a) trans-
fers.' s 6 For that reason, a greater degree of inconvenience is required
for a non conveniens action to take place. 18 7 Consequently one district
court in the Tenth Circuit has gone so far as to use forum non conveniens
only in exceptional cases. ' 88 A statute of limitations may run before the
plaintiff is able to refile and potentially stifling limitations exist as to
where a plaintiff may refile under federal venue statutes because it may
only be filed where the action was capable of originally being
brought. ' 8 9
The Supreme Court has listed the factors of both private and public
interest that courts should consider when making forum non conveniens
decisions. 190 The private interests delineated include the accessibility of
evidence, ability to compel the attendance of witnesses, costs of trans-
181. Id. at 921.
182. Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir. 1990).
183. See Adriana Intern. Corp. v. Lewis & Co., 913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
185. Id. § 1404.
186. For a discussion of transfers under 1404(a), see Michael J. Waggoner, Section
1404(a), Where It Might Have Been Brought: Brought By Whom?, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67
(1988).
187. SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 913 (1979).
188. Pioneer Prop., Inc. v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 1354, 1361-62 (D. Kan. 1983).
189. For a discussion of federal venue possibilities, see David E. Seidelson,Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases: An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by
Venue Restrictions, 37 GEO. WASH L. REV. 82 (1968).
190. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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porting witnesses, a view of the site and the enforceability of a judg-
ment.19 1 Factors of public interest to be considered include court
congestion, burden of jury duty, local interest in the litigation, avoid-
ance of conflicts-of-law issues and unfamiliar laws. 192 In the Court's
words, "unless the balance [of private factors] is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed."' 9 3 Courts are not to emphasize any one factor too heavily for
fear of losing flexibility.1
9 4
These decisions often place a substantial burden on the party whose
case has been dismissed or transferred. It is important to note that an
order granting or denying a transfer under § 1404(a) is generally not in
itself appealable, unless certified for interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) or a grant of a writ of mandamus. 195
An appeal from the forum decision is not made without guidance.
Federal courts may not attempt to determine what a state court would
consider an appropriate forum 19 6 and may not, after dismissal, enjoin
plaintiffs from filing an identical action in state court. 19 7 The doctrine
offorum non conveniens is alive and well at the state court level where one
state's courts may provide a more convenient site for litigation than that
of the dismissing state.' 9 8
In 1981, the Supreme Court, in Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, found the
doctrine of forum non conveniens applicable where the alternative forum
was a foreign nation. 19 9 Piper provided guidance as to the standard to
be used on appeal in reviewing the district court's decision, pronounc-
ing it to be the clear abuse of discretion standard. 20 0 A court will grant
substantial deference 20 ' where it is clear that the lower court considered
all the relevant public and private factors as enunciated in the
caselaw. 20 2 Some states have compiled statutoryforum non conveniens fac-
191. Id. at 508.
192. Id. at 508-09.
193. Id. at 508.
194. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981).
195. Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988). But see Kontoulas v. A.H. Robbins
Co., 745 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding order denying forum non conveniens dismissal
appealable). For further discussion, see David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the
Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 472-78 (1990).
196. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988).
197. Id. at 140.
198. See, e.g., McClain v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 520 N.E.2d 368, 374 (Il. 1988)
(dismissing case underforum non conveniens doctrine where Tennessee was strongly favored
as a more convenient forum).
199. Piper, 454 U.S. at 235. For discussion of an international plaintiff's experience, see
Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens and the International Plaintif, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650 (1992).
200. Piper, 454 U.S. at 257.
201. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions requiring virtually complete defer-
ence to lower court rulings on forum non conveniens, see Hon. HenryJ. Friendly, Indiscre-
tion About Discretion, 31 EMoRy L.J. 747, 748-54 (1982).
202. Piper, 454 U.S. at 257. Cf. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy
of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 832 (1985) (such decisions by the trial court
are subject to only cursory appellate scrutiny).
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tors removing discretion from the trial court. 203
The standard for finding error in refusing to transfer an action
under § 1404(a) is also a "clear abuse of discretion."1204 When a motion
to transfer has been filed, the moving party bears the burden of estab-
lishing the inconvenience of the present forum.20 5 The plaintiff, having
chosen the forum, will be favored in this action. 20 6 A court will not
merely shift inconvenience from one party to another,2 0 7 for what is
convenient for one party will often prove to be equally inconvenient for
their adversary.
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion: Scheidt v. Klein
20 8
1. Facts
This appeal stems from a case involving fraud and breach of con-
tract claims against the appellant involving his representation of the
plaintiff in Tax Court proceedings.20 9 Defendant filed two motions,
both denied, seeking a change in venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). 2 10 The defendant asserted that the majority of contemplated
witnesses resided in Florida, the pertinent documentary evidence was
located in Florida, the conduct occurred in Florida and was to be as-
sessed under Florida substantive law. For all these reasons, the less ex-




Defendant did not prove that (1) the witnesses were unwilling to
come to trial in Oklahoma City, (2) deposition testimony would be un-
satisfactory, or (3) that the use of compulsory process would be neces-
sary.2 1 2 Defendant also alleged that boxes of documents existed would
have to be produced in support of the defense.2 13 The court was unim-
pressed by these arguments and did not find error in the refusal to
change venue.
C. Analysis
The first contention of error was the district court's denial of the
203. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1314 (McKinney 1986).
204. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 439 F.2d
300, 305 (10th. Cir. 1971).
205. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc. 928 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir.
1991).
206. William A. Smith Contracting Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 467 F.2d 662, 664
(10th Cir. 1972).
207. ROC, Inc. v. Progress Drillers, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 147, 152 (W.D. Ok. 1979).
208. 956 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1992).
209. Id. at 965.
210. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) authorizes a district court to transfer a case "to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
211. Scheidt, 956 F.2d at 965.
212. Id. at 966. See ROC, 481 F. Supp. at 152.
213. Scheidt, 956 F.2d at 966.
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appellant's motions for venue transfer under § 1404(a). 2 14 The court
made it clear that three distinct and challenging hurdles must be cleared
before dismissal would be affirmed.
2 15
The first condition precedent to a finding of error in the refusal to
transfer under § 1404(a) is that there be a clear abuse of discretion at
the trial level. 2 16 This opinion appears to be widely-held and well-set-
tled.2 17 In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion.2 18 Second, the movant bears the bur-
den of establishing the inconvenience of the existing forum. 2 19 Finally,
unless the balance strongly favors the party attempting transfer, the fo-
rum in which the plaintiff chose to file should not be changed. 2 20
The court, without the benefit of an individual analysis of these fac-
tors pointed out that the collective weight of these factors favored the
plaintiff in this case. The defendant's assertions for venue transfer have
listed, apparently the same ones suggested previously by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc..221 Defendant's first
contention was that the majority of contemplated witnesses reside in
Florida. 22 2 The court did not argue with this, but rather looked unsuc-
cessfully for one of four factors to be present: an indication of quality of
materiality of the testimony of the Florida witnesses, a showing that af-
fected witnesses were unwilling to come to trial at the designated venue,
a showing that deposition testimony would be unsatisfactory, or a show-
ing of need for compulsory process. 2 2" They found that the defendant's
"meager showing" provided none of these.2 24
Defendant next contended that the relative documentary evidence
was located primarily in Florida.2 25 He never explained or substantiated
why these documents could not be reviewed in Florida and the docu-
ments of import shipped to Oklahoma, the original venue site.2 26 The
fact that he did not describe or identify these documents did not help his
case.
Defendant's weakest contention for transfer was that Florida sub-
stantive law was to be applied in the case which might more easily be
done if the case were heard in Florida.2 27 The court summarily dis-
214. Id. at 965.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Metropolitan, 439 F.2d at 305).
217. See Christine Melady Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens
and Venue Transfer Orders, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 715 (1991).
218. Scheidt, 956 F.2d at 966.
219. Id. at 965 (citing Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509,
1515 (10th Cir. 1991)).
220. Id. (citing William A. Smith Contracting Co. v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 467 F.2d
662, 664 (10th Cir. 1972)).
221. Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1516.
222. Scheidt, 956 F.2d at 965.
223. Id. at 966 (applying ROC, Inc., 481 F. Supp. at 152).
224. Id
225. Id. at 965.
226. Id. at 966.
227. Id. at 965.
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missed this contention because of the simplicity of the legal issues in-
volved in the common law fraud and breach of contract claims. 2 28
Defendant's final contention was that Florida would be the less expen-
sive and more convenient forum.2 29 The court believed that the change
of venue to Florida would do no more than shift the inconvenience from
the defendant to the plaintiff. The Tenth Circuit continued to hold a
mere shift of inconvenience is impermissible 23 0 and that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the transfer motion. Scheidt
is in agreement with the Supreme Court's policy of granting virtually
complete deference to the trial court in this matter.23 1
CONCLUSION
The cases surveyed illuminate thejudiciary's increased awareness of
the need to manage its docket effectively, while at the same time recog-
nizing the need for litigation on the merits of cases. Improper tactics
and frivolous motions are now being harshly dealt with by the Tenth
Circuit.
As Thomas pointed out, courts are growing increasingly intolerant of
the large number of frivolous pro se lawsuits filed and are rapidly strip-
ping away the cloak of immunity that formerly existed protecting pro se
litigants from their inadequacies.
Discovery is also coming under heightened scrutiny by the Tenth
Circuit. Horror stories of discovery abuse are common and at least one
major motion picture has been written about abusive and illegal discov-
ery tactics in a product liability action. 23 2 Courts are now making it
known to all parties involved that a dismissal or default judgment will be
ordered more freely and earlier than it would have been several years
ago. Ehrenhaus is just one of the first cases in the Tenth Circuit reflect-
ing this.
The Scheidt case illustrated the courts' impatience with venue trans-
fers. These no longer remain the viable delay-inducing, cost-increasing
trial tactics they once were. The requirements are now being strictly
adhered to and the defendant must have a compelling argument for
overturning the plaintiff's choice of forum.
These three cases represent only a tiny fraction of the decisions
touching on procedural issues decided this year by the Tenth Circuit.
Yet, these cases, as a whole, indicate a judiciary possessing a heightened
awareness of and reduced tolerance for improper conduct within its hal-
lowed halls.
Steven C. Tempelman
228. Id. at 966.
229. Id. at 965.
230. Id. at 966 (citing ROC, Inc., 481 F. Supp. at 152).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 203-04.
232. Class Action (Twentieth Century Fox 1991) (involving auto manufacturer's inten-




During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed a variety of issues within the area of commercial law. Economic
and political situations, both foreign and domestic, generated engaging
issues for appellate review. At home, the mismanagement and failure of
banks and savings and loans continued to produce a number of cases for
Tenth Circuit review. Part I of this survey will analyze two of these
cases: United States v. DavisI and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v.
Canfield.2
In Davis, the court decided those who serve a federally insured insti-
tution, whether in an employment context or in some other position of
trust, are "connected with" that institution for the purpose of conviction
for misapplying federally insured funds under 18 U.S.C. § 657.3 In Can-
field, a case of first impression at the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit
held that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA)4 provision allowing bank officers and directors to be held
personally liable for "gross negligence" does not bar the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from seeking recovery against of-
ficers and directors under an ordinary negligence theory if applicable
state law allows such actions.
Executive Orders issued in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
acted as a catalyst for a commercial law case involving letters of credit.
Part II of this survey will analyze Centrifugal Casting Machine Company v.
American Bank & Trust 5 in detail. In Centrifugal, the Tenth Circuit ex-
amined the complexities of letters of credit, reaching the conclusion that
Iraq, as account party to a letter of credit, did not have a property inter-
est in the contract down payment made to a beneficiary, Centrifugal
Casting Machine Co. (CCM), even though CCM breached the underly-
ing contract. As a result, the Executive Orders freezing Iraqi assets did
not apply to the payment.
6
1. 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2286 (1992).
2. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 657 (Supp. III 1991) (it is unlawful for a person who is "an officer,
agent or employee of or connected in any capacity with" an insured institution to willfully
misapply funds belonging to the institution).
4. In 1989, in response to the large number of bank and savings and loan failures,
Congress enacted the FIRREA. FIRREA enables the FDIC to stand in the shoes of the
failed bank and its stockholders to sue the officers and directors for mismanagement under
state law. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The
issue in the Canfield case concerned 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 1 1989).
5. 966 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. Id at 1354.
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II. BANKING CASES
A. Background
The savings and loan (S&L) debacle represents one of the greatest
scandals in American history. It is generally agreed that directors and
officers mismanged the failing S&Ls. 7 Simple incompetence by inexpe-
rienced officers and managers combined with fraud resulted in poorly
conceived loans and investments, loans to officers and directors, sweet-
heart loans to affiliated businesses, altered books, bribery and outright
embezzlement. 8 Fraud, specifically, is implicated in approximately sev-
enty percent of the failed institutions.9 The issue before the court in
United States v. Davis '0 was whether an individual, who was not an officer,
director or an agent of a federally insured institution, could be prose-
cuted for misapplying funds under 18 U.S.C. § 657." Although the
Tenth Circuit had not addressed this issue, other circuits have given a
broad interpretation of section 657.12
In addition to criminal activity, negligent management of financial
institutions also contributed to the failure of banks and S&Ls. Although,
historically, corporate directors and officers have enjoyed broad discre-
tion in exercising their fiduciary duties, 13 courts increasingly examine
7. Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV, S7, S34 (1991).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2286 (1992).
11. Davis also raised several other unrelated issues on appeal. For a full discussion of
these issues see Davis, 953 F.2d at 1490-98.
12. In United States v. Prater, 805 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11 th Cir. 1986), the president of
a real estate subsidiary, solely owned by a savings and loan, was found to be "connected
with" the savings and loan under section 657 where the president had the authority to
initiate loans and the savings and loan board relied on him for accurate recommendation
concerning loans. Those who serve a federally insured institution, whether in an employ-
ment context or in some other position of trust, the Eleventh Circuit found, were "con-
nected with" that institution under section 657. Id. See also United States v. Payne, 750
F.2d 844, 855 (11 th Cir. 1985).
A connection with a federally insured institution may result from control through
stock ownership, or control through the power to extend credit. However, such direct
control is not necessary to find that a defendant is connected with the institution. United
States v. Rice, 645 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981) (consultant
retained by savings and loan to originate loans was "connected with" that institution,
notwithstanding that he had not right to approve loans); United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d
350, 352 (4th Cir. 1970) (employee of bank service corporation was connected with the
bank). In United States v. Garrett, 396 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968),
controlling stockholders of a bank were charged with misapplication of national bank
funds in connection with the purchase of mortgages by the bank. The mortgage sellers
paid large commissions to a nonbank corporation owned by the defendants who then dis-
tributed the money among themselves. Id. at 490. The defendants argued that since they
were not officers, directors, agents or employees of the bank, they were outside the reach
of the statute. Id The Fifth Circuit disagreed. After examining the connection between
the defendants and the bank, the court found that the defendants and their nominees
obtained control of the bank by acquiring the majority of its stock. Id. at 491. As control-
ling stockholders, the defendants had a fiduciary duty to both the bank and the minority
shareholders. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded the "fact of ownership ... together with the
activity ... in furtherance of control demonstrates a connection with the bank within the
meaning of the statute." Id.
13. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207 (1988). "Courts interfere seldom to con-
[Vol. 70:4
1993] COMMERCIAL LA W
the propriety of corporate decisionmaking.
Financially distraught companies are frequent sources of litigation
challenging the actions of corporate directors and officers. 14 With the
onslaught of lawsuits, costs of director and officer (D&O) liability insur-
ance increased dramatically. 15 As a result, many directors and officers
chose to resign rather than expose themselves to personal liability due
to inadequate D&O coverage. 16 Many states quickly responded to these
developments by enacting legislation limiting director and officer
personal liability. 17 The states limited liability by imposing lower liabil-
ity standards, some requiring proof of conduct exceeding gross
negligence. ' 8
Utah, however, takes an opposite position. Under Utah law, an of-
ficer or director can be liable for ordinary negligence. 19 The issue
before the court in Canfield was whether section 1821(k) of FIRREA es-
tablished a national liability standard of gross negligence for actions
brought by the FDIC, and thereby preempted the Utah law that permit-
ted such actions under a simple negligence standard.
20
trol such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of
misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which
prevents an unprejudiced exercise ofjudgment." Id. (quoting United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917)). Thereafter, the business judg-
ment rule was routinely invoked to validate directors and officers decisions and to insulate
them from personal liability. Id.
14. See, e.g., Fox v. Chase Manhattan Corp., No. 91JUV-0831, 1986 WL637 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 2, 1986) (Delaware Chancery Court approved a $32.5 million settlement of suit
against Chase Manhattan Corp. and six of its officers arising out of the collapse of Drys-
dale Government Securities); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. SeaFirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762
(9th Cir. 1989) (bank holding company and five of its officers agreed to entry ofjudgment
for $10 million).
15. Over the course of one year, D&O insurance increased an astonishing 360%. In-
suring Directors, WALL ST. J., Mar, 21, 1986, at 31.
16. Hanks, supra note 13, at 1209.
17. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (e) (1989)(willful misconduct or recklessness); Wis.
STAT. § 180.0828(1) (1992)(willful misconduct).
18. See sources cited supra note 17. See generally Hanks, supra note 13; Douglas M. Bran-
son, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to
Corporate Directors, 3 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988).
19. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-840 (Supp. 1992).
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) provides:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally
liable for monetary damages in any civilaction by, on behalf of, or at the requestor
direction of the Corporation, which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for
the benefit of the Corporation-
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, orcause of action purchased for, assigned
by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conservator, or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or causeof action based upon a suit,
claim, orcause of action purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed
in whole or inpart by an insured depository institution or its affiliate in con-
nection withassistance provided under section 1823 of this title, for gross
negligence, including similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater
disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tor-
tious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined underapplicable
State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the
Corporation under other applicable law.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 1 1989).
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B. United States v. Davis2 1
1. Facts
United States v. Davis involved the theft of federally insured deposits
through a series of complex transactions containing elements of decep-
tion, collusion, conflicts of interest and self-dealing. 22 Defendants Don
C. Davis and Daniel M. Burke misapplied or diverted millions of dollars
at the expense of several banks and savings and loans, and ultimately the
United States Treasury.
23
Davis and Burke exercised control over the Guarantee Federal Bank
(GFB) as part of a group that controlled a majority block of stock.2 4
Burke was a director of GFB, and although Davis was not a board mem-
ber, he frequently gave financial advice to the board and attended board
meetings.2 5 Davis and Burke influenced GFB president's decision to
purchase securities from bank holding companies in which Davis and
Burke had interests. 26 In reality, through a series of transactions, the
money was diverted to Davis and Burke. The United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming 27 convicted Davis and Burke of mis-
applying federally insured deposits under 18 U.S.C. § 657.28 On ap-
peal, Davis argued his conviction was invalid because the prosecution
did not meet its burden and establish that Davis was an officer, agent, or
employee of a federally insured institution.
2 9
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit was unswayed by Davis' argument that only "of-
ficers, agents, or employees" who are "connected in any capacity with"
an insured institution may be found liable under section 657.30 The
court disagreed with Davis' construction of the statute, finding it too
21. 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2286 (1992).
22. Id. at 1486.
23. In addition to being charged with misapplying federally insured funds under 18
U.S.C. § 657, Davis and Burke were also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspir-
acy to commit offenses against, and to defraud the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire
fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (making false entries in bank books and records or unlawful re-
ceipt of benefits). Davis was also charged with 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (overvaluing security and
making false statements). Davis, 953 F.2d at 1486.
24. Davis, 952 F.2d at 1487.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Davis Nos. 89-8051, 89-8052, 90-8057, 90-8058 (D. Wyo. 1990)
(on file at Denv. U.L. Rev. offices).
28. Davis was convicted on fourteen counts including one count of conspiracy, five
counts of wire fraud, four counts of misapplying federally insured funds, two counts of
aiding an abetting false entries, one count of aiding and abetting in the unlawful receipt of
benefits, and one count of overvaluing securities. The jury convicted Burke on eleven
counts including one count of conspiracy, three counts of wire fraud, four counts of misap-
plying federally insured funds, two counts of make false entries and one count of unlaw-
fully receiving benefits. Davis, 952 F.2d at 1486. Burke died soon after sentencing and
Davis petitioned the circuit for review. Id. at 1487.
29. Id. at 1488.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 657 (Supp. III 1991).
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narrow.3 1 To read the statute as Davis advocated would require the
court to ignore the Act's language: "[w]hoever, being an officer, agent or
employee of or connected in any capacity with." 3 2 The fact that Davis
had not formally been designated an agent of GFB did not preclude the
trier of fact from finding an agency relationship based upon conduct.3 3
Furthermore, the prosecution did not have to show that Davis was an
agent, but merely that he was "connected in any capacity with" an in-
sured financial institution.
3 4
The court explained that the "connected in any capacity with" lan-
guage should be broadly interpreted in accordance with the congres-
sional resolve to protect federally insured institutions against fraud.
3 5
The court also pointed out that each case should be evaluated on its own
facts. 3 6 Based upon the control Davis exercised over GFB and his ex-
tensive participation in the affairs of GFB, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that Davis was "connected" with the institution within the meaning of
section 657.3
7
C. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Canfield
3 8
1. Facts
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., brought suit against the for-
mer directors and officers of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust, a Utah finan-
cial institution, seeking damages of $7 million for imprudent loans made
or approved by the defendants, and damages for waste of bank assets
and mismanagement. 39 The defendant officers and directors argued
that section 1821 (k) preempts state law and bars the FDIC from seeking
damages from officers and directors for any conduct less than gross neg-
ligence. 40 The FDIC asserted that section 1821(k) preserved the ability
of the FDIC to sue, when authorized by state law, for damages against
officers and directors for ordinary negligence. 4 1 The FDIC maintained
its interpretation was consistent with the objectives of FIRREA. The
district court examined the language of section 1821(k), its legislative
history and the public policy arguments advanced by both parties, and
reached an opposite conclusion, holding that section 1821(k) created a
national standard of gross negligence, and thereby preempted conflict-
31. Id. at 1489.
32. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 657).
33. Davis, 953 F.2d at 1488.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1489. Cf United States v. Ratchford, 942 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1185 (1992). The Tenth Circuit held that a property manager who di-
verted funds from an apartment complex owned by two savings and loan associations was
sufficiently connected to federally insured institutions to support conviction under § 657.
36. Davis, 953 F.2d at 1489.
37. Id. at 1989-90.
38. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.) cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
39. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. at 534. See also supra note 4.
40. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. at 534. Under Utah law, the directors and officer would be
personally liable for money damage for simple negligence.
41. Id.
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ing state law. 42
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit mirrored the lower court's analysis of
section 1821(k). However, the conclusions were markedly different.
Following the district court's analysis, the appellate court began with the
plain language of the statute.43
According to the Tenth Circuit, the language used in section
1821 (k) to describe the potential liability of officers and directors belied
the creation of an exclusive national liability standard. 44 The first sen-
tence of the statute states that "a director or officer may be held person-
ally liable for monetary damages... for gross negligence."'45 The court
focused its attention on the word "may", stating that " 'may' is a permis-
sive term, and it does not imply a limitation on the standards of officer
and director liability."'46 To affirm the lower court's construction of sec-
tion 1821(k), the appellate court concluded it would have to construe
the first sentence as saying that "an officer or director may only be held
personally liable for gross negligence."147 This would require the inser-
tion of a word into the statute, which the court refused to do.48 Further-
more, the Tenth Circuit found the last sentence of the statute consistent
with this interpretation. 49 "Other applicable law", in the last sentence,
means all "other applicable law"-state, federal or any other.50 Any
other law providing that an officer or director may be held liable for
simple negligence survives, such a law being "other applicable law." 5'
Construing the statute to bar application of such "other law" would im-
pair the FDIC's enforcement rights.
52
In further support of this conclusion, the court relied on the general
rule of statutory construction that "the statute should be read as a
whole." s53 The court observed that "[n]owhere does the statute an-
nounce its intention to create a national standard of liability." '54 In fact,
the statute's reliance on state law to define gross negligence contra-
42. Id. at 540.
43. Id. at 445. (the Court began with the plain language of the law) (quoting United
States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 11l S.Ct. 2803 (1991)).
44. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
45. Id. at 446 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)).
46. Id. (citing Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 626-27 (1987)) (the Court refused to read
"may" as establishing anything other than discretionary power).
47. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
48. Id. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991)
("may" does not mean "may only").
49. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
50. Id. See also Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1974)(reliance must be
placed on unambiguous statutes "evident meaning"); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct.
2242 (1992)(the Court read "applicable bankruptcy law" in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) to in-
clude both state and federal law).
51. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05
(5th ed. 1992)).
54. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 447.
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dicted the proposition that FIRREA establishes a national standard be-
cause state law definitions of gross negligence vary.5 5 In contrast, other
sections of FIRREA specifically mention the applicability of state law or
federal law.
56
Next, the court reviewed the legislative history behind the statute
and found it consistent with its interpretation of the plain meaning of
the statute. Specifically, the court followed the senate's lead finding that
section 1821 "does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under
State law or other applicable Federal law, if such law permits the officers
or directors of a financial institution to be sued for violating a lower
standard of care, such as simple negligence."
57
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the public policy arguments
raised by the defendants and concluded that these arguments were
raised in the wrong forum. 58 By inserting the "other applicable law"
verbiage, Congress intended to let the individual states decide the pro-
priety of a simple negligence standard. 5 9 By doing so, Congress allowed
states to consider the implications of problems such as the difficulty of
obtaining D&O insurance and its effect on attracting competent and ag-
gressive business leaders. 60 In this case, the court's only consideration
was whether the statute prohibited the FDIC from pursuing the Utah




Judges Brorby and Moore file separate dissenting opinions.
6 2
Brorby's dissent attacked the majority's analysis of legislative intent stat-
ing that "[flew are so naive as to believe there exists but a single correct
interpretation of any given statute." 63 While Brorby believed the major-
ity opinion supportable, he found the better interpretation of section
55. Id. "[T]here is ... no generally accepted meaning [of gross negligence]." Id. (W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed.
1984).
56. Parts of § 1821 of the statute refer specifically to the other bodies of law it
touches. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(c)(3)(B) ("powers imposed by State law"); § 182 1(c)(4)
("notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, the law of any State"). Similarly,
when the statute refers to itself, it does so with specificity. See, e.g., § 1821 (d)(2)(I) (FDIC
may "take any action authorized by this chapter"); § 1821(e)(3)(C)(ii) ("except as other-
wise specifically provided in this section"). Additionally, when the statute refers to the
whole universe of other laws, it uses the same language as that in section 1821 (k). See also
§ 1821(e)(12)(B) ("No provision of this paragraph may be construed as impairing or af-
fecting any right . . . under other applicable law."),
57. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 448-49 n.6 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. S6912 (daily ed. June
19, 1989)).
58. Id. at 448.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 448-50. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 448.
62. Id. at 449 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 449 n. 1. For nearly every canon of statutory construction, there exists an
opposing canon which supports a contrary interpretation. Id. (citing Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950)).
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1821(k) in the district court's opinion which not only gave effect to the
plain meaning of the statute, but also served Congress' longstanding
goal to achieve uniform administration of federal financial institutions.
64
This interpretation heeds important public policy concerns underlying
FIRREA.6 5 Therefore, Brorby concluded that section 1821(k) defined
"an exclusive, uniform federal threshold of gross negligence for the per-
sonal liability of bank directors and officers named in civil damage suits
brought by the FDIC.
'" 6 6
D. Analysis of Banking Cases
The results in Canfield and Davis are not surprising. The Tenth Cir-
cuit decisions in the banking cases show very broad construction and
deference to the statutes relating to the mismanagement and failure of
banks and savings and loans. It is very clear that the court responded to
the public outrage over the saving and loan bailout and its astronomical
cost to taxpayers. Although it is too late to correct these past abuses,
the court sent a strong message that this type of conduct will not go
unchallenged or unpunished. Although the Tenth Circuit opinions in
Canfield and Davis clearly reflect public sentiment, the decisions are well
reasoned and supported by a thoughtful analysis of precedent and statu-
tory interpretation doctrine.
The precedential decision in Canfield effects officers and directors of
financial institutions, placing them on notice that their managerial deci-
sions require considerable deliberation. Challenges to perceived negli-
gent conduct in the management of financial institutions will continue
with the courts increasingly willing to scrutinize corporate decisionmak-
ing and award damages when appropriate. It will be interesting to ob-
serve the Canfield decision's impact on bank and S&L ability to attract
competent management. We may see greater hesitation by officers and
directors to accept positions in an industry where they are held to a
higher decision making standard.
Unlike the Canfield opinion, where the Tenth Circuit engaged in in-
dependent analysis, the Davis decision relied heavily on cases in other
circuits to conclude that Davis was "connected" with GFB for the pur-
pose of section 657.67 In Davis, the Tenth Circuit Court primarily relied
on a substantially analogous case decided by the Fifth Circuit in Garrett v.
United States.
68
The Davis opinion, like the Canfield opinion, promotes careful scru-
tiny of bank officials' conduct. Davis gives a very broad interpretation of
the class of individuals that are "connected with" a federally insured in-
64. Id.
65. Id. at 451.
66. Id at 452. Judge Moore concurred with Judge Brorby's dissent but wrote sepa-
rately to emphasize his belief that if Congress had intended to establish a standard of
simple negligence for officer and director liability, it would have stated it unequivocally.
To conclude otherwise "defies my form of fundamental logic." Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
67. See supra note 12.
68. 396 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968). See supra note 12.
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stitution for the purpose of criminal responsibility under 18 U.S.C.
§ 657. Not only will officers, directors and agents of a financial institu-
tion be held accountable for misapplying federally insured funds, but
those individuals who are less formally and more remotely associated
with the federally insured institution are now firmly within the grasp of
this statute.
III. LETrERS OF CREDIT
A. Background
The letter of credit was developed as a payment mechanism to alle-
viate the tension that exists between sellers, who do not want to give up
possession of goods before payment is made, and buyers, who want to
have control of goods before payment is tendered. In general, the letter
of credit transaction is a three party arrangement. An "issuer" (gener-
ally a bank) agrees to pay conforming drafts presented under the letter
of credit; a bank customer or "account party" orders the letter of credit
and dictates its terms; and a "beneficiary" to whom the letter of credit is
issued along with the corresponding right to collect monies under the
letter of credit by presenting drafts and making proper demand on the
issuer.69 The letter of credit is normally irrevocable 70 and contains an
expiration date.
This arrangement results in the beneficiary's assurance of payment
because the irrevocable obligation of the account party's bank runs
solely to the beneficiary. This obligation requires performance even
when a dispute arises between the account party and the beneficiary and
the account party requests the issuing bank not to pay.7 1 - Furthermore,
the bank must pay even if the account party is insolvent, cannot, or re-
fuses to reimburse the bank for payment to the beneficiary.
72
Today two broad categories of letters of credit exist; the "commer-
cial letter of credit" used most commonly in international business
transactions to reinforce the mode of payment 73 and the "standby letter
of credit" used as a backup against default on obligations. 74 In the past
decade, with bank failure, customer failure, beneficiary failure, and the
development of standby letters of credit, a considerable volume of litiga-
tion over these instruments developed. 75 The defensive positions taken
by attorneys, and the poor draftsmanship of letters of credit reflected in
these cases illustrate the existing misunderstandings regarding the legal
nature of the letters of credit. 76 It is clear that Article 5 of the Uniform
69. Arbest Const. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 777 F.2d 581, 583 (10th Cir.
1985).
70. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-103(l)(a)(B)(1991).
71. Id. §§ 5-114(1) to -114(2).
72. Id. § 5-114(3).
73. JAMESJ. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19-1, at 806
(3d ed. 1988).
74. Id. § 19-1, at 809.
75. Id. § 19-2, at 812.
76. Id.
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Commercial Code, pertaining to letters of credit, is no longer equal to
its task. 7 7 In the case that follows, under the veil of executive orders
freezing Iraqi assets in the United States, the Tenth Circuit set out to
determine if Iraq, as an account party to a letter of credit, had a property
interest in a payment made to a beneficiary who breached the underly-
ing contract.
B. Centrifugal Casting Machine Co. v. American Bank & Trust Co. 7
8
1. Facts
Iraq was an account party to a letter of credit and a beneficiary of a
standby letter of credit. 79 These letters were issued as payment mecha-
nisms in connection with a contract between Centrifugal Casting
Machine (CCM), an American company, and State Machinery Trading
Company (SMTC), an agency of the Iraqi government. 80
The parties agreed on an irrevocable letter of credit as the form of
payment between SMTC to CCM, for the benefit of CCM in the contact
amount. 8 1 The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) issued the letter of credit
and entitled CCM to draw ten percent of the contract amount as a down-
payment ($2.7 million).8 2 Additionally, the parties agreed to the issu-
ance of a standby letter of credit in the amount of ten percent of the
contract amount ($2.7 million) made by CCM for the benefit of
SMTC.8 3 This standby letter of credit was available to repay SMTC the
amount of the downpayment upon receipt of proof that CCM had not
performed under the contract.8 4 SMTC attempted to draw on the
standby letter of credit, however, the attempt was not accompanied by
the requisite proof of CCM's nonperformance. Consequently the
drawdown was not honored before the expiration date set out in the
letter.8 5
The United States intervened in suits involving parties to the letter
of credit and asserted that Iraq had a property interest in $2.7 million
deposited by CCM with ABT as security for the standby letter. The
United States claimed the bank account containing the $2.7 million was
subject to Executive Orders freezing assets of the Iraqi government. 86
77. See JOHN M. STOCKTON & FREDERICK H. MILLER, SALES AND LEASES OF GOODS IN A
NUTSHELL 117 (3d ed. 1992); See also Task Force Report, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5
(Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAw. 1521 (1990).
78. 966 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1992).
79. Id. at 1349.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1350.
83. Id.
84. This standby letter of credit was issued by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) to
American Bank of Tulsa (ABT), CCM's bank, as the account party, and made payable to
Rafidain Bank, which in turn issued a $2.7 million guarantee to SMTC. Id. CCM deposited
its downpayment under the letter of credit with ABT as security to protect ABT against
any obligation it might incur on the standby letter of credit. Id.
85. Id.
86. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1992, President Bush issued two
Executive Orders blocking any transfer of property in which Iraq held an interest. See
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The district court found no valid draw had been made on the
standby letter of credit, the letter had expired by its own terms, and that
CCM, ABT and BNL had no liability under the standby letter of credit.
8 7
In doing so, the court rejected the claim of the United States.
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the United States argued that the freeze of Iraqi assets
furthered the national policy adopted to punish Iraq by preventing eco-
nomic benefits from transactions with American citizens and compa-
nies. 88 Furthermore, the freeze preserved Iraqi assets for use as
bargaining chips in negotiations and sources for compensation for
American claims against Iraq. 89 Although the court found the policy
arguments compelling, and agreed that Iraqi property interests should
be construed in the broadest sense, the court remained unpersuaded
that the facts in this case gave rise to a property interest in Iraq when it
would not otherwise be cognizable under governing legal principles. 90
The asset in issue, according to the reasoning of the United States,
was the down payment Iraq made on the contract with CCM. Since
CCM did not perform on the contract, it was argued that Iraq had an
interest in this downpayment based on breach of contract. 9 1 However,
the court disagreed with this reasoning finding it contrary to the princi-
ples governing the financial mechanisms chosen by the parties to guar-
antee payment under the contract.
92
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by examining the relationships
of the parties under the standby letter of credit. 93 A letter of credit thus
involves three legally distinct relationships: "between the issuer and the
account party, the issuer and the beneficiary, and the account party and
the beneficiary (this last relationship being the underlying business deal
Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990); Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed.
Reg. 33,089 (1990). These orders were implemented by regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control. See 31 C.F.R.
§§ 575.201-.806 (1991). Under these regulations, "no property or interests in property of
the Government of Iraq that are in the United States ...may be transferred, paid, ex-
ported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in." Id. § 575.201(a).
87. Centrifugal Casting Machine Co., Inc., v. American Bank & Trust Co., and Iraq,
No. 91-5150 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (on file at Deny. U.L. Rev. offices).
88. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1350.
89. Id. at 1350-51.
90. Id. at 1351.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Because the term "letter of credit" was not defined in either the Executive Orders
or the implementing regulations, the court used the meaning ordinarily used by the courts
and parties dealing with this kind of arrangement. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 480
(1949).
[A] letter of credit involves three parties: (1) an issuer (generally a bank) who
agrees to pay conforming drafts presented under the letter of credit; (2) a bank
customer or 'account party' who orders the letter of credit and dictates its terms;
and (3) a beneficiary to who the letter of credit is issued, who can collect monies
under the letter of credit by presenting drafts and making proper demand on the
issuer.
Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1351 (quoting Arbest Constr. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
777 F.2d 581, 583 (10th Cir. 1985)).
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giving rise to the issuance of the letter of credit)." '94 In this case, CBI
was the issuer, SMTC was the account party, and CCM was the
beneficiary. 95
The court pointed out two interrelated features of the letter of
credit providing its unique value in the marketplace, and are critical to
the analysis of the United States claim. First, "[t]he simple result [of a
letter of credit] is that the issuer substitutes its credit, preferred by the
beneficiary, for that of the account party." 96 The issuing bank pays the
beneficiary out of its own funds and then must look to the account party
for reimbursement. 9 7 Second, the issuer's obligation to pay on a letter
of credit is entirely independent of the underlying commercial transac-
tion between the beneficiary and the account party. 9 8 Furthermore, the
issuer must honor a proper demand for payment from the beneficiary
even if that beneficiary breached the underlying contract. 9 9 This princi-
pal of independence is universally viewed as essential to the proper
functioning of a letter of credit and to its particular value, i.e., certainty
of payment. ' 0 0
This assurance of payment gives letters of credit a central role in
commercial dealings, and gives them a particular value in international
transactions, "in which sophisticated investors knowingly undertake
such risks as political upheaval or contractual breach in return for the
benefits in return for the benefits to be reaped from international
trade."1 0 ' Therefore, the courts have concluded that the purpose of the
letter of credit would be defeated by examining the merits of the under-
lying contract dispute to determine whether the letter should be paid. 1
02
After analyzing the characteristics of a letter of credit, the court
94. Centrigal, 966 F.2d at 1351.
95. Additionally, BNL was a confirming bank and thus became directly liable to CCM.
A "confirming bank" is one which will either itself honor the letter of credit already issued
by another bank or guarantees that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third
bank. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 5-103(l)(f)(1963). "A confirming bank by confirming a
letter of credit becomes directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation as
though it were its issuer and acquires the rights of the issuer." Id. § 5-107(2).
96. Arbest Constr. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 777 F.2d 581, 583 (10th Cir.
1985). See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 894 F.2d 1255, 1258 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 308 (1990) (letter of credit gives the beneficiary and irrevocable
right to payment, not from the account party, whom might become insolvent or refuse to
pay, but from the issuing bank); Airline Reporting Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 832 F.2d 823,
826 (4th Cir. 1987) (issuer replaces customer's promise to pay with its own promise to
pay); Pringle-Associated Mort. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir.
1978) (beneficiary's claim based on letter of credit, not on agreement between issuer and
account party and not on the underlying contract).
97. See generally Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 894 F.2d 1255, 1257-58
(1 th Cir. 1990) (issuer which has honored demand for payment is entitled to immediate
repayment).
98. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1352. See also Ward Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 903 F.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1990).
99. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1352.
100. Id. See, e.g., Wood v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 888 F.2d 313 (3d. Cir. 1989);
Tradax Petroleum Am., Inc. v. Coral Petroleum, Inc., 878 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
101. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1352 (quoting Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 474 (5th Cir. 1985)).
102. Id. at 1353.
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concluded that Iraq did not have a property interest in the money CCM
received under the letter.10 3 The court rejected the contention that Iraq
had a property interest in this money as an alleged contract payment
made by Iraq, recoverable by Iraq because CCM breached the con-
tract.' 0 4 In doing so, the United States made a breach of contract claim
on behalf of Iraq that Iraq never made, created a remedy for the con-
tracting parties in derogation of the remedy they themselves pro-
vided' 0 5 and, most importantly, disregarded the controlling legal
principles with respect to letters of credit. 10 6
In support of the decision, the court emphasized that the payment
to CCM under the letter of credit was not made by Iraq, but rather, it
was made by the confirming bank, BNL. 10 7 Furthermore, no legal au-
thority supported the contention that Iraq, as an account party on a let-
ter of credit, had a property interest in the beneficiary's payment based
on the beneficiary's alleged breach of the underlying contract.1 0 8 In
fact, such a conclusion would be antithetical to the principle of indepen-
dence that is universally recognized by the courts as crucial to the use of
the letter of credit as a financing device.' 0 9 Reliance on the underlying
contract is contrary to the unique value of the letter of credit."10 Pay-
ment certainty would be undermined by concluding that the account
party had a right to that payment by virtue of the underlying contract
prior to litigation on that contract."'I The beneficiary's bargained for
right to retain the payment pending contract litigation would be effec-
tively frustrated.
12
In conclusion, the court reiterated its recognition that Iraqi assets
and property interests should be construed in the broadest sense.
113
However, the court declined to restructure the essential characteristics
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The parties themselves provided a remedy through a standby letter of credit in
favor of the agent of SMTC, by which SMTC could recover the down payment in the event
of a breach by CCM. Id. at 1353 n.6. Furthermore, the parties agreed to an expiration date
for the standby letter of credit. Id. The district court found that this letter expired under
its own terms before a proper draw was made upon it. Id. The United States did not
appeal this ruling. Id.






112. Id. The United States' reliance on Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 1 (1st.
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d 19 (1984), was not persuasive because that case was factually
distinguishable in significant respects. In Itek, the First Circuit Court was concerned with
essentially identical Executive Orders and regulations with the exception that the assets
being frozen were Iran's. Under the letter of credit in that case, Iran was the beneficiary
under the letter and thus Iran had a cognizable beneficial interest in the letter. Id. at 8.
The position of Iran in Itek is analogous to Iraq's position as beneficiary of the standby
letter of credit in this case. Once again the Tenth Circuit Court emphasized that the
United States did not appeal the district court's ruling that any right that Iraq had under
the standby letter of credit was extinguished when it expired. Centriugal, 966 F.2d at 1354
n.7.
113. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1353.
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of a letter of credit in order to create a property interest in the payment
made to CCM under the letter of credit. 114 "The national interest is not
furthered by creating a property interest out of conditions that would
not otherwise generate such an interest, particularly when we must do
so at the expense of a critical and unique devise of international
trade."''15
3. Analysis
As stated previously, widespread confusion exists in the legal com-
munity concerning the use of letters of credit. 1 6 Our economy has be-
come more global in nature, and as a result, the use of letters of credit
has expanded dramatically in the past decade. Increased use results in a
predictable increase in litigation construing letters of credit. As in the
Centrifugal case, the transactions underlying the use of letters of credit
are often very complex, involving numerous international parties and
large sums of money.
In Centrifugal, the Tenth Circuit perceptively recognized the confus-
ing issues surrounding letters of credit as well as the unique qualities
that make them a valuable tool in foreign commerce. Unlike the United
States, as intervenor, the Tenth Circuit remained focused on the issues
of the case and did not involve itself in patriotic fervor by trying to cre-
ate an Iraqi interest where one did not exist.
The Centrifugal opinion was a successful attempt to shed light and
provide understanding of the complexities and desirable characteristics
of this payment device. The Tenth Circuit's decision was based on well
entrenched law governing letters of credit, providing a simple and un-
derstandable analytical framework that practitioners can turn to ex-
amine issues raised by the use of letters of credit.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the 1992 survey period, the Tenth Circuit opinions in Can-
field and Davis continued the court's trend of empowering the FDIC and
federal prosecutors by broadly interpreting statutes relating to the fail-
ures and abuses in the banking and savings and loan industry. Unlike
the Davis decision, which was based on established law in other circuits,
the Canfield opinion is significant in that it is a case of first impression at
the appellate level.
The Tenth Circuit based its opinion in Centrifugal, like the Davis de-
cision, upon established legal doctrine. However, the opinion is notable
because it recognizes the widespread confusion surrounding the use of
letters of credit as well as the special value of these instruments in inter-
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1354.
116. See supra notes 73-77.
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national commerce. The opinion provides a well organized analysis of





During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit attempted to give con-
stitutional definition to individual rights where the Supreme Court had
left the contours of those rights subject to specific factual circumstances.
A majority of the decisions addressed constitutional issues in the context
of Civil Rights litigation due to the increasing use of Civil Rights laws to
determine the existence of duties arising when government action af-
fects individual rights. Cases selected for this Survey, involving the First
Amendment right of government employees to speak on issues of public
concern and the Fourteenth Amendment right to personal safety and
security while in custody of the state, evidence doctrine subject to shift-
ing when dependent on different factual circumstances. Cases involving
sovereign immunity and a pretextual prosecution to suppress speech are
indicative of: (1) the need for a constant watchful eye of the judiciary to
protect individual rights from ever-changing political objectives; (2) the
fact that concepts of federalism are alive and well and require revisiting
our constitutional roots. Each case is analyzed to provide the practi-
tioner with its jurisprudential foundation and to indicate the impact that
these decisions may have in the future.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Matters of Public Concern
The United States Supreme Court first addressed a public em-
ployee's First Amendment right to speak on issues of public concern in
Pickering v. Board of Education.I The two-prong analysis set forth in Picker-
ing requires: (1) that the speech was on a matter of public concern;2 and
(2) on balance, the speaker's right to speak as a citizen on matters of
public concern outweighs the state employer's interest in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
3
Matters of "public concern" relate to "any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community."'4 When the speech concerns a matter
"only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances" the
actions of the employer are not subject to a First Amendment challenge.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with applying Pickering
and its progeny in three different areas: racial discrimination, govern-
ment corruption, and sexual harassment.
1. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
2. Id. at 569. The analytical framework for determining what is of concern to the
public was not specifically developed as this issue in Pickering was determined on the facts
of the case. See infra note 4 and accompanying text for a standard used to determine what
is of "public concern".
3. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
4. Id.
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1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. Racial Discrimination and Government Corruption: Patrick v.
Miller 5
Patrick involved a city finance director speaking on behalf of a co-
employee. The appeal arose out of a suit filed by Fred L. Patrick, former
Finance Director and City Controller of the City of Norman, Oklahoma.
Patrick alleged that his employment was terminated because of state-
ments made in his capacity as Chairman of the City of Norman Retire-
ment Board and as supervisor of the city print shop.6 Patrick assisted a
print shop employee in preparing the employee's racial discrimination
case against the city and questioned the city's use of retirement funds to
balance the budget. 7 One month later, the city terminated Patrick's
employment.
Patrick filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 alleging viola-
tions of his statutory rights under § 1981 and his constitutional rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.8 The defendants 9 moved
for summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.
The district court denied the defendants' motion with respect to the
§ 1983 claim but granted their motion with respect to the § 1981 claim.
The defendants appealed and Patrick cross-appealed. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court with respect to the § 1983 claim but
reversed and remanded with respect to the § 1981 claim.' 0 The single
issue before the court was whether those defendants named individually
were to be protected by qualified immunity. I I The court's analysis of
this issue required a determination using the test created in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.'2 Under Harlow, Patrick was required to show that his First
5. 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992) (Before McKay, Barrett and Brorby, J.) (Opinion
by Brorby, J.).
6. Id. at 1242. These positions were part of Patrick's official responsibilities as Fi-
nance Director and City Controller. Id.
7. Id. Both incidents occurred during June of 1988. Shirley Franklin, a print shop
employee, initiated a racial discrimination complaint against the city on May 18, 1988.
Patrick intended to help Franklin with her complaint and met with the City Attorney on
June 23 to discuss his possible involvement. On June 21, Patrick expressed his concerns
regarding the retirement funds during a meeting of the City of Norman Retirement Board.
During this meeting, the Retirement Board voted to seek the City Attorney's opinion as to
the propriety of the use of retirement funds.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law. ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
9. The original defendants included Eugene Miller, the City Manager, John Bloom-
berg, the Director of Administrative Services as well as the city of Norman. On appeal,
"defendants" includes only Miller and Bloomberg.
10. Patrick, 953 F.2d at 1251-52.
11. Id. at 1243.
12. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). This test required a determination of whether a defendant
had violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known" at the time the challenged conduct occurred. Id. at 818.
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Amendment rights in speaking out were established at the time of his
firing.13 In the government employer/employee context, Patrick would
make a sufficient showing of established rights under Harlow by meeting
the Pickering test.1 4 Satisfying the Pickering test in this case required a
showing that Patrick had a clearly established constitutional right to
speak on behalf of his co-employee on the issue of racial discrimination,
or to speak out against perceived governmental misconduct as a matter
of public concern.
The court initially focused on Patrick's action with regard to the co-
employee's racial discrimination claim.1 5 The court determined the first
prong of the Pickering test was met based on Patrick's statements regard-
ing employer practices that affected a co-employee rather than him-
self.16 Defendants asserted that the statements should be regarded as a
personal grievance or an internal personnel matter, and as such, were
not protected by the First Amendment. 17 The court disagreed.
Although the precise content of Patrick's statements were not evidenced
by the record, the fact that the statements were in opposition to racially
discriminatory practices and were made in the presence of numerous
individuals was sufficient to characterize them as matters of social con-
cern to the community.' 8 Furthermore, the subject matter of the state-
ments was of public concern regardless of the fact that the statements
were directed to city officials. 19
Patrick's statements regarding potential illegalities in the city
budget process were made pursuant to the duty imposed by his position
as trustee of the retirement fund. 20 The court viewed his statements in
context. Patrick spoke during a public meeting addressing matters of
political and social concern. Furthermore, the court found that Patrick's
statements were unmotivated by personal interest or hostility. He
merely asked if proper budgetary procedures had been followed. Under
these circumstances, Patrick's statements regarding the city budget were
"clearly established" protected speech. 2 1 After concluding that the
statements on racial discrimination and budgetary improprieties were
matters of "public concern", the court proceeded to the second prong
of the Pickering test; balancing the speaker's right to speak as a citizen
against the city's interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees.
13. Patrick's other constitutional claim, that the Defendants deprived him of his prop-
erty interest in continued employment without due process of law in violation of the four-
teenth amendment, required him to show he had a property interest in continued
employment with the City of Norman. See Graham v. City of Okla. City, 859 F.2d 142
(10th Cir. 1988). A property interest in continued employment is a question of state law
and therefore that portion of this case is omitted from this survey.
14. Patrick, 953 F.2d at 1246-47.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1247.
18. Id.
19. Id. See also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (em-
ployee's private communication with employer protected by first amendment).
20. Patrick, 953 F.2d at 1242.
21. Id. at 1248.
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The court found Patrick's interest in speaking out against racial dis-
crimination and budgetary impropriety as "self-evident. ' 2 2 In evaluat-
ing the defendants' interest in effective functioning of government, the
court noted the lack of support in the record for the defendants' asser-
tions that Patrick's statements regarding budgetary improprieties were
false, interfered with the budget process or discredited their integrity. 23
The defendants also failed to demonstrate any governmental interest
justifying the suppression of statements regarding racial discrimina-
tion. 24 The court affirmed the district court since Patrick, having met
the Pickering test, satisfied the Harlow requirement.2 5 Therefore, the de-
fendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.
b. Sexual Harassment: Woodward v. City of Worland
26
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced again with applying
the Harlow and Pickering tests in the context of § 198327 in Woodward v.
City of Worland. The plaintiffs, former employees of the city of Worland,
Wyoming, filed suit alleging they were subjected to sexual harassment
by two of the defendants, Williams, and Sackett (Officers).28 The plain-
tiffs further alleged that the remaining defendants, Tolley and Seghetti
(Supervisors) knew about the harassment and failed to curb it.29 Fur-
thermore, the plaintiffs alleged that, after complaining of the harass-
ment, the defendants retaliated against them.3 0 After the plaintiffs left
the employ of the city, they filed suit under § 1983 asserting violations
of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due pro-
cess, as well as a violation of their First Amendment right of free
speech.31 The defendants moved for summary judgment of all claims
based on qualified immunity under Harlow. Under qualified immunity,
government officials generally are shielded from liability for civil dam-
ages for violating constitutional rights if their conduct does not violate
"clearly established" constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
22. Id.
23. Id. This refers to the second prong of Pickering which requires a weighing of the
speaker's interest in speaking against the government's interest in suppressing that speech
to promote effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise.
24. Patrick, 953 F.2d at 1248.
25. Id. at 1249. (According to plaintiff's attorney, the case was settled prior to retrial.)
26. 977 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1992)(Before Ebel, CJ. and McWilliams,.Senior CJ. and
Hunter, Senior District Judge. Opinion by Ebel, C.J.).
27. See supra note 8 for relevant text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
28. Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1394. Williams and Sackett. were not co-employees or su-
pervisors of the plaintiffs, however, the plaintiffs performed dispatch services and were
required to interact directly with the officers. Id. at n. .
29. Id. Tolley and Seghetti, were the officers' supervisors and were technically not
employers of the plaintiffs'. As Police Chief and Sheriff, respectively, Tolley and Seghetti
exercised authority over the plaintiffs and their working conditions as ex officio voting
members of the JPB. Id. at n.2.
30. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the harassment and retaliation that followed after report-
ing it to their supervisors was so intolerable that it amounted to a constructive discharge.
Plaintiff Butler resigned in May 1987, plaintiffs Molina and DeSomber resigned in May
1990.
31. Id. at 1396. Due to the focus of this portion of the survey, the due process and
equal protection claims will not be discussed.
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would have known.3 2 The district court denied the motion and defend-
ants appealed.
The court of appeals reversed. The court applied the Pickering test
to the statements made by the employees, first by determining whether
the statements were of public concern. If the statements did not re-
gard matters of public concern, the plaintiffs would not have a "clearly
established" right to First Amendment protections. How the court clas-
sifies particular speech under the public concern/personal concern dis-
tinction set forth by the Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers3 4 focuses "on
the motive of the speaker and attempt[s] to determine whether the
speech was calculated to redress personal grievances or whether it had a
broader public purpose."3 5 The court found that the thrust of the plain-
tiffs' complaint was to stop the sexual harassment of them, personally
and individually. 36 Although the complaint was personal, the court
went on to determine whether the dispute addressed important consti-
tutional rights in which society at large has an interest in protecting. If
so, the speakers would therefore be afforded constitutional protection.
3 7
Noting that no prior case has held that speech similar to the com-
plaints of sexual harassment made by the plaintiffs pertained to a matter
of public concern, the court declined to hold that plaintiffs' complaints
were of public concern.3 8 Additionally, the court cited the fact that the
Officers, not acting as supervisors or co-employees of the plaintiffs,
would not be liable under § 1983 for responding critically to the plain-
tiffs' speech.3 9
2. Analysis of Patrick and Woodward
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has created a bright line dis-
tinction through its decisions in Patrick and Woodward. Government em-
ployees who speak on behalf of a racial minority or on behalf of the
electorate are afforded the protection of the First Amendment when
speaking on issues of racial discrimination or fiscal impropriety. Em-
ployees who speak for themselves, such as women on issues of sexual
harassment in the workplace, are not. The different outcomes of Patrick
and Woodward indicate a tediously slow recognition of constitutional
protections where the alleged violation is based on sex.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1403-04.
34. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
35. Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1403. The court cited an earlier Tenth Circuit decision,
Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1988), which analyzed Connick. However, the
specific analysis created in Connick determined whether speech was calculated to disclose
misconduct or dealt with only personal disputes and grievances with no relevance to the public
interests. This analysis has been construed as requiring a "motive of the speaker" determi-
nation. The difficulty in applying a motive requirement occurs when the speaker may have
a mixed motive, as in the case of Patrick speaking on behalf of a subordinate because she
worked for him, as well as because he suspected racial discrimination.
36. Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1403-04.
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The court in Patrick easily characterized the plaintiffs' statements re-
garding racial discrimination as a matter of social concern to the com-
munity while, at the same time, distinguishing these statements from
internal grievances based on the fact that the statements were made on
behalf of someone else. While this may be a simple resolution of the
public concern/private concern problem addressed in Connick, it creates
a distinction that is inconsistent with an individual's right to seek vindi-
cation of her or his own constitutional rights. Based on this distinction,
if a government employee's constitutional rights are violated, they must
rely on someone else to voice their defense. Luckily, in Patrick, the
plaintiff's right to speak on the particular issues of racial discrimination
and budgetary impropriety were "self-evident." Although the Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have failed to provide
specific guidance as to what is a "public concern," the issues of racial
discrimination and malfeasance of government officials have historically
been regarded as matters of social concern. Regardless of the events of
recent past,40 speaking out against the sexual harassment of an individ-
ual is not considered an issue of "public concern" in the Tenth Circuit.
In 1951 only one in three women participated in the labor force.
4 1
By 1986, half of all women in the United States worked outside the
home or were looking for work.4 2 The dramatic increase of women in
the labor force has affected child care, elder care, and employee bene-
fits, and has restructured the relationships between men and women in
the workplace. 4 3 Incidents of sexual harassment have increased as well.
Surveys conducted as early as 1963 characterized behavior by male co-
workers, that would today be classified as sexual harassment, as acting
"fresh" and dismissed such behavior as inconsequential. 44 By 1988,
when the plaintiffs were allegedly harassed, such behavior was not con-
sidered inconsequential, costing federal taxpayers $267 million over a
two year period because of lowered morale, loss of productivity, ab-
sences, job turnover and escalating litigation costs. 4 5 Sexual harass-
40. See Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of the Anita
Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1992) (selected essays and articles
regarding the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on alleged sexual harassment of Anita
Hill by Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas). The hearings occurred pursuant to
the "advice and consent" proceeding for Presidential appointment of Supreme Court jus-
tices "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." U.S. CONST. art 11, § 2, cl. 2.
41. Women in the Work Force: Supreme Court Issues: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Em-
ployment Opportunities of the Committee on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (Sept. 30,
1986) (statement of Jill Houghton Emery, Acting Director, Women's Bureau, Department
of Labor).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 5-6.
44. LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB
19-20 (1978). The author refers to a study conducted by the Hogg Foundation for Mental
Health published in WOMEN VIEW THEIR WORKING WORLD (1963).
45. U. S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 40 (1988) [hereinafter AN UPDATE]. The time period surveyed
was May 1985 to May 1987. This study updated the U.S. Merit System's Protection
Board's 1981 report on sexual harassment in the federal government. Id. at 12. The 1981
cost estimate was $189 million for the survey period May 1978 to May 1980. U. S. MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORK-
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ment in the workplace has been and continues to be a matter of public
concern.
The Woodward court's analysis of the plaintiffs' speech regarding
sexual harassment focused on the "content, form and context" of their
speech as revealed by the whole record. 46 Upon a review of the record,
the court noted general references by the plaintiffs to the possibility that
other women were subjected to the harassment. 47 Yet both parties
stated that one of the plaintiffs, Beverly DeSomber, supported one of
the other plaintiffs in her sexual harassment complaint.4 8 The court
also reasoned that the purpose or substance of the complaint did not
assert that the sexual harassment prevented the Wyoming Joint Powers
Board (JPB) from properly discharging its official responsibilities. 4 9 Yet
the plaintiffs, as employees of the JBP responsible for discharging its
official responsibilities, may have been subject to a hostile work environ-
ment which prevented them from performing their duties.50 Finally, the
alleged harassers were police and sheriff's officers sworn to uphold the
law. They were charged with a duty that is comparable to, if not exactly
the same as, the duty assumed by city officials for the management of
public funds. If the officers were participating in behavior allegedly in
violation of federal civil rights laws, the standard employed in Patrick for
analyzing governmental corruption is applicable. Allegations that law
enforcement officials are violating the law is a matter of political and
social concern to the community.
Instead, the Woodward decision was premised on the personal na-
ture of the allegations. The court failed to examine whether the allega-
tions contained in the record would constitute a hostile work
environment. All of the plaintiffs were personally subjected to sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court, as well as the Tenth Circuit, have rec-
PLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 76 (1981) [hereinafter Is IT A PROBLEM?]. Both reports noted that
forty-two percent of the women surveyed experienced some form of sexual harassment
during the survey period. AN UPDATE, supra, at 11; Is IT A PROBLEM?, supra, at 36. Four-
teen percent of the men surveyed in 1988 and fifteen percent surveyed in 1981 exper-
ienced some form of sexual harassment during the survey period. AN UPDATE, SUpra, at 11;
Is IT A PROBLEM?, supra, at 36.
46. Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1403 (10th Cir. 1992).
47. Id. at 1404 n.16.
48. Appellant's Opening Brief at 17, Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392
(10th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-8034) ("As the supervising Dispatcher, DeSomber, after she sup-
ported Molina .. .alleges that Sheriff Seghetti pressured her to stop the complaint.");
Appellees' Brief at 7, Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1992) (No.
91-8034) ("Because of her own experiences and because she believed that no employee
should have to put up with sexual harassment, Desomber openly supported Molina in her
complaint against Williams. Sheriff Seghetti put pressure on DeSomber to stop Molina's
complaint .. "); Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1396.
49. Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1404.
50. Sexual harassment severe or pervasive enough to actually affect the alleged vic-
tims work conditions creates a hostile work environment and is considered a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1986). Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). The
actions of the officers were alleged to include the following: rubbing the plaintiffs' necks,
pinching and patting their buttocks and physical simulation of masturbation in the plain-
tiffs' presence. Appellees' Brief at 3, Woodward (No. 91-8034). There were also invitations
for sex and statements such as "spread 'em baby", "I want your bod", and "I'd like to rip
your tits off". Id at 5.
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ognized that sexual harassment need not be targeted at an individual,
but may be so pervasive as to create a generally hostile work environ-
ment.5 1 The crucial allegation in Woodward concerned retaliation for
their complaints of sexual harassment.
If the actions of any one of or all of the defendants, by harassment
or retaliation, constituted a hostile environment as to the female defend-
ants, this situation is analytically indistinct from Patrick's speech on be-
half of a black woman against racially discriminatory policies in city
government. Patrick's speech was intended to redress a discriminatory
practice as applied to one person. The result of Woodward begs the
question. If one of the plaintiffs had stated, "I ask you to stop harassing
me on behalf of all women," would their complaints then be protected
from retaliation? To require such a statement to bring the issue under
the ambit of "public concern" fails to recognize that we all have a right
as citizens to speak out against oppression, regardless of where it occurs
and who is the victim.
B. Pretextual Prosecution to Suppress Speech
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court recognized that
freedom of expression is "vulnerable to gravely damaging, yet barely
visible encroachments" requiring rigorous procedural safeguards.
52
Bantam Books involved a state commission's administrative restraint, by
threatened prosecution of wholesalers, on the distribution of publica-
tions absent ajudicial determination that such publications were lawfully
banned. The Court imposed a heavy presumption against the constitu-
tional validity of any system of prior restraint of expression and stated
such a system would be tolerated only where it allowed judicial supervi-
sion and assurance of "almost immediate judicial determination of the
validity of the restraint."
5 3
Two years later in Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Court returned to the
issue of prior restraint of speech upon review of a district court's denial
of declaratory and injunctive relief.54 The plaintiffs in Dombrowski, civil
rights activists, asked the district court to enjoin the Louisiana state gov-
ernor, law enforcement officials, and a legislative committee from prose-
cuting or threatening to prosecute them for violations of the Louisiana
Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and the Communist
Propaganda Control Law.55 The district court dismissed the complaint
51. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); Hicks v. Gates Rubber
Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987). There are two different types of sexual harass-
ment claims recognized under Civil Rights laws: quidpro quo and hostile work environment.
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when the alleged victim is
required to exchange sexual favors or tolerance of the harassment as a condition of contin-
ued employment. Id. Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when the work-
place is so offensive such that it effects the proper performance of duties required for the
employee's position. Id.
52. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
53. Id. at 66-70.
54. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. Id. at 482.
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and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, noting
that the "chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospect
of its success or failure."
56
An unusual twist on prior restraint of speech may occur in the con-
text of a criminal prosecution causing the indirect result of suppressing
-speech by subjecting the speaker to the costs of the criminal proceeding.
In a criminal case, there is no constitutional right of appeal. 5 7 There is a
statutory right of appeal for "final" decisions of district courts.5 8 In Ab-
ney v. United States the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment was a "final" deci-
sion which would allow appellate review. 5 9 The Court's prior decision
of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. created a collateral order exception
to the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 60 The collateral order
exception allows a court of appeals to review a non-final collateral order
if the order meets three conditions: (1) the district court has fully dis-
posed of the question, in no sense leaving the matter open, unfinished
or inconclusive; (2) the decision resolves an issue completely collateral
to the cause of action asserted; and (3) the decision involves an impor-
tant right which would be irreparably lost if review has to await final
judgment on the merits.
6 1
In Abney, the Court determined that the collateral order exception
was applicable to a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds. 62 The collateral order exception could arguably be applied to
other instances where constitutional rights may be affected if a criminal
prosecution is allowed to proceed. For example, if a criminal defendant
prosecuted under obscenity laws asserts that the prosecution was a
pretextual attempt to chill his First Amendment rights, the continuation
of the prosecutorial proceeding as pretext is an issue collateral to
whether the speech is in violation of the criminal law.
6 3
1. The Chilling of First Amendment Rights: United States v.
P. H. E. 
64
The Tenth Circuit case of United States v. P.H.E. involved an "unu-
56. Id. at487.
57. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 697 (1894).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). "The courts of appeals .. .shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States... except where
a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Id.
59. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
60. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
61. Id
62. Abnty, 431 U.S. at 662. The Court held that "pretrial orders rejecting claims of
formerjeopardy... constitute 'final decisions' and thus satisfy the jurisdictional prerequi-
sites of § 1291." Id
63. Id. at 660-62. The issue of the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant is
separable from the issue of the practical effect of the trial on the defendant's constitutional
rights. Id. at 659-60.
64. 965 F.2d 848 (1992) (before McWilliams, Moore and Aldisert, J.) (opinion by
Aldisert, J.) (McWilliams, J., dissenting).
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sual, perhaps unique confluence of factors."' 65 In 1985 a United States
Attorney from Utah sent a letter to Edwin Meese, then United States
Attorney General, proposing a coordinated, nationwide prosecution
strategy against companies that sold obscene materials. 66 The strategy
called for multiple prosecutions at all levels of government in many lo-
cations. 6 7 The intent of bringing multiple prosecutions was to impose a
financial burden on the companies such that the expense of defending
the prosecutions would undermine profitability, resulting in the termi-
nation of the enterprise. 6 8 As a result of this letter, and other concerns
related to pornography, the Attorney General created the National Ob-
scenity Enforcement Unit to oversee the prosecution of obscenity viola-
tions nationwide. 69 The Justice Department's prior policy discouraged
multiple obscenity prosecutions unless materials were unquestionably
obscene. 70 In September 1987 theJustice Department changed its pol-
icy and encouraged multiple prosecutions against large organizations. 7 1
The first action against PHE 72 began in 1986 in North Carolina and
ended in an acquittal in 1987. 73 During plea negotiations in that case,
prosecutors stated that the only-way PHE could avoid multiple prosecu-
tions was by ceasing distribution in Utah of "all sexually oriented materi-
als" including some materials protected by the First Amendment. 74 PHE declined
to cease distribution and spent more than $700,000 defending the pros-
ecution in North Carolina. Subsequently, a federal grand jury in the
Western District of Kentucky subpoenaed documents as part of an inves-
tigation in that state, and the United States Attorney's office in Utah
began to coordinate prosecutorial efforts between Kentucky, Utah and
North Carolina.
7 5
The defendants sought an injunction in the Federal District Court
65. Id. at 855.
66. Id. at 850. The attorney who drafted the letter was Mr. Brent Ward.
67. Id. (Ward and Assistant United States Attorney Richard Lambert developed the
idea of multiple prosecutions).
68. Id. This goal was initially posited by Ward in his first letter to the Attorney
General.
69. Id at 851.
70. Id. A prior and unrelated case where PHE sought and was granted an injunction
against multiple prosecutions in the District Court for the District of Columbia notes the
change in policy as reflected in amendments to the United States Attorney's Manual occur-
ring between 1986 and 1988. PHE, Inc. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 743 F. Supp. 15,
19 (D.D.C. 1990). See also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY,
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 387 (1970) [hereinafter
PORNOGRAPHY COMMISSION, 1970 REPORT]. The report notes the difficulties of defining
what is legally obscene. This results in "exceedingly rare" enforcement of obscenity laws
with "campaigns" being conducted by police and prosecutors in response to citizen com-
plaints "to make the public periodically aware of law enforcement 'concern' with obscen-
ity." Id.
71. PH.E., 965 F.2d at 851. It is unclear whether this change in policy was due to
Ward's letters or to some other reason.
72. Throughout the remainder of this discussion, "PHE" collectively refers to the ap-
pellants PHE and any one of the number of defendants named individually.
73. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 851.
74. Id. Materials included Playboy Magazine and DR. ALEX COMFORT, THE JOY OF SEX
(1972). Id. at 852.
75. Id. at 851.
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for the District of Columbia against the Department of Justice and vari-
ous individuals to bar prosecutors from causing or permitting indict-
ments for violations of federal statutes prohibiting the mailing of
obscene or crime inciting matter to be returned against them in more
than one federal judicial district within the United States. 76 A prelimi-
nary injunction was granted pending the Court's ruling on a permanent
injunction.7 7 Subsequently, a Utah grand jury returned an indictment
against PHE which was the subject of this appeal. 78 The defendants
sought further injunctive relief in the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia which was denied.
7 9
In Utah, PHE moved for dismissal claiming the prosecution was in
bad faith and was brought in retaliation for the injunction. 80 The dis-
trict court denied the motion, citing the defendants' failure to connect
prosecutorial conduct which occurred in North Carolina and Kentucky
with the decision to seek an indictment against the defendants in Utah.8 '
The court of appeals reversed concluding that the defendants had satis-
fied their burden of showing pretext. On remand the burden shifted to





The majority began its opinion by confirming jurisdiction through
the application of the collateral order exception. The review of the rec-
ord for pretext was required because if the prosecution was allowed to
continue, the defendant's First Amendment rights would be lost if re-
view had to await final judgment.8 3 The government asserted that the
defendants' rights could be protected on appeal from conviction, citing
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.8 4 The majority rejected this as-
sertion since Hollywood Motor Car involved the protection of a procedural
right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a concern less pressing
than the defendants' First Amendment rights.8 5 The majority pro-
ceeded to analyze the defendants' appeal under those cases in which a
prosecutor threatened the actual exercise of First Amendment rights.
86
76. PHE, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 743 F. Supp. 15, 28 (D.D.C. 1990)
(quoted in PH.E., 965 F.2d at 852).
77. Id.
78. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 852.
79. PHE, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, No. 90-0693(JHG), 1991 WL 25753 (D.D.C. Feb. 6,
1991) (unpublished order).
80. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 852.
81. Id. at 852-53.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 853-54.
84. 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam). This case involved the prosecution for the vio-
lation of customs laws. The defendant asserted rights under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for a change of venue and was subject a superseding indictment charging four
new counts. The defendant moved for dismissal of the indictment on grounds of vindic-
tive prosecution. Id.
85. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 855.
86. Id. at 855-56.
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Drawing primarily from Supreme Court the decisions of Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,8 7 Dombrowski v. Pfiter,s 8 and the most recent deci-
sion of Fort Wayne Books Inc. v. Indiana, 8 9 the majority noted that "the
state may not use the agents and instrumentalities of law enforcement to
curb speech protected by the First Amendment." 90 Because the defend-
ants asserted that the act of going to trial under a pretextual prosecution
would have a chilling effect on protected expression, the right asserted
is a "right not to be tried." 9 1 Therefore, the right which would be lost if
the prosecution were allowed to continue was the right to be free from
the chilling of protected rights under the First Amendment.9 2 Finally,
citing Bender v. Clark,93 the majority recognized that even if the issue is
not collateral, justice requires immediate review where the danger of




The dissenting opinion focused on the majority's acceptance of the
appeal for review. Relying on Hollywood Motor Car9 5 and United States v.
Butterworth,96 the dissent noted the crucial distinction between a "right
not to be tried" and a right whose remedy may require dismissal of
charges in post-conviction proceedings. The "right not to be tried" can
only be vindicated prior to trial.9 7 The dissent simply failed to see how
the defendants in this case had a right not to be tried.98 Furthermore,
the majority's reliance on Bender as an alternative cause for review was
dismissed as being impertinent at this time.9 9
2. Analysis
The dissent's failure to see how the defendants had a right not to be
tried requires an analysis of the majority's application of prior doctrine
as well as of the inability to vindicate freedom of expression once re-
strained. The dissent correctly notes that two of the cases relied upon
by the majority, Dombrowski and Fort Wayne Books, did not involve the
question of whether the denial of a motion to dismiss a grand jury in-
dictment is immediately appealable.' 0 0 Those cases discussed circum-
stances where a defendant's constitutional rights would be irreparably
87. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
88. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
89. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
90. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 856.,
91. Id. (quoting United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 267
(1982)).
92. Id.
93. 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984).
94. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 857.
95. 458 U.S. 263 (1982).
96. 693 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1982).
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lost if the proceeding below was to continue without review.10 But
although the analysis in P.H.E. was performed under the collateral order
doctrine, the court of appeals focused on the third prong of this analy-
sis.10 2 A review under the third prong is analytically consistent with the
review of a denial of injunctive relief performed in Dombrowski. 103 Fur-
thermore, adjudicating the proper scope of the First Amendment pro-
tections has been recognized as a federal policy that merits application
of an exception to the general finality rule.1 4 The Fort Wayne Books ra-
tionale allowing for review where refusal to do so "might seriously
erode federal policy" is applicable to this appeal. 10 5 Not only may
PHE's constitutional rights be eroded, but the integrity of the United
States government may also be questioned if a lengthy trial, resulting in
tremendous taxpayer expense, were to result in a reversal due to a
pretextual prosecution.'
0 6
Next, the district court's conclusion that PHE had failed to connect
the questionable behavior of Utah Assistant United States Attorney
Lambert's involvement in both the North Carolina case and the prosecu-
tion in this case formed the basis for the finding of lack of unconstitu-
tional motivation by prosecutors. 10 7 The Tenth Circuit found the
district court's conclusion "clearly erroneous" on the facts and found its
allowance of prosecutors to proceed on the "tainted" indictment as er-
101. What these cases did examine was the chilling of First Amendment rights by ac-
tions short of physically confiscating materials by the state. In Dombrowski, the plaintiffs
were threatened with prosecution under a state Communist propaganda control law. The
Court noted that "determining the contours of the regulation would have to be hammered
out case by case-and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to
determine the proper scope of the regulation." Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487.
In Fort Wayne Books, the Court noted that the "probable cause" standard for allowing
seizures under the fourth amendment was not adequate to remove books or films from
circulation believed to be obscene but not judicially determined to be so. Fort Wayne Books
V. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989).
102. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 854-55.
103. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. In Dombrowski, the Court noted that
there was no immediate prospect of a final state adjudication, uncertainty that the prosecu-
tions would resolve all constitutional issues, and that a series of state criminal prosecutions
would not provide satisfactory resolution of constitutional issues. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at
489.
104. See, e.g., National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44
(1977).
105. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 55. Fort Wayne Books applied an analysis recognized
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), for reviewing cases as "final"
even though further proceedings are pending in state courts. An application of Cox turns
on whether a refusal to immediately review the state court decision might "seriously erode
federal policy." Cox, 420 U.S. at 482-83.
106. See P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 851. Defendant spent $700,000 in connection with the
North Carolina prosecution that ended in acquittal. Although the cost of prosecution is
not determined, any figure close to this amount, expended solely in an attempt to drive a
defendant out of business rather than secure a criminal conviction pursuant to federal
statutes, would call into question the government's allocation of resources.
107. "As the government convincingly notes, there is no allegation of bad faith motiva-
tion on the part of Benson [the Utah prosecutor] nor is any improper motive to be found
in the prosecution memorandum prepared by Lambert and upon which Benson relied in
deciding to seek an indictment." Memorandum Decision and Order at 7, United States v.
P.H.E. Inc., Case No. 90-CR-177W (C.D. Utah Aug. 28, 1991).
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ronous as a matter of law.' 0 8 The fact that the indictment was issued by
an independent grand jury was insufficient to remove the "taint" of a
pretextual prosecution that had begun years earlier in other
jurisdictions.
The larger issue is the Department of Justice's use of federal funds
to pursue a political agenda outside of the bounds of First Amendment
jurisprudence. 10 9 Such pursuits are reflective of a form of "pragmatic
liberal affirmative action" where government on behalf of the "better"
interests of society espouses "normative standards regulating sexual de-
sire and depictions."" 0 Where the focus is limited by a political agenda
to inhibit a particular form of constitutionally protected expression, it is
the duty of the judiciary to widen this focus and direct attention to the
true liberty interest at stake.
The majority's use of the collateral order doctrine analysis merely
provided a framework for analyzing the "unique confluence of factors"
involved in this particular case. The collateral order doctrine is equally
applicable in both civil and criminal proceedings."I ' The "final deci-
sion" which would allow review requires a practical rather than technical
construction. 1 2 In this case, the final decision of the district court-
that pretext was not a factor-would result in the continuation of the
prosecution. The defendants, if correct in their assertion that the goal
of the government was to make the defense of the prosecution cost pro-
hibitive, could not possibly vindicate their First Amendment rights post-
trial as their ability to distribute their goods was already impaired.' 13
Thus, the government's use of the vehicle of the trial may result in a
chilling of the defendant's First Amendment rights. Where the govern-
ment uses the threat of trial as a pretext for closing down the defend-
ant's operation, "the case would clearly implicate First Amendment
concerns and require analysis under the appropriate First Amendment
108. P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 857-60.
109. The change in philosophy by prevailing political winds is evident by a comparison
of two separate reports from the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. In
1970, the Commission recognized that there was some value of pornography through the
exchange of dialogue concerning obscenity and an opportunity for the development of
healthy attitudes toward sexuality. See generally, PORNOGRAPHY COMMISSION, 1970 REPORT,
233-56, 309-38.
A 1986 report from the same Commission found almost no value in pornography:
Still, when we look at the standard pornographic item in its standard context of
distribution and use, we find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that this material
is so far removed from any of the central purposes of the First Amendment, and
so close to so much of the rest of the sex industry, that including such material
within the coverage of the First Amendment seems highly attenuated.
1 U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT
267 (1986).
110. DONALD A. DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY 26 (1989). The author
discusses the effect of conservative politics on traditional standards of liberty.
Ill. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 n.4 (1977).
112. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). A technical
construction would require an adjudication on the issue of guilt or innocence, rather than
allowing an expedited review of the infringement of constitutional rights.
113. The Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of the press embraces circula-




standard of review." 114
III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In Ex parte Young, 1 5 the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment' 16 does not bar a federal court injunction to stop state offi-
cials from enforcing state laws that violate the United States Constitu-
tion. Sixty-six years later in Edelman v. Jordan, 17 the Supreme Court
revisited Young and allowed a federal court injunction and prospective
relief consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 While Edelman went further to deny the
award of retroactive benefits as a violation of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity, prospective relief was granted in both cases to individuals whose
constitutional rights had been violated."l 9 The division created by
Young and Edelman-that a state is not immune from injunctive relief but
may assert immunity when faced with retroactive monetary relief-cre-
ates an analytical framework by which Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity questions are to be determined. This requires a weighing of
the right to the relief requested by an individual against the right of a
state's citizens to have their public funds insulated from repercussions
that may arise out of state officials performing their duties.
A. Relief Through Bankruptcy: In re Crook 120
The Tenth Circuit decision of In re Crook addressed the United
States Bankruptcy Court's practice of "writing down" mortgages held by
a state. t 2 1 Under reorganization, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) permits the bank-
ruptcy court to declare debt to be secured up to the actual market value
of the property, while the amount of debt beyond market value of the
property becomes unsecured. 122 The portion of debt that becomes un-
114. Arcara v. Cloud Books Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 708 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting a city's use of a nuisance statute as pretext for closing down a bookstore because it
sold indecent books as implicating the first amendment).
115. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
116. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
117. 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
118. The plaintiff in Edelman sued for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging State
officials had violated the Equal Protection Clause by non-compliance with federal regula-
tions. Id. at 653.
119. Young involved the denial of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Young, 209 U.S. at 131. Edelman involved the denial of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 653.
120. 966 F.2d 539 (10th Cir.) (before Anderson, Aldisert and Brorby, Circuit Judges)
(opinion by Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting by designation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 491 (1992).
121. Id. The case involved the state of Oklahoma. "Writing down" occurs through the
application of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) of the bankruptcy code and is then applicable to
the states, as is the rest of the code, through 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The debtors applied for relief under Chapter 12 reorganiza-
tion and as part of the reorganization included the writing down of the mortgages in the
reorganization plan. Crook, 966 F.2d at 540.
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secured is that part which is "written down." In Crook, the debtors had
mortgaged property to the Commissioners of the Land Office, an agency
of the State of Oklahoma.' 23 The State foreclosed on the mortgages
and the debtors filed for bankrupcty under Chapter 12.124 Applying 11
U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 106(c), the bankruptcy court declared the State's
notes to be secured only up to market value, with the remainder of debt
as unsecured.1 25 The State appeared specially to contest the bankruptcy
court's constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction under § 106(c)
over the State's mortgage interest.
1 26
The argument advanced by the State in the bankruptcy court began
by explaining state law and state constitutional provisions which enable
public funds to be invested in mortgages. 127 If a portion of the mort-
gage is unrecoverable due to writing down, "depletion of state coffers
through the exercise of unconsented state jurisdiction" for the loss in-
curred to the state mortgage fund would result. 128 The bankruptcy
court rejected the State's contentions. Citing Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas, 12 9 which permitted the abrogation of a state's immunity by Con-
gress pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the bankruptcy court analo-
gized the powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause and
the Bankruptcy Clause thus permitting the abrogation of a state's immu-
nity under both clauses.' 3 0 Furthermore, the "unmistakably clear" lan-
guage of § 106(c) made that portion of the bankruptcy code applicable
to the states.'
3 '
The State appealed and the United States intervened.' 3 2 The dis-
trict court affirmed, applying the bankruptcy court's analysis. On fur-
123. Crook, 966 F.2d at 540.
124. Id. Chapter 12 of the bankruptcy code allows for reorganization rather than total
relinquishment of assets. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 1205 (West Supp. 1992).
125. Crook, 966 F.2d at 540.
126. Id. at 539.
127. Id. at 540. The Oklahoma Constitution requires the reimbursement of funds, dis-
bursed for purposes of financing mortgages, to state trust. See OKLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2;
Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1906).
128. Crook, 966 F.2d at 541 (quoting appellant's brief).
129. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding Article I power per-
mits some abrogation of sovereign immunity).
130. Memorandum Order on State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Commissioners of the Land
Office Objection to Jurisdiction, In re: Randy Crook, KK No. 89-3972-LN Chap: 12,
(Bank. W.D. Okla. July 30, 1990). The bankruptcy court reasoned that the plurality opin-
ion of Union Gas noted that the commerce clause both expands federal power and con-
tracts state power. The contraction of state power by the commerce clause, coupled with
the plenary power granted to Congress through the surrender of that portion of state
sovereignty in Article I allowed for the abrogation of the states' eleventh amendment im-
munity through the bankruptcy clause. Id. at 7.
131. Crook, 966 F.2d at 541. See also 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988).
132. Intervention occurred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) providing, in relevant part:
In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which the
United States or any agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party, wherein
the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn
in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, and shall
permit the United States to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is
otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of
constitutionality.
28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1988).
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ther appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment, not on the basis of
Article I but rather on the basis that the relief against the State was de-
claratory or injunctive in nature and resulted in mere incidental expen-
diture of state funds.1
3 3
The court of appeals noted three issues for consideration: (1)
whether § 106(c) contains "unmistakably clear" language indicating that
Congress meant that section to apply against the states; (2) if so,
whether Article I bankruptcy power authorizes Congress to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity through application of the bankruptcy
laws; and (3) whether the bankruptcy court's ruling violates the Tenth
Amendment.' 3 4 Addressing the first issue, the court noted the recent
Supreme Court decision of United States v. Nordic Village, Inc. ,15 which
held that the application of § 106(c) did not establish a textual waiver of
government immunity.' 3 6 Nordic Village was then distinguished as an ac-
tion for damages, while the case at hand concerned an action for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief. Given this distinguishing factor, the analysis
performed by the bankruptcy court using Pennsylvania v. Union Gas and
Article I (state immunity balancing) was inapplicable. The court then
analyzed the case using the Ex parte Young and Edelman line of cases.
Under § 1227(a) of the bankruptcy code, a bankruptcy court's ap-
proval of the debtors' reorganization plans, including the writing down
of mortgages, is a declaratory order that binds each creditor. 137 Appli-
cation of the general provisions of § 524(a) provides a discharge of obli-
gation that voids any judgment obtained against the debtor and
operates as an injunction against any action to recover on such debts. '
38
Furthermore, citing Hoffman v. Connecticut Income Maintenance Dep 't, 139 the
court noted the Supreme Court's construction of § 106(c) where the de-
termination of an issue that binds the governmental unit but does not
require a monetary recovery from a state is more indicative of declara-
tory and injunctive relief. 1
40
The State asserted that reliance on Ex parte Young and Edelman was
misplaced because there was no unlawful act committed by the State.' 4 '
The court disagreed noting that Ex parte Young and its progeny were con-
133. Crook, 966 F.2d at 540, 542-44.
134. The Tenth Amendment issue is not analyzed in this survey as it was decided under
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and involves no novel
issue for consideration.
135. 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992).
136. Id. at 1017. Nordic Village involved an adversarial proceeding by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy against the Internal Revenue Service to recover corporate funds used illegally to
pay an individual's tax liability. The Supreme Court addressed federal immunity under
§ 106(c).
137. Crook, 966 F.2d at 543. The relevant portion of 11 U.S.C. § 1227(a) provides:
"[T]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor [and] each creditor... whether or
not the claim of such creditor . . is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such
creditor ... has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1227(a)
(1988).
138. Crook, 966 F.2d at 543.
139. 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
140. Crook, 966 F.2d at 543.
141. Id
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cerned with the relationship between two sovereigns rather than the
grant of relief by a party aggrieved. 142 This case involved two compet-
ing interests, the State's interest in protecting its financial investment
and the bankruptcy courts interest in settling the debtors accounts in
accordance with bankruptcy laws. 14 3 In this case, the court found no
violation of the Eleventh Amendment in resolving these competing
interests. 144
B. Analysis
By construing the act of writing down a mortgage under the bank-
ruptcy code as part of a larger request for injunctive or declaratory re-
lief, the court of appeals was able to hold that Eleventh Amendment
immunity is not compromised by the application of certain provisions of
the bankruptcy code. While such a construction may be sufficient to ad-
judicate this particular factual situation, it fails to answer the question
posed by the State of Oklahoma: does action by the Federal Judiciary
taken on behalf of a individual against the legal rights of a state consti-
tute a violation of sovereign immunity?
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the bankruptcy
court's actions with respect to following the letter of the bankruptcy
code provides relief that is injunctive in nature. 14 5 However, the issue
concerns the devaluation of property under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and the
application of this provision to a state held legal interest. While it is true
that the Supreme Court decision of Nordic Village involved a claim for
monetary damages, that decision held that § 6(c) did not establish a
waiver of governmental immunity from a bankruptcy trustee's claims for
monetary relief. 146 If no waiver on the part of Oklahoma is established
through § 6(c) then the resolution with respect to sovereign immunity
turns on how "writing down" under § 506(a) is to be construed.
Applying § 506(a) by "writing down" results in a devaluation of the
state's economic interest yielding two results. The state is restrained
from pursuing common law remedies and is compelled by state law to
reimburse the state trust. This result highlights the Supreme Court's
division of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence characterized by Young
and Edelman. The reasoning of Edelman 147 applies to the second result
of "writing down." The state is compelled to reimburse the trust by the
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 544.
145. See supra notes 118 & 119 and accompanying text.
146. Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct at 1017. "Neither § 106(c) nor any other provision of law
establishes an unequivocal textual waiver of the Government's immunity from a bank-
ruptcy trustee's claims for monetary relief." Id.
147. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-67 (1974). At issue in Edelman was the
retroactive payment of public aid benefits to correct delays in processing claims. The
Court reasoned that such payments would reduce availability of future public funds:
[W]here the state has a definable allocation to be used in the payment of public
aid benefits, and pursues a certain course of action such as the processing of ap-
plications within certain time periods as did Illinois here, the subsequent order-
ing by a federal court of retroactive payments to correct delays in such processing
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amount of devaluation of the mortgages. Thus, the Edelman portion of
Eleventh Amendment doctrine should work to protect the state from
this result of the application of the bankruptcy code.
The other analysis of this case concerns the source of power that
creates the prospective relief for the debtors and how that power is
used, not to protect but to encroach on the rights of the state. It is on
this point that the court fails to discuss the important issues of federal-
ism that arise when a congressional grant of power, made pursuant to
the bankruptcy clause, does not act to shield a debtor but works a result
prohibited by Edelman. Such a result may have a resounding effect on
state supported financing programs which would only serve to diminish
the availability of resources for a state's citizens to better their economic
welfare. 148 In absence of the protection granted by the Eleventh
Amendment, the citizenry deserves at least an explanation.
IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 149 the Supreme Court considered the sub-
stantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 150 The Court, drawing from prior
decisions,'51 held the involuntarily committed have a right to the estab-
lished liberty interests of personal security and freedom from bodily re-
straint, as well as a right to such training related to safety and freedom
from restraint of professionals who are charged with ensuring those
rights.15 2 In the more recent case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services, 153 the Court addressed the question of whether
a state is categorically obligated to protect a child who was taken into
custody by a state agency then released to the natural father and suffers
harm caused by the father. The Court answered this question in the
negative. However, in a footnote, the Court suggested that where a
state affirmatively exercises its power to remove the child from free soci-
ety and place him in a foster home a sufficiently analogous situation to
institutionalization may arise that may trigger application of
Youngberg.154 This footnote has created some confusion as to what fac-
tual situations may call for substantive due process protections. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with two different situations in
will invariably mean there is less money available for payments for the continuing
obligations of the public aid system.
Id. at 666 n. 11.
148. Id.
149. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
150. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV.
151. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316-15 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(right to personal security constitutes a historic liberty interest)); Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (liberty from bodily restraint recognized as a core
liberty protected).
152. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322.
153. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
154. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
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Yvonne L v. New Mexico Department of Human Services 155 and Maldonado v.
Josey 1 5 6 which required review to determine if they were sufficiently
analogous to Youngberg to trigger due process protections.
A. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs.
The plaintiffs, Yvonne L., age 9, and Demond L., age 7, were in the
physical and legal custody of the State of New Mexico Human Services
Department (HSD) in August 1985 when they were placed in a not-for-
profit foster care facility for children.' 5 7 Yvonne was sexually assaulted
in the presence of Demond by another child in an unsupervised area of
this facility on August 16, 1985. Plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action
against HSD 158 for alleged violations of their federal statutory15 9 and
constitutional rights while in foster care. The district court dismissed
the constitutional claim under qualified immunity, finding that there was
no clearly established constitutional right in August, 1985, protecting a
child in the legal and physical custody of the state from bodily harm
from third persons. 160 The plaintiffs appealed.
The court of appeals reversed. 16 1 In a unanimous opinion the
court held that the law was sufficiently clear at the time of the incident to
afford due process protections to those individuals in the physical cus-
tody of the state. The court cited the DeShaney footnote referring to
cases holding due process protections existed in slightly different factual
contexts. 162 Furthermore, the Youngberg decision established a state
duty to assume responsibility for the safety and .general well-being of a
person taken into custody and held against their will by the state. The
court cited opinions from three circuits 163 explicitly finding an right to
reasonable safety while in foster care established prior to 1986. Finally,
citing the Tenth Circuit decision of Milonas v. Williams, the court quoted
its own language regarding a juvenile involuntarily placed in foster care:
"Such a person has the right to reasonably safe conditions of
confinement." 164
The HSD asserted that the plaintiffs failed to show that HSD acted
155. 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.. 1992) (before Logan, Seymour, and Moore, J.) (opinion
by Logan, J.).
156. 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992) (before Seymour, Tacha, and Benson, J.) (opinion
by Tacha, J.) (Seymour, J., concurring), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3581 (1993).
157. Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 885.
158. All defendants are referred throughout this survey as "HSD".
159. The statutory violations alleged were part of the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1988).
160. Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 885. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for an expla-
nation of qualified immunity.
161. Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 884.
162. See supra note 154 and cases cited therein.
163. Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 891 (citing Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv's.,
649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983)); Taylor ex rel. Walker v.
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11 th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); K.H.
ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
164. 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
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with "deliberate indifference," the standard applicable to their con-
duct.16 5 Although the district court never addressed the standard to be
applied, the court of appeals did so to provide guidance on remand.1
66
The court elected to use the "failure to exercise professional judgment"
standard enunciated in Youngberg noting that it is a higher standard than
mere negligence, implying "abdication of the duty to act professionally
in making the placement" to foster care. 16 7 To the extent that this stan-
dard differs from deliberate indifference, the court noted that foster
children are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions than
criminals. 1
68
2. Maldonado v. Josey
On March 16, 1987, Mark Maldonado was an eleven year-old fifth
grade student attending a state-run school in Raton, New Mexico.
16 9
He became caught on his bandana in a cloakroom adjacent to his class-
room and died of strangulation. 170 He had allegedly been in the cloak-
room, unsupervised, for twenty minutes while Margaret Berry, his
teacher and the person responsible for his supervision, conducted class
in the classroom.'17 On August 7, 1990, Leroy Maldonado, as personal
representative for Mark's estate, filed a § 1983 action for wrongful
death.' 7 2 The complaint asserted that the death occurred because of
the deliberate indifference to training and supervision requirements by
Berry and two school administrators.17 3 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment finding that the plaintiff failed to show deliberate indif-
ference on behalf of the administrators and that the law regarding a
teacher's duty to observe every student in class during classtime was not
clearly established. 17 4 The plaintiff appealed, challenging only the judg-
ment with regard to the teacher. 175 The court of appeals affirmed.
17 6
a. Majority Opinion
The court viewed the plaintiff's contention that a liberty interest
and protection from deprivation of life without due process were impli-
cated by the failure to provide reasonable care and safety for public
165. Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 893. The "deliberate indifference" standard articulated by
the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and applied to conduct alleged
as a violation of the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment was
applied in Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795-97, and Doe, 649 F.2d at 141-45.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 894.
168. Id. The court went on to state: "These are young children, taken by the state
from their parents for reasons that generally are not the fault of the children themselves.
The officials who place the children are acting in place of the parents." Id.
169. 975 F.2d 727, 728 (10th Cir. 1992).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. See supra note 8 for relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 1983.
173. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 728.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 733.
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grade school children and by reckless indifference to supervision re-
quirements in a public grade school, as an assertion of a categorical obli-
gation to protect Mark Maldonado. 17 7 The assertion of a "categorical
obligation" is analyzed under DeShaney. 178
The court proceeded to set forth the DeShaney limitation of a state's
obligation to protect an individual from harm caused by third persons
and the limited situations where a duty has been found to exist.' 79 In
framing the issue to be decided on appeal, the court cited the DeShaney
requirement that it is the "[sitate's affirmative act of restraining the indi-
vidual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through ... institutionaliza-
tion, or other similar restraint of personal liberty" which triggers due
process protections.' 8 0 Thus, the issue was whether state compulsory
attendance laws restrain a school child's personal liberty such that due
process imposes an obligation to protect that child.' 81
Cases involving extreme corporal punishment, or sexual abuse or
harassment by a teacher were distinguished as inapplicable because
those cases involve direct infliction of the harm by a state actor.182 This
case more closely resembles DeShaney, where the harm was inflicted by a
private actor.' 83 The court went on to distinguish a prior discussion of
the relationship between the state and public school students made in
the Tenth Circuit decision of Hilliard v. City and County of Denver. 184 The
dictum concerning a schools duty of care in Hilliard was created in the
context of bringing a due process claim under Ingraham v. Wright,18 5 a
corporal punishment claim involving a state actor and was therefore in-
applicable to the present case.
The Maldonado court held that compulsory attendance laws in no
way restrain a child's liberty so as to render a child and his parents un-
able to care for the child's basic needs, and therefore fail to trigger the
177. Id. at 729.
178. Id. It is unclear whether the court meant the substantive portion of the DeShaney
opinion or footnote 9 which creates the possibility for finding a constitutional obligation.
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
179. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 729.
180. Id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago City Social Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S 189, 200
(1989)).
181. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 730.
182. Id (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Stoneking v. Bradford Area
School Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988)).
183. Id at 731.
184. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 656 (1991). Hilliard addressed the duty of police officers to ensure the safety of
those persons who are not in custody but are placed in a more dangerous position due to
the actions of the officers. The exact language in Hilliard was:
Public school students, although not restricted to the same degree as arrestees,
convicts and patients involuntarily committed to state mental hospitals, are simi-
larly involved in an environment where the state has some lawful control over
their liberty. Students are required by state law to attend school and thus are
prevented by the state from voluntarily withdrawing from situations posing the
risk of personal injury.
Id. at 1520.
185. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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due process obligation to protect school children from harm.' 8 6 The
court noted with approval two courts of appeals decisions which came to
the same conclusion.' 8 7 These cases reasoned that incarceration and
institutionalization involve full time severe and continuous restrictions
of liberty. By contrast, school children reside in their parents' home,
attend the schools of their parents' choice and the parents retain pri-
mary responsibility for meeting the child's basic human needs.188 The
court concluded by noting that parents remain the primary caretakers of
the students, charged with determining and addressing the child's basic
needs. ' 8 9 For these reasons, compulsory attendance laws do not impose
restraints so severe as to implicate the Due Process Clause.' 90
b. Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion noted that Yvonne L. held that the state
owes children in its custody an affirmative duty of protection. 19 ' The
Maldonado majority limits that duty by excluding schoolchildren. The
concurrence advocated the imposition of a duty of some level of protec-
tion to school children because they are forced into temporary day-time
custody of the state due to compulsory attendance laws.' 92 However,
since the plaintiff failed to show the deliberate indifference of the de-
fendant to the danger of injury to Mark Maldonado, the concurrence
would affirm summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.19
The concurring opinion began with reviewing the Tenth Circuit's
Yvonne L. analysis, noting the standard approved by that decision of
"failure to exercise professional judgment" with respect to the dan-
ger.194 The concurrence next distinguished cases cited by the majority
in two ways. First, those cases involved repeated incidents that afforded
a parent the opportunity to know of the danger and to take action.' 9 5
Second, those cases failed to recognize that during the school day and
class periods, parents are incapable of ensuring the reasonable safety of
their children. 19 6 This obligation is better left to a teacher or other
school staff members. The opinion went on to cite two cases that failed
to follow the majority's reasoning because of the custodial relationship
186. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 731.
187. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., Nos. 91-1136, 91-1137,
1992 WL 191115 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 1992); JO. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11,
909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990). Middle Bucks distinguished student care from foster care
because foster care children depend on the state to meet their needs creating a continuing
obligation, while school children are not so dependent. Middle Bucks, Nos. 91-1136, 91-
1137, 1992 WL 191115 at **8.
188. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 731-33.
189. Id. at 733.
190. Id.
191. Id. (Seymour, J., concurring).
192. Id
193. Id.
194. Id. at 735; see supra note 167 and accompanying text.
195. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 734-35. Middle Bucks involved repeated sexual assaults by
students while Alton involved repeated sexual assaults by a teacher.
196. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 735.
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between teachers and students.' 9 7 The concurrence concluded by stat-
ing that it would affirm the dismissal of the complaint for a failure to
allege facts sufficient to show deliberate indifference or failure to exer-
cise professional judgment by the teacher.'
98
B. Analysis
The different outcomes of Yvonne L. and Maldonado highlight diver-
gent analyses of alleged substantive due process violations in the con-
text of § 1983. The issue to be resolved is whether the imposition of a
duty on the alleged tortfeasor may be based on some constitutionally
supplied norm. In Yvonne L., the court took the first step by applying the
tort-based standard of Canton v. Harris.19 9 This standard begins with
requiring malfeasance, in that the defendants should have known that
their actions in formulating a policy to provide for the physical safety of
the children as well as their action in placing the children in foster care
put the plaintiffs in personal danger. 20 0 The second requirement is that
the defendant know that the placement would, put the children in dan-
ger.20 1 Finally, there must be a causal link between either action of the
defendant and the injury. These elements must be met for the plaintiffs
to be held liable for the deprivation of the recognized substantive due
process interests in safe conditions, personal security and bodily injury
for persons in state custody.
20 2
The issue of duty in Maldonado involved a slightly different factual
circumstance. The duty was to be imposed on the teacher, rather than
the school administrators. 20 3 The issue of qualified immunity under
Harlow was the same, whether the law regarding the existence of a duty
197. Id. (The concurrence cited Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools, 714 F. Supp.
641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) and Waechter v. School District No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005
(W.D.Mich. 1991)).
198. Id.
199. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The plaintiff is required to show three
things: (1) that the defendant instituted a policy or training program; (2) the defendant
knew of the asserted danger or failed to exercise professional judgment with respect to the
danger; and (3) that there be a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. at 385-90.
200. Yvonne L v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1992)
(In Yvonne L. there were two opportunities for the plaintiffs to show a violation under
Canton since there were two affirmative acts that may have been causally linked to the
injuries).
201. Id. at 890. This requirement has been characterized by some courts as "deliberate
indifference" to the danger or more affirmatively by the U.S. Supreme Court as a failure to
exercise professional judgment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). For an
extensive critique of the Court's creation of differing standards see Charles F. Abernathy,
Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1483-90 (1989).
202. It is unclear whether the interest in bodily integrity for persons in state custody is
an existing constitutional right or whether the custody signifies the requirement of "state
action" for purposes of a section 1983 action. See supra note 8.
203. Maldonado v.Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 728 (10th Cir. 1992). The district court found
that the school administrators could not reasonably be said to have been "deliberately
indifferent". Id. This standard is higher than the Youngberg standard adopted in Yvonne L.
which requires a showing of "a substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment, practice, or standards." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. The differing standard notwith-
standing, the appeal pertained only to the teacher's liability. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 728.
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was clearly established. 2° 4 The court's analysis differed sharply from
that in Yvonne L. Instead of analyzing whether the teacher owed a duty
to supervise Maldonado within the Youngberg standard, the court pre-
mised its finding of "no duty" on the fact that the teacher did not inflict
the injury rather than whether the teacher could have prevented the
harm.2 0 5 The duty to prevent harm is precisely the issue addressed in
both DeShaney and Youngberg.
Applying the tort-based standard Of Canton to Maldonado, the act
which satisfies the first element is the requirement that students attend
school through the state compulsory attendance law. 20 6 The court's
analysis should have determined Whether a duty could be imposed based
on whether the actions of the teacher amounted to malfeasance, or non-
feasance given the supervisory capacity she held. 20 7 The court analyzed
this point by citing cases that considered whether a "special relation-
ship" existed between students and schools such that a duty may be im-
posed.20 8 However, Maldonado is not a "special relationship" case.
Compulsory attendance laws provide the duty. There are affirmative
acts on the part of the defendant, one of which consists of providing a
supervised and safe environment conducive to the education of chil-
dren.2 0 9 Although the law is clear after DeShaney and Youngberg regard-
ing the existence of a duty when the state takes custody of a person, the
court uses a strained definition of custody to obfuscate the law and fails
to provide a standard for determining which forms of custody would
give rise to a duty.
V. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit was faced with similar
204. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for an explanation of qualified immunity.
205. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 731.
206. "Every child of school age and of sufficient physical and mental ability shall be
required to attend a public or other school during such period and for such time as pre-
scribed by law." N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
207. Under Youngberg, malfeasance or nonfeasance is not the determining factor but
whether either is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. In this case the teacher's inaction with knowledge
that her student was absent from the classroom for twenty minutes would be analyzed
using the Youngberg standard.
208. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit case of Doe v. Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) found a duty to protect school children
based on compulsory attendance laws and the fact that schoolchildren are dependent on
their parents to guard against the dangers of their surroundings. "By removing a child
from his home ... the state obligates itself to shoulder the burden of protecting the child
from foreseeable trauma." Id. at 146. This author would advocate a varying degree of
duty commensurate with the age of the child and foresecability of harm by the supervisor.
209. A public school "assumes a duty to protect [the schoolchildren] from dangers
posed by anti-social activities ... and to provide them with an environment in which edu-
cation is possible." Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir.
1982). The Supreme Court has recognized that schools "act" as parents to protect stu-
dents from some harms. "[Prior] cases recognize the obvious concern on the part of par-
ents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a
captive audience--from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). The audience was "captive" in a
school assembly.
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questions of individual rights under different factual circumstances. The
cases surveyed do not give a clear indication of the direction the court
will take in a particular factual scenario. However, the Tenth Circuit is
slow to recognize the existence of constitutional duties or rights absent a
showing that such duties or rights exist by decisions of other circuits. It
is certain that the increasing use of Civil Rights laws to address viola-
tions of an individual's constitutional rights will continue to confront the




In 1992, the Tenth Circuit challenged precedent in the areas of
search and seizure and sentence enhancement. In an en bane opinion,
United States v. Abreu, I the Tenth Circuit rejected the reasoning adhered
to by six other circuits concerning the application of a sentence en-
hancement provision. In a panel decision, United States v. Green,2 the
Tenth Circuit reached the opposite result in applying a similar provi-
sion. In United States v. Ward,3 the court refused to extend a Supreme
Court ruling concerning the constitutionality of random bus searches to
the setting of private train compartments.
This Survey examines the Abreu and Green opinions and the discrep-
ancy between them. The Tenth Circuit's sentence enhancement doc-
trine is unclear because the two opinions cannot be reconciled. This
Survey also analyzes the Ward opinion, which sets forth the Tenth Cir-
cuit's current search and seizure doctrine. An examination of the Tenth
Circuit's independence in these areas defines current Tenth Circuit
criminal procedure jurisprudence.
II. APPLICABILITY OF SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT PROVISIONS
A. Background-United States v. Abreu
Sentence enhancement involves the imposition of a greater sen-
tence upon a defendant who has previously been convicted of criminal
wrongdoing. It is a common feature of the federal and state criminal
justice systems. 4 The Constitution permits sentence enhancement for a
subsequent offense, contingent upon the validity of the prior conviction.
The justifications for sentence enhancement include deterrence, inca-
pacitation and the view that recidivists, or repeat offenders, are more
culpable than first-time offenders. 5
The sentence enhancement provision at issue in Abreu was 18 U.S.C.
section 924(c).6 Although described as a sentence enhancement provi-
sion in Simpson v. United States,7 the Supreme Court held this statute cre-
ates an offense distinct from the underlying felony rather than merely
1. 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
2. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 435 (1992).
3. 961 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. D. Brian King, Note, Sentence Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior Convictions,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1989).
5. Id. at 1373-74.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988). Congress passed § 924(c), an amendment to the Gun
Control Act of 1968, on October 22, 1968. The Gun Control Act of 1968 was part of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543,
1545-46 n.6 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987).
7. 435 U.S. 6, 10 (1978) (superseded by 1984 amendment to § 924(c)).
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enhancing the sentence.8 The second offense under section 924(c) is a
distinct crime which carries a-heavier penalty. 9
Congress adopted this amendment following the assassinations of
John and Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King,Jr.10 It provided
an additional sentence of five years for anyone convicted of using a fire-
arm in a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. I In the event of a
subsequent conviction under section 924(c), the statute provides an ad-
ditional sentence of twenty years. 12 The sponsor of the amendment
stated the purpose of this amendment was to persuade would-be felons
to leave their guns at home.' 3 Deterrence was of primary concern to
the legislators. They stressed that a criminal who used a gun to commit
a crime, and is convicted, will go to jail for a specific number of years.
Courts did not have discretion in sentencing. For the deterrent to be
effective, the criminal must know "he cannot beat the rap".' 4
In Simpson v. United States '5 and Busic v. United States, 16 the Supreme
Court addressed whether Congress intended section 924(c) to apply
when the predicate felony statute had its own enhancement provision.
The Court held it did not; sentences could not be enhanced twice. 17 In
response, Congress amended section 924(c) to clarify that it did author-
ize an enhanced sentence in addition to any enhancement provided by
the underlying felony statute.' 8
In applying section 924(c), questions arose over the nature of the
second offense required to trigger the 20-year enhancement provision.
In United States v. Rawlings,19 the defendant was convicted of two counts
of bank robbery and of using a gun in connection with each count in
8. Id. at 10.
9. Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415, 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 620 (1922).
10. Rawlings, 821 F.2d at 1545-46 n.6.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides in pertinent part:
(c) (1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffick-
ing crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides
for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five
years .... In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such
person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years .... (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. "Any such person should understand that if he uses his gun and is caught and
convicted, he is going to jail. He should further understand that if he does so a second
time, he is going to jail for a longer time." 114 CONG. REC. 22,231 (daily ed. July 19,
1968)(statement of Rep. Poff). Representative Rogers agreed: "(Any person who com-
mits a crime and uses a gun will know that he cannot get out of serving a penalty in jail.
And if he does it a second time, there will be a stronger penalty." Id. at 22,237.
14. Id. at 22,243 (statement of Rep. Latta).
15. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
16. 446 U.S. 398 (1980) (superseded by 1984 amendment to § 924(c)).
17. Busic, 446 U.S. at 404; Simpson, 435 U.S. at 16.
18. Congress affected this change by including within § 924(c) the parenthetical: "(in-
cluding a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced pun-
ishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device)." 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1988). See United States v. Lanzi, 933 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. 821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 70:4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
violation of section 924(c). 20 The district court held that the conviction
of the second section 924(c) count triggered the enhanced penalty pro-
vision, regardless of the fact both counts were charged in the same in-
dictment. 2 1 On appeal, Rawlings asserted that the statute required
conviction and sentencing under two separate indictments before the
enhanced penalty provision applied.
2 2
The Eleventh Circuit, on rehearing en banc, relied on its independ-
ent reading to determine the statute's applicability. 23 Giving full effect
to each provision of the statute, and assuming Congress used the words
as they are commonly and ordinarily understood, 24 the court pointed
out that the legislature chose to use the broad phrase "second or subse-
quent conviction." 25  Subsequent meant "following in time, order, or
place," while second only meant "one more after the first." 26 The court
concluded that a second conviction under section 924(c), "even though
in the same indictment as his first conviction, legitimately triggers the
enhancement provision."
27
The Rawlings court noted that had Congress intended to narrow the
provision, it could have done so explicitly. 2 8 The court cited the special
offender statute29 as an example. The statute defined a special offender
as a person convicted of two or more offenses and imprisoned for at
least one of those convictions within five years of the current offense.
30
In contrast, in section 924(c) Congress included none of the restric-
tions of the special offender statute.3 1 In addition, the defendant's argu-
ments were inconsistent with the broad purpose of the provision.
Congress intended to severely punish those who commit violent crimes
with firearms. Prosecutors could satisfy the separate indictment require-
ment merely by charging offenses in separate indictments, "thereby en-
suring that one of the convictions would occur later in time than the
other."3 2 The court concluded: "We do not think Congress intended
the enhanced penalty for a repeat offender of section 924(c) to hinge on
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1545.
22. Id. at 1546.





28. Id. at 1546.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if - (1) the defend-
ant has previously been convicted in courts of the United States . . .for two or
more offenses committed on occasions different from one another and from such
felony and punishable in such courts by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year,for one or more of such convictions the defendant has been imprisoned prior to the com-
mission of such felony, and less than five years have elapsed between the commission
of such felony and either the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from
imprisonment .... (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Rawlings, 821 F.2d at 1546.
32. Id.
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the machinations of the prosecutor."3 3
Since the Rawlings decision, five other circuits3 4 have adopted its
reasoning and held that a second conviction under section 924(c), even
though charged in the same indictment as the first, legitimately triggers
the enhancement provision of section 924(c).3 5 In United States v.
Abreu,36 the Tenth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, disagreed. Rather than
phrasing the issue as whether section 924(c) required separate indict-
ments, the court focused on whether the statute required that the of-
fenses be separated by an intervening conviction. The court concluded
that an enhanced sentence applies only when the underlying offense was
committed after a judgment of conviction on the prior section 924(c)
offense.
3 7
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. United States v. Abreu 8
The prosecution. charged Orestes Abreu in one indictment with
drug and conspiracy offenses and four counts of using a firearm in con-
nection with each offense in violation of section 924(c)(1).3 9 Following
conviction on all counts, the trial court sentenced Abreu on the drug
and conspiracy charges and two of the section 924(c) charges.40 The
sentence for the second section 924(c) conviction was enhanced pursu-
ant to the provisions of that statute.
4 '
In a companion case, the prosecution charged James Thornbrugh in
one indictment with three counts of bank robbery, with each robbery
occurring on a separate date, and three section 924(c) counts, one for
each of the alleged bank robbery offenses. 42 Thornbrugh was convicted
of all the charges and received enhanced sentences for the second and
third section 924(c) convictions.
43
On appeal, both defendants questioned the propriety of their en-
hanced sentences under section 924(c). The Tenth Circuit ordered re-
hearing en banc to consider the lower court's interpretation of the
enhancement provision of this statute.4 4 In a 7-3 decision, the court
found the text of the statute and legislative history to be ambiguous with
33. Id.
34. United States v. Bernier, 954 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, (June 29,
1992); United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nabors, 901
F.2d 1351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 192 (1990); United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d
189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 534 (1990); United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 112 (1990).
35. Rawlings, 821'F.2d at 1545.
36. 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 1453-54.
38. 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992).








respect to the intended definition of "second or subsequent convic-
tion." 45 Hence, the court held that an enhanced sentence under section
924(c) for a second or subsequent conviction could not be imposed "un-
less the offense underlying this conviction took place after ajudgment of
conviction had been entered on the prior offense." 4 6 Accordingly, the
court reversed the enhanced sentences and remanded the cases for
resentencing.
a. Majority Opinion
Judge Seymour, writing for the majority, ruled that the phrase "sec-
ond or subsequent conviction" was ambiguous because it was subject to
more than one definition. 4 7 The majority found the legislative history
ambiguous as well. 4 8 Statements made by Representatives, which re-
ferred to severe penalties for offenders who use guns and 'even more
severe penalties for second offenders, did not compel a particular inter-
pretation of "second or subsequent conviction."
'49
Given the ambiguity, the majority applied rules of statutory con-
struction, specifically the rule of lenity.5 0 The rule requires strict con-
struction "to avoid and protect against unintended applications. s"5 ' The
Supreme Court in Ladner v. United States5 2 stated that courts may not
interpret statutes "so as to increase the penalty that it places on an indi-
vidual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a
guess as to what Congress intended."
5 3
The majority examined other enhancement provisions for gui-
dance. 54 Many statutes require enhancement when a second offense is
committed after a prior conviction.5 5 In particular, the court pointed to
21 U.S.C. section 962(b), which states, "a person shall be considered
convicted of a second or subsequent offense if, prior to the commission
of such offense, one or more prior convictions of him for a felony ...
have become final." '56 The court noted the government failed to iden-
tify any federal enhancement statute that did not require a prior convic-
45. Id. at 1450.
46. Id. at 1453.
47. Id. at 1449-50.
48. Id. at 1450.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1451.
51. Id. (citing Rogers v. United States, 325 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds and remanded for resentencing, 378 U.S. 549 (1964)).
52. 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
53. Id. at 178.
54. Abreu, 962 F.2d at 1451. In ascertaining congressional intent, the Supreme Court
has indicated that reference to other statutes may be appropriate. See, e.g., United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 534-44 (1940).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) (special offender statute); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)
(commission of drug crime after prior drug conviction), 844(a) (simple possession of
drugs after two or more prior convictions), 845(a) (engaging in continuing criminal enter-
prise after prior conviction), 859(b) (distributing drugs to minor after prior conviction),
860(b) (distributing or manufacturing drugs near a school after prior conviction), 861 (c)
(employing minors to violate drug laws after prior conviction) (1988 & Supp. IIl 1992).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 962(b) (1988).
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tion before a sentence could be enhanced.5 7
The majority asserted that the government's interpretation of sec-
tion 924(c) defeated the legislative purpose behind subsequent offense
statutes. 58 "Reformation and retribution theories of punishment are
the primary reasons for imposing greater penalties on the repeater."5 9
Drafted as a deterrent, the statute made clear that a second offender,
who apparently had not learned from the initial penalty, would receive
more severe treatment.6 ° The majority maintained that until the initial
penalty has had an opportunity to effect the desired reformation, a sub-
sequent offense statute may not be applied to that offender. 6 ' There-
fore, as neither Abreu or Thornbrugh had the opportunity to learn from
their mistakes, their sentences should not have been enhanced.
b. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent accused the majority of rewriting section 924(c) to in-
clude limitations not specified by Congress. 62 The dissent found the
analysis employed by the other six circuits that addressed this issue per-
suasive. 6 3 The dissent argued that the plain meaning of the statute sup-
ported the conclusion that a second firearms conviction, even if charged
in the same indictment, gave rise to an enhanced sentence. 64
The dissent asserted that the majority's application of the rule of
lenity was unwarranted. 6 5 A statute was not ambiguous "for purposes
of lenity merely because it [is] possible to articulate a construction more
narrow than that urged by the Government."'6 6 Six other circuits found
the statute unambiguous. 6 7 The dissent pointed out that the rule of len-
ity is reserved "for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists
about a statute's intended scope."'6 8 Consequently, the majority placed
premature emphasis on the rule of lenity as lenity applies only "at the
end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at
the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to
wrongdoers."
69
Finally, the dissent echoed the concern expressed by the other cir-
cuits over inefficient prosecution. Requiring the second or subsequent
conviction to be the result of a separate indictment will do nothing more
than require prosecutors to charge repeat offenders in separate indict-




61. Id. at 1452-53.
62. Id. at 1454 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (Judges Tacha and Baldock joined Judge
Brorby in dissent).
63. Id. at 1454-55.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1455.
66. Id. (citing Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461, 465 (1990)).
67. Id. at 1454. See supra note 33 and sources cited therein.
68. Abreu, 962 F.2d at 1455 (citing Moskal, 111 S.Ct. at 465).




ments. 70 Accordingly, the dissent maintained that the only legitimate
interpretation of section 924(c) allowed a second or subsequent convic-
tion charged in the same indictment as the first to trigger the enhance-
ment provisions of that statute.
7'
Surprisingly, neither the Abreu majority nor dissent referred to
United States v. Tisdale 7 or United States v. Bolton. 73 Those cases involved
the interpretation of a similar sentence enhancement provision, in which
the Tenth Circuit held intervening convictions were not a prerequisite
to sentence enhancement.
C. Background-U.S. v. Green
The sentence enhancement statute at issue in United States v. Green 
74
was 18 U.S.C. section 924(e), 7 5 an amendment to the Armed Career
Criminal Act (Career Criminal Act). The amendment provided that a
convicted felon who possesses, receives or transports a firearm in inter-
state commerce may be fined up to $25,000 and shall be imprisoned not
less than fifteen years. 76 Congress aimed the amendment at career
criminals-for example, burglars and robbers who make up "one person
crime waves."
77
The original theory behind the amendment was that once the career
criminal became a "three-time loser"-acquired three previous convic-
tions-the only reasonable solution required permanent incarcera-
tion. 78 Subsequently, the length of the incarceration was changed to a
15-year minimum because the drafters recognized hypothetical circum-
stances wherein a life sentence might be extreme.
79
The Career Criminal Act may be characterized as a recidivist statute
because it imposes an increased sentence upon a repeat offender. 80 Re-
cidivism is defined as "the reversion of an individual to criminal behav-
ior after he or she has been convicted of a prior offense, sentenced, and
(presumably) corrected.' '8 1 The Second Circuit in United States v. Ber-
70. Id. 962 F.2d at 1455.
71. Id.
72. 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 596 (1991).
73. 905 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 683 (1991).
74. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 435 (1992).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). The predecessor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), became
§ 924(e) as a result of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act in 1986.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions differ-
ent from one another, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and
imprisoned not less than fifteen years ....
77. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 1989).
78. Id. at 680.
79. Id.
80. See Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute
or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1085, 1094 (1988). Courts are split on this issue.
Some characterize § 924(e) as an enhancement statute while others have held it creates a
new federal offense. Id. at 1087 n.10.
81. King, supra note 4, at 1373 n.2.
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nier 82 pointed to the specificity of the statute as proof that "when Con-
gress intends to require prior convictions as a predicate for enhanced
sentencing, it uses clear language to effectuate its intent." 83
As the bill targeted "revolving door felons," 84 the language of the
statute has been read to require intervening convictions between the
first and second conviction, as well as between the second and third
before enhancement of the fourth conviction. 85 Legislative history sup-
ported this interpretation. 86 Despite the statute's wording and the legis-
lative history, the Tenth Circuit, as well as six other circuits, interpreted
the Career Criminal Act to require only that the multiple criminal epi-
sodes be distinct in time, not that the offenses be separated by interven-
ing convictions.87
In Abreu, the Tenth Circuit defined a second or subsequent convic-
tion in the enhancement statute context to mean "commission of a sec-
ond offense after a prior conviction."' 88 The Tenth Circuit, therefore,
defined prior conviction as a conviction that is rendered prior to a sub-
sequent offense.8 9 Two months later, the Tenth Circuit, in a panel de-
cision, handed down United States v. Green.90 In Green, the court affirmed
its holdings rendered in 1990 in United States v. Bolton 9 1 and United States
v. Tisdale.9 2 In those cases 93 the Tenth Circuit held that the Career
82. 954 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 820.
84. Balascsah, 873 F.2d at 682.
85. Id.
86. A statement made by Assistant Attorney General Stephen Trott supported the
reading that intervening convictions are necessary to trigger sentence enhancement.
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their definition, that lock-
ing them up and letting them go doesn't do any good. They go on again, you
lock them up, you let them go, it doesn't do any good, they are back for a third
time. At that juncture we should say, "That's it; time out; it is all over. We, as
responsible people, will never give you the opportunity to do this again."
Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing on H. R. 1627 and S.52 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1984).
87. See United States v. Hayes, 951 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1694 (1992); United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 596 (1991); United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 683 (1991); United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101
(1989); United States v. Herbert, 860 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070
(1989); United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 857 (1988);
United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988);
United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999 (11 th Cir. 1986).
88. United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 1453.
90. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1992).
91. 905 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1990).
92. 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990).
93. The facts of Bolton and Tisdale are nearly identical to Green. Bolton was convicted
of four counts of armed robbery in a single judicial proceeding. Each robbery occurred at
a separate time. Bolton appealed the enhancement of his sentence for a subsequent con-
viction of possession of a firearm by a former felon. Bolton, 905 F.2d at 319. Tisdale was
convicted in a single judicial proceeding of three counts of burglary. Each burglary oc-
curred at a separate time. Tisdale appealed the enhancement of his sentence for a subse-
quent conviction of possession of a firearm by a former felon. Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1095. In
both cases, the Tenth Circuit denied the appeals and affirmed this application of
§ 924(e)(1). Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1101; Bolton, 905 F.2d at 324.
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Criminal Act only required that felonies be "committed on occasions
different from one another,"9 4 and that it did not require that the of-
fenses be separated by intervening convictions.
9 5
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. United States v. Green
9 6
Two months after the Abreu decision, a Tenth Circuit panel, which
included two of the three dissenting justices of Abreu, decided Green.
9 7
In Green, the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed its prior decisions that sen-
tence enhancement under the Career Criminal Act was proper even
when the requisite "three prior convictions" were the result of a single
judicial proceeding. While Abreu and Green addressed separate provi-
sions of section 924, both involved the definition of "prior conviction"
for purposes of sentence enhancement with each arriving at different
conclusions.
On July 26, 1979, in one judicial proceeding, Green was convicted
of three armed robberies occurring on separate occasions.9 8 On August
12, 1991, Green was convicted of possessing a firearm after a prior fel-
ony conviction.9 " The government filed a notice for an enhanced pen-
alty pursuant to the provisions of the Career Criminal Act. Green urged
the district court to find that the simultaneous convictions of July 26,
1979 did not meet the requirements of the Career Criminal Act.10 0 The
district court rejected Green's argument and consequently enhanced
Green's sentence.' 0 '
On appeal, Green acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit recently
held that the enhancement provision of the Career Criminal Act could
be triggered even if the three prior convictions were the result of a sin-
gle judicial proceeding, 10 2 but sought reconsideration in light of United
States v. Balascsak.10 3 In Balascsak, the Third Circuit held 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1202(a), the predecessor statute to the Career Criminal Act, re-
quired that the first conviction must have been rendered prior to the
commission of the second crime. 10 4 However, the deciding vote in
Balascsak concurred in the result, yet agreed with the dissent's analysis of
section 1202(a).10 5 The Balascsak dissent argued that Congress in-
94. Green, 967 F.2d at 461.
95. Id.
96. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1992).
97. Justices Tacha and Baldock joined Justice Brorby in dissent in Abreu. Abreu, 962
F.2d at 1454. Justice Joseph T. Sneed, Circuit Justice for the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,. sitting by designation, joined in the opinion with Justices
Tacha and Brorby in Green. Green, 967 F.2d at 460.





103. 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989)(en banc), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 173 (1990).
104. Id. at 682.
105. Id. at 684-85 (Becker, J., concurring).
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tended section 1202(a) to apply when the convictions arose from sepa-
rate criminal episodes regardless of the date of the convictions.1 ° 6
Because the majority and dissent each received six votes, the preceden-
tial authority of Balascsak was unclear.
The Third Circuit resolved this ambiguity in United States v. School-
craft, 10 7 which held that the Career Criminal Act did not require the sep-
aration of the three predicate offenses by intervening convictions, but
rather that the criminal episodes be distinct in time.1 08 This multiple
episodes approach has been adopted by every federal court of appeals
that has considered this issue. 10 9
The Green court found the reasoning of Schoolcraft persuasive, in ad-
dition to the wording of the Career Criminal Act. Because the statute
"only requires that the felonies be 'committed on occasions different
from one another,' "1 10 it was clear that it did not require that the of-
fenses be separated by intervening convictions. Accordingly, the court
found the enhancement of Green's sentence under the Career Criminal
Act proper. 1 1' The Green panel did not mention its recent Abreu
decision.
E. Analysis
The discrepancy between Abreu and Green warrants examination. In
both cases appropriate application of enhancement provisions was at is-
sue. The Tenth Circuit determined whether Congress drafted these
statutes primarily for their deterrent effect to discourage criminals from
committing multiple crimes, regardless of prior convictions, or whether
the statutes solely targeted those who fail to reform after an initial con-
viction. If inherent in the concept of "enhancement" is the notion of
"second time through the system," then no additional statutory mention
of such intent is necessary, as suggested by the Abreu majority. Congress
offered and passed section 924(c) on the same day, hence, congressional
reports and committee reports do not exist.' 12 Consequently, the court
must resort to the "sparse pages of the floor debate"' 1 3 to interpret
legislative intent. Absence of language in these pages of opportunity to
reform can hardly be conclusive. In contrast, Congress did not offer and
pass the Career Criminal Act in one day. Congressional and committee
reports do exist offering more insight into the drafters' intent. The leg-
islative history behind the Career Criminal Act consistently referred to
"repeat offenders," "revolving door" offenders and "inability to
rehabilitate." 114
106. Id. at 685 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
107. 879 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1989).
108. Id. at 73.
109. United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing cases).
110. United States v. Green, 967 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing § 924(e)(1)).
111. Id. at 462.
112. United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992).
113. Id.
114. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1989).
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In construing statutes, words-not specifically defined will be inter-
preted as having their ordinary, common meaning.1 5 Courts are not
devoid of their common sense when interpreting legislative intent.
Although section 924(c) is headed "Penalties," courts describe it as an
enhancement provision. 1 16 Webster's Dictionary defines "enhance" as
to "raise," "to make greater," or to "heighten." '" 7 Common sense dic-
tates that enhancement attaches to the sentence for a crime committed
after a previous conviction for a previous crime committed at a previous
time.
However, a fine line exists between a court employing its common
sense and a court interjecting terms it perceives as necessary to effectu-
ate statutes." 18 For example, the Abreu majority relied on the specific
language of other sentence enhancement statutes to assert that if limita-
tions were included there, so too must Congress have intended them to
apply to section 924(c). 119 This logic of inferring from parts of various
enhancement statutes to the whole of every enhancement statute strips
the legislature of its decision-making authority. Such logic also assumes
Congress acted carelessly in the drafting of section 924(c) and inadver-
tently left out not merely one word, but full sentences which would sig-
nificantly narrow the statute's scope. While the court "should strive to
interpret a statute in a way that will avoid an unconstitutional construc-
tion," 1 20 the court is not given a license to "rewrite language enacted by
the legislature." 12'
Therefore, the court must exercise caution in asserting its common
sense. "[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation
of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by
judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public
weal.' ",122 Courts should not speculate, much less act, on whether Con-
gress would have altered its stance,' 23 had particular situations been an-
ticipated, because "[i]f corrective action is needed, it is the Congress
that must provide it."'
12 4
The divergent circuit opinions exist due to imprecise and inconsis-
tent statutory drafting by the legislature. To assert, however, that the
legislature chose words in one statute and therefore deliberately left
those words out of a similar statute is to assume the same legislature
drafted each statute. Congress does not refer to a lexicon of statutory
language. Use of certain words is not mandatory to convey certain
115. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
116. Abreu, 963 F.2d at 1448; United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1544 (1Ith Cir.
1987).
117. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 375 (1981).
118. United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 193 (4th Cir. 1991).
119. Abreu, 963 F.2d at 1451-52.
120. Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1927 (1991).
121. Id.
122. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 410 (1980) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
195 (1978)).
123. Id. at 405.
124. Id.
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meanings. Rather, the wording of a statute hinges on the personalties of
its sponsors, purposes of the legislation, time allowed for debate, revi-
sions and amendments. Consequently, statutes enacted to effect the
same result may possess little uniformity.
Because of inept drafting, the courts of this country face the di-
lemma of either adhering to a strict construction approach or using their
judgment and common sense. A strict construction approach risks illog-
ical and unjust results in an effort to keep the doctrine of separation of
powers intact. A common sense approach may result in the nonliteral
interpretation of the language used by the legislature, thereby risking
erosion of the separation of powers. Congress's failure to clearly an-
nounce its intent results in courts balancing this equation.
The pursuit of that balance engaged these circuits in their attempts
to interpret the applicability of enhancement provisions. Not only do
there exist opposing views between circuits as to which approach should
be adopted, but within circuits as well. The Abreu majority employed
common sense and judicial discretion while the Abreu dissent and the
Green court adhered to a strict and putatively literal statutory construc-
tion approach. A better approach would require courts to enforce the
laws as written and resort to a common sense interpretation only when
clearly necessary, for example, when failure to do so would yield absurd
or illogical results.
However, it appears the Supreme Court will not decide which of
these approaches was correct. A petition for certiorari was denied in
Green on November 2, 1992.125 A petition for certiorari was filed in
Abreu onJuly 9, 1992. The petition has not been granted or denied. 126
Rather, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an identical case, United
States v. Deal,127 on due process grounds rather than based upon statu-
tory construction, and presumably will dispose of Abreu upon resolution
of Deal.128 On October 21, 1992, the Federal Public Defender's Office
filed a supplemental memorandum in hopes of consolidating Abreu with
Deal. 129
125. 113 S. Ct. 435 (1992).
126. The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari as to Thornbrugh's convic-
tions. United States v. Thornbrugh, No. 92-5053, 1992 WL 171156 (U.S. Oct 5, 1992).
127. 954 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. (1992). Deal was charged and
convicted in a single judicial proceeding of six counts of bank robbery, six violations of
§ 9 2 4(c) and one violation of § 92 2 (g). Id. The trial court held the six separate convictions
of § 924(c) triggered the enhancement provisions of that section, thereby resulting in a
consecutive sentence amounting to 105 years. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the second or subsequent conviction language provided for enhanced penalties for a crime
of violence even if charged in the same indictment as the first. Id. at 263.
128. Telephone interview with Vicki Mandell-King, Asst. Federal Public Defender for
the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming (Nov. 18, 1992).
129. Id. The supplemental memorandum was filed pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 15.7, 28
U.S.C.A. § 15.7 (Supp. 1992).
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III. TESTING THE SCOPE OF BOSTICK AS APPLIED TO POLICE-PASSENGER
ENCOUNTERS ON TRAINS
A. Background
Discussion concerning the constitutionality of police field interroga-
tion - police authority to stop, question, and frisk suspicious persons
who cannot be arrested - first appeared in 1960.130 The Supreme
Court issued landmark opinions on police field interrogation in Terry v.
Ohio,13 1 and Sibron v. New York.' 3 2 At the time these cases were decided,
the exclusionary rule' 33 was the most frequently invoked remedy to con-
trol and limit police activities. 134 Once the Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule to the states in 1961,135 it became important to more
precisely define what constituted a seizure that required probable cause.
The Terry Court recognized that not all interaction between police
officers and citizens involved seizures. "Only when the officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."' 13 6 In
Terry and its companion cases, the Supreme Court attempted to further
define acceptable police practices 137 by categorizing police-citizen en-
counters as falling into one of three types: (1) voluntary encounters-
"nonseizures," which require no evidentiary predicate at all, and there-
fore, do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative deten-
130. Frank J. Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCIENCE 386 (1960).
131. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
132. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Sibron was a consolidation of two cases, the other being Peters
v. New York.
133. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by, Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960) on other grounds.
134. However, its function was, and still is, limited. Courts only invoke the exclusion-
ary rule 1) if the illegally obtained evidence is needed for conviction; and 2) if an appro-
priate motion is made at the appropriate time. The state may indirectly use illegally
obtained evidence, for example, for impeachment purposes. A major flaw of the exclu-
sionary rule is that it is geared solely toward conviction and fails to account for the fact that
police illegality is still utilized in the bargaining process. Lawrence P. Tiffany, The Fourth
Amendment and Police-Citizen Confrontations, 60 J. CRIM L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE
442, 452 (1969).
135. The Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to the state courts in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
136. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
137. Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1988). Terry was not
the first occasion the Supreme Court had to address this question. In Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), the Court had to determine the legality of a seizure. Two
police officers approached a cab stopped at a light driven by Rios. Id. at 256. The issue
was whether an arrest occurred when the officers took their positions at the doors of the
cab, which would have been illegal; or whether the arrest took place after one of the of-
ficers saw the defendant drop what turned out to be narcotics to the floor of the cab. Id. at
262. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine when the arrest oc-
curred, but provided no significant guidelines, nor addressed the question of whether po-
lice officers may properly detain individuals for questioning without reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 262. The state court avoided these issues as well, determining that the officers'
actions were justified as part of routine interrogation. Rios v United States, 192 F. Supp.
888, (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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tions - seizures which must be supported by reasonable suspicion, an
evidentiary requirement less than probable cause; and (3) arrests, which
must be supported by probable cause.13 8
Analyzing search and seizure cases with three questions in mind
proves helpful. The first question asks whether the police seized the
suspect, and if so, whether the seizure occurred lawfully. The second
question asks whether the search occurred lawfully. The third question
addresses consent. The only circumstance under which evidence ob-
tained from an unlawful search may be admissible'is if the suspect volun-
tarily consented to the search of his person or belongings. In order for
consent to be voluntary, it must be sufficiently attenuated from any ille-
gal detention. 139 Answers to these questions can only be derived from
an examination of the totality of the circumstances of each case.
In Terry, a police officer observed Terry and another man, Chilton,
repeatedly walking back and forth in front of a store window. 140 The
officer, suspecting the men of "casing a job, a stick-up," confronted the
men. The officer frisked Terry and found a gun. Defense counsel
moved to suppress the weapon. In an 8-1 decision,' 4 1 the Court af-
firmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The Court held the officer
had reasonable grounds to support his belief that the two men acted
suspiciously and that they might be armed, thereby justifying the pat-
down search. 1
42
The Court drew a distinction between an investigatory stop and an
arrest. An arrest required probable cause to believe a crime had been
committed and that the suspect committed it. An investigatory stop re-
quired "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."1 4 3 The
Court also distinguished between a "frisk" and a full-blown search. The
Court held an officer may frisk a suspect for dangerous weapons if the
officer has evidence that reasonably lead him to believe that the suspect
is armed and dangerous.14 4 In contrast, a full-blown search is justified
only by probable cause.
Because the officer physically seized Terry almost immediately, the
Court did not need to address at what point a seizure took place.' 4 5
The scope of Terry was narrow. It held only that when an officer investi-
gates a suspicious person, the officer may frisk that person for danger-
138. See United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1255 (1984).
139. United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 958 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 230
(1991). In 1975, the Supreme Court identified the factors to consider in determining
whether voluntary consent exists. A reviewing court must look at 1) the closeness in time
between the illegal detention and the "consent;" 2) the existence of intervening circum-
stances; and 3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968).
141. Id. (Justice Douglas dissented).
142. Id. at 30-31.
143. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 30.
145. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 437 n.4.
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ous weapons if the officer has evidence that reasonably leads him to
believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.14 6 Consequently, the
Terry Court left undefined the precise contours of an arrest, a non-
seizure and an investigatory detention.
The scope of Sibron14 7 was equally narrow. In Sibron, a police of-
ficer observed defendant Sibron over an eight-hour period in conversa-
tion with people known to the officer as narcotic addicts.14 8 The officer
observed Sibron speaking with three more known addicts that evening
inside a restaurant. 14 9 The officer approached him and told him to
come outside. Outside, the officer said to Sibron, "You know what I am
after."' 150 The officer testified Sibron "mumbled something and
reached into his pocket."' 5 ' Simultaneously, the officer thrust his hand
into the same pocket and discovered several glassine envelopes, which
were later determined to contain heroin.' 52 The trial court held the of-
ficer had probable cause to arrest Sibron.153 Accordingly, it held that
the search was properly incident to that arrest.1 54 The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed without opinion.
15 5
The Supreme Court, in five opinions, 15 6 reversed Sibron's convic-
tion. Chief Justice Warren, writing the majority, defined the frisk of
Sibron as the intrusion that had to be justified as the record was unclear
whether Sibron had been seized prior to the search. 15 7 The Court
found no elements of a self-protective search and therefore, concluded
that the intrusion was unconstitutional. 158
In Terry and Sibron the Court refused to address the issue of whether
the initial confrontations involved restraint. In Terry, the Court stated:
"We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety
of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes
of 'detention' and/or interrogation."' 159 Similarly, in Sibron the Court
stated: "We are not called Upon to decide in this case whether there was
a 'seizure' of Sibron inside the restaurant antecedent to the physical
seizure which accompanied the search."' 160 The Court acknowledged it
146. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
147. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).





153. Id. at 47.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Justices Brennan, White, Stewart and Marshall concurred with ChiefJustice War-
ren's majority opinion. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 40. Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion,
seemed to agree with the approach of the majority. Id. at 68. Justice Harlan reiterated the
analysis he advocated in Terry. Id. at 70. Justice Fortas would have given more weight to the
confession of error. Id. at 70. Finally, Justice Black dissented on the ground that the police
action was taken in reasonable self-defense. Id. at 70, 79.
157. Id. at 60 n.20.
158. Id at 66-67.
159. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
160. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63.
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is not necessary for a suspect to be taken to the station house before a
seizure has occurred, however, it gave no guidelines for determining
when a seizure has taken place, outside the undefined "show of
authority." 1
6'
In the decade following Terry, courts focused' on clarifying the defi-
nition of "investigatory detentions." Not until the early 1980s did the
"nonseizure" category-supposed "voluntary encounters'-the focus
of this analysis, receive further scrutiny.
16 2
The two cases which gave rise to the test currently employed by
courts to determine whether a police-citizen encounter constituted a
"nonseizure" are United States v. Mendenhall163 and Florida v. Royer. 164 In
Mendenhall, Drug Enforcement agents believed Mendenhall's behavior in
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport was characteristic of a drug trafficker.
The agents approached her, identified themselves and asked to see her
driver's license and airline ticket.' 65 After discovering a discrepancy be-
tween the names listed on the two items and observing Mendenhall's
increased nervousness, the agents asked Mendenhall to accompany
them to the DEA office for further questions. 16 6 There, Mendenhall
agreed to a search of her person and handbag despite being told she
could refuse such a search. The search resulted in the discovery of her-
oin and the agents arrested Mendenhall.
16 7
Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, focused on whether Men-
denhall had been seized when approached by the agents and asked ques-
tions. 6 8 In answering this question, Justice Stewart followed the view
expressed in Terry that a person is "seized" only when his freedom of
movement is restrained by means of physical force or a show of author-
ity. 16 9 Thus, Justice Stewart held "that a person has been 'seized' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave."'170 Justice Stewart concluded that
"nothing in the record suggests that the respondent had any objective
reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the
concourse and proceed on her way, and for that reason we conclude that
the agents' initial approach to her was not a seizure."'
171
Justice Powell concurred with the result, but found that a seizure
based on reasonable suspicion occurred. 17 2 While he did not disagree
with the "walk away" standard put forth by justice Stewart, he felt it was
161. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
162. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 437-38.
163. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
164. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
165. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48.
166. Id. at 548.
167. Id. at 549.
168. Id. at 551-52.
169. Id. at 553.
170. Id. at 554.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
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a close call as to whether Mendenhall was free to walk away. 173 Justice
White, dissenting, assumed as well a seizure occurred, and disagreed
with the standard suggested by Stewart.174 The three differing views in
the Mendenhall opinion created uncertainty among lower courts as to the
standard for determining whether a seizure took place.175 Three years
later, the Supreme Court addressed this uncertainty in Florida v.
Royer. 1
76
In Royer, Justice White, writing for the four justice plurality, ad-
hered to the "free to leave" test of Mendenhall.177 Yet, the Court
reached the opposite result with facts virtually identical to Mendenhall.
Royer, like Mendenhall, fit a drug courier profile.1 78 Royer produced a
driver's license and airline ticket bearing different names, and became
noticeably more nervous as the conversation with the government
agents progressed. 17 9 The agents did not return Royer's license or
ticket, but asked him to accompany them to a flight attendant's
lounge. 180 Royer's luggage was brought to the room without Royer's
consent. When requested, Royer produced a key to one suitcase and
allowed the officers to pry open the other suitcase. The agents found
marijuana and arrested Royer. 181
The court ruled the search of the luggage was unlawful because at
that time, Royer "as a practical matter" was under arrest' 8 2 and prob-
able cause did not exist to justify such an arrest.183 Paramount to this
determination was the fact the agents retained Royer's ticket and
driver's license without indicating in any way he was free to depart.'
8 4
While tenuous to hinge the different outcomes of Mendenhall and Royer
on whether identification was returned, this one fact further supported
the Court's "free to leave" analysis.
185
173. Id. at n.l.
174. Id. at 569-71 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 447.
176. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
177. Id. at 503-04 n.9.
178. Id. at 493.
179. Id. at 494.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 494-95.
182. Id. at 501.
183. Id. at 507.
184. Id. at 503-04 n.9.
185. The next Supreme Court decision that addressed the issue of when a seizure oc-
curs was I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). In that case, the practice of immigration
officers in conducting surveys of factories in search of illegal aliens was challenged.
Agents approached employees, asked questions and, in some cases, requested immigra-
tion papers. The Ninth Circuit applied the Mendenhall test to conclude that the entire work
force had been seized because a reasonable worker "would have believed he was not free
to leave." The Supreme Court reversed, citing the language of Royer that "interrogation
relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself,
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." The Court felt the employees could not have
possessed a reasonable fear that they were not free to continue working or move about the
factory. Delgado, with its unusual setting of a factory, added little in the way of clarification
to the murky doctrine of "nonseizures." Id.
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In 1991, the Supreme Court in Florida v. Bostick 186 interpreted the
Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test to include the concept of "free to
terminate the encounter."1 8 7 At issue in that case was the constitution-
ality of random bus searches. In an effort to curtail drug traffic, Broward
County Sheriff's Department officers routinely boarded buses and, with-
out articulable suspicion, asked passengers for permission to search
their luggage.18 8 Bostick, after being advised of his right to refuse, con-
sented to such a search. After finding cocaine, the officers arrested Bos-
tick.' 8 9 The trial court denied his motion to suppress the cocaine. The
Florida Court of Appeals affirmed, but certified a question to the Florida
Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of such random bus
searches. 190
The Florida Supreme Court, citing the Mendenhall-Royer test, held
that a reasonable passenger would not feel free to leave the bus to avoid
questioning by the police, and adopted a per se rule that such "working
the buses" was unconstitutional.' 9' The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine whether this per se rule is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court held the "free to leave" analysis inapplicable to
the setting of a bus because Bostick's freedom of movement was re-
stricted not because of police conduct, but because he chose to be a
passenger on a bus. 19 2 Consequently, the appropriate inquiry "is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' re-
quests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' 9 3 At issue then, was
whether such a police-citizen encounter on a bus constituted an investi-
gatory detention first identified in Terry.
The Court recognized that a seizure does not occur merely because
a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. Such
an encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection unless it
loses its consensual nature. 194 In addition, police officers may request
consent to search luggage as long as they do not convey the message
that compliance with their request is mandatory. 195
The Court pointed out-that the trial court did not evaluate all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether a
seizure occurred, but rather based its finding solely on the fact the en-
counter took place on a bus. 19 6 The location of the encounter is one
factor for consideration, but the trial court erred in making it the only
186. Ill S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
187. Id. at 2387.
188. Id. at 2384.
189. Id. at 2384-85.
190. Id. at 2385.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2387.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2386.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2388.
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relevant factor.' 9 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded so the
Florida court could properly evaluate the seizure question. 19 8
The Bostick dissent took issue with the majority's authorization of
police questioning of citizens without particularized suspicion, which it
viewed as a violation of the core values of the Fourth Amendment. 19 9
Judge Marshall, speaking for the dissent, characterized such "random
indiscriminate stopping and questioning of individuals ' 20 0 as "inconve-
nient, intrusive, and intimidating."'2 0 1 The'dissent argued if the Court
allowed these types of confrontations, so too will it allow "random
knocks on the doors of our citizens' homes seeking 'consent' to search
for drugs." 2 0 2 The dissent agreed with the majority's test, but failed to
understand how Bostick could have felt free to decline the officers'
requests.
20 3
The dissent argued Bostick had no reasonable alternative to coop-
erating with the officers. 20 4 Had Bostick refused to answer questions,
he would have aroused the officers' suspicions. In addition, leaving the
bus at an intermediate point in a long bus journey20 5 and abandoning
his belongings in the process was not a feasible option. 20 6 The dissent
concluded by emphasizing police may approach passengers whom they
have reason to suspect of criminal wrongdoing. 20 7 In addition, police
may confront passengers without suspicion "so long as they took simple
steps, like advising the passengers confronted of their right to decline to
be questioned, to dispel the aura of coercion and intimidation that per-
vades such encounters."'20 8 As the encounter with Bostick did not fall
within one of these two acceptable categories, the dissent found the en-
counter illegal.
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. United States v. Ward20 9
a. Background
In Ward, the Albuquerque Police Department received information
concerning an Amtrack train passenger, Ward. The information re-
197. Id. at 2389.
198. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court found that defendant's consent to search
his luggage was voluntary, and affirmed the conviction. Bostick v. State, 593 So. 2d 494
(Fla. 1992).
199. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens joined Justice Marshall in dissent. Id.
200. Id. at 2391 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (D.D.C.),
rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
201. Id. at 2390 (quoting United States v. Chandler, 744 F. Supp. 333, 335 (D.D.C.
1990)).
202. Id. at 2391 (quoting Lewis, 728 F. Supp. at 788-89).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2392-94.
205. Id. at 2393.
206. Id. at 2393-94.
207. Id. at 2394.
208. Id. at 2394-95.
209. 961 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992).
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vealed that the passenger had paid $600 in cash for a one-way ticket
from Flagstaff, Arizona to Kansas City, Missouri; the call-back number
given by the passenger originated in Tucson, a known drug origination
point; and that the passenger reserved the largest private room on the
train.2 10 Detective Erekson and Agent Small met the train when it ar-
rived in Albuquerque. The officers boarded the train and knocked on
the door to the train sleeper car occupied by Ward. Ward opened the
door and the detective leaned inside the compartment and asked Ward
for permission to talk to him and to enter the compartment. 2 1 1 Ward
granted both requests.
The detective sat down between Ward and the door. The detective
questioned Ward about his luggage and identification. 2 12 Ward stated
that his only luggage was a shoulder bag, which he allowed the detective
to examine.2 13 Discovering a discrepancy between the names listed on
Ward's ticket and his driver's license further aroused the detective's
suspicion.
While these events took place between Ward and the detective, the
agent discovered that Ward had boarded the train with two suitcases.
The agent informed the detective of this fact.2 14 The detective asked
Ward if he possessed keys to the luggage. Ward consented to a search
of his pockets which uncovered a key to the luggage. Ward subse-
quently produced three more keys, further tying Ward to the luggage
despite the fact that he subsequently disclaimed ownership of the lug-
gage.2 15 These keys opened the luggage, the search of which led to the
discovery of 41 pounds of marijuana and the arrest of Ward.
2 16
The trial court denied Ward's motion to suppress the marijuana.
Ward entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of narcotics and
subsequently appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.2 1 7 The
Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding the
seizure and subsequent search of Ward's luggage was unlawful.
218
b. Opinion of the Court
The court began by finding the initial information the officers pos-
sessed concerning Ward consistent with the concept of innocent travel.
Consequently, that information was insufficient to provide the officers
with a reasonable suspicion on which to base an investigatory deten-
tion. 21 9 However, the court did find the officers had reasonable suspi-
cion to detain Ward upon learning of the discrepancies concerning the
210. Id. at 1529.
211. Id. at 1530.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1529-30.
214. Id. at 1530.
215. Id. at 1535.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1528.
218. Id. at 1536.
219. Id. at 1529.
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identification and luggage.2 20 Still, the search of Ward's luggage was
illegal unless it could be determined Ward voluntarily consented to the
questioning and subsequent search of his luggage. The court therefore
defined the issue as whether the encounter between Ward and the of-
ficers was consensual.
22 1
As the Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test is inapplicable to the
setting of a train, 2 22 the court employed the test handed down by the
Supreme Court in Bostick: "[W]hether a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encoun-
ter." 223 Noting the small size and frail condition of Ward, 224 the pres-
ence of two officers, with one officer seated between Ward and the door,
and the fact the interrogation of Ward took place in a small roomette
outside the view of other passengers, the court concluded that a reason-
able person in Ward's position would have felt unable to decline the
requests of the officers or terminate the encounter. 22 5 In addition, the
officers did not make simple, general inquiries of Ward, but asked fo-
cused, potentially incriminating questions. As this form of questioning
implied the investigation has focused specifically on the individual, that
individual will feel less able to terminate the encounter.2 26
The court also distinguished Bostick from the instant case in that the
officers in Bostick specifically advised Bostick of his right to terminate the
encounter. 22 7 The officers gave no such advisement to Ward. Although
such failure to advise is not determinative of whether a seizure took
place, it should be afforded greater weight in light of the fact the en-
counter with Ward took place in a nonpublic setting.2 28 Based on a to-
tality of these circumstances, the court concluded Ward had been
unlawfully seized at the point the officer first began asking Ward incrimi-
nating questions.
2 29
Next, the court addressed the question of whether Ward voluntarily
consented to a search of his pockets, which produced the first luggage
key. The court pointed out that in order for the consent to be deemed
voluntary, it must be sufficiently attenuated in time from the illegal de-
tention.23 0 Noting that Ward's consent to a search of his pockets oc-
curred only minutes after the illegal seizure began, the court found no
intervening circumstances which attenuated the two. 2 3 1 Accordingly,
the court held Ward's consent to the search of his pockets was tainted by
220. Id. at 1530.
221. Id.
222. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387-88 (1991).
223. Id. at 2387.
224. At the time, Ward was 5'7, weighed 145 pounds and had recently undergone a
kidney transplant. Ward, 961 F.2d at 1533.
225. Id. at 1531-33.
226. Id. at 1532.
227. Id. at 1533.
228. Id.




DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the prior illegal seizure, rendering the marijuana the fruit of such illegal
seizure.
2 32
The court applied the same analysis to determine whether Ward
voluntarily disclaimed ownership of the bag. Like consent to search,
when abandonment is preceded by an illegal seizure, the abandonment
is only valid if sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure. 23 3 As the
Government failed to prove such attenuation, the court found Ward's
disclaimers of ownership tainted by the illegal seizure.23 4 Accordingly,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of Ward's motion to suppress, and
remanded for consistent further proceedings.
Two months after Ward, the Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished opin-
ion, decided a similar case, United States v. Arendondo.23 5 The totality of
the circumstances, however, led the Tenth Circuit to affirm Arendondo's
conviction for possession of drugs, as contrasted with Ward. A compari-
son of these two cases illustrates the Tenth Circuit's commitment to de-
ciding search and seizure cases based solely on the totality of the
circumstances.
C. Analysis
The Supreme Court's lack of clarity in the realm of search and
seizure allows the lower courts considerable leeway to decide when a
seizure occurred. Whether a seizure has occurred should be determined
by a realistic examination of the facts in each case. Rather than relying
on the fact-specific "totality of the circumstances" test, many courts still
apply the unrealistic Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test.2 3 6 Courts ap-
pear comfortable applying a modified Mendenhall-Royer test to the search
and seizure context.2 3 7 However" a lack of uniformity in the "modified"
versions adopted by the courts has resulted in inconsistent treatment of
similar cases.
For example, encounters between police and suspected drug smug-
glers in airports are uniform, 23 8 yet determining at what point a seizure,
if any, has occurred, is analyzed differently by different courts.23 9 Some
courts find the entire encounter illegal, as the officer lacked sufficient
reasonable suspicion. Other courts find the encounter consensual,
232. Id. at 1535.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1535-36.
235. No. 91-2103, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14654 (10th Cir.June 17, 1992). Tenth Cir-
cuit Rule 36.3 states that unpublished opinions and orders and judgments have no prece-
dential value and shall not be cited except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the
law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel.
236. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 463.
237. Id.
238. Agents develop a suspicion of a passenger usually arriving on a flight from a
source city. Id at 457. The agents follow the suspect, approach, identify themselves and
ask if the suspect will talk with them. Then the agents ask to see the suspect's ticket and
identification. At this point the agents either ask the suspect to accompany them to an
office for further questioning or ask for consent to search their luggage. If consent is given
and drugs are found, the suspect is arrested. Id. at 457-58.
239. Id. at 458.
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-therefore, no seizure occurred. Often courts find a seizure which isjus-
tified by the requisite level of suspicion, and hence is legal. 240
Almost all courts agree that officers merely approaching individuals,
requesting to speak with them, and asking for identification does not
constitute a seizure. 241 Many courts find a seizure has occurred at some
point in the encounter, but hold different views as to when that seizure
took place. These points vary from retention of the passenger's ticket
and identification, 2 4 2 the officer informing the individual of his suspi-
cions, 2 43 asking the individual a question designed to confirm or dispel
suspicion, 24 4 the officer asking the individual to accompany him to an-
other location, 245 requesting permission to search2 46 and threatening to
seek a search warrant. 24 7 The result of these inconsistent applications
of the Mendenhall-Royer test is the varied treatment of essentially identical
situations.
The lack of bright-line rules provided by the Supreme Court as to
when a seizure has taken place results in fewer restrictions placed upon
police conduct.2 4 8 In 1969, Professor Tiffany suggested one result of
Terry's ambiguity may be increased judicial intervention to control police
practices if the relevant policing agencies do not undertake to do it
themselves. 24 9 However, judicial intervention since Terry has done little
to clarify this area of law. In the twenty-four years since Terry, the
Supreme Court has handed down Mendenhall, Royer and Bostick providing
the ambiguous "reasonable person," "free to leave" and "free to termi-
nate the encounter" tests. Courts have difficulty interpreting these tests
and policing agencies show increasing tendencies to exploit rather than
help clarify the ambiguity. Hard to apply, difficult to define tests do lit-
tle to clarify search and seizure doctrine.
Professor Butterfoss pointed out the Mendenhall-Royer test may not
even be true to the principles of Terry.2 50 Terry held that "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person." 2 5 1 The Terry court emphasized this
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983) (seizure occurred
when officer held license while making additional requests).
243. United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986) (seizure occurred when
officer retained suspect's drivers license).
244. United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1986) (seizure oc-
curred when officers identified themselves and asked defendant from where he came).
245. United States v. Lehmann, 798 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1986) (no seizure until agents
asked defendant in airport parking lot to accompany them to F.A.A. office).
246. United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1988) (encounter became
seizure when federal agent told suspect he was a narcotics officer and requested permis-
sion to look in suspect's bag), over-ruled by, U.S. v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990).
247. United States v. Pirelli, 650 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mass. 1986) (consensual encounter
became seizure when officers threatened to obtain search warrant unless suspect con-
sented to search).
248. See Tiffany, supra note 132, at 453.
249. Id.
250. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 480.
251. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
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determination can only be made "in light of the particular circum-
stances." 2 52 Justice Stewart in Mendenhal converted the Terry detention
test to a "reasonable person" 2 53 test, placing more emphasis on that
unrealistic subjective standard rather than the necessary objective stan-
dard of focusing on the particular circumstances.
Viewed in this light, it appears the Tenth Circuit in Ward, while it
may have modified Mendenhall-Royer" remained true to Terry. In Ward,
the court tested "the limits of Bostick in an encounter in a small private
compartment of a train."' 2 54 However, examination of Ward has shown
that the fact the encounter took place on a train was but one element
factored into the real questions posed by Ward. The first question asked
if Ward was detained, and if so, whether that detention was legal. The
second question asked, regardless of the legality of the detention,
whether Ward voluntarily consented to the search of his pockets and
luggage. As these are the principle questions addressed in every search
and seizure case, Ward, while it may add a twist in that it occurred on a
train, is no different.
In deciding whether Ward had been detained, the Tenth Circuit
placed great emphasis on the fact Ward was subjected to potentially in-
criminating questioning, but did not base its decision on that fact
alone. 2 55 Rather, that fact, when combined with the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" 2 56 gave rise to the illegal detention. That Ward does not
stand for a per se rule prohibiting the asking of train passengers poten-
tially incriminating questions is evidenced by the unpublished opinion
the Tenth Circuit handed down two months after Ward, in United States v.
Arendondo.
25 7
In Arendondo, the same DEA agent involved in Ward, Agent Small,25 8
boarded an Amtrack train in Albuquerque. Unlike the situation in Ward,
Agent Small did not act pursuant to a tip. Agent Small's attention was
drawn to Arendondo when he saw Arendondo, who did not appear
handicapped, sitting in the handicapped section of the train.25 9 Agent
Small approached Arendondo, displayed his badge and asked to speak
to him. Arendondo agreed. 260  Agent Small next asked to see
252. Id. at 21.
253. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 480.
254. United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 1528 (10th Cir. 1992).
255. Id. at 1532, 1534. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has held that asking incriminating
questions absent reasonable suspicion renders a detention illegal in the setting of routine
traffic stops. In United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), an officer
stopped the defendant for not wearing a seat belt. The court ruled the officer lacked rea-
sonable suspicion to detain and question the defendant further outside the purpose of the
stop. The Tenth Circuit followed this opinion three years later in United States v. Walker,
941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1168 (1991).
256. Ward, 961 F.2d at 1534.
257. No. 91-2103, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14654 (10th Cir. June 17, 1992).
258. Agent Small was involved in yet another train case in 1992. See United States v.
Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit did not materially distinguish
Bloom from Ward, and applied Ward to reverse the district court's denial of the motion to
suppress. Id.




Arendondo's ticket, which Arendondo produced, and Arendondo's
identification, which Arendondo said he did not have. At this point
Agent Small informed Arendondo he "was a DEA agent who daily
boarded the train looking for people traveling alone and carrying nar-
cotics." '2 6 1 Arendondo replied he did not have any drugs. Agent Small
then asked for permission to search Arendondo's luggage "to make sure
they don't contain any drugs."12 6 2 Arendondo consented, the search un-
covered drugs, and Arendondo was arrested.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Arendondo. The
Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Ward because the agents
questioned Ward in "physically intimidating surroundings" as com-
pared to the fact Arendondo was questioned in "an open public car
immediately in front of an exit."' 263 In addition, two officers questioned
Ward while one questioned Arendondo. Moreover, the court noted
physical size greatly favored Arendondo, whereas Ward was
diminutive.
26 4
Ward, when read in conjunction with Arendondo, can be viewed not
so much as registering dissent to the holding of Bostick, but as register-
ing dissent to the application of unrealistic tests, like Mendenhall-Royer.
Cases cannot be decided based solely on the location of the encounter,
or on what an artificial "reasonable person," who is much more assertive
than the average citizen,26 5 might feel. Rather, courts must base their
decisions solely on the "concrete factual context of the individual
case. ' 266 Courts must examine whether the encounter involved aggres-
sion, authoritative commands or blockage of passage.2 6 7 Courts should
look to whether the officer visibly displayed his weapons or physically
intimidated or threatened the suspect.2 68 Also relevant is whether the
encounter took place at an unusual time or place.2 69 No single factor
may be dispositive of whether a seizure has occurred implicating the
Fourth Amendment; rather, it depends on the totality of all the circum-
stances surrounding the incident.
2 70
While the Supreme Court received much criticism for its imprecise
tests, no alternative exists. If each case is truly to be decided on the
basis of assessing the "coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a
whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isola-
261. Id. at *3.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *8 n.8.
264. Id.
265. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 439. The reality is citizens virtually never feel free to
walk away when approached by a police officer. Id.
266. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).
267. Cf Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988) (police presence alone does
not constitute seizure).
268. Cf United States v. Brady, 842 F.2d 1313, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (defendant faced
none of the factors typically found to intimidate persons into thinking compliance is
obligatory).
269. Id.
270. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572.
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tion,"2 7 1 the test must be imprecise to accommodate varying facts.
Search and seizure doctrine became more unclear when the Supreme
Court adopted the unrealistic "reasonable person free to leave or termi-
nate the encounter" test. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has consistently
adhered to examining the seizure "in light of the particular circum-
stances" 2 72 and in that sense, has remained true to Terry.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated indepen-
dence in the areas of sentence enhancement and search and seizure. In
Abreu, the Tenth Circuit rejected the reasoning adhered to by six other
circuits as to the applicability of a sentence enhancement provision.
However, because of the apparent inconsistency between Abreu and
Green, the Tenth Circuit's sentence enhancement doctrine remains un-
clear. In Ward, the Tenth Circuit registered its dissent to the unrealistic
Mendenhall-Royer test and reasserted the importance of deciding search
and seizure cases based on the totality of the circumstances. In so do-
ing, the Tenth Circuit refused to extend the Supreme Court's holding in
Bostick to the setting of private train compartments. It will be interesting
to see if the Supreme Court finds it necessary to harness the indepen-
dence demonstrated by the Tenth Circuit in 1992.
Martha A. Paluch
271. Id. at 573.




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with several difficult
issues in 1992. The employment cases decided by the court mostly dealt
with procedural due process in public employment. The court contin-
ued its narrow construction of the procedural rights of government em-
ployees. It applied a high standard necessary for plaintiffs to establish a
protected property interest and established a low standard for defend-
ants to meet to comply with Fourteenth Amendment requirements. In
Brown v. Independent School District No. 1-06,1 the court narrowly construed
the word "termination" in a statute protecting school employees from
arbitrary discharge so as to exclude employees with contracts not re-
newed by the school district. In Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City, 2 the
court held personnel policies enacted by city officials protecting city em-
ployees did not override employment-at-will provisions of the
Oklahoma City Charter. Similarly, in Phillips v. Calhoun 3 the court held a
section of the city code which transferred the plaintiff into a protected
classification did not override the at-will provisions of the city charter.
But in Patrick v. Miller,4 a merit clause of the city charter was found to
take precedence over other at-will language of the charter.
In 1992 the Tenth Circuit also considered using a Title VII analogy
to resolve issues arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act in both the substantive and procedural context. In Oestman v. Na-
tional Farmers Union Insurance Co. ,5 the court applied the same test used in
Title VII discrimination cases to determine whether a plaintiff is an em-
ployee protected by the Act or an unprotected independent contractor.
The court rejected the Title VII analogy in the statute of limitations con-
text in Aronson v. Gressly.
6
II. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND DUE PROCESS
Government employees found the Tenth Circuit unreceptive to
their claims in 1992. It narrowly defined "property interest" and re-
laxed its standard of procedural due process to restrict governmental
employee rights in the termination context.
A. Defining Property Interest
Through the use of Section 1983, 7 government employees have
1. 974 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1992).
2. 954 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. 956 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
5. 958 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states:
753
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availed themselves of the protections in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a weapon against workplace discrimination.
Under the Supreme Court's rulings in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill,8 and Board of Regents v. Roth, 9 plaintiffs must show (1) that
they had a protected property interest in continued employment'0 and
(2) that they were deprived of such interest without due process of law
as defined in Mathews v. Eldridge." In 1992 the Tenth Circuit used a
literal interpretation of the standard set forth in Loudermill, Roth and
Matthews in establishing a property interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. Tenth Circuit Case Law
The classic case where the courts are unwilling to find a protected
property interest in continued employment is a complaining employee
under a definite-term contract that is not renewed by the government
entity. In that situation, the employee has no reasonable expectation of
continued employment and is unprotected from non-renewal. This
principle guided the court's analysis in Brown v. Independent School District
No. 1-06.120utside of the classic scenario, the court used a formalistic
interpretation of municipal and state law to reject constitutional claims
in Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City 13 and Phillips v. Calhoun.1 4 But in Pat-
rick v. Miller,15 the court resolved a conflict among city charter provi-
sions in favor of a complaining employee.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
8. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Loudermill was hired as a security guard by the Cleveland
Board of Education. On his application he indicated that he had never been convicted of a
felony. The Board subsequently discovered that he had been convicted of larceny, a fel-
ony under Ohio law, and terminated him. Loudermill filed suit complaining that the
Board's summary dismissal of him without any pre-termination hearing or procedure vio-
lated his due process rights. Because he was a classified civil servant under Ohio law, the
Court held that he could only be terminated for cause and was entitled to a pre-termina-
tion opportunity to respond and a post-termination administrative review.
9. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court held that Roth, a teacher employed under a one-
year contract by a state college, failed to establish a protected property interest because he
had not acquired tenure according to Wisconsin law. The Court also held that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not require an opportunity for a hearing prior to the non-renewal
of a nontenured teacher's contract, where, as here, the teacher fails to come forward with
evidence of stigma or disability foreclosing other employment or terms of his employment
conferring a protected property interest.
10. Employees often assert state statutes, city ordinances, city charters or employment
contracts as a source of protected property interest in procedural due process cases. See
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 513-21 (4th ed. 1991).
11. 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976). In Eldridge, the Court held that the interests of the
government in obtaining a summary decision in the dispute must be balanced against the
dangers of arbitrary or erroneous decisions inherent in a summary proceeding in deter-
mining whether Due Process requirements have been met.
12. 974 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1992).
13. 954 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1992).
14. 956 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1992).
15. 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
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a. Brown v. Independent School District No. 1-065
The plaintiffs were employed as secretaries of an Oklahoma school
district. 16 Both worked in that capacity for many years and were parties
to a series of one-year employment contracts. 17 In June of 1989, the
school board voted not to enter into new contracts with the employ-
ees. 18 The employees sought a hearing with the board to discuss the
reasons for its decision not to renew their contracts and were refused.
The board also refused to offer any reasons for their decision. 19 The
employees then sued and the district court granted the board's motion
for summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs had no protected prop-
erty interest in continued employment with the school district.
20
On appeal, the employees argued that Oklahoma statutes as well as
the school board's policy created a sufficient basis to assert a constitu-
tionally protected property interest. The statutory provision prohibited
the suspension, demotion or termination of certain employees the plain-
tiffs except "for cause."' 2 1 The court held that termination, for the pur-
poses of the statute, does not include the natural death of the contract.
22
Therefore, the "for cause" language did not apply to the decision not to
renew the employees' contract and the employees could not claim a
property right on that basis.
23
The employees then asserted a property right based on the school
board policy contained in an employee handbook. "The continuation of
employment shall be based on the quality of work, ethical conduct, ne-
cessity of the work and the availability of district funds."' 24 The Tenth
Circuit held that the handbook only restated the termination require-
ments in the statute and did not apply to the natural death of the con-
tract.2 5 The handbook was not sufficient to create a property interest
protected by procedural due process.
b. Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City
In Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City,26 the Tenth Circuit held that city
personnel policies requiring employees be discharged only "for cause"
do not negate contradictory city charter provisions. 27 The Oklahoma
16. Brown, 974 F.2d at 1238.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1239.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-101.40 (Supp. 1993). The statute reads:
A support employee who has been employed by a local board of education for
more than one (1) year shall be subject to suspension, demotion or termination
only for cause, as designated by the policy of the local board of education ....
This section shall not be construed to prevent layoffs for lack of funds or work.
22. Brown, 974 F.2d at 1240.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1240-41. "[W]e interpret the provision to refer to termination of an ex-
isting contract rather than to a failure to renew a contract."
26. 954 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 1514-15.
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City Charter provided that city employees could be terminated for any
reason construed to be in the interest of the service.2 8 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court had previously held that city employees working under
the "interest of service" provisions of a city charter did not have a prop-
erty interest subject to due process protection.2 9 In Driggins, the Tenth
Circuit agreed that such provisions in the charter precluded the plaintiff
from claiming a protected property interest in continued employment.
3 0
The plaintiff in Driggins was an employee of the City of Oklahoma
City as a human resources specialist. At the time of termination, the
plaintiff was a six-year employee of the city.3 ' Driggins argued three
factual bases for constitutional protection from termination without pro-
cedural due process: (1) City Council regulations suggest that city em-
ployees could only be discharged "for cause;" (2) an informal but
mutual understanding existed between Driggins and the city that she
was a permanent employee and could only be terminated for cause; and
(3) as an employee of a federally funded Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA) program,3 2 Driggins had a protected property
interest "by virtue of CETA's mandate that participating state and local
governments adopt a merit[-based] personnel system."
33
The trial judge submitted the question of Driggins's possible consti-
tutionally protected property interest in continued employment with the
city to the jury, which found in the affirmative.3 4 The Tenth Circuit re-
versed, holding that when a city charter contains a provision empower-
ing the city manager to terminate employees "for the good of the
service," the existence of a protected property interest should be deter-
mined by the court as a matter of law.35 The Tenth Circuit then re-
viewed the issue de novo and held that, given the city charter provisions,
Driggins did not have a protected property interest in continued em-
ployment with the city.
3 6
The court reasoned that, with the aforementioned city charter pro-
visions and the charter's grant of all authority in employment decisions
to the city manager, the city council resolution establishing a "for cause"
personnel policy did not bind the city and did not establish a property
interest for due process purposes.
3 7
The court also rejected the plaintiff's second argument for the
existence of a mutual understanding that she would only be terminated
28. Id. at 1514. The court noted that Article III, Sec. 1 of the Oklahoma City Charter
states that "removals and demotions shall be made solely for the good of the service."
29. Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196 (Okla. 1980).
30. Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1514-15.
31. Id. at 1512.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 802-992 (1975). CETA has since been repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-300,
§ 184(a)(1), 96 Stat. 1357 (1982), but the plaintiff was employed while the Act was still in
effect. See Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1515.
33. Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1515.
34. The reported opinion does not cite to the district court opinion nor does it delve
into the reasoning of the jurors in finding that such a property interest existed.
35. Driggns, 954 F.2d at 1513.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1514.
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for just cause that would establish a protected property interest.3 8 The
court recognized the fact that mutual understandings can be the source
of a property interest,3 9 but refused to recognize such an interest here:
Driggins points to no authority, however, for the proposition
that mutually explicit understandings can give rise to a pro-
tected property interest where an express city charter provision
allows employees to be discharged "solely for the good of the
service."
4 0
Finally, the court held that Driggins failed to point to any provision
of CETA which imposed substantive restrictions on city officials in ter-
minating employees. The court reasoned that even if CETA conferred
additional rights on employees after its repeal, it did not confer a pro-
tected property interest in continued employment to city employees.
4 1
c. Phillips v. Calhoun
Under a similar fact. situation, the court found no protected prop-
erty interest in continued employment in Phillips v. Calhoun.42 In Phillips,
the city charter of Sand Springs, Oklahoma contained language identical
to that found in the Oklahoma City Charter in Driggins. A city attorney
38. Id. at 1515.
39. Id. The court cited Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 430 (10th Cir. 1984), for the
proposition that mutual understanding "can create a property interest in continued em-
ployment by means of an implied contract." In Vinyard, a hospital's director of volunteer
services successfully argued that a protected property interest in continued employment
had been created by the hospital when it distributed an employee handbook. Id.
40. Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1515.
41. Id. at 1516.
42. 956 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1992). An interesting variation on this theme was set out
by the court in Farnsworth v. Town of Pinedale, 968 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1992). In Farns-
worth the court affirmed the district court's granting of defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
Farnsworth and other city employees claimed that they were discharged without any
procedure after a municipal election. Id. Immediately following the election, the new
mayor and two new councilmen voted to repeal certain personnel policies and not to reap-
point plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs objected claiming that they had a protected property interest
in continued employment with the city that could not be revoked without due process of
law. Id.
While the Tenth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs had established a constitutionally
protected property interest, the court found that such interest did not extend beyond the
term of the political officials who appointed them. In construing several provisions of the
Wyoming statutes to preclude town councilmen and mayors from making appointments
which are for a duration longer than their own terms of office, the court rejected plaintiffs'
§ 1981 claims:
Appellants ... possessed a constitutionally protected property right in continued
employment. However, that right extended only until the end of their term of
office, at which time the incoming mayor and town council had the option to
replace them by the authority granted by Wyoming Statute § 15-2-102(a).
Id. at 1057.
As in Driggins and Phillips, the court in this case concentrated on the formalistic munic-
ipal procedures to determine the extent of the protected property interest. There were
several ambiguities and contradictions in the Wyoming statutory scheme. To affirm sum-
mary judgment in this case seems to imply that the existence and the extent of a constitu-
tionally protected property interest in continued employment will always be a question of
law to be decided by the judge, completely taking the expectations, no matter how reason-
able, of the plaintiff/government employee out of the due process analysis. This is an
unfortunate result. See discussion infra section I.A.2.
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filed a § 1983 claim for wrongful discharge claiming that some proce-
dural safeguards granted by the charter to classified employees created a
protected property interest in continued employment.
The district court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff was an
unclassified employee and, therefore, granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that even if he was
an unclassified employee under the charter, § 2-617 of the city cod,
"subsequently effected his transfer into the classified service."14 3 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit held that such a classification was contrary to th
city charter and was therefore a nullity, leaving plaintiff with no pro-
tected property interest in that the "for the good of the service" lan-
guage of the charter "[did] not create a cognizable interest in
employment."
44
d. Patrick v. Miller
In Patrick v. Miller,45 a Tenth Circuit panel headed by Judge Brorby
held that an at-will city charter provision did not defeat the plaintiff's
claim to a protected property interest when another provision of the
charter required employment decisions be made on merit alone.
4 6
The trial judge denied Miller's motion for summary judgment on
Patrick's § 1983 claim and the defendants appealed.4 7 Judge Brorby
reasoned that if precedent allowed city charter provisions confer com-
plete discretion in employee discharges that would necessarily defeat
any claims of protection from wrongful discharge, the converse must
also be true:
Where a city charter restricts a city manager's authority to ter-
minate employees, Oklahoma courts would not allow city offi-
cials to alter those terms so as to expand their authority to the
detriment of employees. City employees therefore have a legit-
imate expectation of continued employment to the extent that a
city charter limits its officials' power to terminate such
employment.
48
The panel upheld the district court's refusal to grant summary judg-
ment on plaintiff's section 1983 claim.
4 9
2. Analysis
In rejecting the protected property claims in Brown and Driggins, the
Tenth Circuit went to great lengths to trammel government employees'
due process rights. The court held that when there is an at-will or
equivalent provision in a city charter, the question of the existence of a
protected property interest is a matter of law to be decided by the court.
43. Phillips, 956 F.2d at 952.
44. Id. at 953.
45. 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
46. Id. at 1245.
47. Id. at 1242.
48. Id. at 1244-45.
49. Id. at 1246.
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The court in Driggins relied primarily on city charter provisions and a
restrictive Oklahoma Supreme Court decision interpreting those provi-
sions50 permitting the termination of employees for the good of the ser-
vice. The court elevated these obscure city charter "at-will" and "good
of the service" caveats to complete disclaimer status revoking any due
process rights granted by the city to its employees.
The court ruled this way despite the fact that the Supreme Court
cases in this area turn on the mutual expectations of the government
and its employees, rather than the formal authority of city officials.
5 '
While the court correctly addressed the issue of whether Oklahoma state
law conferred a property right upon the plaintiffs in Driggins and Phillips,
it ignored the fact that such a protected interest may also be created by
contract or mutual understanding.
52
The Supreme Court has afforded the circuits the opportunity to
broadly interpret property interests for due process purposes and it is
troubling that the Tenth Circuit discarded the logic and spirit of the
mutual understanding doctrine in favor of a formalistic interpretation of
municipal authority. State cases within the Tenth Circuit that have ad-
dressed the issue of at-will employees' enforcement of procedural bene-
fits promised subsequent to the commencement of employment have
held that the expectations of the employee create the procedural
rights. 5 3 Such a rule is as logical as it is equitable and should be
adopted by the Tenth Circuit.
Although the court used the same analysis in Patrick that it used in
Driggins and Phillips (that the provisions of the city charter are control-
ling), the decision was different. The court found that, unlike the char-
ter in Driggins, the Norman City Charter in Patrick provided that
50. O'Keefe, supra note 29. It should also be noted that the Tenth Circuit previously
held that the "for the good of the service" language found in city charters does not confer
a property interest to city employees. See Campbell v. Mercer, 926 F.2d 990 (10th Cir.
1991); Lane v. Town of Dover, 761 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Okla. 1991), aff'd, 951 F.2d 291
(10th Cir. 1991).
51. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344 n.6 (1976), Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ("[a] person's
interest in a benefit is a 'property interest' if there are ... mutually explicit understandings
that support his claim of entitlement").
Commentators argue that "[i]f the government gives the employee assurances of con-
tinual employment or dismissal . . .then there must be a fair procedure to protect the
employee's interests when the government seeks to discharge him [or her] from the posi-
tion." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 519.
52. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 519 (protected interest may also "come from
statutory law, formal contract terms, or the actions of a supervisory person with authority
to establish terms of employment"). Whether apparent authority, as the term is used in
the common law of agency, is sufficient to establish a protected interest was not addressed
in Drigins but would probably not find a receptive audience in the Tenth Circuit given its
formalistic approach to the powers of the municipal entities and the relationship of ordi-
nances to organic charters.
53. See e.g., Continental Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987). Keenan was
hired by Continental for an indefinite term and was an at-will employee. Keenan was sum-
marily discharged and sued claiming that an employee manual created reasonable expecta-
tions of procedural due process prior to termination. The trial court granted
Continental's motion for summary judgment based on the at-will rule but the Supreme
Court of Colorado reversed and remanded.
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employment decisions "shall be made upon the.basis of merit and fit-
ness alone."' 54 Because the "for cause" language asserted by the plain-
tiff in Driggins appeared only in a city council resolution, the at-will
language of the charter in that case was dispositive. This distinction's
helpfulness is questionable. In the aggregate, the rule implied by these
cases appears to be that the quantum of protection to be afforded public
employees is to be determined solely by the source of the interest.
Under this rule, expectations created by a municipal authority are mean-
ingless unless supported by city charter provisions. A rule that excludes
property interests in continued employment as a matter of law for the
sole reason that an "at-will" or similar provision exists in the city charter
is unduly harsh and lacks logical justification. A better rule would be to
allow the question to be submitted to a jury if the plaintiff comes forth
with some evidence of a protected interest (e.g., a handbook, municipal
ordinance, policy or resolution). A per se finding of no protected interest
in any case where there is an "at-will" charter provision significantly un-
dermines the Due Process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Sufficiency of the Process
Once a plaintiff establishes a protected property interest, the issue
becomes whether the government actor provided sufficient procedural
redress to protect that property interest. The Supreme Court has pro-
vided three primary factors to be used in determining what process is
due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
55
Establishing a plaintiff's deprivation of a protected property inter-
est does not automatically entitle that plaintiff to a formal hearing.
"What is required is procedure, not necessarily a hearing."'5 6 The
courts must balance the three factors set forth in Matthews to determine
what process is due.
1. Tenth Circuit Case Law
The Tenth Circuit considered the sufficiency of process in two cases
in 1992, West v. Grand County5 7 and Aronson v. Gressly.58 In both cases,
the court held that although the employees successfully established a
54. Patrick, 953 F.2d at 1245.
55. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
56. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 530.
57. 967 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1992).
58. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
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protected property right, the limited procedure afforded them by the
governmental entities sufficiently satisfied due process requirements.
a. West v. Grand County
The Tenth Circuit had no trouble finding a protected property in-
terest in West v. Grand County. The county provided employee hand-
books which prohibited the discharge of permanent employees except
for cause, for reasons of curtailment of work or for 'lack of county funds.
The court held that, given these provisions, plaintiff West possessed a
protected property interest in continued employment. 59 "The record
and the case law clearly establish that West had a protected property
interest [and] was thereby entitled to due process."
'60
West's primary contention was the denial of her procedural protec-
tions as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Her supervisor, just
elected to County Attorney, cited a reduction in force as the sole reason
for her discharge. West claimed that she was the victim of subterfuge
aimed at discharging her solely because of her ties to the previous ad-
ministration.6 1 Prior to her termination, West met with the incoming
County Attorney, Coates, to discuss the reasons for her probable termi-
nation. At that time, she had an opportunity to respond to Coates as
well as to the County Commissioners concerning the proffered reasons
for her discharge. 62 This procedure, the court held, was sufficient to
satisfy due process requirements.
Citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,6 s and the Tenth Cir-
cuit cases which applied the Loudermill rule, 64 the court held that a full
evidentiary hearing was not required prior to termination in order to
comply with procedural due process. 65 Rather, the court held:
A full evidentiary hearing is not required prior to an adverse
employment action. The individual entitled to due process
protection needs only to be given notice and an opportunity to
respond. We have held that pretermination warnings and an
opportunity for a face-to-face meeting with supervisors, and a
conversation between an employee and his supervisor immedi-
ately prior to the employee's termination were sufficient to sat-
isfy constitutional requirements.
66
West argued that her post-termination hearing was constitutionally
insufficient in that: (1) she was not given the opportunity to challenge
the evidence of those seeking to terminate her; (2) the Commissioners
presiding over the hearing were not impartial; and (3) the Commission-
59. West, 967 F.2d at 366.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 367-68.
62. Id. at 368.
63. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
64. Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989); Seibert v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Univ. of Okla. Health Sciences Ctr., 867 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1989).
65. West, 967 F.2d at 367.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
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ers based their decision on ex parte communications. 6 7 In rejecting
West's arguments, the court held that the post-termination hearing af-
forded the plaintiff was sufficient to protect her property interest.
The court further held that because West did not seek to have
Coates present at the hearing, she could not complain of her inability to
confront him at that time. 68 West's attorney objected at the time of the
hearing to the fact that commissioners who were involved in the decision
to terminate West were conducting the hearing, but because the attor-
ney agreed to go forward with the hearing, the court held that he ex-
pressly waived West's right to object to the lack of impartiality of the
hearing officers.6 9 Finally, the court held that West's allegation that the
decision was a result of ex parte communication was unsubstantiated
speculation.7
°
b. Aronson v. Gressly
The Tenth Circuit had less difficulty in considering the issue of what
quantum of process is due public employees in Aronson v. Gressly.
7 1
In that case Aronson, a biographical specialist at the American Heri-
tage Center at the University of Wyoming, was terminated. 7 2 After be-
ing turned down for a promotion, allegedly because of her age, and after
having a succeeding Director of the Center redefine her position, Aron-
son refused to report to work.7" She was warned on multiple occasions
by mail that her continued insubordination would result in termination
and she continued to refuse to report for work. She was terminated on
April 25, 1988. 7 4 Aronson was reinstated as a full-time library employee
with back pay and benefits after going through the established grievance
procedures. 75 She filed suit in federal court, however, alleging depriva-
tion of her protected property interest in continued employment with-
out due process of law. 76 The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and Aronson appealed.
77
Applying the notice and opportunity to be heard standard of
Loudermill, the Tenth Circuit held that Aronson had been afforded ade-
quate procedure to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment:
In short, Aronson received ample opportunity to return to
work or to respond to the University's charges. Aronson
67. Id. at 369.
68. Id
69. Id. at 370.
70. Id.
71. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).




76. Id. at 909. Plaintiff alleged that the treatment she received from the University
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court granted the University's motion for




clearly had an opportunity to present her side of the story.




The court's opinion in West represents the faults in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's application of the procedural due process doctrine. Requiring
only notice and an opportunity to respond prior to termination leaves
government employees far too vulnerable to arbitrary or discriminatory
treatment, especially those who are terminated for reasons of patronage
rather than merit. Under the rule set forth in West, a reviewing court
need not delve into the substance of the process provided, but may sat-
isfy itself with the fact that some basic notice and an opportunity to re-
spond was provided prior to termination. A better rule requires courts
to make an initial inquiry into the fairness and sincerity of the proceed-
ings, making it more difficult for government employers to immunize
themselves from due process challenges by simply promulgating proce-
dures consisting more of form than substance.
In West the court's failure to consider the bias of the post-termina-
tion hearing commission is especially troubling. Plaintiff's counsel
raised the issue at the hearing and objected for the record. The court
held that the attorney's choice to proceed despite the possible bias of
the hearing officials "expressly waived" the plaintiff's right to object.79
Again, the court used unduly formalistic rules in defeating the rights of
an aggrieved government employee. If the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require a full evidentiary hearing, but
something less formal,80 it is unclear why the court insisted on holding
the plaintiff to a strict procedural standard for objection and waiver.
Clearly, if the court is not willing to require a formal hearing concerning
the property interests of government employees, then it should follow
that such employees should not be held to the strict evidentiary and pro-
cedural standards of the judicial process. West's attorney made the ob-
jection to the potential bias of the Commissioners for the record.8 '
78. Id. at 910.
79. West, 967 F.2d at 370.
"West's attorney expressed his misgivings regarding the neutrality of the com-
missioners on the panel at the grievance hearing, but then stated that he was
willing to proceed:
If the three of you were involved in the process of the decision to terminate
Trish it might be appropriate if there was a neutral arbitrator or neutral hear-
ing officer appointed to hear this grievance instead of having the commission
hear it. . . . We're prepared to present testimony. .. . I just wanted to raise
that for the record - That is a concern that we have. I'm not suggesting that
the three of you would be in any way biased or anything - it just might be an
easier situation. If you want to proceed, we're prepared.
He then proceeded without either requesting or obtaining a ruling form the Commission-
ers on his suggestion that they might not be impartial. In doing so, he expressly waived
West's right to object to the partiality of the decisionmakers at the grievance hearing." Id.
(quoting record of the grievance hearing).
80. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
81. West, 967 F.2d at 370.
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Given the informality of the required proceeding, the mere fact that the
attorney did not refuse to proceed with the hearing should not have pre-
cluded West from raising the bias issue on appeal.
Although the court in Aronson used the same low sufficiency of pro-
cess standard as it used in West, the result is more palatable. Here, Ar-
onson, through her own conduct, affirmatively rejected opportunities to
appear to answer the charges of the director of the American Heritage
Center.8 2 The several and explicit offers at procedure and reconcilia-
tion were rebuffed by Aronson and for her to then sue based on the
failure of the University to provide her with pre-deprivation due process
was properly recognized by the court as groundless.
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA)
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act8 3 prohibits employ-
ment discrimination against individuals over 40 years of age. The act
prohibits discrimination in hiring, discharge and other acts affecting the
terms and conditions of employment based on an individual's age. Also,
retaliatory action taken by an employer against an employee who op-
poses a discriminatory practice is prohibited by the act.
8 4
In 1992 the Tenth Circuit addressed two issues affecting ADEA
claims. In Oestman v. National Farmers Union Insurance Co.,85 the court
clarified the analysis to be used in making the employee/independent
contractor distinction in the ADEA context. In Aronson v. Gressly,8 6 it
considered whether the 240-day statute of limitation for filing a claim
under Title VII8 7 also applies to ADEA cases.
A. Oestman v. National Farmers Union Insurance Co.. Employee/
Independent Contractor Distinction
Like Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
only protects employees from discriminatory treatment.8 8 The statute de-
82. Aronson v. Gressly, 961 F.2d 907, 910 (10th Cir. 1992).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1988).
84. BARBARA L. SCHLExI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 485 (2d ed.
1983).
85. 958 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
86. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
87. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Specifically, the Title VII statute of
limitation is found in section 2000e-5(e).
88. Regarding prohibited employer practices, the ADEA states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). Almost identical language is found in Title VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
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fines "employee" as "an individual employed by an 'employer'." 8 9 Due
to the ambiguity and circularity of this definition, the issue determining
whether or not a plaintiff is an employee entitled to the protection of the
act or is an unprotected independent contractor is a source of much
litigation. 90
In Oestman the Tenth Circuit tried to answer this question in the
ADEA context. Plaintiff Oestman was an insurance agent with National
Farmers9 ' who filed suit in federal district court claiming a violation of
the ADEA. 92 The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the plaintiff was an independent contractor not
subject to the protection of the Act. 93 On appeal, plaintiff argued that
the trial court erred. Had the court applied the common law control
doctrine in determining the plaintiff's employment status, it certainly
would have denied defendant's summary judgment motion.
9 4
The Tenth Circuit held that the proper test to evaluate the employ-
ment status of an ADEA plaintiff is not the common law control doctrine
but the "hybrid test."195 Although the hybrid test focuses on the em-
ployer's right to control the means and matter of the employment, simi-
lar to the common law "right to control" test, the hybrid test also takes
into account the economic realities of the relationship. 9 6 The court re-
lied upon the hybrid factors enumerated by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Spirides v. Reinhardt, a Title VII case:
9 7
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work
usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by
a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the par-
ticular occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the individ-
ual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place of
89. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
90. See, e.g., Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct 676 (1991).
91. Oestman, 958 F.2d at 304.
92. Id. at 303.
93. Id. at 303-04.
94. Id. at 304. The common law control doctrine is best described by section 2 the
Restatement of Agency which distinguishes servants from independent contractors:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs
and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in
the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to
the right to control by the master.
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of
the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (emphasis added).
95. Oestman, 958 F. 2d at 305.
96. Id.
97. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Spirides, a Title VII sex discrimination case, the
plaintiff worked intermittently as a foreign language broadcaster for the Voice of America.
Her contract stipulated that she was to work as an independent contractor. She was paid
per assignment. She filed suit when her contract was not renewed. The trial court found
that the plaintiff was an independent contractor and granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. Id.
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work; (4) the length of time during which the individual has
worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the
job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is termi-
nated, i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and
explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether
the work is an integral part of the business of the "employer";
(9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10)
whether the "employer" pays social security taxes; (11) the in-
tentiori of the parties.98
The Tenth Circuit, following the Third Circuit in E.E.O.C. v. Zippo
Manufacturing Co. ,99 reasoned that because the substantive provisions of
the ADEA mirrored those of Title VII, the hybrid test used in Title VII
cases should be used to resolve the substantive question of what consti-
tutes an employee as opposed to an independent contractor under the
ADEA.1 00 The court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the
trial court holding that even under the hybrid test, the plaintiff was an
independent contractor and therefore ineligible for ADEA protection.
B. Aronson v. Gressly:10 1 Filing Periods
The Tenth Circuit refused to extend the Title VII analogy to the
procedural aspects of the ADEA. In Aromon the court held that the 240-
day limitation provision for Title VII actions in deferral states' 0 2 does
not apply to ADEA cases. 1
0 3
As in Title VII cases, ADEA charges must be filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory action.' 0 4 Cases that arise in states that have similar stat-
utes and agencies equipped to investigate age discrimination claims-
98. Oestman, 958 F.2d at 305 (quoting Spiris, 613 F.2d at 832).
99. 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).
100. Oestman, 958 F.2d at 305.
101. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
102. A deferral state is one which has enacted anti-discrimination legislation similar to
Title VII which sets up a state equivalent of the EEOC charged with investigating unlawful
employment practices. Title VII requires claimants under that statute to allow 60 days for
the state equivalent agencies to attempt to resolve the dispute before it will receive a
charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
103. Aronson, 961 F.2d at 912. The Aronson court failed to recognize a recent step taken
by Congress to draw a closer parallel between Title VII and the ADEA. Under the statute
as originally enacted, ADEA actions had to be filled within two years of the adverse em-
ployment action except charges of willful violation of the act could be commenced within
three years. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(e), 255(a) (1988). However, in 1991, Congress amended the
Act's limitation provision, making it substantially similar to the statute of limitation of Title
VII. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626 (e) (West Supp. 1992); see also Administration & Enforcement: ADEA
suits, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 431:172 (1991).
104. The relevant section of ADEA states:
(d) Filing of charge
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60
days after a charge alleging unlawful discrinmination has been filed with the
Equal Employment Oppurtunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed-
(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or... (2)...
within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days
after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State
law, whichever is earlier.
29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d) (1988).
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known as deferral states-allow plaintiffs 300 days in which to file with
the EEOC in order to provide the state agencies ample time to investi-
gate and seek conciliation.' 0 5 Once the administrative proceedings have
terminated and the plaintiff is so notified, the plaintiff then has 90 days
to file a civil action.1
0 6
The United States Supreme Court held in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
10 7
that in deferral states Title VII requires claimants to wait 60 days after
the discriminatory practice before commencing their federal course of
redress.' 0 8 In effect, this 60-day window decreases the 300-day limit
prescribed under Title VII to 240 days.' 0 9 Because the ADEA also pre-
scribed a 300-day limit for cases arising in deferral states, the court in
Aronson was faced with the issue of whether or not the 60-day reduction
imposed in Mohasco applied to ADEA cases as well.
In Aronson, the court noted the numerous similarities between Title
VII and the ADEA. It reasoned that because the ADEA allowed claim-
ants to file with the state before or after filing with the EEOC, 1 0 the 60-
day waiting period of Title VII could not deducted from the 300-day
statute of limitations of the ADEA.III Therefore, the 300-day limit set
forth in the Act controlled the actions and Plaintiff's ADEA claim filed
on day 246 was not time barred.1
2
C. Analysis
Title VII and the ADEA are substantially similar in their substantive
prohibitions of discrimination and the Tenth Circuit has joined other
courts in holding that substantive ADEA issues can be resolved by anal-
ogy to Title VII precedent. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the Title VII
framework to determine the method of proof required under the
ADEA.' 11 It is therefore logical that the analogy be used to determine
other substantive questions, including how to make the employee/in-
dependent contractor distinction. It is sound judicial policy to utilize
105. Id. § 626(d)(2).
106. Administartion & Enforcement: ADEA suits, 8 Fair Empi. Prac. Manual (BNA) 431:172
(1991).
107. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
108. Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 816-17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 706(c)).
109. Id. at 814 n. 16; see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 82, at 490.
110. Aronson, 461 F.2d at 911 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756
n.4 (1979)).
The court in Aronson took notice of the fact that under the ADEA the federal EEOC
and the state equivalents are to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over age discrimination
claims. In Title VII cases the state is granted a 60-day period of exclusive jurisdiction and,
therefore, the claimants are prohibited from filing with the EEOC during such time.
ADEA claimants, conversely, may file with the EEOC before or after the state has investi-
gated the claim. Therefore, because claimants are not required to wait 60 days before
filing with the federal agency, the 300-day limitation should not be reduced to 240 days as
it is in Title VII deferral cases. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 911-12
113. The court adopted the Title VII McDonnel Douglas/Burdine test of disparate
treatment in the ADEA context in Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir.
1988).
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the substantive similarity of the statutes in order to avoid the accumula-
tion of an entirely separate and often duplicative body of case law in
order to interpret the ADEA.
There are, however, significant disparities between the procedural
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA. Because the procedural aspects
of the acts differ substantially, the analogy is less helpful in that area.
The Supreme Court in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 114 recognized that the
concurrent administrative jurisdiction provisions were intentionally in-
cluded by Congress to expedite the processing of age discrimination
suits. Congress intended to give older Americans faster access to re-
dress than was available under the sequential procedure of Title VII.
"The premise for this difference is that the delay inherent in sequential
jurisdiction is particularly prejudicial to the rights of 'older citizens to
whom, by definition, relatively few productive years are left.' "115
Given the intentional differences in procedures, binding ADEA
plaintiffs to the 240-day limitation period to which Title VII plaintiffs are
bound would ignore the clear intent of the Congress.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals continued to erode
public employees' rights by strictly interpreting the "property" provi-
sion of the Due Process Clause and creating a rudimentary baseline pro-
cedural requirement to satisfy constitutional demands. The court
continued to delineate the analytical process to be used by courts in in-
terpreting and applying the ADEA, borrowing the substantive case law
of Title VII but correctly refusing to impose that statute's rigid proce-
dural requirements on ADEA plaintiffs.
Daniel Grossman
114. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).




In 1992, the Tenth Circuit addressed several issues certain to have a
major impact on the evolution of environmental law. The court consid-
ered issues arising under: (1) the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), I which continues
to spawn expensive litigation as parties seek to impose financial respon-
sibility on others for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) the Clean
Water Act (CWA),2 responsible for maintaining the integrity of the na-
tion's waters; and (3) the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),3
which mandates that federal agencies consider mitigation of adverse en-
vironmental effects before taking action.
This Article surveys select environmental cases decided by the
Tenth Circuit. Part I discusses the issue of civil suits for medical moni-
toring expenses under CERCLA.4 Part II discusses to what extent the
Clean Water Act waives sovereign immunity for penalties in a civil ac-
tion. 5 Part III evaluates the role of permit stipulations in an agency's
decision to incorporate a mitigation discussion into its Environmental
Impact Statement.
6
II. MEDICAL MONITORING UNDER CERCLA: DAIGLE V. SHELL OIL Co.
7
A. Background
CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund, deals with the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites which pose a threat to public health and the envi-
ronment. 8 The statute also provides for civil suits against the parties
responsible for the hazardous waste, imposing liability on responsible
parties for the costs of cleanup as well as "any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person." 9 At issue in Daigle was whether
provision for response costs extends to the creation of a "medical moni-
toring" or "medical surveillance" fund for those exposed to hazardous
waste. Such a system would detect the onset of latent diseases caused by
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 and Supp. 1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988).
4. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992). See also infra text
accompanying notes 7-73.
5. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 972 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1992)(Lujan II). See also infra text
accompanying notes 74-133.
6. See Holy Cross Wilderness Fund v. Madigan, 960 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1992). See
also infra text accompanying notes 134-182.
7. 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) provides for remedial action "[w]henever (A) any
hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the
environment.., or substantial threat of release ... [of material dangerous] to the public
health or welfare ......
9. See id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
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toxic pollutants.' 0
1. Early Decisions
In Brewer v. Ravan, I I the federal district court for the Middle District
of Tennessee attempted to address the issue of medical monitoring
costs within the scope of CERCLA. Former employees sued a capacitor
manufacturer for exposure to contaminated soil. The defendants
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that
CERCLA did not contemplate medical monitoring liability.' 2 The dis-
missal was denied. The court concluded that an action to recover costs
for assessing the effects of a release of hazardous substances was a rec-
ognizable claim under CERCLA.13 The court reasoned that because the
term "response costs" also included costs incurred in the removal of
toxic substances, medical testing was a legitimate cost involved in sub-
stance removal. 14 Little analysis was offered for this result other than
the definitions supplied by CERCLA which provide for removal costs
necessary to monitor a release.
15
In Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 16 the federal district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania arrived at a conclusion in direct opposi-
tion to that of the Brewer court. The Coburn court examined in detail the
response cost definitions supplied by CERCLA and considered them in
light of earlier cases on similar matters.17 The court began by acknowl-
edging that CERCLA is inherently vague, finding that its definitions give
little guidance and its legislative history is equally ambiguous.' 8 The
court searched prior decisions for guidance on the matter. For example,
the Coburn court explained that, in Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 19 the Supreme
Court determined that Superfund money may not be used to "compen-
sate private parties for economic harms that result from discharge of haz-
ardous substances."
'20
The Coburn court also disagreed with the Brewer conclusion that
medical monitoring tests fell within the range of response costs and con-
cluded that the costs of medical screening were not "necessary costs of
10. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1532-1533. Also at issue in Daigle was the "discretionary func-
tion exception" applicable to federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence, id. at 1537-43,
and an ultrahazardous strict liability claim. Id. at 1543-45.
11. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
12. Id. at 1178.
13. Id. at 1179.
14. Id.
15. Id. (applying 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)(1988)).
16. 1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988).
17. Id. at *3-*5.
18. Id. at *2-*3.
19. 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
20. Coburn, 1988 WL 120739, at *3 (quoting Exxon, 475 U.S. at 375)(emphasis ad-
ded)). The court contrasted this reasoning with that used in cases such as Jones v. Inmont
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984), in which medical testing apparently met the
definition of "removal" expressed in CERCLA. However, theJones court did not address
the question of whether medical monitoring was one of the possible "necessary costs of
response." Although theJones decision did not attempt to clear this confusion, it did iden-
tify the problems involved in defining response costs. Id.
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response." 2 1 The definition of the phrase merely contemplated the
cleanup of hazardous substances. 2 2 The court also noted that legislative
history showed that Congress intentionally repealed a provision to pro-
vide for recovery of medical expenses. 23 This indicated to the court that




The extensive analysis given by the Coburn court set the stage for
later decisions. Werlein v. United States2 5 sought a monitoring fund,
based on the response costs provision, to screen for early signs of dis-
ease stemming from exposure to toxic substances. 26 The court dis-
cussed both the Brewer line of cases as well as the cases following Coburn.
The Werlein court found the Coburn line of cases persuasive, 27 and partic-
ularly emphasized the fact that CERCLA provided a medical care provi-
sion through the creation of the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR),2 8 thus showing that Congress intended the
medical costs to be provided through a separate system. 29
A federal district court in Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc. so also followed the
Coburn decision by holding that CERCLA response costs did not include
provisions for medical monitoring. 3 ' The Ambrogi court recognized the
emerging trend developing a consistent manner of dealing with medical
monitoring under CERCLA.3 2 Furthermore, the Ambrogi court asserted
that, under the CERCLA definitions, "removal" actions only applied to
activities designed to "affect the threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances." 3 3 Thus, once the release occurred, the statutory scope no





23. A Legislative comment shows that Congress "deleted the Federal cause of action
for medical expenses." 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
24. Coburn, 1988 WL 120739, at *6.
25. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn.
1992).
26. Id. at 901.
27. Id. at 903.
28. Id. The Agency for Taxic Substances and Diseased Registry was established by 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988).
29. Id.
30. 750 F. Supp 1233 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
31. Id. at 1246.
32. Id. at 1239. For a further examination of the development of medical monitoring,
see Allan Kanner, Note, Medical Monitoring.- State and Federal Perspectives, 2 TUL. ENvrL. L.J. 1
(1989). See also Dan A. Tanenbaum, Note, When Does Going to the Doctor Serve the Public
Health? Medical Monitoring Response Costs Under CERCLA, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 925 (1992).
33. Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247 (emphasis in original).
34. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1531.
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B. Tenth Circuit Decision
1. Facts
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal (Arsenal) is a federally controlled
CERCLA site near Commerce City, Colorado. 35 In 1956, the Army be-
gan using an area on the Arsenal known as Basin F to incinerate hazard-
ous waste materials.3 6 Shell Oil Company also used the basin to
impound wastes generated in its herbicide and pesticide production fa-
cility.3 7 The combination of the wastes created one of the most toxic
hazardous waste sites in .the country.3 8 In 1984 the Army began a Re-
medial Investigation and Feasibility Study,3 9 under which the Army
identified Basin F as a site which needed an "Interim Response Action"
to deal with the spread of contaminants from the site.40 During the fol-
lowing year the Army transferred liquid hazardous wastes to on-site
storage tanks and lined surface impoundments and moved solids into a
lined waste pile, which was capped and then covered with top soil and
vegetation.
41
During this cleanup procedure, the plaintiffs complained of noxious
odors and airborne pollutants being carried into their trailer park, lo-
cated one-and-one-half miles from Basin F. 42 Residents allegedly suf-
fered economic damage as well as a variety of physical ailments and the
possibility of more serious latent diseases. 43 Under the CERCLA provi-
sion for "response costs," plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court
for the District of Colorado to establish a long-term medical monitoring
fund to detect any diseases that may be produced by exposure to the
contaminants.4 4 Shell Oil and the United States Government moved to
dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that re-
sponse costs under CERCLA did not include medical monitoring.
4 5
The district court denied this and other motions and both parties sought
interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed in part, af-





39. Id. This study took place pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).




44. Id. at 1532-33. CERCLA provides that:
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such per-
son, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
45. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1531.
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were not included under CERCLA response CoStS. 4 6
2. Holding
In reversing the district court's decision not to dismiss the medical
monitoring charges, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the issue centered
on the definition of "any other necessary costs of response."147 The
court decided that medical monitoring was'not included in the defini-
tion. CERCLA does not directly define this phrase, rather, it only at-
tempts to define the word "response." A "response" is defined by
CERCLA as a removal action or a remedial action.48 "Removal" is de-
fined as the cleanup of already released hazardous substances from the
environment. 4 9 These actions are designed to effect an interim solution
to a contamination problem, 50 as opposed to "remedial actions," which
are designed as permanent solutions to the contamination.5 1 Imple-
mentation of remedial actions occurs instead of, or in addition to, re-
moval actions.
52
Plaintiffs in this case argued that a broad reading of the CERCLA
language, - "other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health" 5 3 - within the definition of "re-
moval" suggests that removal actions do include medical monitoring
CoStS. 5 4 In support of this reading, the park residents relied primarily
on Brewer v. Ravan,55 which held that medical monitoring costs were in-
cluded under CERCLA removal and remedial costs.
56
The DaigLe court decided that the Brewer interpretation was too far
reaching and that the response cost provision of CERCLA did not con-
template medical monitoring costs. 57 Instead, the Tenth Circuit relied
on the analysis given in Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 5 8 which rejected the
46. Id. at 1537.
47. Id. at 1533. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
48. "The terms respond or response means [sic] remove, removal, remedy, and reme-
dial action .... 42 U.S.C. 9601(25)(1988).
49. The terms 'remove' or 'removal' means (sic] the cleanup or removal of re-
leased hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be neces-
sary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the
environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate
the release or threat of release of hazardous substances ....
Id. § 9601(23).
50. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533-34.
51. Id. at 1534. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988) provides:
The terms 'remedy' or 'remedial action' means [sic] those actions consistent with
permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event
of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment,
to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not
migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare
or the environment.
53. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
54. Id.
55. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
56. Id. at 1179. See also supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
57. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535-36.
58. 1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988). See also supra text accompanying notes
16-24.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Brewer analysis. In so doing, Coburn set the trend for most CERCLA
medical monitoring cases to follow. The Coburn court based its decision
on the plain meaning of the statute and concluded that CERCLA re-
sponse costs did not extend to long-term medical monitoring costs. 5 9
As had the court in Werlein v. United States,6 ° the Daigle court also
concluded that medical monitoring could not be used once a hazardous
release occurs. 6 ' Because CERCLA defined remedial actions as actions
used to prevent a release,6 2 once a release occured, as in the Daigle case,
the scope of CERCLA response costs no longer covered the type of
long-term monitoring requested.63
The Daigle court found support for denying the medical monitoring
action by pointing to the fact that CERCLA contains a provision for a
type of medical monitoring. 6 4 CERCLA established the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR),65 which allows indi-
viduals to petition for a health assessment and long-term health surveil-
lance programs. 66 Despite the plaintiffs' argument that this provision
indicate that CERCLA provides for medical monitoring expenses, the
court decided that ATSDR does not extend a generalized adoption of
medical monitoring to other CERCLA provisions. 67 As grounds for this
conclusion, the court noted that the funding for ATSDR is separate
from the funding for response costs.
68
C. Analysis
As the first federal appellate court to address directly the matter of
medical monitoring costs under CERCLA, 6 9 this case will significantly
influence future cases in other circuits. The Daigle decision adds little to
the analyses developed by the lower federal courts in Coburn and Am-
brogi. The Daigle court adopted the analysis of CERCLA definitions used
by the Coburn court. This interpretation follows the structure of CER-
CLA and concludes that the private right of recovery for response costs
does not include a right to costs for medical monitoring. 70 The Daigle
court also adopted the analysis used by the Ambrogi court, as the circuit
court concluded that long-term medical monitoring does not prevent
59. Id. at *6.
60. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn.
1992).
61. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
63. Id. at 1535-36.
64. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536-37.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1988).
66. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(B).
67. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537.
68. Id. For a discussion of the role of ATSDR within CERCLA as well as its many
inherent problems, see Martin R. Siegel, Integrating Public Health Into Superfund: What Has
Been the Impact of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry?, 20 ENvrz. L. REP. 10013
(1990).
69. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533.
70. Id. at 1535.
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contact between a hazardous substance and the public. 7 1 Once a release
occurrs, monitoring is no longer within the scope of response costs.
72
While the Daigle decision may add nothing new to the trend emerg-
ing in the lower courts, it does solidify and refine the law by compiling
the persuasive arguments from prior decisions. As noted in Ambrogi, the
law on this issue is slowly developing a certain consistency. 73 The Tenth
Circuit gave the Coburn and Ambrogi decisions enough emphasis to estab-
lish a lasting degree of clarity in this previously murky area of law.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE CLEAN WATER AcT: SIERRA
CLUB V. LUJAN (Lujan II)
74
A. Background. Sierra Club v. Lujan (Lujan 1)75
The Tenth Circuit originally held in Sierra Club v. Lujan (Lujan I)
that the Clean Water Act (CWA) waived sovereign immunity for civil
penalties. 76 Normally, the United States is immune from any suit in the
absence of consent. A waiver of sovereign immunity "must be unequiv-
ocally expressed" by Congress. 7 7 Courts are also required to strictly
construe a waiver and not extend it beyond the language of the stat-
ute.78 However, the CWA exposed the federal government to liability
through section 1323 of the Act.
7 9
Lujan I involved a citizen suit concerning alleged violations of a
CWA permit at the Leadville tunnel in Lake County, Colorado.8 0 Sec-
tion 1365(a) allows citizens to bring suit against the United States for
violations of the CWA. 8 ' The statute also gives federal district courts
jurisdiction over these matters and allows them to "apply any appropri-
ate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title."'8 2 The court de-
termined that section 1319(d), which authorizes civil penalties for CWA
violations,8 3 could be applied because a permit for the tunnel had been
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
73. Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1239.
74. 972 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1992).
75. 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 1429.
77. Id. at 1423 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
78. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983)).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) states that "[e]ach department, agency, or instrumentality...
shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of
water pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity
.... (emphasis added).
80. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1422.
81. Section 1365(a)(1) allows any citizen to file suit "against any person (including (i)
the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter .... ".33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1) (1988).
82. Id. § 1365(a)(2).
83. For violations of the CWA:
Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of
this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections
in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator, or by a
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issued by the EPA under section 1342.84
The court examined section 1323(a) to determine the extent to
which the federal government is liable for civil penalties. The section
states that "the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties
arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce
an order or the process of such court" 85 Finally, the court looked to
section 1362 of the CWA for the definition of "person." The section
defines person as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association,
State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or
any interstate body."
'86
The main issue in Lujan I was whether the term "sanctions" in the
section 1323(a) phrase "process and sanctions" encompassed "civil pen-
alties" under Section 1319(d). 8 7 The court held that the CWA clearly
authorized courts to assess civil penalties against federal agencies,8 8 and
decided that "sanctions" encompassed civil penalties as provided in sec-
tions 1365 and 1319.89
The United States Department of the Interior and the United States
Bureau of Reclamation9" urged the court to view "sanctions" as includ-
ing only coercive sanctions.9 Coercive sanctions may be used to force
agency compliance with a court order.9 2 The agencies argued against
including punitive sanctions designed to punish an agency for past non-
compliance. 93 However, the agencies cited only McClellan Ecological Seep-
age Situation v. Weinberger9 4 to defend this position, which concluded that
Congress had not unambiguously waived sovereign immunity for puni-
tive fines. The Lujan I court pointed out that McClellan, however, is an
isolated case and that many courts have held that the CWA does waive
sovereign immunity for punitive fines.
95
The Lujan I court also rejected the defendants' argument that the
CWA generally excludes the federal government as a person for the pur-
pose of assessing penalties. 96 Because section 1365 states that a civil
State ... shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each
violation ....
33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
84. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1424.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 1362(5).
87. Lujan I, 931 F.2d at 1425.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The United States Dept. of the Interior and the United States Bureau of Reclama-
tion jointly own and operate the Leadville tunnel and are both subject to the CWA permit-
ting regulations. Id. at 1422.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1425.
93. Id.
94. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
95. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1425. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United
States Dep't of Navy, 722 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Il1. 1989), dismissed in part, 737 F. Supp. 51
(1990); California v. United States Dep't of Navy, 631 F. Supp. 584 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd,
845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988).
96. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1426-27.
[Vol. 70:4
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
suit may be brought against "any citizen (including . . . the United
States)", Congress showed an express desire to waive sovereign immu-
nity for civil actions under the CWA.
9 7
B. Supreme Court Action
The question in United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio 8 parallels the
issue in Lujan H. The state of Ohio sought punitive fines from the De-
partment of Energy for past violations of the CWA.9 9 The lower court
held that the CWA waived sovereign immunity for punitive fines and the
Supreme Court reversed.' 0 0 The Court distinguished punitive fines
from coercive fines, holding that while the CWA waived sovereign im-
munity for coercive fines, '01 Congress did not explicitly waive sovereign
immunity for punitive fines.'
0 2
While the Court analyzed the same important issues as had the Lu-
jan I court, it arrived at an opposite conclusion in each instance. The
Court found that the overall goal of the CWA excluded the United States
from the definition of "person."10 3 Although the section 1365 civil suit
provision of the CWA included the United States in the definition of
person, 10 4 it was not included as such in the section 1362 definition of
person, nor under the section 1323(a) federal facilities pollution control
provisions.' 0 5 The Court inferred from this that Congress intended the
United States to be deemed a person only when explicitly stated by
statute.'
0 6
The Court then concluded that the section 1323(a) waiver of sover-
eign immunity for "process and sanctions" did not include a waiver for
punitive fines. 10 7 The Court offered no persuasive authority for this
conclusion and ignored the developing trend in the lower courts to in-
clude a waiver of sovereign immunity for punitive fines.' 0 8 Neverthe-
less, the Court clearly stated that, through its own narrow construction
of the statute, sovereign immunity was "waiv[ed] no further than the
coercive variety."' 0 9 This ruling effectively overruled the Lujan I deci-
sion and allowed the agencies to appeal the original Tenth Circuit deci-
sion. Later, the Supreme Court vacated Lujan I and remanded for
further consideration. 110
97. Id. at 1427.
98. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
99. Id. at 1632.
100. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
101. Id. at 1634-35.
102. Id. at 1634.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1635 n.14.
105. Id. at 1635.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1639.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Lujan v. Sierra Club, 112 S. Ct. 1927 (1992).
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C. Sierra Club v. Lujan (Lujan II) 111
1. Facts
The Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation own
and operate the Leadville tunnel, located in Lake County, Colorado. In
1975, the EPA issued to the Bureau of Reclamation a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 112 permit authorizing the dis-
charge of pollutants. 1 13 The EPA reissued the permit several times. " 4
On January 13, 1989, the Sierra Club along with the Colorado Envi-
ronmental Coalition filed a complaint in federal district court alleging
the Interior Department and Bureau of Reclamation violated the 1975
NPDES permit."15 The plaintiffs asked the court to: (1) issue a
mandatory injunction enjoining further permit violations; (2) order the
agencies to pay civil penalties; and (3) declare that the agencies were in
violation of the CWA."1 6 The defendant agencies moved to dismiss the
civil penalties claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that
the CWA did not waive sovereign immunity for civil penalties."17 The
district court denied the agencies' motion and certified the question of
civil penalties for interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 118
2. Opinion
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit court was
forced to follow the Supreme Court analysis in United States Department of
Energy v. Ohio and reverse its original holding in Lujan I. The Lujan H
court reiterated the Court's arguments pertaining to the definition of
the phrase "process and sanctions." It quoted the Court's language that
"[t]he very fact.., that the [section 1323(a)] text speaks of sanctions in
the context of enforcing 'process' as distinct from substantive 'require-
ments' is a good reason to infer that Congress was using 'sanction' in its
coercive sense, to the exclusion of punitive fines."' 9
The Lujan II court next addressed the problem of the 1323(a) provi-
sion subjecting the United states to liability "only for those civil penal-
ties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to
enforce an order or the process of such court."120 While the first part of
the phrase indicates that civil penalties may also include punitive fines,
the latter part seems to deal only with fines used to enforce a court or-
der-coercive fines. The Lujan I court followed the United States Dep't Of
111. 972 F.2d 312 (l0th Cir. 1992).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).




117. Id. at 312.
118. Id. at 312-13.
119. Id. at 315 (quoting United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1637
(1992)).
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(C) (1988); Ljan H, 972 F.2d at 315.
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Energy v. Ohio analysis and resolved this tension through "the require-
ment that any statement of waiver be unequivocal,"' 2 ' holding that the
CWA did not waive sovereign immunity for punitive fines.
12 2
D. Analysis
The Sierra Club attempted to distinguish United States Dep't of Energy
v. Ohio from the facts in Lujan II case by arguing that the former case
involved alleged violations of a state-issued permit' 23 while Lujan II in-
volved a permit issued directly by the EPA.' 2 4 The Sierra Club argued
that because the permit was issued by a federal agency, it was within the
scope of the CWA section 1323(a) provision subjecting the United States
to liability "for those penalties arising under Federal law."' 2 5 The Lujan
H court summarized the Sierra Club argument as stating that "when the
government has violated a permit issued directly by EPA 'under federal
law,' any confusion regarding the waiver of sovereign immunity in sec-
tion 1323(a) disappears."1
26
Such an argument is possible because the Court in United States Dep't
of Energy v. Ohio held that "Ohio's argument for treating state-penalty
provisions as arising under federal law . . .fails."' 2 7 The Court thus
appeared to make a distinction between a state-issued permit and a per-
mit issued directly by a federal agency. Such an implied distinction
leaves unanswered the actual meaning of the phrase "civil penalties aris-
ing under federal law."' 1 8 The Court speculated on possible reasons
for inclusion of the phrase in the statute, but concluded its discussion by
stating that the "question has no satisfactory answer."'
129
The Tenth Circuit was in a position to carve out an exception to the
holding in United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio by affirming the district
court decision. Rather than doing so, the court read the Supreme
Court's ambivalence broadly and concluded that United States Dep't of En-
ergy v. Ohio stood for the proposition that "Congress did not legislate an
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity regarding the assessment of
punitive civil penalties against the United States under the Clean Water
Act."13
0
While a disappointing decision for environmental groups, the
court's decision nonetheless is a rather magnanimous attempt at creat-
ing uniformity and clarity on this issue. The Tenth Circuit gave no dis-
cussion of the fact that the Supreme Court decision in United States Dep'
121. Lujan 11, 972 F.2d at 316 (quoting United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.
Ct. at 1639).
122. Id. at 316.
123. United States Dept. ofEnergy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1632.
124. Lujan 11, 972 F.2d at 316.
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(2)(C) (1988).
126. Lujan H, 972 F.2d at 316.
127. United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct at 1639.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Lujan H, 972 F.2d at 316.
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of Energy v. Ohio created a roadblock in the path taken by this area of law,
which demanded a complete reversal of the circuit's past direction.
Sierra Club made a valid argument based on the "analytic gymnas-
tics"113 1 the Supreme Court performed to arrive at its conclusion. The
Tenth Circuit indicated that a uniform approach was more important
than a further fragmentation of the issue. Thus, the new direction of law
on this issue appears relatively settled, even if in direct opposition to
precedent. The court concluded that whether a CWA permit is issued by
a state or by the EPA, "the result is the same-no waiver of sovereign
immunity."'
3 2
Unless Congress disagrees with this new interpretation and clarifies
the CWA, this new direction in the law will ultimately present federal
agencies with more opportunities to use their own discretion. Under
Lujan II, federal agencies are shielded completely from punitive fines for
violations of the CWA. Fines will not accrue, and the agencies will not
be threatened until a court order is actually imposed, making coercive
fines a real possibility.' 3 3 Although the Supreme Court disagreed with
the argument that punitive fines were necessary deterrents, the fact re-
mains that a significant tool capable of forcing agencies to comply with
the Clean Water Act has been lost.




The Homestake II project is a long-term water development plan
designed to provide the Colorado cities of Colorado Springs and Aurora
(Cities) with additional water.' 3 5 The project involves diverting water
from Cross Creek and Fall Creek in the Holy Cross Wilderness Area to
the Homestake Reservoir through a series of diversions and under-
ground tunnels.13 6 In 1982, the Cities sought a land use easement from
the Forest Service, requiring it to conduct an environmental analysis.13 7
The Forest Service prepared a draft Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) analyzing six project alternatives and conducted twenty public
131. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S.Ct at 1641 (White, J., dissenting).
132. Lujan 11, 972 F.2d at 316.
133. United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1638. Plaintiff State of Ohio ar-
gued that the purpose of punitive fines was "to encourage compliance with comprehen-
sive, federally approved water pollution programs .... [Flederal facility compliance ...
cannot be .. .accomplished without the [punitive] penalty deterrent." Id.
134. 960 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1992).
135. Id. at 1518.
136. Id. The Wilderness Area is managed under the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131-
1136 (1988). However, due to Congressional intent, the Homestake II project is exempt
from the Wilderness Act's ban on water projects. Id. § 1133(4).
137. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1518. An environmental analysis is a detailed statement of
environmental impact required by the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") for
any "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
.... " 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (1988). Environmental Impact Statements are submitted to
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEO) before regulations are promulgated. Id.
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hearings on the water project.' 3 8
In 1983, the Forest Service completed its final EIS, concluding that
the Homestake II project would not significantly impact wetlands or
other environmental areas.' 3 9 With this finding, the Forest Service is-
sued its Record of Decision 140 and granted a land use easement. Once
the land use easement had been obtained, the cities next sought a
dredge and fill permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. 14 1 Rather
than automatically adopting the Forest Service's final EIS, the Corps
conducted an independent review of that statement.14 2 The Corps con-
cluded that the Forest Service had not adequately shown that there
would be no wetlands damage.1
4 3
The Corps then hired an independent consultant, Aqua Resources,
Inc. (ARI), to study the wetlands impact.14 4 In 1984, ARI's report indi-
cated a potential for wetlands harm.145 ARI recommended undertaking
additional studies, requiring pre- and post-construction monitoring and
implementation of measures if deemed necessary by the additional stud-
ies.' 46 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) then reviewed the
ARI study and concluded that additional studies should be considered
before construction of the water diversion project. 14
7
Disregarding the advice of ARI as well as the EPA, the Corps chose
not to conduct additional studies, nor did it prepare its own EIS. 148
Rather, it adopted the Forest Service EIS and issued a dredge and fill
permit subject to specific conditions requiring the Cities design a plan
that would prevent wetlands damage in the wilderness area. ' 49 The per-
mit specifically stated that "the applicants shall prevent the loss of
wetlands."' 50
In compliance with this permit condition, the Cities prepared a nine
volume wetlands report and mitigation plan which provided for exten-
sive, long-term monitoring as well as a detailed mitigation plan to pre-
vent wetlands losses and concluded that no wetlands loss would
138. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1518.
139. Id. at 1519.
140. Id.
141. Id, A dredge and fill permit is required "for the discharge of dredged or fill mate-
rial into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988).
142. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1519.
143. Id. Meanwhile, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service had conducted a re-
view and concluded that there would be no detrimental impact on wetlands. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The report concluded that "[t]here is a potential for significant adverse im-
pacts to downstream wetlands in terms of sequentially (over time) lowering the water table
associated with several Cross and Fall creek wetlands." Id.
146. Id. at 1520.
147. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1520.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. In the Record of Decision, the Army Corps District Engineer stated, as ration-
ale for issuing the permit but only with the condition, "I intend that these wetlands be
preserved, but I do not wish to unnecessarily prolong the permitting process or restrict the
City's [sic] development of their water rights." Id.
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occur. 15 1 The Corps approved this plan in 1988.152
The Holy Cross Wilderness Fund filed suit in 1985 to set aside the
land use easement as well as the dredge and fill permit, claiming that
both violated NEPA.15 3 After trial, the district court concluded that the
Corps did not violate NEPA or any other law. Holy Cross Wilderness
Fund then appealed.' 5 4
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed that there were no violations
of NEPA. The Forest Service final EIS was properly adopted by the
Corps and the Corps' need to seek additional information concerning
the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts was obviated by
the Corps' decision to issue the permit with the condition that no wet-
lands losses occur.1
55
The court examined separately the issues of the EIS adoption and
permit conditions. First, the court held that the Corps could adopt the
Forest Service final EIS rather than complete another unless it found
substantial doubt as to the adequacy of the final EIS. 15 6 Under these
guidelines the court then looked to the adequacy of the original Forest
Service final EIS. The court could not find that the final EIS, which ad-
dressed the impact of the water project on wetlands, lacked a "reason-
able, good faith, objective presentation" of adverse environmental
effects. 157 The court then decided that the lack of a detailed mitigation
plan stemmed from the Forest Service's initial decision that the project
would not adversely effect any wetlands areas. 158 The Forest Service
was under no obligation to create a mitigation plan for adversities it did
not anticipate. '
59
Second, the court examined the Fund's argument that the Corps
erred in deciding not to supplement the final EIS after learning from
ARI that additional data were needed. 160 Because experts disagreed on
this issue, the court felt it best to defer to the discretion of the
agency. 16 1 Thus, the court refused to second-guess the agency and
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1521.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1526.
156. Id. An agency may adopt a Federal draft or final environmental impact statement
or portion thereof provided that the statement or portion thereof meets the standards for
an adequate statement under these regulations. Id. at 1522; 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(a) (1992).
157. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1526 (quoting Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088, 1091
(10th Cir. 1983)). Judicial examination is "performed for the limited purpose of ensuring
that the document is a good faith, objective, and reasonable explanation of environmental
consequences that responds to the five topics of NEPA's concern." Johnston, 698 F.2d at
1091.
158. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1526-27.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1526. The court also addressed the Fund's arguments under the CWA. See
id. at 1524-25 & 1527-29.
161. Id. at 1527. The Madigan court cited Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Coun-
cil, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1988), which stated that when "specialists express conflicting views,
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could find no basis for holding that the Corps' decision lacked a rea-
soned evaluation of the new information. 16 2 The court found this espe-
cially true in light of the fact that the Corps issued the permit with the
stipulation that no wetlands losses occur. 16 3 This condition apparently
obviated the need for the Corps to prepare a supplemental EIS. 164
C. Analysis
NEPA requires that a federal agency considering a major action pre-
pare an EIS. 16 5 Under these guidelines the agency is required to discuss
ways to mitigate adverse environmental consequences.' 6 6 However, "it
is 'well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but
simply prescribes the necessary process.' "167 Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council 168 discussed the fact that as long as the agency ade-
quately identified and evaluated the adverse effects of an action, it may
decide that other values outweigh the environmental effects.' 6 9 How-
ever, the Court did not minimize the significance of the discussion of
mitigation measures. The Court labeled them an "important ingredient
of an EIS."170
The Tenth Circuit in Holy Cross dealt with a slightly more refined
issue than did the Supreme Court in Robertson. The Fund argued that
the Corps erred in adopting the Forest Service final EIS which did not
contain a detailed mitigation plan. Under a strict application of Robert-
son, this appears to be a compelling argument. However, the Holy Cross
court distinguished Robertson by showing Forest Service's initial conclu-
sion that there would be no adverse effect on wetlands obviated the
an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified




164. Section 4332 of NEPA provides:
[T]o the fullest extent possible .. . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall ...
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented ....
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988).
165. Id. § 4332(c) (1988).
166. Id.
167. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1522 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Coun-
cil, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)).
168. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
169. Id. at 350.
170. Id. at 351. The Court proceeded to state that an "omission of a reasonably com-
plete discussion of possible mitigation measures would undermine the 'action-forcing'
function of NEPA." Id. at 352.
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need to prepare a detailed mitigation plan.' 7 1
This conclusion presents a potentially large problem in challenging
agency actions under NEPA. While agencies are under no obligation to
adopt a mitigation plan, a discussion of such plans in the EIS is re-
quired.17 2 The Tenth Circuit avoided a reversal of the Forest Service
and Corps actions due to the lack of a detailed mitigation discussion in
the Forest Service final EIS in two ways. First, the court deferred to the
agency's judgment because of the conflicting opinions of experts.
173
Second, and most significantly, the court pointed to the fact that the
Corps issued the dredge and fill permit with the stipulation that no wet-
lands loss occur. 174 The court concluded that, due to this stipulation,
"the Corps no longer needed to evaluate 'reasonably foreseeable signifi-
cant adverse impacts' on wetlands, because [the Corps] assumed such im-
pacts [would occur] and essentially guaranteed that the Cities mitigate
those impacts." 175 Under this analysis, the court held that there were
no NEPA violations.1
76
Leaving aside the court's deference to the agencies, the court's ac-
ceptance of the Corps' permit stipulation presents two problems. In this
instance the agency concluded that its actions presented no threat of
loss to wetlands and yet also assumed that some adverse impacts were
inevitable. With this type of awkward logic, it seems clear under the
ruling in Robertson that a detailed mitigation discussion is required in a
final EIS.177 Also, the court overlooked the fact that Robertson does not
require a mitigation plan merely for environmental loss, but focuses in-
stead on "adverse environmental effects."
'178
Second, this reasoning leaves open the question of what agencies
must do in similar future cases. The court's language suggests that a
171. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1526.
172. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410-11
(1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
173. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1527.
174. Id. at 1526.
175. Id. (emphasis in original).
176. Id.
177. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). Robertson
held that "[i]mplicit in NEPA's demand that an agency prepare a detailed statement on
'any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be imple-
mented' . . . is an understanding that the EIS will discuss the extent to which adverse
effects can be avoided." This rationale is supported by the CEQimplementing regulations
which define mitigation to include:
(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an
action.
(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its
implementation.
(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected
environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and mainte-
nance operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources
or environments.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1992).
178. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351.
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stipulation attached to a permit will substitute for an adequate mitiga-
tion discussion in the agency's final EIS. This reasoning seems contrary
to the goals of NEPA and the accepted interpretation of those goals as
enunciated through cases such as Robertson.
The decision further constricts an already narrow standard of judi-
cial review for finding an agency action "arbitrary and capricious."'
17 9
The Tenth Circuit showed it was willing to defer to an agency decision
with little inquiry into that agency's rationale. While the arbitrary and
capricious standard is narrow, the court should not automatically defer
as a general rule.' 8 0 The facts showed that the Forest Service found
there would be no wetlands loss, while independent experts and the
Corps' District Engineer in his Record of Decision found a significant
possibility for such adverse impacts. ' 8 ' While the court clearly may not
substitute its judgment for that of an agency, 182 the court must undergo
a review of the agency's decision. Such an inquiry was clearly lacking in
Holy Cross. Such lack of evaluation leaves unclear whether the agency
use of permit stipulations may substitute for EIS mitigation discussions
in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
In Holy Cross, 183 the Tenth Circuit again showed itself to be ex-
tremely willing to defer to federal agencies under the Chevron rule.
184
The Supreme Court reinforced this deference in United States Department
of Energy v. Ohio,' 8 5 which compelled the Tenth Circuit to reconsider its
earlier holding in Lujan 1. 86 The Lujan II court reversed Lujan I, refus-
ing to carve out an exception. By so doing, the court further extended
substantial judicial deference to federal agency decisions. Holy Cross
portrayed the court as willing to defer to the agency without undergoing
a proper analysis of the federal agency's reasoning. This lack of inquiry
seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling that the courts
should make an independent inquiry into the agency's interpretations to
ensure that the agency's decision was reasonable. In Daigle, 187 the court
solidified the direction of lower courts on the issue of medical response
costs. The Daigle holding strengthens the emerging trend that CERCLA
179. See Chevron, USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984).
180. The court should not automatically defer to the agency's express reliance without
carefully reviewing the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made a rea-
soned decision. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
181. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1527.
182. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378.
183. Holy Cross, 960 F.2d at 1515.
184. Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See
Robert D. Comer et al., Note, Recent Developments in Environmental and Natural Resources Law,
69 DENV. U. L; REV. 997, 1017 (1992).
185. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). See supra text accompanying notes 98-109.
186. 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991). See supra text accompanying notes 76-97.
187. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
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The Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit addressed the modem intel-
lectual property rights of trade dress, patent reexaminations and unique
copyright damages during 1992. First, the Supreme Court streamlined
the test for trade dress protection in deciding its first substantive trade
dress case. Second, after Congress developed an additional patent chal-
lenge proceeding, the Tenth Circuit enumerated duties this new proce-
dure requires. Third, the Tenth Circuit awarded the unique copyright
damages of research and development costs for copyright infringement.
This survey addresses the Tenth Circuit's approach to these three areas
of intellectual property.
II. TRADE DRESS: SECONDARY MEANING NOT REQUIRED IF INHERENTLY
DISTINCTIVE
Trade dress refers to the overall image of a product, its packaging
and the manufacturer's choice of visual design. Federal courts of appeal
disagreed as to the proper test allowing protection for trade dress. The
Supreme Court in its first decision concerning this exploding new area
of law' clarified that test. In doing so the Court placed the developing
law of trade dress squarely within the well-established law of trademarks
despite their differences.
A. Background
Historically, trade dress infringement claims developed under fed-
eral trademark and unfair competition law.2 The conduct controlled by
the two areas differs more in degree than in kind.3 Under unfair compe-
tition, the total image creating consumer confusion must be modified
upon a finding of infringement. 4 In contrast, under trademark law a
court focuses on the discrete elements of plaintiff's marketing image. 5
The Lanham Act was the first major step toward substantive federal
trademark and unfair competition legislation in the United States. 6 The
Act defines a trademark as any word, name, symbol, or device, or combi-
nation used to identify and distinguish a person's goods and to indicate
the source of such goods.7 A trademark can only be registered if it dis-
1. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
2. Scott H. Culley & Ezekiel J. Williams, Trade Dress: An Overview and Tenth Circuit
Survey, TRIAL TALK, July/Aug., 1992, at 181.
3. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DocrRINES
55 (3d ed. 1990).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 181.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
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tinguishes the applicant's goods from those in commerce.
8
Registration affords the trademark owner several rights. First, it
provides constructive notice of ownership,9 thereby preventing subse-
quent people from acquiring any right to use that mark. 10 Second, any
person using the same mark before registration has some rights against
the registered owner but only in the specific territory the user occupied
at the time of registration."l Third, after five consecutive years, a regis-
tered mark becomes immune from cancellation 12 and becomes incon-
testable.' 3 Fourth, registration grants the owner an exclusive right to
use the mark and establishes prima facie validity of the mark in any court
proceeding.14 Remedies are provided to protect the registrant of a reg-
istered mark including: (1) injunctive relief;15 (2) recovery of profits,
damages, costs and attorney fees; 16 and (3) destruction of the infringing
articles. 17
Registering a trademark requires a demonstration of the mark's dis-
tinctiveness and use in commerce. The former ensures that the mark
identifies a single source of goods. 18 Judge Friendly articulated four
well-accepted categories of distinctiveness: (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. 19 A generic term, such as
"soap" or "bandage," cannot become a trademark under any circum-
stances. 20 Descriptive marks only describe the product such as "aloe
soap" or "adhesive bandage." Descriptive marks are not distinct by def-
inition, but must acquire distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
2 1
Secondary meaning occurs when a capacity to identify goods to a single
source develops. Suggestive marks require a product's name to create
an inference concerning the type of goods it represents. 2 2 An example
is "Ivory Soap." 23 An inference exists between the color ivory and the
purity of the soap. Fanciful and arbitray marks do not relate to the
goods, such as "Dial Soap" or "Cutex Bandages." These marks never
need a demonstration of secondary meaning to gain protection.
24
The legal recognition of an inherently distinctive trademark or
trade dress grants the owner a proprietary interest in this valuable infor-
mation device even if no substantial consumer association has oc-
8. Id. § 1052.
9. Id. § 1072.
10. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 296.
11. Id.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988).
13. Id. § 1065.
14. Id. § 1115.
15. Id. § 1116.
16. Id. § 1117.
17. Id. § 1118.
18. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 203, 223.
19. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).







curred.2 5 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides statutory protection
for trade dress infringement claims.2 6 Courts define trade dress as the
total image of a product and include features such as size, shape, color,
color combinations, texture and graphics.2 7 Examples include the well-
known configuration of a whiskey pinch bottle2 8 or the distinct look of a
greeting card. 29 The statute provides recovery for a party injured by a
competitor's "false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" in regard to its
product.3 0 Section 43(a) does not contain registration instructions un-
like the section pertaining to trademarks. Claims typically arise out of
misleading packaging or trade dress. 3 ' Generally, the plaintiff must es-
tablish: (1) nonfunctionality; (2) a likelihood of consumer confusion;
and (3) secondary meaning.3 2 The Supreme Court requires a showing
of secondary meaning only if the trade dress is not inherently distinc-
tive3 3-thereby paralleling the trade dress test with trademark law even
though Section 43(a) does not contain a distinctiveness requirement.
1. The Trade Dress Test
Courts first determine if trade dress is functional or nonfunctional
in nature. Trade dress protects nonfunctional or ornamental configura-
tions of a product's package, but not functional or utilitarian features.
3 4
Nonfunctional features include, for example, a style of a greeting
card,35 a fishing reel cover,3 6 the visual impression of a restaurant3 7 and
a pinch whiskey bottle.3 8 The determination of functional features has
proved difficult for courts to make in a uniform fashion.3 9 The Second
25. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2761 (1992).
26. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 354.
27. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987).
28. Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230 (1958).
29. Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
30. The section provides:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact ... shall be liable
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
31. Dawn R. Duven, Comment, The Present Scope of Recovery for Unfair Competition Viola-
tions Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 58 NEB. L. REV. 159, 165 (1978).
32. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1271.
33. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
34. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 181. But see Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of
Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 77, 80 (1982) (discussing how the functionality doctrine was improperly imported
from the common law doctrine of unfair competition and should not be used in deciding
trade dress infringement).
35. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1268.
36. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987).
37. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
38. Exparte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (1958).
39. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 181.
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Circuit claims a functional feature must be essential to the use or pur-
pose of the article, or affect the cost or quality.40 The Fifth Circuit de-
fines functionality as a feature of an article superior or optimal in terms
of engineering, economy of manufacture or accommodation of utilita-
rian function or performance; 4 1 the Seventh Circuit defines functionality
as a feature shared by different brands that is costly not to have;42 and
the Tenth Circuit defines it as the feature creating a monopoly which
would prevent others from successfully competing. 43
Next, a plaintiff must show "likelihood of consumer confusion," the
main purpose of the Lanham Act.44 In determining consumer confu-
sion, the Tenth Circuit adopted the factors listed in the Restatement of
Torts.4 5 These factors include: (1) the degree of similarity between
designation and the trade dress; (2) appearance; (3) suggestions; (4) in-
tent of the party in adopting the designation; and (5) the relation in use
and manner of marketing between goods marketed by the party and
those marketed by another. 46 The plaintiff does not need to show actual
consumer confusion but it may be the strongest evidence to support
such a determination.
4 7
Finally, trade dress traditionally required a demonstration of secon-
dary meaning. A label or package has secondary meaning when a con-
sumer associates it with a certain producer and will make the same
association when another uses a similar label or package design.48 The
public need not know the identity of the manufacturer, only that the
product comes from a single but anonymous source.4 9
A plaintiff proves secondary meaning with either direct or circum-
stantial evidence. One commentator has stated that "[djirect evidence
consists of the testimony of consumers as to their states of mind at the
time they purchased the product."' 50 A plaintiff establishes circumstan-
tial evidence by demonstrating the seller's efforts in advertising the
product to a wide group of potential purchasers. 5 1 In Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme Court eliminated the need to demon-
40. Beth F. Dumas, The Functionality Doctrine in Trade Dress and Copyright Infringement
Actions: A Callfor Clarification, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 471, 480 (1990).
41. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1988).
43. Hartford House, Ltd v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th
Cir. 1987).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). See Michael J. Alien, The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under
Federal Trademark Law: Who Must Be Confused and When?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321
(1991).
45. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986); See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
46. Beer Nuts, 805 F.2d at 925. These factors are not comprehensive.
47. Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 521.
48. Litman, supra note 34, at 80.
49. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 184.
50. Timothy R.M. Bryant, Comment, Trademark Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence
of Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 473, 485 (1989).
51. Id. at 486.
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strate secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress.5 2
2. Conflict Among the Circuits as to Secondary Meaning
Until 1992, a conflict existed between the circuits as to whether
trade dress infringement required actual proof of secondary meaning.
The Second Circuit, most notably, demanded evidence of secondary
meaning before granting trade dress protection.5 3 In Vibrant Sales, Inc.
v. New Body Boutique, Inc. ,54 the Second Circuit relied on a presumption
that registered marks indicate the source of the product whereas unreg-
istered marks do not, absent a showing of secondary meaning. 55 The
Fifth Circuit, however, followed Judge Friendly's test from Abercrombie,
56
and did not require a showing of secondary meaning when the trade
dress was inherently distinctive. 5 7 The Eleventh5 8 Circuit also agreed
with Judge Friendly's approach.
Until Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,59 the circuits received little
guidance from the Supreme Court. Only two Supreme Court cases had
even mentioned the concept of trade dress and neither contained much
discussion on the matter. The Court hinted at the possibility of recovery
for infringement of trade dress in Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc. 60 and
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.6 1 In Inwood Lab., the Court
only acknowledged that trade dress protection may exist and remanded
to the court of appeals to determine the infringement claim. 6 2 The
Court recognized trade dress protection in Bonito Boats, but in a design
patent context. 63 The Court ignored an early chance to establish a uni-
form trade dress test among the federal circuits.
52. 112 S. ct. 2753 (1992).
53. Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd. 725 F.2d 18, 19 (2d
Cir. 1984); see also American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136,
1141 (3d Cir. 1986); Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986);
Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., Inc., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985); Keebler
Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980).
54. 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
55. Id. at 304. After its decision in Vibrant, the Second Circuit announced it would
follow the classification of marks set out by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1976); Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
753 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1985). Regardless of this decision, the court still continued to deny
trade dress protection absent proof of secondary meaning. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985).
56. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
57. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702-
03 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).
58. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974,979 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
59. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
60. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
61. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
62. 456 U.S. at 858-59.
63. 489 U.S. at 154.
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3. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Toco Cabana, Inc.6 4
a. Facts
Taco Cabana, Inc. operated a chain of fast food restaurants in
Texas. 65 The restaurant first opened in San Antonio in September of
1978, expanding to five additional San Antonio sites in 1985 and the
Houston and Austin markets by 1986.66 Taco Cabana described its
Mexican trade dress as a festive atmosphere having interior dining and
patio areas decorated with bright neon colors, paintings, murals, and
artifacts. The stepped exterior of the building had a vivid color scheme
using top border paints and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas
continued the theme 67 In December, 1985, Two Pesos opened a res-
taurant in Houston with a very similar Mexican motif.68 Taco Cabana
sued Two Pesos for trade dress infringement under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.
6 9
The trial court instructed the jury that Taco Cabana's trade dress
was protected if either it was inherently distinctive or had acquired sec-
ondary meaning. 70 Thejury found that: (1) Taco Cabana had an inher-
ently distinctive trade dress; (2) the trade dress had not acquired
secondary meaning in the Texas market; and (3) the alleged infringe-
ment created a likelihood of confusion on the part of the ordinary cus-
tomer. 7 ' In the course of calculating damages, the trial court held that
Two Pesos intentionally and deliberately infringed on Taco Cabana's
trade dress.
72
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the instructions adequately stated the
applicable law and that the evidence supported the jury's findings. The
court rejected Two Pesos' argument that a finding of no secondary
meaning contradicted a finding of inherent distinctiveness.
73
b. Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
Justice White, writing for the majority, affirmed the Fifth Circuit
opinion by drawing parallels from the well-established trademark
field. 7 4 The decision analyzed the trade dress issue specifically relying
on the categorization of trademarks described by Judge Friendly.75 The
Court found no persuasive reason why the analysis of trademark and
trade dress should differ.
76
64. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
65. Id. at 2755.
66. Id. at 2755-56.
67. Id. at 2755
68. Id.




73. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991).
74. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760.
75. Id. at 2757.
76. Id. at 2760.
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The Court rejected Two Pesos's argument that trade dress should
have only temporary protection and be subject to defeasance if failing to
acquire secondary meaning. 77 The Court stated that if a mark is inher-
ently distinctive, the failure of it obtaining secondary meaning does not
remove this distinctiveness. Instead, the fact that the public does not
associate a product with a source indicates the failure of a business to be
successful in the marketplace.
78
The majority analyzed the conflict in the federal courts of appeal
and concluded that the Fifth Circuit's test that did not require secondary
meaning for inherently distinctive marks furthered the purposes of the
Lanham Act, i.e., preventing deception and unfair competition. 79 The
Court found that adding a secondary meaning requirement could have
anticompetitive effects, which might create particular burdens on the
start-up of small companies.80
c. Concurring Opinions
81
Justice Thomas relied not on adjacent sections of the Lanham Act
but solely on the language of section 43(a) before amended.8 2 At com-
mon law arbitrary, fanciful and suggestive marks were presumed to rep-
resent the source of a product. The first user could sue a second
without having to demonstrate that the mark in fact represented the
product's source.
8 3
Trade dress at common law seemed incapable of being inherently
distinctive making secondary meaning a requirement for protection. 4
Over time judges learned that packaging can be as arbitrary or fanciful
as a word or symbol. Courts recognized that trade dress could serve as a
representation or designation of source under section 43(a).8 5 There-
fore, secondary meaning was no longer necessary.
8 6
77. Id. at 2759.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2760.
80. Id. at 2761.
81. Justice Stevens concentrated on the transformation of meaning that Section 43(a)
has experienced in the past decades. Id. at 2761 (Stevens, J., concurring). In the past,
false designation of origin meant exclusively a misrepresentation of geographic origin.
False description or representation encompassed two kinds of wrongs, false advertising
and passing off. The passing off claim contained an element of secondary meaning. Id. at
2762.
Justice Stevens discussed how the courts of appeal have expanded the categories to
include misrepresentation of the origin of manufacture. Id. at 2762-63. The expansion
was unsupported by the Act's language, but Justice Stevens believed it furthered the Act's
general purposes. Id at 2764. Congress had accepted the expansion by broadening
§ 43(a) to include a likelihood of consumer confusion test. Id Justice Stevens concurred
with the majority decision because stare decisis persuaded him that secondary meaning
need not be shown. Id. at 2765-66.
82. Id. at 2766-67 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2767.
86. Id. at 2761 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Justice Scalia wrote a separate note to voice his
complete agreement with Justice Thomas's explanation as to how the language of 43(a)
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
B. Analysis
1. Prior Tenth Circuit Tests
The Tenth Circuit has decided few cases in the area of trade dress
since its first trade dress decision in 1985.87 The court held that alpha-
numeric markings on the top of a wellhead were descriptive and, there-
fore, not entitled to trade dress protection. 88 The opinion suggested,
but did not decide, that secondary meaning would not be necessary for
inherently distinctive trade dress.89 The Tenth Circuit's next opinion
contained a footnote stating that secondary meaning might not be nec-
essary for inherently distinctive dress, but expressly declined to decide
the matter.9 0
The most recent Tenth Circuit case, Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc.-,° articulated a trade dress test that required the plaintiff to
establish an acquired secondary meaning for trade dress protection.
9 2
The issue that was appealed did not involve secondary meaning; how-
ever, the court did not as before include a caveat footnote stating that
the issue of secondary meaning was undecided.9 3 Any uncertainty in the
Tenth Circuit's use of secondary meaning for distinctive dress vanished
with the Two Pesos decision.
2. Impact of Two Pesos
Two Pesos brought not only uniformity to this area, but also some
confusion. The Supreme Court did not clarify whether the removal of
the secondary meaning requirement brought trade dress squarely within
the established law of trademarks, or if it will continue as a separate
concept. The Court did not state whether trade dress could now be reg-
istered if a court finds the trade dress inherently distinctive. Addition-
ally, the Court did not indicate whether secondary meaning had
applicability in other prongs of the test, such as likelihood of confusion.
The majority opinion relied on the entire Lanham Act to delete the
need for secondary meaning with inherently distinctive trade dress. In
doing so, the Court ignored the structure and organization of the stat-
ute. Section 43(a) embodies an alternative for protection of unregis-
tered marks, words, and symbols.94 The Court compared Section 43(a)
with Sections 1 and 2 of the Lanham Act which specifically apply to reg-
istered marks. The Court did not clarify if the test that allows for pro-
tection of trade dress also determines if the dress becomes a registered
mark. Instead of reverting to well-established trademark law, the
and its common-law derivation are broad enough to embrace inherently distinctive trade
dress.).
87. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Lowery Wellheads, Inc., 778 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1985).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1470.
90. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987).
91. 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 1271.
93. Id
94. Duven, supra note 31, at 159.
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Supreme Court should have distinguished trademark law from trade
dress law. Trade dress, unlike trademarks, encompasses the entire look
of a product requiring consideration of more factors than does trade-
mark law. By paralleling the sections, the Court implied that trade dress
may be entitled to registration.
The term "secondary meaning" does not exist in the text of the
statute relating to registered or non-registered marks. Section 2 articu-
lates an exception for marks used by the applicant which have become
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. 9 5 Courts created sec-
ondary meaning as a way to differentiate between descriptive marks and
arbitrary or fanciful marks. 96 The purpose of Section 2 is to distinguish
between the marks the Trademark Office registers and does not register.
In this decision, the Court implied Section 2 applies to trade dress pro-
tection. Thus, trade dress appears to be registerable whether or not the
Court intended that result.
9 7
The Court did not discuss the likelihood of confusion prong of the
test as it was not appealled. 98 Through the Lanham Act Congress codi-
fied the common law provisions of trademark and unfair competition. 9 9
Congress articulated that the purpose for the law was to prevent the
likelihood of confusion and consumer deception. This language ap-
pears in both Section 1 and Section 43(a).10 0 Secondary meaning may
be helpful in determining the third prong of proving likelihood to con-
fuse consumers, the heart of the Lanham Act. Secondary meaning exists
when a consumer associates a name, symbol or package appearance with
a particular source.'0 1 Confusion occurs when another manufacturer
replicates that image. Without an association between a product and its
producer, the consumer cannot be confused as to the source of the
product. Proving the existence of an association establishes a prima fa-
cie case of a likelihood of confusion. An inherently distinctive product
does not necessarily have the association to a particular source. Courts
recognize that the factors used to determine likelihood of confusion are
not exclusive. 10 2 Secondary meaning is a potentially probative way to
determine likelihood of confusion. Although the Court removed the ne-
cessity of showing secondary meaning for the second prong of the trade
dress test, that does not preclude using secondary meaning for deter-
mining the third prong-likelihood of consumer confusion.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988).
96. See Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 139 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 1964).
97. Some types of containers and packaging have acquired registered status. See Ex
parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (1958). However, the concept of trade
dress encompasses a more intangible idea of overall visual effect as well as the products
packaging. Julius Lunsford, The Protection of Packages and Containers, 56 TRADEMARK REP.
567 (1966) (discussing whether overall image is afforded registration).
98. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758.
99. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 55-56.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1152 (1988).
101. Litman, supra note 34, at 79.
102. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986); see RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
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Justice Thomas correctly noted that the Court relied on common
ground between the sections of the Act without stating a reason for such
a holding. Such an approach seems more in tune with the meaning of
the Lanham Act. By focusing on common law reasons for Section 43(a),
he did not parallel trade dress with trademarks. This analysis precludes
a possibility of registration for trade dress.
C. Conclusion
The Court opened a new door for plaintiffs looking for trade dress
protection. Under this decision, registration of trade dress is possible.
The complexity likely to result from trying to register all the factors of
trade dress, however, makes the proposition unworkable. By pulling the
unfair competition claim of trade dress into the arena of trademarks, the
Court made trade dress identical to trademarks, when in reality, differ-
ences exist. Discord still exists among the circuits as to how a plaintiff
proves functionality10 3 and likelihood of confusion.' 0 4 The Court de-
cided only one aspect of the trade dress infringement claim, leaving the
more controversial prongs of functionality and consumer confusion
undecided.
III. EXPANSION OF THE DuTy OF CANDOR IN A PATENT REEXAMINATION
PROCEEDING
No major substantive changes have occurred in patent law since the
1966 Supreme Court decision in Graham v. John Deere Co. 105 where the
Court added a new prong to the patentability test. The procedures
available to challenge patent validity, however, have changed. A patent
challenger can now request a patent reexamination. 10 6 Implicit in any
patent proceeding is the element of candor and good faith. The Tenth
Circuit, in Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp. , 17 broadened the duty of good faith
to the reexamination requester rather than traditionally limiting it to the
patent defender.' 0 8 The court, however, did not establish procedures
to make that extension meaningful, such as expanding the requester's
participation.
A. Background
After the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issues a patent to a
successful applicant, the patent can be altered in only two ways. First, if
the PTO discovers a patent is wholly or partially inoperative through
error without any deception, the Commissioner may reissue the patent
in accordance with the amended application. 10 9 Second, now Chapter
103. Dumas, supra note 40, at 471.
104. Allen, supra note 44, at 321-22.
105. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
107. 967 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1992).
108. Id.
109. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988).
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30 of the Patent Act allows any person to file a reexamination request at
any time to challenge the validity of the patent."l 0
Patent reexamination procedures"' provide an additional forum
besides federal district court to determine the validity of patents." 
2
Several problems exist for a patent attorney practicing in federal court.
Litigation is extremely expensive in a patent case due to the traditional
use of several experts," l3 and the judge and jury in federal court usually
lack the expertise in the pertinent technology.1 4 A reexamination pro-
ceeding, however, utilizes the technical expertise of PTO examiners,
does not allow discovery or witnesses, and is less expensive than
litigation. 15
The procedure for reexamination begins with a request by any per-
son, including the patent owner, to the PTO and payment of a $2,000
fee." 6 The scope of the reexamination focuses primarily on issues
based upon previous patents or printed publications describing prior
art."l 7 It excludes other important issues of patentability such as patent
misuse, inequitable conduct making a patent unenforceable, inadequacy
of disclosure and fraud on the PTO." 8 A federal court must decide if
these defects exist.
After receipt of the request, the Commissioner determines whether
a substantial new question of patentability exists.~1 9 If the Commis-
sioner decides that the evidence does not raise a question of patentabil-
ity, the decision is final and not appealable. 120 If the Commissioner
agrees with the patent challenger that an issue of patentability exists, a
reexamination is ordered. ' 2 The patent owner then has two months to
file a statement regarding the issues raised in the request for reexamina-
tion.' 2 2 The reexamination requester has an opportunity to file a reply
to the owner's statement. 123 However, if the owner does not file a re-
sponse, the requester may not file a reply and the requester's participa-
tion in the reexamination is ended. 12 4 The only way for a challenger to
110. Id. § 302.
111. Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 1, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988)).
112. George N. Neff, Patent Reexamination- Valuable, But Flawed: Recommendations for
Change, 68J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 575 (1986).
113. Id.
114. Id. This has somewhat been removed with the creation of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). The Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982 withdrew
patent jurisdiction from the twelve regional courts of appeals and granted exclusive juris-
diction to the CAFC. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(1988)).
115. Neff, supra note 112, at 576.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); MANUAL OF PAT'ENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2215 (5th
ed. 1983) [hereinafter MPEP].
117. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
118. Neff, supra note 112, at 576-77.
119. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
120. Id. Upon this finding a refund of $1,500 is given to the patent reexamination
requester. MPEP, supra note 116, § 2215.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Neff, supra note 112, at 578.
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make additional arguments is to file another reexamination request after
paying another $2,000.125
Patents extend a valuable monopoly to the patent owner. Privi-
leged monopolies constitute an anomaly in our economy founded on
the concept of free enterprise.' 2 6 Due to this advantage, public interest"
demands that patent monopolies not be granted through fraudulent or
inequitable conduct.' 2 7 Those with applications pending with the PT6
have an uncompromising duty to report all facts concerning possible
fraud or inequity.12 8 The purpose for this uncompromising duty is due
to the ex parte nature of a patent application or reexamination proceed-
ing.129 Courts do not view this as a true adversarial proceeding. ' 30 The
PTO does not have full research facilities nor were such facilities in-
tended by Congress.' 3 ' In examining applications, the PTO relies heav-
ily upon the prior art references cited in the application.' 3 2
Section 1.555 of the Code of Federal Regulations specifically calls
for a duty of candor and good faith for individuals brought before the
PTO for a reexamination hearing.13 3 The language of the regulation
states that the duty of disclosure applies to "the patent owner, each at-
torney or agent who represents the patent owner, and every other indi-
vidual who is substantially involved on behalf of the patent owner." 13
4
The regulation does not mention a duty of candor for the reexamination
requester, only the defender.
To find that someone has breached the duty of candor, the court
looks for three elements. First, the breacher must have intended the
breaching act through deliberate concealment, falsehoods in petitions,
misrepresentations, or false affidavits.' 3 5 Some courts have relaxed the
requirement of intent, holding unintentional misrepresentation as ade-
125. Id.
126. S. William Cochran, Historical Review of Fraud in Patent Procurement: The Standards
and Procedures for Doing Business Before the Patent Office, 52J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 71 (1970).
127. Id.
128. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 818 (1945).
129. Michael J. Ram, Patent Fraud- A New Defense?, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 363, 373
(1972).
130. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Parmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1971). Judge Mansfield disagreed with this proposition. He stated that in patent applica-
tion prosecutions, unlike most ex parte proceedings, the examiners act like adversaries
representing the general public. Id. at 885 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
131. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 564 (5th Cir.
1970).
132. Id. The Patent Examiner is not limited to the references cited by the patent appli-
cant and is obligated to fully search the references in the field. Ram, supra note 129, at 374
(quoting L. AMDUR, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND PRACTICE 104 (1959)).
133. 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (1991). The PTO has recently revised the regulation to parallel
the duty of disclosure in patent application proceedings. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg.
2021-36 (1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.555). The type of information required to
be disclosed at a patent reexamination has changed, but the regulation still does not define
who must disclose this information. Id. The patent requester again is noticeably left out
of the statutory change.
134. Id. at 2036.
135. Ram, supra note 129, at 371.
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quate evidence of lack of candor.' 3 6 Second, the fraudulent misrepre-
sentations must be material in granting the patent.' 3 7 This is
determined objectively by the court or PTO.' 3 8 Courts consider both
intent and materiality together to determine inequitable conduct.' 3 9 A
higher level of materiality requires a lower level of intent. 140 Finally, the
examiner must have relied on the misrepresentations.'
4 1
The courts have lacked consistentcy in determining whether a
breach of the duty of candor exists. In Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chem-
tronics, Inc., 142 the Fifth Circuit concentrated on the intent of the parties.
Due to intentional concealment by the patent owner, the court invali-
dated the patent.' 43 The Federal District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California found a breach of the duty of candor upon a showing
of gross negligence. 144 Moreover, the consequences of inequitable con-
duct by a reexamination requester have not been defined in any case.
The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has suggested inequita-
ble conduct by the requester would not vacate the reexamination pro-
ceeding.' 4 5  The Commissioner stated a patent owner has an
opportunity to correct any misstatements of facts. 14 6 The Tenth Circuit
did not define requisite level of intent and expanded the duty of candor
to patent requesters without discussing the consequences of a
breach. 147
B. Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp.
148
1. Facts
Ball Corporation (Ball) holds the Roller patent' 49 for a method of
136. Id. at 372. The District Court of Northern California stated that "a finding of
gross negligence will warrant a holding of inequitable conduct if the undisclosed or mis-
stated information meets the objective 'but for' test of materiality." Micro Motion, Inc. v.
Exac Corp., 686 F. Supp. 789, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
137. Ram, supra note 129, at 372.
138. See generally Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 482 U.S. 909 (1987); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
139. Akzo N.V, 808 F.2d at 1481.
140. Id. at 1481-82. Courts generally recognize four levels of materiality: (1) there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding
patentability; (2) the information might reasonably affect the examiner's decision to issue a
patent; (3) the examiner would have rejected the claims even though the claims were pat-
entable; and (4) the information in fact renders the claims unpatentable. Micro Motion,
Inc. v. Exac Corp., 686 F. Supp. 789, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
141. Akzo N. ., 808 F.2d at 1481.
142. 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
143. Id. at 566.
144. Micro Motion, 686 F. Supp. at 789.
145. In re Burkner, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630, 1633 (1987).
146. Id.
147. Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 967 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1992)[hereinafter Ball I]
(references to Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Colo. 1988) are hereinaf-
ter Ball 1).
148. Id.
149. United States Patent No. 3,778,308 was issued to inventors Kent G. Roller,
George H. Alhorn and Richard E. Brown in December of 1973. Id.
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lubricating magnetic storage devices such as computer memory disks,
drums and tapes. The Roller patent describes "the application of a lu-
bricant known as perfluoralkyl polyether (PFA) over a substrate of mag-
netic material." 1 50 Xidex Corporation (Xidex) "has used PFA as a
lubricant since 1978 without a license from Ball."'' Xidex disputed
whether the Roller patent covered use of PFA by Xidex. Xidex argued
that the thickness of the PFA coating was the material element of the
process and that the Roller patent only covered products falling within
the thickness range described in the patent. 152 Ball broadly defined its
patent as simply PFA applied to storage devices in a thin coating regard-
less of a specific thickness.'
53
In 1986, Ball filed a patent infringement suit before the Colorado
Federal District Court against Xidex claiming the Xidex disks fell within
the thickness specifications. 154 Xidex asked the trial court to declare
certain materials confidential for purposes of the patent infringement
claim and to keep certain sales reports under the court's protective or-
der. 155 After substantial discovery in the patent infringement case,
Xidex instituted a reexamination proceeding in the PTO claiming the
Roller patent was obvious in light of prior art.15 6 The patent examiner
agreed with Xidex and invalidated certain claims of the patent. 15 7 Ball
brought a subsequent suit claiming Xidex damaged the company by
making false statements and withholding material evidence during the
reexamination proceeding.158 Ball also argued that Xidex, the reexami-
nation requester, breached its duty of candor and good faith to the
PTO. Ball stated the standard of intent was only gross negligence.
15 9
The trial court found that Mr. Kujawa, Xidex' attorney, did not act
maliciously and had a reasonable belief regarding the materiality of the
thickness specifications.' 60 Mr. Kujawa's actions did not rise to the level
of negligence. Since Ball failed to prove the causation element of the
claimed torts, the court dismissed all of Ball's claims.'
6 '
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit expanded the responsibilities of a patent reex-
amination requester without determining what level of intent constitutes
a breach. The court stated that the uncompromising duty of candor de-
scribed in section 1.555 requires a patent owner, attorney or agent of








158. Ball 1, 705 F. Supp. 1470, 1471 (D. Colo. 1988).
159. Ball 11, 967 F.2d at 1445.
160. Id. at 1443. The trial court also determined Xidex was entitled to a qualified im-
munity under the First Amendment for defamatory statements made before the PTO. Ball
I, 705 F. Supp. at 1472.
161. Ball I, 967 F.2d at 1443.
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the patent owner to bring materials to the attention of the PTO as they
become aware of the information. 162 The court extended the duty of
candor to the reexamination requester as well as the patent defender
even though the statutory language mentions only the patent de-
fender. 163 Implicit with that duty was an element of intent. 164 Mr.
Kujawa had a duty to disclose all evidence material to the determination
of patentability and a duty to correct misrepresentations.' 6 5 In this
case, however, Mr. Kujawa lacked the requisite intent to have breached
his duty to the PTO. 166 The court did not decide what level of intent
was necessary, and simply accepted the trial court's finding that Mr.
Kujawa did not act even negligently.
16 7
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the responsibility of
candor and good faith to the patent reexamination requester. It did not
reach this decision by examining the regulatory language of section
1.555 which applies only to the patent owner, representatives of the
owner and anyone substantially involved on behalf of the patent
owner. 16 8 This extension, however, seems logical. The Supreme Court
imposes a duty of disclosure and candor on all parties involved with the
PTO. 169 An increase in moral responsibility generally benefits all legal
proceedings. However, commentators have suggested more attention
should be focused on technical and economic facts rather than on moral
questions. 1
70
The court did not elaborate on what this duty entails. Although
recognizing that the level of intent was the heart of the issue, 17 1 the
Tenth Circuit failed to reach a conclusion on this important question.
Ball argued that the level of intent should be gross negligence, or at
most recklessness. 172 The court stated that since Mr. Kujawa had a rea-
sonable belief in his statements his conduct did not even rise to the level
of negligence. 17 3 By leaving this question unanswered, the court did
162. Id. at 1447; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (1992).




167. Id. at 1446 n.6. The court also held that the district court erred in holding that
Xidex' statements were protected by a qualified immunity. Id. at 1445. Relying on
Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit found an absolute immunity for attorneys
against defamation claims. Id. at 1445 (citing Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d
1369 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1160 (1992)). This immunity, however, does
not extend to allegations of fraud. Id. at 1444.
168. 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (1992).
169. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 818 (1945).
170. Donald S. Chisum, Patent Law and the Presumption of Moral Regularity: A Critical Re-
view of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Inequitable Conduct and Willful Infringement, 69 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 27, 28 (1987).
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not decide whether traditional liability principles are applicable to PTO
proceedings.
The Supreme Court described this duty of candor as uncompromis-
ing. 174 The Tenth Circuit stated that the duty applies whenever a par-
ticipant is or becomes aware of any information material to the PTO's
determination of patent validity. Extending this duty to the reexamina-
tion requester places an even higher burden on that individual due to
the ex parte nature of the proceedings. Commentators, however, call
the lack of participation by the requester one of the biggest flaws in the
new procedure. 175 An uncompromising duty of candor falls particularly
heavily on a requester. The only opportunity a requester has to address
the PTO occurs in the initial request, and possibly in a reply, provided
the patent owner files a response. Presently, no procedures exist to
amend or add to a reexamination request. Ball indicates a movement
towards a more interactive role for the requester.
The duty may have little practical effect. In re Burkner176 suggests
the inequitable conduct on the part of a requester has no effect on the
proceeding. The Commissioner would not vacate the reexamination
even after a showing of inequitable conduct, because the patent owner
can correct any misrepresentations during the reexaminaiton proceed-
ing. The Tenth Circuit, however, by extending this duty, probably did
not intend it to be only cosmetic or superficial. By not enumerating pro-
cedures to enforce the duty, it might not be effectively upheld.
The Tenth Circuit only mentioned the test of materiality in deter-
mining whether Mr. Kujawa breached the duty of candor. The opinion
stated: "Mr. Kujawa lacked awareness of the information's materiality,
and he therefore did not have the requisite intent to breach his duty to
the PTO."'177 It appears that the Tenth Circuit used a subjective test for
materiality. This is not sound. Prior case law indicates that the PTO
must determine what is material and what is not. 178 The Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California, in Micro Motion, Inc. v.
Exac Corp. , 179 stated that materiality and intent are intertwined when de-
termining inequitable conduct. The court did not propose that materi-
ality should be measured by an indiviidual's own subjective view.
180 If
courts use a subjective view, a problem with bias arises. The PTO or
courts must decide the objective level of materiality before applying it to
the issue of intent. Although simple negligence and erroneous judg-
ment are insufficient to constitute a breach even when the information is
extremely material, the standard still must remain objective.' 8 1 Here,
174. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 818.
175. Neff, supra note 112, at 575.
176. 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630 (1987).
177. Ball 11, 967 F.2d at 1447.
178. See Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
179. 686 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Cal. 1987).




Mr. Kujawa's judgment was erroneous, but a subjective determination of
materiality is not the appropriate standard. By sidestepping the issue of
materiality, the Tenth Circuit inadvertently allowed a subjective test to
enter into a materiality analysis, contrary to the general consensus of the
other courts. A subjective test weakens the duty of candor by allowing
possible breaches to be explained away simply because the attorney did
not believe the information was material.
D. Conclusion
Extending responsibility to the reexamintion requester is a step in
the direction of increasing ethical behavior by attorneys. Moral respon-
sibility is a desired trait. In practice, however, this responsibility could
stifle the use of a beneficial new patent procedure. Without linking ex-
panded participation in the reexamination proceeding with expanded
responsibility, the rule loses power. Allowing a subjective test of materi-
ality also eliminates some benefits from this rule.
IV. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS: A POSSIBLE ACTUAL DAMAGE
FIGURE FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Proving actual damages for copyright infringement is very difficult
and often results in the copyright owner settling for statutory damages.
In Harris Marketing Research v. Marshall Marketing and Communications,1
8 2
the Tenth Circuit enumerated an alternative to proving actual damages:
granting recovery for the development cost of a computer program.
The absence of case law supporting this type of recovery suggests that
attorneys often fail to ask for these damages.
A. Background
The 1976 Copyright Act18 3 lists the remedies available for copy-
right infringement. The purposes for awarding these damages include
compensating the copyright owner for losses due to the infringement
and preventing unjust enrichment for the copyright infringer. 184 Sec-
tion 504(a) states an infringer of a copyright is liable for the copyright
owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer or
statutory damages. 185 The 1976 Act alleviated conflict between the cir-
cuits as to the meaning of actual damages. Under the 1909 Act it was
unclear whether the measure of actual damages included profits or if
profit recovery was an alternative remedy. 18 6 The 1976 Act balanced
the deterrent and compensatory approach by allowing the copyright
182. 948 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1991).
183. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
184. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1988).
186. Compare Thomas Wilson & Co. v. IrvingJ. Dorfman Co., Inc., 433 F.2d 409 (2d
Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971) (cumulative remedies) with Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (alternative
remedies).
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owner to recover actual damages and any profits not taken into account
in determining the actual damages.' 8 7 Section 504(b) describes the
meaning of actual damages by explaining the procedure of proving the
infringer's profits.' 8 8 Congress gave copyright owners a choice of
whether to seek statutory damages.' 8 9 In electing statutory damages,
the copyright owner can recover without having to prove economic
harm. 190 Courts infer harm from the demonstration of a copyright in-
fringement and have discretion to increase the award for any infringe-
ment committed willfully to a sum of not more than $100,000.191 The
release from having to prove actual damages makes this a very attractive
alternative. '
9 2
The complexity of determining copyright infringement and appro-
priate damages increases in the area of computers and computer
software. In 1980, Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act to in-
clude computers in the general definition section of the Act. 19 This
firmly placed computers and their programs within the realm of copy-
right protection.' 94 Infringement of a computer program occurs when
any of the exclusive rights specified in section 106 of the Act are vio-
lated. 195 Simply using a computer program also may constitute in-
fringement. 196 Many computer software developers choose statutory
187. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 707.
188. The statute provides:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or
her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attrib-
utable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual
damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required
to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is re-
quired to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attribu-
table to factors other than the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988).
189. Id. § 504(c) (defining statutory damages as a range from not less than $500 to
more than $20,000, as the court considers just).
190. ALLAN LATMAN, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAw 283 (William F. Patry ed., 6th ed.
1986).
191. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
192. LATMAN, supra note 190, at 283.
193. Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (Act of Dec. 12, 1980).
194. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
195. Section 106 states:
[Tihe owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
196. L.J. KNUTrEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 2.07 (1989); see Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc.,
638 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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damages when they discover infringement 9 7 for the following reasons:
(1) proving actual damages is difficult; (2) infringers can easily escape
detection; and (3) pursuing an intellectual property case is very
expensive. 1 9 8
Actual damage can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. The
Copyright Act did not specifically define the nature of actual dam-
ages. 199 This often requires a court to estimate infringement dam-
ages. 20 0 Nevertheless, uncertainty about and a need to estimate
damages does not prevent recovery.20 1 Courts often use lost sales as a
basis for determining damages for copyright infringement.2 0 2 Courts
utilize this measure when an infringer directly 'competes with the copy-
right owner.2 0 3 In theory, the infringer displaced sales of the copyright
owner and, therefore, must replace the lost sales. 2° 4 Conversely, if an
infringer indirectly competes with the owner, the court applies a reason-
able royalty rate.20 5 A reasonable royalty usually equals a previously
granted license rate.2 0 6 Finally, if the copyright owner has not previ-
ously licensed the copyright, the market value of the copyright at the
time of the infringement becomes the measure of damages.
20 7
The heart of calculating damages focuses on the extent that the
market value of the copyright has been injured or destroyed by the in-
fringement. 20 8 Courts look at indirect evidence bearing on the value
because of the difficulty in making such a determination. 20 9 The owner
of the intellectual property may testify as to its intrinsic value. 210 If a
special value endows the work with greater than market value, a court
looks at the nature of the work, its particular utility to the plaintiff and
whether the work can be reproduced.
2 1'
1. Recovery of Development Costs
Few cases allow research and development costs as a form of actual
damages. Courts, however, do not appear reluctant to grant this type of
recovery. The absence of cases granting research and development
costs is most likely connected to an absence of attorneys requesting
them.
197. KNUTrEN, supra note 196, § 2.07[5][d].
198. PETER B. MAGGS ET AL., COMPUTER LAw 413 (1992).
199. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02 (1992).
200. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
201. LATMAN, supra note 190, at 283.
202. Stevens Linen Assoc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1981).
203. GoLsTEIN, supra note 3, at 707.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Cream Records, Inc. v.Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1985).
207. See NIMMER, supra note 199, § 14.02, at 14-8 n.3. Nimmer notes that if the plain-
tiff's work had been infringed by another work prior to the defendant's infringement, the
damages would be reduced. This tends to reduce the value of the copyright at the time of
the defendant's infringement.
208. Fitzgerald Pub. Co. v. Baylor Pub. Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986).
209. NIMMER, supra note 199, at § 14.02[A].
210. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 369 (9th Cir. 1947).
211. NIMMER, supra note 199, at 14.02[A].
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In American Fabrics Co. v. Lace Art, Inc. ,212 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York hinted at the availability of
research and development costs as an appropriate remedy. The court
denied American Fabrics a preliminary injunction that would prevent
Lace Art from selling its lace patterns due to an insufficient showing of
irreparable harm. 2 13 American Fabrics complained that their high de-
velopment costs afforded the copier an opportunity to undersell
them. 2 14 The court found no reason why monetary damages would not
serve as an adequate remedy for. these costs; development costs pro-
vided a basis for monetary damages.
2 15
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennslyvania mentioned recovery of development costs for dam-
ages in a footnote.2 1 6 The opinion stated that "a split produces two
additional 3090 microcode copies . . . for which IBM may recover addi-
tional development costs and profits."'2 17 Finally, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana allowed development
costs in Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc. 2 18 In calculat-
ing actual damages for copyright infringement, the court gave an award
that included costs to convert the owner's program into a program com-
patible with a personal computer.2 19 The Tenth Circuit agreed that re-
search and development costs provide an additional mode of recovery
for copyright infringement in Harris Market Research v. Marshall Marketing
and Communications, Inc.
2 20




Harris Marketing (Harris) developed a customized software pro-
gram for Marshall Marketing and Communications (Marshall) to assimi-
late marketing information for television and radio stations for easier
analysis. Marshall and Harris entered into a license and operating
agreement (License Agreement) which allowed Marshall to sublicense
the software to the individual stations.2 2 2 The License Agreement re-
quired Marshall to pay Harris licensing and processing fees for use of
the software. 22 3 With this agreement, "Harris Market expected to re-
212. 291 F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
213. Id. at 592.
214. Id. at 591-92.
215. Id.
216. Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 547
n.39 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
217. Id.
218. 785 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. La. 1991).
219. Id. at 584.
220. 948 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1991).
221. Id.




trieve license fees over seven years to amortize its investment .... -224
Marshall failed to make all scheduled payments prompting Harris to
send a notice of intent to terminate the License Agreement. 22 5 After
Marshall orally agreed to cure the payment default, Harris sent another
letter agreeing to hold the termination at abeyance if Marshall met cer-
tain conditions. Harris contended Marshall did not meet the conditions
and began contacting the television stations directly for payment of the
license fee. Harris then became concerned when it did not immediately
receive copies of the sublicense agreements on which the payment
schedule for Marshall was based. 22 6 After receiving the agreements,
Harris concluded it had not billed Marshall correctly so Harris sent an-
other notice of termination and refused to undertake any new perform-
ance under the License Agreement.
22 7
Harris brought an action for breach of the License Agreement and
copyright infringement in Kansas District Court. 22 8 Marshall counter-
claimed for breach of the License Agreement, misappropriation of pro-
prietary information, interference with sublicense agreements, and
malicious prosecution for the copyright infringement claim. Following a
trial, a jury returned a special verdict finding Marshall liable for breach
of the License Agreement and copyright infringement. 2 29 The jury
found Harris liable for breach of the License Agreement, misappropria-
tion of proprietary information, interference with sublicense agree-
ments, and malicious prosecution for the copyright infringement
claim. 23 0 This discussion focuses on whether the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting Harris' development costs as proof of actual
damages.
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting evidence of Harris's development costs. 23 ' These damages
are recoverable as copyright damages. The jury instruction explaining
copyright damages stated that "the law allows a successful plaintiff to
recover actual damages suffered as a result of the infringement including
unrecovered costs and lost profits." 23 2 Marshall did not object to this jury
instruction.
The court explained that Harris "expected to retrieve license fees
over seven years to amortize its investment but was unable to recover its
development CoStS." ' 23 3 The trial court correctly admitted the develop-
224. Id. at 1524.
225. Id. at 1521.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications, Inc., No. CIV.A.86-
2491-S, 1990 WL 81044 (D. Kan. May 1, 1990).
229. Id. at 1.
230. Id.
231. Harris Mkt. Research, 948 F.2d at 1524.
232. Id. (emphasis in original).
233. Id.
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ment cost amount. Reluctant to overturn evidentiary rulings of the trial




The most obvious effect of Harris Market Research is in the enumera-
tion of an additional way to prove actual damages in a computer copy-
right action. Courts have acknowledged this measure of remedy in
several other cases but not so clearly as in Harris Market Research.23 5 The
computer industry definitely benefits from this decision due to the high
costs associated with developing both computers and software. Other
industries, however, also may rely more on this form of actual damages.
Allowing recovery for these damages furthers the purposes of enforcing
copyright infringement. The damages compensate the individual for
costs not taken into account when the court grants recovery of profits,
and enhanced damages effectively deter infringers.
A problem with the court's decision occurs in the articulation of the
remedy. The trial court admitted a summary of costs associated with
developing the computer program.2 3 6 Marshall objected to introduc-
tion of the summary of costs, but the trial court overruled the objection
without any discussion. 23 7 The Tenth Circuit seems to authorize these
damages without discussion2 38 and without authority for this proposi-
tion. The court then focused on Jury Instruction 12 noting that it con-
tained a provision for unrecovered costs. Marshall did not object to that
specific instruction. 23 9 The court emphasized that fact, yet did not dis-
cuss that Marshall previously objected at the time the trial court admit-
ted the evidence. Instead of firmly stating that Harris could recover
development costs, the court ties the admittance to the ommission of
objection on the part of Marshall. In doing so, the assurance of the rem-
edy becomes clouded. Will an objection to an instruction on develop-
ment cost damages remove the figure from the actual damages
calculation? The Tenth Circuit did not clarify this issue.
Harris Market Research demonstrates what the Tenth Circuit requires
to grant development costs as damages. Harris introduced a summary
of the costs associated with developing that specific computer pro-
gram.240 The court then found that Harris was unable to recoup its de-
velopment costs by retrieving license fees over several years. 2 4 1 Hence,
the court will require very clear and precise evidence of unrecovered
costs before granting this form of damage. This decision encourages
industries to undertake costly advances in technology. The assurance of
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
236. Harris Mkt. Research, 948 F.2d at 1523.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1524 (These damages are recoverable as copyright damages.).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1523.
241. Id. at 1524.
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recovery for these costs removes some of the risks involved in using
initiative.
Although the case at first glance appears to be of little importance,
it demonstrates to practitioners the need to ask the court for unusual
damages, especially in the area of copyright infringement where actual
damages are not defined. Creativity is not always common in the prac-
tice of law. This case suggests that the Tenth Circuit will allow unique
damages for copyright infringement. However, it is not clear what effect
an objection to those damages will have on the court's decision to grant
or deny them.
V. CONCLUSION
The intellectual property area has exploded to encompass a wide
variety of areas. The three decisions discussed in this survey demon-
strate some of the newest developments in intellectual property law.
First, distinctive trade dress uniformly does not require secondary
meaning for statutory protection. Second, patent reexamination, an ad-
ditional way to challange patent validity, has extended the duties and
responsibilities to the patent defender but also to the patent challenger.
Third, a copyright owner can recover development costs from a copy-
right infringer.
For each decision that resolves an issue, more unanswered ques-
tions arise. These cases illustrate not only what courts have decided in
these new areas but also what courts will need to decide in the future.
Two prongs of the trade dress test still require definition. Additional
procedures are needed to increase the usefulness of patent reexamina-
tions. While copyright damages continue to evolve, the courts need to
supply some concrete guidelines as to what measure of damages will be
allowed. With an expansion of intellectual property rights comes a cor-




LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Oil, gas and coal production drives the development of natural re-
sources law in the Tenth Circuit. In Doheny v. Wexpro Co.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled balancing in-kind is
the preferred remedy for production imbalances on gas wells subject to
joint operating agreements. In Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. v. United
States,2 The Tenth Circuit clarified the Secretary of the Interior's fiduci-
ary duty to Indians in the approval of oil and gas leases. Both cases
demonstrate that the court promotes mineral production when develop-
ing natural resources law. This Survey analyzes Doheny and concludes
the court's decision wisely favors producers who deliver gas to the mar-
ketplace. The Survey also analyzes how the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes case
will impact mineral leasing on Indian Lands. Finally, part III discusses
standing doctrine as a procedural hurdle for parties objecting to ex-
changes of federal coal lands in the cases of State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan 
3
and Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan.
4
I. OIL AND GAS
Gas Balancing Remedies in the Absence of a Balancing Agreement: Do-
heny v. Wexpro Co.5
A. Background
Gas balancing arises in the production and marketing of natural gas
and is a generic term for a class of various remedies used to offset pro-
duction imbalances. Multiple parties often have a right to a partial share
of gas production from a single well, lease or unitized area. 6 These par-
ties become co-lessees in the specified area. Gas imbalances occur when
a mineral co-lessee sells gas from the co-owned lease while another co-
lessee with a right to a share of the production does not sell. Simply
stated, "an imbalance occurs if someone who has a right to a portion of
that stream does not take that portion."17
Numerous factors cause gas imbalances. A natural gas pipeline
company may refuse to purchase gas from one or more of the unit les-
sees due to failure of the gas market, 8 or may employ discriminatory
1. 974 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1992).
2. 966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. 969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
5. 974 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. Patrick H. Martin, The Gas Balancing Agreement: What, When, Why, and How, 36
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 13.01, at 13-3 (1990).
7. Id. § 13.02, at 13-8.
8. Edel F. Blanks, III et al., A Primer On Gas Balancing, 37 Loy. L. REV. 831, 833
(1992).
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purchase practices against certain unit operators. 9 A working interest
owner may refuse to sell natural gas at current market value in hopes of
negotiating a future higher price.' 0 The pipeline company may experi-
ence mechanical and engineering difficulties that prevent or delay con-
nection to the production facility."I
When a party sells more than his share of the production, he has
"overproduced," while the non-selling party has "underproduced."' 2
If the parties own gas in common, as in a cotenancy, they owe a duty to
account to one another for sale of the common gas. The failure to fulfill
the duty is a failure to account, not a gas imbalance.' 3 Conversely, gas
balancing necessarily presupposes both a right to a definite share of the
gas and a failure to take the gas actually produced. 14 In essence, gas
balancing is the process by which overproduced and underproduced
parties balance their respective shares of ownership to the produced gas
by adjusting their take of future gas or through cash payments.
15
Gas balancing problems arise when parties to a joint operating
agreement fail to take gas in proportion to their ownership interest.
Often the joint operating agreement does not include a balancing agree-
ment. 16 When a dispute arises from a production imbalance in the ab-
sence of a formal balancing agreement, parties must agree on an
acceptable balancing method. Principal methods are balancing in-kind,
cash balancing and combined in-kind and cash balancing. 17 In-kind bal-
ancing allows the underproduced party to take a share of the overpro-
duced party's gas until the parties are balanced.' S Cash balancing
requires the overproduced party to pay the underproduced party peri-
odically or upon depletion of the gas-bearing formation until the pro-
9. Eugene Kuntz, Gas Balancing Rights and Remedies in the Absence of a Balancing Agree-
ment, 35 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 13-01, at 13-3 (1990).
10. Martin, supra note 6, § 13.02, at 13-8.
11. Id.
12. Blanks et al., supra note 8, at 833.
13. Martin, supra note 6, § 13.02, at 13-10.
The "production imbalance" approach is to be distinguished from a "true
cotenancy" approach and from a "capture" approach. These two latter ap-
proaches have been urged on the courts. The "true cotenancy" approach postu-
lates an ownership right in every molecule of gas, and any sale of the gas stream
inures to the benefit or detriment of every party with an ownership interest. Fail-
ure to account for the value realized by a selling party would be keeping money
that belongs to others. Such an approach must reject the idea that any party has a
right to take a share in kind because everyone shares an ownership right in each
and every molecule.
Id. § 13.02, at 13-8 to 13-9.
14. Id. § 13.02, at 13-9.
15. 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 84
(1992).
16. Gas production often occurs under an A.A.P.L. Model Form Operating Agree-
ment. However, most model joint operating agreements do not contain balancing agree-
ment provisions, which leads to balancing disputes between overproduced and
underproduced co-lessees. David E. Pierce, Taking Gas In Kind Absent a Balancing Agreement,
in THE OIL AND GAS JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT pt. 9, at 9-1 (Mineral Law Series No. 2,
1990).
17. Blanks et al., supra note 8, at 838.
18. Id.; Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (5th Cir.
1990); Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
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duction imbalance is remedied. 19 The payment amount is usually based
on the price the overproducing party received.20 Disputes are com-
monly complicated by actual market price and the price the under-
produced party would have received had she sold her gas. 2 1 Finally,
under combined in-kind and cash balancing, the underproduced party
receives in-kind balancing until the reservoir is depleted, at which time
the overproduced party must pay the outstanding balance in cash.
22
The attention to gas balancing in secondary authorities dispropor-
tionately outweighs case law on the subject. 23 Few cases lend definition
to the doctrine of gas balancing; however, courts tend to agree on basic
issues. Generally, courts to address the issue agree balancing in-kind is
the preferred balancing remedy. 24 However, the courts willingly impose
cash balancing where equities suggest balancing in-kind would detri-
ment one of the parties. This usually arises when the overproduced
party depleted the gas reservoir beyond the capacity to remedy the im-
balance in-kind or the underproduced party is unable to accept delivery
of the gas. 25 Courts do not consider a current low market price as an
equity requiring cash balancing for an underproduced party.
2 6
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
In Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 27 the Tenth Circuit ruled that, unless condi-
tions suggest otherwise, balancing in-kind is the preferred remedy to
19. See, e.g., Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 569 (10th Cir.
1989); WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 85.
20. Kaiser-Francis, 870 F.2d at 569.
21. Blanks et al., supra note 8, at 838.
22. Id.
23. Martin, supra note 6, at 13-14 n.l (citing numerous articles on gas balancing). See
also 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION
§ 19.05, at 19-119 to 19-135 (3d ed. 1992) (gas balancing in the context of pooling and
unitization); 6 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 951 (1992)
(comprehensive background of pooling and unitization relevant to balancing remedies);
Theodore R. Borrego, Gas Balancing Agreements Selected Problems and Issues, 40 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N 4-1 (1989) (analysis and model gas balancing agreement); Bert L. Camp-
bell, Gas Balancing Agreements, in OIL AND GAS AGREEMENTS pt. 9 (Mineral Law Series 1983)
(sample gas balancing agreement and commentary); Haywood H. Hillyer, Problems in Pro-
ducing and Selling, By Split or Single Stream, Gas Allocable to Diverse Working Interest Ownerships,
16 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 243, 263-66 (1965) (detailed discussion of balancing in-
kind); David L. Motloch, Form 6 Gas Balancing Agreement, in THE OIL AND GASJOINT OPERAT-
ING AGREEMENT pt. 10 (Mineral Law Series No. 2, 1990) (discussing provisions of model
gas balancing agreement); Thomas W. Niebrugge, Oil and Gas: Production Imbalance in Split
Stream Gas WellsGetting Your Fair Share, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 955 (1977) (practical suggestions
regarding problems encountered in gas balancing); Ernest E. Smith, Gas Marketing By Co-
Owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors' Claims to Royalty, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
365 (1987) (contemporary gas marketing realities cause sales out of proportion to owner-
ship interest thereby requiring gas balancing); Claude Upchurch, Split Stream Gas Sales and
the Gas Storage and Balancing Agreement, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 665 (1978) (multiple
interest owners and increased production necessitate gas balancing).
24. Pogo Producing Co., 898 F.2d at 1067; United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Pre-
mier Resources, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 127, 131 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Beren, 546 P.2d at 1359.
25. See Pogo Producing, 898 F.2d at 1067; United Petroleum, 511 F. Supp. at 131; Beren,
546 P.2d at 1360.
26. Pogo Producing, 898 F.2d at 1067.
27. 974 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1992).
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correct gas production imbalances in the absence of a formal gas balanc-
ing agreement.2 8 Plaintiff-appellant Doheny sought review of an ad-
verse district court ruling granting summary judgment to the
defendants. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court on all counts.
2 9
Doheny (among others) was an interest holder in oil and gas leases
in Sweetwater, Wyoming, referred to as the Trail Unit. Defendants were
Wexpro, the gas well operator; Questar Pipeline Company, owner of the
pipeline connected to the well; and Celsius Energy Company, BHP Pe-
troleum and Mountain Fuel Supply Company, all three divided interest
owners. 30 In 1958, Doheny entered a unit operating agreement with
defendants to produce gas at the Trail Unit. 3 ' In 1987, Doheny entered
a gas purchase agreement with Questar Pipeline Company's predecessor
that allowed annual renegotiation of the gas purchase price, or contract
cancellation if the parties could not agree on the price. In the summer
of 1989, Doheny and Questar terminated the contract after failing to
renegotiate the price.3 2 After ceasing production during the summer,
Wexpro resumed production for the other Trail Unit owners in the fall
of 1989. All other Trail Unit interest owners except Doheny had con-
tracts to sell their gas. Wexpro kept daily production records detailing
the extent of Doheny's underproduction and the other interest owners'
overproduction.
3 3
Questar informed Doheny it would transport the plaintiffs' gas if
Doheny could locate another purchaser. Wexpro subsequently pro-
vided plaintiffs with a list of seven regional natural gas marketers. How-
ever, Doheny failed to sell his gas.3 4 Doheny maintained the cost of
transporting gas through Questar's pipeline rendered any sales to third
parties economically infeasible.
3 5
Doheny filed suit against Wexpro, Questar and the other interest
owners in June, 1990, in United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming.36 The complaint stated he was entitled to cash balancing to
remedy his underproduction in the Trail Unit based on his cotenancy
relationship with the other interest owners and Wexpro's fiduciary du-
ties as operator.3 7 On summary judgment motions, the district court
ruled the proper remedy was balancing in-kind as opposed to cash bal-
ancing.3 8 The lower court further ruled that the unit operating agree-
28. Id. at 134.
29. Id. at 135.
30. Id. at 131-32. Plaintiffs' minority interest in the Trail Unit well constituted an
8.2831% interest. Defendants' working interests were, respectively: Celsius Energy Com-
pany, 3.5529%; BHP Petroleum, Inc., 46.12099%; and Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
42.04301%.
31. Id. at 132. See the definition of unit operating agreement, infra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text.
32. Doheny, 974 F.2d at 132.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 132-33.
35. Id
36. Id at 132.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 132-33.
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ment did not create a cotenancy relationship, and Wexpro did not owe a
fiduciary duty to Doheny requiring the operator to obtain a balancing
agreement upon termination of plaintiff's purchase contract.39
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit ruled that balancing in-kind is the pre-
ferred method of the oil and gas industry unless circumstances indicate
otherwise. 40 The court stated conditions requiring cash balancing are
depletion of the well by the overproducer and physical inability of the
underproduced party to accept gas in-kind, neither of which were pres-
ent in this factual situation. 4 1 While the court recognized Doheny's
valid interest in obtaining a favorable price for his gas, the court ruled
such market price considerations do not justify imposing cash balancing
on the overproducers.
4 2
The court noted several policy considerations favoring balancing
in-kind over cash balancing. Underproduced parties may be forced to
sell their gas at a price they deem unacceptable if cash balancing is "uni-
versally and automatically applied."143 Additionally, if after the fact in-
terest owners could elect cash balancing over balancing in-kind, such
discretionary license would foster speculation. Producers would choose
to "take in-kind in a rising price market and to take the cash in a declin-
ing market."
'44
Based on a several liability clause and language referring to the
interest owners' separate shares of production in the unit operating
agreement, the Tenth Circuit ruled the working interest of the Trail
Unit owners was not a cotenancy. 45 The lack of a cotenancy relationship
among the interest owners foreclosed the remedy of a cash
accounting.
4 6
Doheny argued unsuccessfully before the district court that Wex-
pro's contract obligations created a fiduciary duty requiring the operat-
ing company to shut down production at the Trail Unit well until a gas
balancing agreement was acquired once Doheny terminated his
purchase agreement with Questar. 4 7 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
lower court and stated that based on elementary contract principles, no
such fiduciary duty arose on Wexpro's part unless specifically set forth in
the operating agreement.48 Accordingly, Wexpro did not breach the
contract since the contract contained no specific provision requiring
Wexpro to obtain a gas balancing agreement on behalf of Doheny.4 9
39. Id.
40. Id. at 133 (citing Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064, 1067
(5th Cir. 1990); United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Premier Resources, Ltd., 511 F.
Supp. 127, 131 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1975)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Pogo Producing, 898 F.2d at 1067).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 133-34.
45. Id. at 134.
46. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
47. Doheny, 974 F.2d at 134-35.
48. Id. at 135.
49. Id.
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C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Doheny recognized that in the ab-
sence of a balancing agreement, an underproducer may not pursue the
most favorable economic remedy to the detriment of other working in-
terest owners. In a sense, underproduced parties must accept gas in-
kind to balance production because they failed to negotiate a favorable
purchase contract with a pipeline company or other third-party buyer.
Cash balancing too often provides a windfall for the non-diligent under-
producer. 50 Balancing in-kind awards underproduced interest owners
exactly what they are due: gas.
Cash balancing is most equitable when the underproduced party
bears little or no responsibility for the imbalance. An overproducer who
depletes the reservoir of natural gas to the detriment of other interest
owners is literally unable to remedy the imbalance in-kind. A cash pay-
ment immediately and efficiently balances the account and penalizes the
overproducing party for drinking too deeply at the well. Under-
produced parties who cannot accept gas in-kind should receive cash to
balance their underproduction only if they bear little culpability for the
imbalance.
As the Tenth Circuit demonstrated, courts should guard against the
inequities poised in the shadows of gas balancing remedies. An under-
produced party may request balancing in-kind in a rising market and
cash balancing when the market price of natural gas falls. 5 1 The over-
produced party will favor the opposite remedy. Courts should disfavor
such predatory opportunistic approaches by either party to balancing
remedies, but should defer in favor of the overproducer in order to en-
courage production.
Balancing in-kind rightly favors the overproducer. While circum-
stances exist in which an underproducer would favor balancing in-kind
over cash, the diligent overproducer is accountable to other interest
owners in gas, not market price. An overproducer forced to balance in
cash as a matter of uniform principle bears the burden of market varia-
tions more than the underproducer. The overproducer's success in ne-
gotiating favorable purchase contracts or diligently seeking untapped
markets is distributed among the less diligent, less guarded under-
producers who have failed to successfully market their gas. Cash balanc-
ing encourages a group of interest owners to unfairly profit from the
success of any one co-interest owner without risking their own gas in the
vagaries of the marketplace.
As a central tenet, oil and gas law favors production. In allocating
benefit among producers, courts favor the party delivering gas to the
marketplace. If underproducers could obtain either remedy at their dis-
cretion, underproducers would ride the slipstream of the successful
overproducer who sells his gas at a high market price, or conversely de-
50. Id. at 133-34.
51. Id.
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mand gas in-kind for past imbalances in a market of climbing natural gas
price. Setting forth balancing in-kind as the standard remedy for pro-
duction imbalances places the risk of loss disproportionately on the un-
derproducer and the opportunity for advantage on the overproducer in
order to favor production.
Parties to joint operating agreements should include a gas balanc-
ing agreement. Expense and disputes arising in the absence of a formal
balancing agreement are avoided through careful selection of gas bal-
ancing remedies at the onset of ajoint operating agreement. Obviously,
parties who understand the inherent advantages of various balancing





Fiduciary Duty of the Secretary of the Interior: Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of
52. For an excellent account of the provisions in a model gas balancing agreement,
see Motloch, supra note 23.
53. Cases decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1992 demonstrate that the court continues
to develop Indian law. In addition to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. case which is the
subject of this portion of this survey, the Tenth Circuit decided several other cases
involving Indian law. However, these decisions are less significant since they involve well-
settled areas of Indian law such as the immunity of Indians from state taxing authorities
and the sovereign immunity of tribal businesses from litigation in federal courts.
The Tenth Circuit decided two cases concerning Indian immunity from state taxing
authorities: Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
969 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1992) (Indian tribe not immune from legal obligation to collect
state tax on sales of cigarettes to non-tribal members on reservation; however, sovereign
immunity bars federal court enforcement action) and; Sac & Fox Nation v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 967 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1992) (state tax authority could collect income tax from
non-member employees of tribe but lacked authority to collect taxes from tribal members
employed by tribe).
According to settled Indian law, tribes are immune from state tax authorities. See
generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (State of
California may tax Indians on Tribal lands only if Congress consents); Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (State of Montana may not tax royalty
interest of Indian tribe from mineral development on tribal lands); Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (State of Montana
cigarette sales tax and personal property tax on automobiles invalid as applied to Indians
on reservation); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
(State of Arizona lacked jurisdiction to tax income of Navajo Indians residing on the
Navajo Reservation whose income was wholly derived from reservation sources); FELIX S.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 254-55 (1986) (overview of limitations on state
taxing authorities regarding Indian tribes); JAY VINCENT WHITE, TAXING THOSE THEY
FOUND HERE 33-52 (1972) (legal history of federal instrumentality doctrine prohibiting
state taxation of lands held in trust); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND
THE LAw 96-99 (1987) (analysis of case law construing immunity of tribes from state
taxation); Clydia J. Cuykendall, Recent Development, 49 WASH. L. REv. 191 (1973)
(federal preemption of taxation analyzed in light of Indian sovereign immunity).
The Tenth Circuit also decided two cases that support the well-founded doctrine that
Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity: Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972
F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1992) (tribal sovereign immunity bars'federal court interpleader
.action against tribal business); Citizen Band, 969 F.2d at 943 (tribal sovereign immunity
bars enforcement in federal court of tribal obligation to collect state tax on sales of
cigarettes to nontrbal members on reservation).
It is a well-settled doctrine of Indian law that tribes enjoy sovereign immunity. See
generally Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505 (1991) (Indian tribe immune from state taxes on cigarette sales on reservation);
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
Okla. v. United States 4
A. Background
The Supreme Court first recognized the existence of a trust rela-
tionship between the federal government and Indian tribes in early deci-
sions interpreting treaties. 55 The United States entered hundreds of
treaties with tribes between 1787 and 1871 in which the tribes gave up
land in exchange for promises from the government. 5 6 Generally, the
treaties promised that the federal government would create permanent
reservations for the tribes and protect and safeguard the health and
well-being of the Indians.
5 7
Chief Justice Marshall provided a conceptual basis for the trust be-
tween Indian tribes and the government by describing the relationship
in guardian-ward terms. Indian tribes are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. 58
Half a century later, the Court recognized that treaties with Indian tribes
promised protection by the federal government and thereby created a
formal fiduciary relationship. 59 The basis for the fiduciary relationship
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)
(State of Washington may tax sale of cigarettes to non-tribal members on reservation, but
tribal sovereign immunity bars state taxation of sales to tribal members), reh g denied, 448
U.S. 911 (1981); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribal sovereign
immunity barred suit in federal court against Indian tribe by tribal member under Indian
Civil Rights Act); Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1991) (tribal sovereign immunity
requires exhaustion of tribal court remedies before pursuit of suit against tribal member in
federal court); Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986) (tribal
sovereign immunity requires exhaustion of tribal court remedies before oil company may
instigate suit against tribe in federal court); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE
NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984)
(excellent political and social history of tribal sovereign immunity); GEORGE S. GROSSMAN,
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES: A MATrER OF LEGAL HISTORY (Matthew
Stark ed., 1979) (concise summary of Indian sovereign immunity); Ralph W. Johnson &
James M. Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153
(1984) (detailed summary of statutory and case law regarding tribal sovereign immunity);
Frederick J. Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent
Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 600 (1976) (arguing status of Indian
tribes is based on federal preemption of state law, not true sovereign immunity); Steve E.
Dietrich, Comment, Tribal Businesses and the Uncertain Reach of Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A
Statutory Solution, 67 WASH. L. REV. 113 (1992) (statutory remedy proposed to alleviate
problems sovereign immunity creates for commercial tribal ventures).
54. 966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992).
55. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. 1 (1831).
56. See COHEN, supra note 53, at 46-66.
57. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 38 (2d ed. 1992).
58. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
59. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities de-
pendent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent
for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from
them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where
they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government
with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Execu-
tive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886)(upholding congressional power to
confer federal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reservations); see also United
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is literally trust: the tribes trust the United States to fulfill its treaty obli-
gations given in exchange for Indian lands. 60 While the general duties
arising out of a treaty require the United States to meet the rigorous
standards of a fiduciary, 6 1 treaty obligations lack specificity in areas of
narrow subject matters such as natural resources development.
In addition to treaty-based fiduciary responsibilities, the Supreme
Court has held the federal government acts as a fiduciary to Indians on
statutory and regulatory grounds. Federal statutory law creates a fiduci-
ary relationship in the same manner as a treaty. Express statutory lan-
guage requires the United States to regulate, control or protect Indian
natural resources and lands for tribal benefit and imposes specific duties
and trust obligations on the federal government. 6 2 Where courts base
fiduciary obligations on subject matters regulated by statutory schemes,
the government must act with a high degree of care and responsibility.
6 3
The more pervasive and encompassing the federal agency regulation
and control of Indian resources, the greater the trust responsibility. 64
Where a federal agency as trustee mismanages tribal resources and in-
jures the tribe as beneficiary, the trust relationship necessarily permits
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)(recognizing that congressional legislation prohibit-
ing alcohol on Indian reservation is validly based on government's guardianship over
Indians).
60. For additional background on the trust relationship doctrine, see generally Co-
HEN, supra note 53, at 169-73 (trustee/beneficiary aspects of "wardship" status of Indians);
Nancy Carol Carter, Race and Power Poltics as Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American
Indians: Land Related Cases, 1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197 (1976) (survey of Indian
lands cases over 50-year period recognizing federal fiduciary duty to tribes); Reid Peyton
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1213 (1975) (congressional statutory intent mandates executive branch act as trustee to
Indian tribes).
61. In 1942, in an action for breach of fiduciary duties arising from treaty obligations,
the Supreme Court cited numerous prior decisions and described in moral terms the na-
ture of the fiduciary relationship:
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government is
something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self-im-
posed policy.., it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest respon-
sibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in
dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduci-
ary standards.
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
Although fiduciary obligations elude concise summary, fiduciaries must act selflessly
in their wards' best interest, and give them the benefit of special knowledge, skill and
expertise. Courts demand fiduciaries to act in good faith and avoid self-dealing and con-
flicts of interest. See, e.g., Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539, 539-
45 (1949)(well-written exposition of fiduciary principles applicable to range of
relationships).
62. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to manage timber sales, oil and gas
development and mineral leasing on Indian lands. 25 U.S.C. § § 391-416 (1988 & Supp. II
1991). See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)(statutes and regulations requir-
ing the United States to manage Indian timber resources for tribal benefit creates common
law trust that renders government liable in damages for breach of fiduciary duties).
63. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 206; Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d
855 (10th Cir. 1986)(en banc), adopting in relevant part, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron
Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563-73 (10th Cir. 1984)(Seymour, J., dissenting), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986).
64. See, e.g., Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 224-25; Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624
F.2d 981, 986 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
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the tribe to sue the trustee agency for damages resulting from the
breach of fiduciary obligations.
65
Tribal entities aggrieved by agency action may sue under provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to obtain injunctive or de-
claratory relief.6 6 , Generally, federal courts will set aside only that
agency action that is arbitrary and capricious, or not in accordance with
the law. Under principles of administrative law, an agency must con-
sider relevant factors and consequences regarding its administrative de-
cision and support the action with an administrative record that
ventilates the major issues of policy and fact. Although courts defer to
agencies upon judicial review, the administrative record must demon-
strate the agency weighed-the facts and alternatives and based its action
on reasonable conclusions.
6 7
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
In Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. v. United States,6 8 the Tenth Circuit
recognized that fiduciary duties constrain the Secretary of the Interior's
(Secretary) discretion to approve oil and gas leases on tribal lands. The
court ruled that the Secretary breached his duties as a fiduciary when he
failed to consider relevant factors, including current market and eco-
nomic conditions, before approving communitization agreements.69
The court reviewed the district court's summary judgment ruling over-
turning the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) 1981 decision. The BIA ap-
proved two communitization agreements unitizing oil and gas
operations on two spacing units owned by the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribes of Oklahoma (Tribe) in Custer County, Oklahoma.
Woods Petroleum Company and Reading and Bates Petroleum
Company (Companies) owned a total of six oil and gas leases originally
approved by the BIA on Tribal lands. 70 The lease terms included com-
mence drilling clauses that extended the lease duration if drilling initi-
ated before the leases expired on May 10, 1981. 7 1 The leases also
included unit operating clauses that allowed the parties to communitize
the gas field as one operating unit if adopted by a majority of the operat-
65. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225 n.31.
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-590 (1988 & Supp. III 1992). See generally PEVAR, supra note 57, at
320-22 (providing discussion ofjudicial review of administrative actions affecting Indians
and tribal entities).
67. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)(rec-
ord maintained contemporaneous with agency decision-making necessary to survive judi-
cial review when challenged); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977)(agency action arbitrary and capricious where administrative record failed to disclose
secret and undocumented ex parte contacts between agency and those affected by agency
action), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products
Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977)(agency regulation void as arbitrary and capricious
where data upon which regulation was based was not publicized and comments of inter-
ested parties who submitted contrary evidence went unaddressed in record by agency).
68. 966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 589-90.
70. Id. at 584-85.
71. Id. at 585.
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ing interests and approved by the Secretary. 72
Under a communitization agreement, gas production anywhere on a
gas field is deemed to occur on each lease within the communitized
area. 73 Communitization is a synonym for unitization. This term de-
notes the joint operation of all or a portion of a petroleum reservoir
subject to different ownership interests.74 Unitization functions as a
conservation measure by which few wells are drilled and operated in the
unitized area in order to prevent waste, maintain reservoir pressures and
best use secondary recovery techniques. 75 Unitization is often the only
manner by which production from numerous tracts overlying a common
reservoir is economically feasible.
76
A communitization agreement in conjunction with the commence
drilling clause would extend the duration of all the leases on the Tribe's
lands if drilling commenced on any single lease within the communitized
area despite the termination date.77 Three weeks prior to the May 10,
1981, termination date, the Companies decided to communitize the
leases and requested approval from the Tribe. 78 Tribal business repre-
sentatives met with the Companies and local BIA officials and refused to
approve the communitization agreements unless the leases were renego-
tiated to provide a $1,500 per acre lease bonus and a ten percent back-in
working interest to the Tribe.79 The Companies rejected renegotiations
of the leases and threatened litigation unless the Tribe assented to the
communitization agreements.8 0 On the grounds that the agreements
adequately protected the Tribe's limited interests, the United States
Geological Survey recommended that the BIA approve the communi-
tization agreements. 8 1 On May 8, 1981, just two days before the Com-
panies' leasehold interests in the oil and gas field would expire, the
72. Id. A unit operating clause is the provision in a lease which permits the parties to
enter a unit operating agreement. The latter is defined as "[a]n agreement or plan of
development and operation for the recovery of oil and gas made subject thereto as a single
consolidated unit without regard to separate ownership and for the allocation of costs and
benefits on a basis as defined in the agreement or plan." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
15, at 13.15.
73. See, e.g., Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dep't of the Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 384 (10th Cir.
1982). See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 921-24.
74. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 1317-18.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 23, § 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-3.
77. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 585.
78. Id
79. Id A lease bonus is broadly defined as "the cash consideration paid by the lessee
for the execution of an oil and gas lease by a landowner." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
15, at 114. The lease bonus acts as an incentive in unitization negotiations involving reluc-
tant interest owners such as the Tribe. See Charles Nesbitt, A Primer on Forced Pooling of Oil
and Gas in Oklahoma, 50 OKLA. BJ. 648, 650 (1979).
A back-in working interest may, like a lease bonus, induce reluctant owners to consent
to unitization. A back-in working interest allows land-owners to regain a working interest
in a well after it has been proven tobe successful. Accordingly, a back-in working interest
can be significantly more lucrative than a lease bonus. A back-in working interest is often
given as incentive to an operating owner affected by unitization. WILJAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 15, at 81.
80. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 585.
81. Id.
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Acting Area Director of the Anadarko Office of the BIA approved the
communitization agreements.82
The Tribe sought administrative review of the BIA action,83 and
ultimately filed action against the United States, the BIA and the Depart-
ment of the Interior in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma. The complaint challenged the BIA's authority to
approve the communitization agreements and extend the terms of the
oil and gas leases.8 4 The district court concluded the unit operation
clause in the leases did not require consent from the Tribe in order to
activate the communitization agreements. However, the court held the
Acting Area Director of the BIA breached his fiduciary trust obligations
to the Tribe under statutes regulating Department of Interior mineral
leasing on Indian lands8 5 by approving the communitization agreements
without first examining prevailing market and economic conditions.8 6
This breach of trust by the Secretary's representative rendered invalid
the communitization agreements regarding the leases on which the
Companies had not commenced drilling. The leases terminated upon
expiration of their primary terms.
87
The Tenth Circuit granted Woods Petroleum Company's petition
for interlocutory appeal and the Tribe's petition for cross-appeal.8 8 The
court dismissed the Companies' claim that the Tribe's administrative ap-
peal was time barred and pointed out that the administrative appeal was
timely as the regulation at issue 89 required written notice to the Tribe of
the BIA action.90 Since the Tribe never received written notice of the
BIA approval of the communitization agreements, the Tribe's right to
appeal was never time barred. 9 1
The Companies also maintained the district court considered irrele-
vant factors in concluding the Secretary was constrained by its fiduciary
duty in the approval of the communitization agreements. 92 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed and outlined the statutory and regulatory framework
that mandates discretionary approval by the Secretary of communitiza-
tion agreements of oil and gas leases on Indian lands.9 3 The Mineral
Leasing Act required the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations
82. Id.
83. In sequence, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
the BIA affirmed the Anadarko Area Director's approval of the communitization agree-
ments. Id. at 586.
84. Id. Due to an insufficient record, the district court remanded the case to the Secre-
tary, whose response to the Order of Remand provoked a round of summary judgment
motions from the parties.
85. Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396(a)-(g) (1988)(statutory scheme set-
ting forth Secretary's role in mineral leasing on Indian lands).
86. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 586.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 584.
89. 25 C.F.R. § 2.7(b) (1992)(right to appeal agency action or decision continues until
agency gives written notice).
90. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 587.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 588.
93. Id.
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regarding mineral leasing of Indian lands and directed that the Secre-
tary in his discretion approve reasonable unit operating agreements.
9 4
These regulations required the Secretary's approval of cooperative
agreements such as the communitization agreements. 95 The court held
that despite the absence of express statutory or regulatory language, the
Secretary acts as a fiduciary to the Indians, and "the United States' func-
tion as a trustee over Indian lands necessarily limits the Secretary's dis-
cretion to approve communitization agreements." 9 6 The court affirmed
the principle that whenever the government controls Indian properties
or monies, the United States acts as a fiduciary to the tribe.9 7 Relying
on the Mineral Leasing Act and Department of Interior regulations,
which require Secretary approval of oil and gas leases and communitiza-
tion agreements, the court stated that a fiduciary relationship arises be-
tween the Secretary and the Tribe because of the government's
pervasive role in oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. 9 8
The Secretary's discretion to approve oil and gas leases and com-
munitization agreements is limited by fiduciary standards which neces-
sarily include the duty to maximize lease revenues and safeguard the
economic interests of the Tribe.9 9 On administrative review, the Secre-
tary's action must meet the demanding standards of a fiduciary, not just
the minimal requirements of administrative review.10 0 Applying these
standards, the court held that when the BIA originally approved the
communitization agreements, the Acting Area Director failed to con-
sider relevant economic factors, including marketability and market
value of the leases if renegotiated.10 1 Affirming the district court's find-
ing, the Tenth Circuit held the failure to consider economic conditions
was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion and a breach of the
Secretary's fiduciary duties to the Tribe.10 2 Accordingly, the court ruled
the communitization agreements approved by the BIA were invalid and
94. All operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursuant to
the terms of sections 396 a to 3 9 6g of this title or any other Act affecting re-
stricted Indian lands shall be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of the Interior. In the discretion of the said Secretary, any lease for
oil or gas issued under the provisions of sections 396a to 396g of this title shall be
made subject to the terms of any reasonable cooperative unit or other plan ap-
proved or prescribed by said Secretary prior or subsequent to the issuance of any
such lease which involves the development or production of oil or gas from land
covered by such lease.
Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 396(d) (1988).
95. All such leases shall be subject to any cooperative or unit development plan
affecting the leased lands that may be required by the Secretary of the Interior,
but no lease shall be included in any cooperative or unit plan without prior ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior and consent of the Indian tribe affected.
25 C.F.R. § 171.21(b) (1981)(repromulgated at 25 C.F.R. § 211.21(b) (1992)).
96. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 588.
97. Id. at 588 (citing Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981 (1980)).
98. Id. (citing Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)).
99. Id. at 589.
100. Id. at 590-91 (citing Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d
1555, 1563 (10th Cir. 1984)(Seymour,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), dissent-
ing opinion adopted as the majority opinion as modified, 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 591.
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any leases upon which drilling had not commenced by May 10, 1981,
terminated on that date.' 0 3
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes defines the
role of the Secretary in mineral leasing on Indian Lands. As trustee, the
Secretary must consider all factors in oil and gas leases relevant to the
best interests of the beneficiary Tribe. After Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, fail-
ure to consider the Indians' economic interest in aggregate with social,
environmental and conservation factors renders BIA action regarding
mineral leasing both arbitrary and capricious on administrative review
under the APA and a breach of fiduciary duty. 10 4
The BIA may not solely consider the conservation interests inher-
ent in any unitization agreement on Indian lands, but must examine
whether unitization- serves the Tribe's economic interests. If oil and gas
lease values significantly rise, renegotiation of lease terms at higher rates
better serves the Tribe. Despite conservation benefits realized through
unitization of oil and gas fields, the Tenth Circuit decision demonstrates
that economics may trump conservation concerns. Indians aggrieved by
administrative action that constitutes a breach of the trust responsibility
may obtain damages from the agency in addition to injunctive and de-
claratory relief under the APA. Based on the pervasive role of the De-
partment of the Interior and the BIA in the regulation of mineral leasing
on Indian lands, the fiduciary obligations of the Secretary are rigorous
and demanding. '
0 5
The Tenth Circuit differentiated between the general trust respon-
sibility arising from treaty obligations and the subject-specific fiduciary
duties arising in the context of mineral leasing supervised by the Secre-
tary under the Mineral Leasing Act and implementing regulations.
Although treaty obligations create a general trust relationship between
the United States and the Indians, obligations based on a statutory and
regulatory framework demand that agencies meet the exacting standards
of a fiduciary at every stage of agency participation. 10 6 After Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes, agency officials administering mineral development and
production on Indian lands held in trust must seriously consider the
best interest of the Indians regarding the maximum revenue-producing
use of the lands. As fiduciary, the Secretary should treat Tribal mineral
development as an investment under the stewardship of the Department
of the Interior. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes demonstrates a judicial willing-
ness to force the Secretary as common-law fiduciary to justify the reve-
nue produced by specific leases on Tribal mineral lands.
However, the fiduciary standard set forth in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes
is ultimately no more rigorous than that demanded of all agencies under
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
106. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tibes, 966 F.2d at 591.
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the APA and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 10 7 Upon judi-
cial review, the Secretary may satisfy the fiduciary standard by exhibiting
an administrative record which simply considers the Tribe's economic
interests. Such a record is sufficient to pass scrutiny under Overton Park.
The Secretary simply failed to even consider the Tribe's economic best
interest when the BIA reviewed the communitization agreements.
Although the court framed the Secretary's obligations in substantive fi-
duciary terms, the net effect is, ultimately like all administrative exer-
cises, procedural. The Secretary's actions would most likely have
withstood legal challenge if the BIA had conducted an exercise in ad-
ministrative record building that justified how the Tribe's economic best
interests are served by renewing the communitization agreements.
In historical context, the United States has rarely met even the con-
tractual treaty obligations promised Indian tribes. 10 8 Review of admin-
istrative action that requires the executive branch to act as a common-
law fiduciary to the Indians or risk judicial censure appears to demand
the United States to honor obligations long ignored and attempts to
prospectively remedy an historic injustice of appalling proportions. The
fiduciary obligations recognized in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tibes'are, however,
ultimately procedural. Challengers or defenders of BIA action regard-
ing minerals development on Tribal lands should strategize as in any
administrative action under the APA.
III. PUBLIC LANDS
Standing to Sue When Challenging Public Lands Exchanges: A Proce-
dural Hurdle: State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan;109 Ash Creek Mining Co. v.
Lujan. 10
A. Background
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution limits the judicial power of fed-
eral courts to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies."' II Stand-
ing doctrine arises out of the case and controversy limitation on the
scope of judicial authority and serves to ensure that the party seeking
relief has established such a personal interest in the controversy as to
"assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues. ' ' 112 Reduced to the minimum, standing identifies disputes ap-
107. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
108. See COHEN, supra note 53, at 46-66; PEVAR, supra note 57, at 38.
109. 969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992).
110. 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
111. Article III, § 2, cl. 1 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party;to Controversies between
two or more States;between a State and Citizens of another state;between Citi-
zens of different States;between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
112. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 99 (1968). ChiefJustice Warren explained in Flast:
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propriate to judicial resolution.' 13 Any party seeking relief in federal
court must establish standing in order to challenge the action at issue in
the lawsuit. 114 The Supreme Court recently demonstrated that litigants
who ignore standing requirements do so at their peril.' 15
The Supreme Court set forth the constitutional essence of standing
as three elements that a party seeking relief must establish: injury in fact,
causation and redressability. 116 First, an injury in fact must be discrete,
concrete, specific and actual or imminent. 1"7 A conjectural or hypothet-
ical injury is insufficient to sustain standing." 8
[I]n terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of
standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is
on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has "a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy," and whether the dispute touches upon "the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
Id at 101 (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Standing doctrine has
engendered a vast array of commentary. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAw 78 (2d ed. 1988); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 3531 (2d ed. 1984)(constitutional foundation of standing doctrine); Roger
Beers, Standing and Related Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, I J. ENvTL. L. &
LITIG. 65 (1986)(arguing that careful plaintiff selection and exhaustion of administrative
remedies surmount standing difficulties encountered in environmental litigation); Kevin
A. Coyle, Standing of Third Parties To Challenge Administrative Agency Actions, 76 CAL. L. REV.
1061 (1988)(causation element of standing doctrine should be abandoned in administra-
tive actions on behalf of third parties); Robert Dugan, Comment, Standing To Sue: A Com-
mentay on Injury in Fact, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 256, 257 (197 1)(maintaining injury in fact
is the primary element of the tripartite standing test); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Maria E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The
Supreme Court's "Hypothetical" Bamers, 68 N.D. L. REV. 1 (1992); Gene R. Nichol,Jr., Abusing
Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985)(Supreme Court
concern with separation of powers evinced in standing opinions furthers agenda ofjudicial
activism); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984)(less confusing
and obfuscated standing doctrine provides better access to federal courts for deserving
claimants); Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and Judicial Review After Lujan: Two Criti-
ques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1991); Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 881 (1983)(arguing standing is a central and indispensable tenet of the principle of
separation of powers); Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue. A Brief Review of Current Stand-
ing Doctrine, 71 B.U. L. REV. 667 (1991); Stu Stuller, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed-
eration, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 933 (1991)(current standing doctrine requires environmental
litigants to meet same standing requirements as other public interest litigants).
114. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). The party seeking review in federal
court bears the burden of demonstrating standing elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
115. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (environmental group
plaintiffs failed to establish that any of their members would be directly injured by federal
funding of projects in other countries adverse to endangered species); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (environmental group which challenged Bureau of
Land Management land withdrawal program did not aver sufficient injury in fact to sup-
port standing under the APA where plaintiffs merely used lands in vicinity of mining
activities).
116. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
117. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)(citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983)).
118. Glover River Org. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 675 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir.
1982)(citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
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The party seeking judicial relief must demonstrate a definite and
recognizable injury to itself'1 9 to satisfy the injury in fact element of
standing. Accordingly, the injury must affect the individual in a personal
and particularized way. 120 Second, the injury must have a causal con-
nection to the action challenged in the lawsuit. 12 1 Stated another way,
the claimed injury must result from the defendant's actions, and not the
result of "the independent action of some third party not before the
court." 12 2 Third, redressability is the relation of the injury to the
court's remedial and equitable powers. It must be likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion. 123 The plaintiff's requested relief must remedy the claimed injury.
When a party challenges government action or inaction in federal
court, standing depends on whether the plaintiff is the object of the as-
serted action or inaction. 124 When the plaintiff is the direct object of the
government action or inaction, both the causation and redressability ele-
ments of standing are usually satisfied. 125 However, when a party's
claimed injury arises from the government's regulation or alleged un-
lawful regulation of another party, the causation and redressability ele-
ments of standing are more attenuated. 12 6 Challenging government
action or inaction regarding a third party is therefore substantially more
difficult to establish.'
2 7
B. Tenth Circuit Opinions
In two cases arising from an exchange of federal coal for a conserva-
tion easement in Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, the Tenth Cir-
cuit ruled both the State of Wyoming and the Ash Creek Mining
Company lacked standing to challenge the Secretary of the Department
of the Interior's (Secretary) action. In both State ex rel. Sullivan 128 and
Ash Creek Mining Co., 129 the State of Wyoming (State) and Ash Creek
Mining Company (Ash Creek) appealed the district court's ruling that
the parties lacked standing to object to the Secretary's completed ex-
change of federally owned coal for theJY Ranch conservation easement.
Laurance S. Rockefeller owned the JY Ranch located within Grand
Teton National Park, Wyoming. In 1985, Rockefeller negotiated with
the Department of the Interior for the exchange of a conservation ease-
ment of 1106.49 acres within the ranch for 2560 acres of federally
119. Id. at 254.
120. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 n.l.
121. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 38, 43.
124. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2137.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44-45 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505
(1975)).
128. 969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992).
129. 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
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owned coal in Sheridan County, Wyoming.' 3 0 In 1987, Rockefeller
donated the conservation easement to a non-profit organization, the
Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research (Institute).131 The Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM) prepared an environmental assess-
ment of the proposed exchange and concluded an environmental impact
statement was unnecessary. Subsequently, the BLM published a notice
in the Federal Register detailing the proposed exchange. 13 2 The State
and Ash Creek filed protests to the exchange.13 3 Ash Creek, a coal com-
pany owned by Public Service Company of Oklahoma, owned a 160-acre
fee coal tract adjacent to portions of the Sheridan County coal offered in
exchange and was the surface owner of roughly seventy acres overlying
the federally owned coal.
13 4
On May 11, 1990, the day after the Institute conveyed the conserva-
tion easement to the United States, the Department of the Interior dis-
missed the complaints filed by the State and Ash Creek. 35 The BLM
then issued a patent to the Sheridan County coal to the Institute, which
subsequently sold the rights to Reserve Coal Properties Company.
136
Two months later, the State filed a four-count complaint in federal
district court against the Secretary, the Department of Interior, Rocke-
feller, the Institute and Reserve Coal Properties Company.137 The com-
plaint sought judicial review of the Secretary's action and challenged its
validity based on the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA)1
38
and the Secretary's failure to act in the public interest, failure to ensure
the parity of the value of the exchanged parcels and failure to follow
BLM internal procedure. The final count challenged the Secretary's ex-
change under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 139 on the
grounds of an inadequate environmental assessment and lack of envi-
ronmental impact statement.1 40 The State alleged the Secretary de-
prived the State of revenues because the exchange removed coal from
the competitive leasing system, under which the Mineral Leasing Act
(MLA) 14 1 entitles the state to recover royalty payments.'
4 2
On August 21, 1990, Ash Creek filed a complaint in federal district
court against the same five parties seeking judicial review of the Secre-
tary's action and requesting invalidation of the exchange.143 The impe-
tus of Ash Creek's complaint was an interest in acquiring the exchanged
130. Id. at 870; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879.
131. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879.
132. Id.
133. Id.; Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871.
134. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871.
135. Id
136. Id
137. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879.
138. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(c) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
140. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879-80.
141. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988 & Supp. H 1991).
142. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
143. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871.
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federal coal through the competitive leasing process.144 The Ash Creek
complaint challenged the Secretary's action under FLPMA, NEPA, MLA
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)145 .
All defendants successfully moved to dismiss both the State's and
Ash Creek's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' 4 6 The district court noted in both cases that the State and
Ash Creek lacked standing to challenge the exchange because the al-
leged injuries could not be redressed by any conceivable court rem-
edy. 14 7 Rather, both claimants requested judicial reversal of the
Secretary's exchange to dispose of the Sheridan County coal through
the competitive leasing system. Ash Creek wished to acquire the coal 148
and the State of Wyoming desired the accompanying royalty reve-
nues. 14 9 However, the district court noted that the Secretary has discre-
tion with regard to decisions to dispose of the coal through the
competitive leasing system. The possibility Ash Creek would acquire
the coal was indefinite, 150 as was the potential of the lease producing
royalty revenues for the State. 151 The lower court further noted that the
State lacked standing under the NEPA claim because the State was not
within the zone of interest protected by the statute. 1
52
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Circuit Judge Ruggero J. Aldis-
ert15 3 wrote two nearly identical opinions affirming the district court
and dismissing the State and Ash Creek on standing grounds. After
deftly summarizing current standing doctrine, 15 4 Judge Aldisert criti-
cized both parties for failing to present injuries redressable by judicial
remedy.
Although the State asserted a colorable injury in fact regarding the
deprivation of royalty revenues, the court stated the "case is a conjec-
ture based on speculation that is bottomed on surmise. It ostensibly
asserts public policy concerns, but on final analysis, the State's interest
begins and ends with the royalties it expected to receive had the Secre-
tary chosen to offer the coal for competitive leasing."' 155 In an incredu-
lous tone, Judge Aldisert worked through the logic of the State's
144. Id.
145. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-590 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
146. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 872.; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880. Rule 12(b)(6) states:
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ...
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
147. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 872; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
148. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871-72.
149. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
150. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 872.
151. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
152. Id.
153. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting by designation. Id. at 878.
154. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 874-75; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880-81.
155. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 882.
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argument, pausing to express disbelief at the sheer impossibility of a
ruling favorable to the State that would redress the asserted injury of
lost royalty revenues: "A favorable ruling in this case will not guarantee
the State one nickel of coal leasing royalties from these lands."' 15 6 The
court pointed out the federal judiciary is powerless to order the Secre-
tary to release federally owned coal through competitive leasing. 1
5 7
The court also dismissed the State's FLPMA claim regarding the Secre-
tary's alleged failure to adequately consider the interests of state and
local people on the grounds the State's complaint fell outside the zone
of interests protected by FLPMA. 158
Ash Creek fared no better. The court initially criticized the "vague-
ness and lack of focus in Ash Creek's opening brief"'159 and then ana-
lyzed Ash Creek's standing based on two injuries allegedly caused by the
exchange: Ash Creek's lost opportunity to participate in competitive
coal leasing; and hinderance of its surface ownership rights to lands
overlying the exchanged coal. 160 Judge Aldisert dismissed Ash Creek's
first asserted injury on the grounds the loss of the possibility of leasing
the coal was an injury not redressable by judicial decision and that Ash
Creek thereby lacked standing. 16 1 Ash Creek contended mining of the
exchanged coal would adversely impact Ash Creek economically. Ap-
parently the company had stockpiled a huge quantity of overburden on
lands overlying the federal coal deposits exchanged for the conservation
easement. Overburden is the waste product of the strip mining process.
In essence, Ash Creek maintained that its surface ownership, adjacent
coal mine and use of the tract at issue as a refuse pile for hundreds of
thousands of cubic yards of overburden prevented the Secretary from
leasing or exchanging the coal to any party besides Ash Creek. 16 2 In
scalding language, the court ruled:
To state this argument in these simple terms devoid of the
obfuscation and confusion set forth in Ash Creek's written and
oral arguments is to expose the futility, and fatality, of the argu-
ment. Ash Creek has not demonstrated a substantial nexus be-
tween the relief requested and the elimination of its injuries.
No court can fashion an order redressing these alleged injuries
because no court has the power to vest Ash Creek with mining
rights to the exchanged coal lands or to prevent any other coal
operator from possessing them.'
6 3
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and held Ash




158. Id. at 882-83.
159. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 873.
160. Id. at 873-74.
161. Id. at 874.
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C. Analysis
After Ash Creek and Sullivan, parties claiming an injury from pro-
posed or completed public lands exchanges must demonstrate with
specificity all three elements of standing or risk denial of federal jurisdic-
tion. As parties indirectly affected by the exchange of the coal for the
conservation easement, Ash Creek and the State demonstrated Judge
Scalia's maxim set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: "[W]hen the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but is ordinarily 'substantially
more difficult' to establish."' 165 Ash Creek and Sullivan demonstrate that
"substantially more difficult" should read "nearly impossible."
Although both the State and Ash Creek were so aggrieved by the
Secretary's action to pursue litigation in federal court, their injuries
were ultimately peripheral to the challenged exchange. The Tenth Cir-
cuit focused almost exclusively on the consequences of a ruling
favorable to the plaintiffs and held the attenuated chain of causation be-
tween the coal exchange and the claimant's alleged injuries prevented
their direct and sure redressability. 1
66
When establishing standing to invoke federal jurisdiction, parties
must draft pleadings and frame the requested relief with care. An actual
or perceived injury that may be relieved in some way, even favorably, by
judicial remedy may not support standing.' 6 7 Although court action
may plausibly alleviate an aggrieved and injured party, the substance of
standing supporting federal jurisdiction may dissolve for lack of causa-
tion or redressability. Rather, the alleged injury must be both directly
caused by the defendant's action or inaction and capable of definite re-
dress through court action. When causation of the injury in fact is trace-
able directly to the challenged action or inaction, in a singular and
demonstrable cause and effect relationship, adequate redressability may
exist. However, an injury in fact arising from a multilinked chain of
cause and effect is nearly per se invalid to support federal jurisdiction.
Causation and redressability are obverse aspects of injury in fact. Injury
implies causation, which in turn bears on remedial benefit. Obviously, a
judicial remedy directed to actions that have not caused the injury at
issue can in no way alleviate that injury.'
68
CONCLUSION
In Doheny, the Tenth Circuit ruled balancing in-kind is the preferred
remedy for production imbalances. The opinion comports with case law
from other jurisdictions and factors a doctrine into oil and gas law that
encourages parties to deliver gas to the marketplace. In Cheyenne-Arap-
aho Tribes, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the Secretary of the Interior
165. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992)(quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)).
166. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 882; Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 876.
167. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976).
168. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 114, § 3531.4.
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must act as a fiduciary to Indians regarding mineral leasing on tribal
lands held in trust. The government may satisfy its fiduciary obligations,
however, by constructing a contemporaneous record that merely consid-
ers the Indians' economic best interest. Finally, as demonstrated in Ash
Creek Mining Co. and State ex rel. Sullivan, the Tenth Circuit does not hesi-
tate to invoke standing doctrine to deny federal jurisdiction to challeng-




Caveat brokers, registered representatives, accountants, attorneys
and others: investors are not taking their lumps. The investors of today
refuse to merely accept the failure or poor performance of their invest-
ments. Rather, many sue the deepest pocket and recover handsomely
for it.' Investors sue broker-dealers for breach of trust and confidence;
brokerage houses for respondeat superior or controlling person liability
and inadequate supervision; other individuals, including accountants
and attorneys, for aiding and abetting; and everyone and anyone for se-
curities fraud. The dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of
law suits2 raises concerns that untempered liability for brokers, regis-
tered representatives, accountants and attorneys will have far reaching
negative effects on capital markets. 3 Concern over the implications to
1. In 1991, the average claim against accounting firms was for $85 million and the
average settlement was for $2.7 million. Big Six Call for Reforms to Slash Litigation Costs, 24
Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 36, 1460 (Sept. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Big Six]. In 1992, the
accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand agreed to pay $50 million to settle the Texas Minis-
cribe case. Company News: A $128.1 million Settlement Reached in Miniscribe Case, N. Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1992, at D5.
2. According to Rep. W.J. Tauzin, (D-LA), 1990 and 1991 witnessed a large jump in
the number of securities class action lawsuits filed, with 614 suits filed in all-more than
the combined total of the previous five years put together. Big Six CPA Firms Join Battle
Against Deep Pocket Lawsuits; Bills Reduce Liability, 2 THoMsoN's INT'L BANK AccouNTANr, 33,
1 (Sept. 7, 1992). According to a position paper from the Big Six accounting firms (Arthur
Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick
and Price Waterhouse) the accounting profession as a whole faces about 4,000 lawsuits
and $30 billion in claims. Liability System Threatens Independent Audits; U.S. Capital Markets and
Global Competitiveness at Risk; Tort Reform Needed Now, PR Newswire, N. Y., August 31, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library (Fin. News) [hereinafter Liability System]. In 1991 the Big
Six's total expenditures for settling claims was $477 million, an 18% increase over 1990
which were $404 million. Id. A survey by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants ("AICPA") indicates that claims against firms other than the Big Six rose by
two-thirds between 1987 and 1991. Id.
3. See Liability System, supra note 2, at *2. Speculators and their attorneys have utilized
the securities laws to coerce nuisance settlements. Id. Where a company has had volatile
stock price fluctuations, namely mid-sized, high-technology high-growth companies new to
the market, speculators file class action securities fraud suits with the sole purpose of co-
ercing settlements. Id. To increase the size and prospect of settlement, speculators join
accountants and other deep pockets who bear joint and several liability, even where their
participation was minimal. Id. Under the law the company as the defendant bears the
burden for the legal costs of discovery. Id. Thus, threats of huge legal fees, tarnished
corporate image, and joint and several liability induce companies to settle these nuisance
suits despite their innocence. Id
In the aftermath of the failure of the accounting firm of Laventhol & Horwath in 1990,
the largest bankruptcy for a professional corporation in U.S. history, accounting firms
practice risk reduction. Big Six, supra note 1. Firms avoid what they perceive as high risk
audit clients and industries, including financial institutions, insurance companies, real es-
tate investment firms, high-technology firms and private companies making initial public
offerings. Id. As a result, three hundred corporate, accounting, financial institution and
association members including the Big Six accounting firms, the AICPA, Merrill Lynch &
Co., Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., the National Association of Corporate Directors, the
Public Securities Association and the Securities Industry Association have joined together
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American business of private securities litigation has prompted mem-
bers of Congress in both houses to introduce legislation 4 aimed at curb-
ing implied private securities fraud suits under Rule lOb-5. 5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has not been im-
mune from these concerns or trends. During the recent survey period
the circuit decided three cases involving brokers' and accountants' liabil-
ity. In all of them, the court refused to attach liability to the brokers or
accountants. The court's language in these decisions suggests a judicial
attitude reflecting curtailment of, or at least a refusal to expand, the
scope of Rule 1 Ob-5 liability. In Board of County Commissioners of San Juan
County v. Liberty Group,6 the court reversed the trial court's imposition of
liability against a broker for churning based on simple negligence. In
O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc. ,7 the court upheld a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the broker, determining that the investor failed to
establish the requisite scienter for an unsuitability claim under Rule 1Ob-
5. In curtailing Rule 1Ob-5 liability, the court imposed an additional re-
quirement of control to establish an unsuitability claim. Finally, in
Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,8 the court dismissed securities
fraud claims against an accounting firm for failure to allege fraud with
particularity and upheld a summary judgment ruling in favor of the ac-
counting firm on aiding and abetting claims.
in the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits ("CEASS") to launch a coordinated
federal and state effort to achieve liability reform. Securities Suits Reform Bill Lauded by Busi-
ness Coalition, PR Newswire, N. Y., August 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (Fin.
News). According to Philip B. Chenok, president of the AICPA, "The current doctrine of
joint and several liability must be replaced if accountants are to continue performing au-
dits in high-risk situations such as initial public offerings." Id. Chenok pointed out that a
competent outside audit is a requirement for any company seeking to raise capital in the
stock or bond markets. Id.
4. S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) in the Senate Banking Committee and H.R.
5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) in the House Energy and Commerce Committee were
introduced to reduce frivolous securities fraud suits filed to coerce nuisance settlements.
To achieve this both bills carry provisions restricting the application of the joint and sev-
eral liability standard and limiting an actor's liability only to damages that result directly
from the actor's work. In addition, both bills provide judicial discretion that can require
unsuccessful plaintiffs to shoulder all legal costs. Thus, the bills reduce the coercive tools
available to speculators by altering joint and several liability to proportionate liability. The
bills also prescribe a disincentive for filing meritless claims. Voting on these bills is sched-
uled to occur early in 1993.
5. "Rule l0b-5" is the implied right of action for fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities found in Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
6. 965 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1992).
7. 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
8. 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992).
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II. RECENT TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS SHOW A RELUCTANCE TO
EXPAND THE SCOPE OF SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY.
A. Rule 10b-5 Liability Not Expanded to Include Acts of Mere Negligence
In Board of County Commissioners v. Liberty Group the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the trial court's expansion of "scienter" to include acts of negli-
gence. In Liberty Group, the County of San Juan, New Mexico ("County")
used a number of brokers for its investments. Liberty Group executed
thirteen transactions in which it charged mark-ups over the price paid
for the bonds, but never informed the County of the charges. After the
mark-ups were discovered by the State Auditor, the County brought suit
under Rule lOb-5 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO"). 9 The County claimed that Liberty's registered rep-
resentative had churned the County's account by making frequent trades
and charging excessive and undisclosed mark-ups.' 0 The jury charge
included Instruction 24, which described the requisite mental state for
liability on a Rule lOb-5 churning claim as follows:
The plaintiff, in order to recover on his 10B-5 claim, must show
that the defendant acted knowingly, that is, with a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In order
to establish this element the plaintiff must prove by the greater
weight of the evidence that the defendant made material state-
ments which he knew to be false, or made statements with reck-
less disregard for their truth or falsity, or knew of the existence of
material facts which were not disclosed and he should have realized their
significance in the making of an investment decision, or knew of the
existence of material facts which were not disclosed although
he knew that knowledge of those facts would be necessary to
make his other statements not misleading."I
The defendants objected that this instruction incorrectly stated the law,
asserting that the instruction allowed liability to be imposed for mere
negligence. 12 The court denied the objection and the jury found Lib-
erty liable for churning. 13 Liberty appealed.
Although no cases by the U.S. Supreme Court confirm the existence
of a churning cause of action, the lower courts generally agree to its
existence and elements. 14 Churning, under Rule 1Ob-5, developed from
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Know Your Customer Rule, 15 the
National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice' 6
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1990).
10. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 881.
11. Id. at 883.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 881-82.
14. See Mark C. Jensen, Abuse of Discretion Claims Under Rule l0b-5: Churning, Unsuitabil-
ity, and Unauthorized Transactions, 18 SEc. REG. L.J. 374, 377-78 (1991).
15. The New York Stock Exchange, Know Your Customer Rule provides: "Every member
organization is required.., to (1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to
every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such
organization." NYSE Rule 405, CCH New York Stock Exchange Manual 1 2405 (1990).
16. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, sec. 2(a)
2152 (1991):
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and the Securities and Exchange Rule 15c 1-7(a). 17 In the Tenth Circuit,
the elements of a churning claim include: (1) excessive trading in light
of the plaintiff's investment objectives; (2) control over the trading in
the account; and (3) scienter. 18
The excessive trading element, unique in each churning case, de-
pends upon the investor's objectives and the communication of those
objectives to the broker. As a question of fact, excessive trading has
been found primafacie where the annual turnover rate, the dollar value of
the investor's transactions with his broker for the entire year divided by
the investor's average monthly equity in his account, is greater than
six. 19 However, some have criticized this turnover rate test.2 0 The Fifth
Circuit, for example, in determining "excessive trading" also considered
the nature and objectives of the account, the in-and-out trading, the
holding period of the respective securities, the broker's profit, the NYSE
Know Your Customer Rule and the NASD suitability rules.2 1
The second element, control, occurs where the broker has actual
discretionary authority to execute transactions for the investor without
prior authorization. Where the broker lacks discretionary authority,
control may occur de facto. For instance, where the investor lacks the
ability to evaluate recommendations and to exercise his or her own in-
dependent judgment, courts consider the broker to possess de facto
control. 22 In determining de facto control, some courts focus on the
investor's capacity or practical ability to evaluate the broker's recom-
mendations and to reject unsuitable transactions. 23 Other courts con-
sider that as long as the investor has the capacity to exercise his final
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other securities holdings and as to his financial situation and
need.
17. Rule 15cl-7(a) prohibits excessively large or excessively frequent trading in dis-
cretionary accounts. The Rule provides:
The term manipulative deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance as used in sec-
tion 15(c) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker, or dealer
or municipal securities dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's ac-
count in respect to which such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer his
agent or employee is vested with any discretionary power in any transactions of
purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial
resources and character of such account.
C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1992).
18. See, e.g., Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 893; Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 888 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1989); Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384
(10th Cir. 1987).
19. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
20. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context,
39 Bus. LAw. 571, 596-98 (1984) (criticizing the turnover rate as a measure of excessive
trading because it ignores other factors).
21. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Know
Your Customer Rule, NYSE Rule 405, CCH New York Stock Exchange Manual 2405
(1990); National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, sec. 2,
2152 (1991).




right to say "yes" or "no," the investor controls the account.2 4
In Liberty Group, the Tenth Circuit did not delve into an analysis of
the excessive trading or control elements for churning. Rather, the
court determined the case on the issue of the final element, the requisite
mental state of scienter, 25 and particularly the defendant's assertion that
Rule lOb-5 liability required more than mere negligence.2 6 Scienter,
common to all Rule lOb-5 claims, exists in a churning claim when a bro-
ker acted with actual intent to defraud or with a reckless disregard of the
investor's interests.
2 7
In Ernst & Ermst v. Hochfelder,2 8 the United States Supreme Court
established that lOb-5 liability required scienter, but expressly declined
to decide whether scienter included "recklessness." 2 9 Six years after
Hochfelder, the Tenth Circuit joined an emerging trend3 0 deciding this
question in the affirmative. 3 ' The court stated that reckless behavior
includes "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,
and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either
known to the defendant or so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it."-3 2 As a result of this and other decisions, Rule 1Ob-5 liabil-
ity had expanded to include reckless behavior.
In Liberty Group, the Tenth Circuit had opportunity to further ex-
pand liability to include acts of mere negligence. Liberty, the defendant,
recognized that the language "should have realized" in Instruction 24
provided a finding of fault based on that lesser standard. Liberty argued
that scienter should not be expanded because Hochfelder required "much
more than mere negligence."13 3 The Tenth Circuit agreed. It held the
trial court's instruction on the Rule lOb-5 count, allowing a finding of
fault based on the simple negligence standard of "should have realized,"
to be error as a matter of law.3 4 In doing so the Tenth Circuit restricted
an expansion of the scope of Rule lOb-5 liability to acts of simple
negligence.
24. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating investor has control if
she has "sufficient financial acumen to determine her own best interests and she acqui-
esces in the broker's management").
25. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 883.
26. Id.
27. " 'Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud.'" Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
28. 425 U.S 185 (1976).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981);
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,
44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
31. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982) (expressly holding
"recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement").
32. Id. at 1118.
33. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 883 (citing Hochfelder, 425 U. S. at 193).
34. Id. at 882-83.
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B. Primary and Secondary Liability Restricted Under Rule lOb-5.
1. Primary Liability Restricted for Breach of Trust and
Confidence by Imposing the Element of Control
In O'Connor v. R. F. Lafferty & Co., the Tenth Circuit analyzed a claim
of unsuitability and added the requirement of control. In 1975, Carol
O'Connor received $200,000 from her divorce and deposited the entire
sum into an account with the investment firm of R.F. Lafferty & Com-
pany, Inc. ("Lafferty"), to be handled by Roy Foulke.3 5 She gave Laf-
ferty and Foulke complete discretion to handle her account. Foulke
knew that she relied on him to make all decisions concerning the ac-
count, that maintaining a savings account was her only prior investment
experience and that her objective was to receive a fixed monthly income.
When O'Connor became concerned about the value of her account she
directed Foulke to stop all trading. Claiming that Foulke and Lafferty
purchased securities unsuitable for her investment objective, she
brought suit under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 alleg-
ing liability against Foulke for unsuitability and against Lafferty as con-
trolling person and under the doctrine of respondeat superior.3 6 The
trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the defendants
lacked the requisite scienter to sustain such a claim.3 7 The court also
found that although the defendants had invested in unsuitable securi-
ties, O'Connor could not demonstrate justifiable reliance on the
purchases where she knew that the securities were unsuitable and, acting
recklessly, failed to investigate.3 8 O'Connor appealed.39
In affirming the summary judgment order, the Tenth Circuit, in its
analysis of the unsuitability claim, recognized that although the elements
for churning were well established, the elements for unsuitability were
not. As with churning, unsuitability claims are premised on the NYSE
Know Your Customer Rule and the NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
40
Courts analyze unsuitability as either a claim based on material omis-
sions or misrepresentations, or as a claim based on fraudulent prac-
tices. 4 1 Unsuitability claims based on material omission or
misrepresentation are widely accepted, amounting to little more than
specialized versions of ordinary omission or misrepresentation claims.
4 2
35. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 895.
36. Id. at 896.
37. Id. at 893.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 15-16.
41. See San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8318, (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991).
42. Id. at *3. "Under this [omission] theory, it would appear that a suitability claim is
merely a specialized form of an ordinary omission claim. Id.
For cases accepting unsuitability claims based on omission or misrepresentation, see
Lefkowitz v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham, Co., 804 F.2d 154, 155 (1st Cir. 1986); Lazzaro
v. Manber, 701 F. Supp. 353, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Arlington Heights Police Pension Fund
v. Poder, 700 F. Supp. 405, 406 (N.D. Il. 1988); Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Rush v. Op-
penheimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); M & B Contracting, Corp. v.
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An ordinary omission claim occurs when the defendant fails to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 43 How-
ever, for this failure to disclose to be actionable, the defendant must
have had a duty to disclose that information. 44 This duty arises out of
relationship of trust and confidence between parties. 4 5 In the typical
securities case, the defendant's duty arises from the fiduciary relation-
ship between the broker and the investor.4 6 Thus, an omission or mis-
representation based unsuitability claim arises when the defendant,
knowing of plaintiff's investment objectives, recommends a course of
trading at odds with those objectives. The broker, in effect, is omitting
to tell the investor about the unsuitability of the recommendation.
4 7
The broker may also be breaching a duty to disclose the nature of the
recommended transaction in such a way that the investor could under-
stand its ramifications.
48
In Lafferty, however, Ms. O'Connor did not assert that the registered
representative failed to tell her the stocks he purchased were unsuitable.
Rather, she claimed that he fraudulently purchased stocks for her ac-
count. She asserted unsuitability not on omission or misrepresentation,
but on fraud by conduct. Unsuitability claims based on fraudulent prac-
tices or fraud by conduct are less settled than omission unsuitably claims
and courts tend to mix the concepts of traditional securities fraud and
fraud by conduct.4 9 Due to these differing approaches, a uniform set of
elements has yet to be established, though a consensus seems to be
emerging. The Second Circuit, in Clark v. John Lamula & Co.,50 first
developed elements for unsuitability not based on misrepresentation or
omission. The early cases did not describe the claim or define its ele-
Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567
F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Procedure in unsuitability cases relates to procedures under traditional securities
fraud claims, but the plaintiff's allegations of unsuitability must be sufficiently specific and
must be material to an ordinary investor. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485,
493-94 (6th Cir. 1990); Franks v. Cavanaugh, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,441, 92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 853 F.2d
616, 618 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding claim dismissal where plaintiff failed "to identify any
allegedly false representations or a single trade made because of improper advice"); Le/ko-
witz, 804 F.2d at 156 (finding investor's allegations insufficient to establish what objectives
were); Bischoff v. G.K. Scott & Co., 687 F. Supp. 746, 750-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating
alleged investment objectives were insufficiently specific and alleged nondisclosures too
vague). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
44. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
45. Id. at 230.
46. Leason v. Rosart, 811 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1987)(holding brokers have a fiduciary
duty to their investors).
47. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 897. See also San Jose, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8318, at *3.
48. See, e.g., Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 460 (9th
Cir. 1986); Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.
1984).
49. Jensen, supra note 14, at 386-87.
50. 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978).
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ments. 5 1 Under the Lamula test the plaintiff merely had to prove that
the broker made a recommendation of unsuitable securities with either
intent to defraud or reckless disregard for the investor's interests. 52 Un-
suitability could be found where the investor proved that the broker
knew or reasonably believed the recommended securities were unsuita-
ble but still recommended purchase to the investor.
53
The modem view, adopted by the Tenth Circuit, regards unsuitabil-
ity based on fraud by conduct analogous to, or part of, a churning
claim. 54 The courts' analysis of this unsuitability claim supports each of
the three elements of churning: (1) unsuitability rather than churning-
unreasonable quality of transactions rather than excessive quantity of
transactions); (2) scienter;5 5 and (3) control.5 6 The same requirements
that establish control in churning claims also define control in unsuita-
bility claims, i.e., control exists through actual discretionary authority on
the part of the registered representative, or de facto discretionary au-
thority due to the investor's inability to evaluate recommendations or to
exercise independent judgment.5 7 Virtually every case that allows fraud
by conduct-unsuitability claims to proceed involve allegations of con-
trol. However, these unsuitability claims are often combined with or
made part of churning claims, which necessarily require control. When
both claims are asserted courts do not articulate whether the unsuitabil-
ity analysis includes a separate element of control. This oversight
clouds the description and requirements of the claim for fraud by con-
duct-unsuitability. In a fraud by conduct claim the defendant has made
no overt representation. However, as with any other claim based on si-
51. See Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Mihara v.
Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 600. As with the misrepresentation-based claim, the fraud by conduct claim
also requires the investors' allegations regarding their objectives and resources to be suffi-
ciently specific and material. This specificity with which the investor's objectives and re-
sources are communicated and known by the broker must be alleged and proven. See, e.g.,
Craighead, 889 F.2d at 490-91 (holding complaint must plead specific facts constituting
excessive trading); Penson v. Cowen & Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,868 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing complaint for failing to allege with particular-
ity specific instructions to broker).
53. Lamula, 583 F.2d at 600.
54. The First Circuit described an unsuitability claim as going to the quality of the
securities compared with churning going to the quantity. Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dil-
lon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 4-5 (lst Cir. 1983). Accord Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,881 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The
Tenth Circuit here held that "[f]raud by conduct is a violation of Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) and
is analogous to a churning claim." R.F. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 898.
55. As with other Rule lOb-5 claims, unsuitability requires scienter. Scienter in un-
suitability cases has been described as the intent to defraud the investor or the reckless
disregard of the investor's interests. See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318,
324 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Some courts have explicitly required control in unsuitability claims. Wieringa v.
Oppenheimer & Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,986,
90,906 (N.D. Ohio 1985). See also Craighead, 899 F.2d at 493-94 (affirming dismissal of
unsuitability claim where control was not alleged). While other courts have allowed im-
plied control. Yet, some degree of control is required. See, e.g., Rolf, 637 F.2d at 80-81 (no
liability for executing orders for unsuitable securities). Accord Stander v. Financial Clear-
ing & Serv. Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
57. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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lence, liability only occurs under Rule 10b-5 when there is a duty to
disclose between broker or agent and client. 58 Showing control estab-
lishes a registered representative's duty to his investor because an agent
generally has the duty not to misuse the principal's property placed in
his control. 59 If control is not required, an alternative duty must be es-
tablished to ensure the unsuitability doctrine satisfies rule lOb-5.
60
In Lafferty the Tenth Circuit recognized that other circuits required
a plaintiff to merely prove unsuitability and scienter to succeed on their
claim for unsuitability based on fraud by conduct. The Tenth Circuit
imposed the additional element of control. Accordingly a plaintiff must
prove three elements to maintain a fraud by conduct unsuitability claim:
(1) that the registered representative recommended-or in the case of a
discretionary account purchased-securities which are unsuitable in
light of the investor's objectives; (2) that the broker recommended or
purchased the securities with intent to defraud or with reckless disre-
gard for the investor's interests; and, (3) that the broker exercised con-
trol over the investor's account.6 ' Here the court determined that
although the defendants had invested in unsuitable securities, the plain-
tiff failed to establish the requisite scienter, since the conduct failed to
rise to the level of recklessness necessary to sustain a lOb-5 claim. 6 2 Ac-
cordingly, the court upheld summary judgment dismissing the unsuita-
bility claim, remanding only the state law negligence claims.
63
The facts in Lafferty allowed the court to analyze and decide the case
on the issue of scienter alone. Yet, the court went further and imposed
the additional requirement of control for fraud by conduct-unsuitability
claims, choosing to follow the trend to restrict the scope of Rule lOb-5
liability. This aggressive opinion illustrates the Circuit's reluctance to
follow other jurisdictions, which have extended the cause of action for
unsuitability. For example, in 1991, unsuitability claims were expanded
to include discount brokers who typically take orders, have no discre-
tionary authority, and make no recommendations. An arbitration panel
of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") awarded a
Florida investor $39,500 of the $132,000 he claimed to have lost trading
options with the brokerage firm of Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.64 The
panel premised its decision on suitability violations. Two of the three
arbitrators ruled that Schwab had neglected its "ongoing obligation" to
monitor the suitability of its client's investments, strategy and trading
decisions.6 5 The third arbitrator found Schwab's actions appropriate
under the circumstances because the broker appeared to assume an obli-
gation to determine suitability.6 6 Under either rationale the award ex-
58. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 402 (1977).
60. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
61. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 898.
62. Id. at 898-900.
63. Id. at 900.
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panded unsuitability liability to brokers who neither make
recommendations nor have any discretionary authority.
6 7
Other courts have expanded broker liability by holding that a viola-
tion of the suitability rules support state law claims for fraud.6 8 This
increases liability by including "negligence" as the requisite mental state
sufficient for some state claims. 69 Still other courts have extended liabil-
ity by providing a private right of action for violations of the NYSE and
NASD suitability rules. 70 The majority of modem courts, however, re-
fuse to premise a private right of action upon a violation of an exchange
rule.7 1 Indeed, the Lafferty court refused to decide whether a violation
of the NYSE or NASD Rules gave rise to a private cause of action based
on negligence, reasoning that actions violating the unsuitability rules
give rise to Rule lOb-5 claims. 72 Since Rule lOb-5 violations require
proof of scienter, 73 the court refused, as in Liberty Group, to extend liabil-
ity to include acts of mere negligence.
74
2. Primary Liability Restricted for Failure to Reasonably
Supervise
a. Liability of the Brokerage Firm
In most cases where a substantial investment amount has been lost,
the investor seeks redress not only from the registered representative
but also from the brokerage firm and/or supervisors. Investors sue such
defendants for inadequate employee supervision of their fraudulent
salesman. In Lafferty, Ms. O'Connor brought suit against R.F. Lafferty &
Company for negligent failure to supervise the conduct of its registered
representative, Mr. Foulke.
75
The New York Stock Exchange and the Self Regulating Organiza-
tions (SRO) all require brokerage firms to reasonably supervise their
67. The Schwab decision followed a 1990 arbitration ruling that discount broker
Quick & Reilly pay an investor $106,653 for allowing him to trade in naked put options.
Quick & Reilly, Inc. and Q& R Clearing Corp. v. Barton, NYSE, No. 9002033, February
15, 1990. Like Schwab, Quick & Reilly had made no specific investment recommendations
to its client, nor retained any discretionary authority. Id.
68. See, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980); Twomey
v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 243 (1968).
69. See, e.g., Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 900 ("liability under the state analogue to § 12(2)
only requires negligence"). See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125(3) (1987). See also Pottern
v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 589 P.2d 1378, 1379 (1978) (ruling state analogue to federal
Section 12(2) requires only negligence).
70. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135, 143 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021,
1040-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
71. See, e.g., SSH Co. Ltd. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1058
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
72. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 897 n.5. "Federal courts recognize such a claim [unsuitability]
as a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Id. at 897.
73. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
74. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 883. "[T]he appellants... [argue]... that Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder ... established that lOb-5 liability requires much more than mere negli-
gence. This reading is correct." Id.
75. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 903.
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registered representatives and establish systems to prevent these agents
from violating the securities laws and the rules and regulations of the
SROs. 76 A firm may be civilly liable or face regulatory sanctions for fail-
76. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides sanctions
against a broker-dealer found to have:
failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the
provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations, another person who commits
such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision. For the pur-
poses of this subparagraph (E) no person shall be deemed to have failed reason-
ably to supervise any other person, if- (i) there have been established procedures,
and a system for applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected
to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other
person, and (ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations
incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and system without reason-
able cause to believe that such procedures and system were not being complied
with.
Section 15(f) of the Exchange Act requires broker-dealers to "establish, maintain and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed... to prevent the misuse...
of material nonpublic information by such broker or dealer or any person associated with
such broker or dealer."
Section 2 IA of the Exchange Act provides civil penalties against controlling persons
who "knowingly or recklessly" fail to establish, maintain or enforce any policy or proce-
dure required under Section 15(f).
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, section 27 requires members to establish,
maintain and enforce written procedures for supervising activities of registered represent-
atives, reviewing customer accounts, and keeping records. Section 27 further requires that
members: (1) designate a registered principal for each type of the firm's business to carry
out the firm's supervisory obligations; (2) designate an office of supervisory jurisdiction for
each location; (3) assign registered persons to a supervisor; (4) make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the supervisory personnel are properly qualified; (5) designate a principal to
review the firm's supervisory practices and procedures and make recommendations to se-
nior management to assure compliance with the applicable rules and regulations; (6) es-
tablish a schedule of branch examinations; and (7) meet at least annually with each
registered representative to discuss compliance matters relevant to the representative.
The NASD has also recently required members to use their best efforts to obtain the most
recent Form U-5 for any person seeking employment in the capacity of a registered repre-
sentative and to conduct a thorough background search on all prospective account execu-
tives.
NYSE Rule 405(2) requires member organizations to "[s]upervise diligently all ac-
counts handled by registered representatives of the organization."
NYSE Rule 342 requires the person in charge of a group of employees to "reasonably
discharge his duties and obligations in connection with supervision and control of the
activities of those employees related to the business of their employer and compliance with
securities laws and regulations." The firm must also designate a senior person to have
"overall authority and responsibility for internal supervision and control of the organiza-
tion and compliance with securities laws and regulations." This person must then:
delegate to qualified principals or employees responsibility and authority for
supervision and control of each office, department or business activity, and pro-
vide for appropriate procedures of supervision and control [and] establish a sepa-
rate system of follow-up and review to determine that the delegated authority and
responsibility is being properly exercised.
NYSE Rule 342 also requires member firms to review proprietary trades of the firm
and trades of firm employees and family members for insider trading violations and other
manipulative and deceptive practices. It also requires that the firm prepare an annual re-
port to its chief executive officers, which discusses, among other matters, customer com-
plaints, internal investigations made during the year, significant compliance problems, and
compliance efforts and procedures.
NYSE Rule 351 requires that member firms submit quarterly written reports to the
NYSE signed by a senior officer of the firm stating that the firm has reviewed its proprie-
tary accounts and accounts of its employees and family members and that trades in those
accounts do not violate the Exchange Act or NYSE rules against insider trading and ma-
nipulative and deceptive devices. The firms may use sampling techniques to review pro-
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ing to reasonably supervise a registered representative who violates a
securities law or rule. 77 However, the brokerage firm may avoid liability
and sanctions by acting in good faith to fulfill its obligations. Good faith
may be established by showing the adequacy of a firm's supervision and
compliance systems.78 There is probably no single supervisory or com-
pliance system appropriate for all brokerage firms. Thus, the rules of
the Exchange, the various SROs, as well as the SEC, anticipate each bro-
kerage firm will develop its own system to ensure effective compliance
with the various laws, rules and regulations based on the nature of its
business. The established supervisory system, however, must meet vari-
ous SRO requirements. 79 A firm's noncompliance with its own policies
may result in liability.8 0
In upholding summary judgment in favor of the registered repre-
sentative, the Lafferty court avoided a complex analysis to determine
whether Lafferty inadequately supervised Foulke. The court held in-
stead that no claim for inadequate supervision may be maintained
against the brokerage firm without an underlying violation of a securities
law or rule by the registered representative.8 ' Thus, in restricting the
registered representative's liability by imposing a control requirement,
the Tenth Circuit has, in effect, restricted the scope of liability faced by
the representative's brokerage firm.
b. Compliance Department Personnel and Other Supervisors'
Exposure
The trend to restrict the scope of untempered exposure for inade-
quate supervision has been followed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Had the registered representative in Lafferty vio-
lated the securities laws, conceivably his superiors may have faced indi-
vidual sanctions for failure to adequately supervise. In determining
exposure for sanctions the SEC has focused on the lack of adequate pro-
cedures, 82 the failure to follow such procedures8 3 and the personal fail-
prietary accounts and employee accounts, provided that each employee account is
reviewed during one of the year's quarters. Rule 351 also requires that members provide
the Exchange with statistical information regarding customer complaints relating to mat-
ters designated by the Exchange. This provision is yet to be implemented by the
Exchange.
77. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 21A & 15(b)(4)(E).
78. See, e.g., Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984-85 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,936 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Smith v. Christie, [1981
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,828 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
79. See, e.g., NYSE Rules' 342, 351, 405, and 476 and NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art.
III, sec. 27, supra note 76.
80. Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1981)
(finding negligence based on defendant's failure to diligently enforce own rules).
81. See Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 898-900.
82. See, e.g., Mabon Nugent & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 27301, 1989 SEC LEXIS
1865 (Sept. 27, 1989).
Effective supervision by broker-dealers is a critical element in the regulatory
scheme and its importance has increased as firms have grown in size. As broker-
dealers expand their activities through the acquisition of branch offices or into
new areas within the securities business, there must be a concomitant expansion
of their supervisory procedures to insure regulatory compliance and sound inter-
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ure of line and staff supervisors to supervise account executives.8 4
In re Chambers,8 5 decided by the SEC in April of 1990, indicated that
a chief compliance officer responsible for maintaining adequate supervi-
sory and compliance procedures within a brokerage firm could be held
personally liable under section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act 86 for defi-
ciencies in supervision. 8 7 The Chambers case was settled and therefore
offered little insight about the factual or legal basis for the SEC's posi-
tion or what steps compliance officers should take to avoid exposure.
The concerns raised in Chambers subsided following the decision of In re
Arthur James Huff.88
In March of 1991, the SEC commenced an enforcement action
against Huff, a vice president in the compliance department of
nal controls. Apart from adopting effective procedures, broker-dealers must pro-
vide effective staffing, efficient resources and a system of follow-up and review to
determine that any responsibility to supervise delegated to compliance officers,
branch managers and other personnel is being diligently exercised.
Id. at *2-3.
83. See, e.g., Barlage, Exchange Act Release No. 25563, 1988 SEC LEXIS 740 (April 8,
1988). The SEC found a branch manager liable for failing to supervise a registered repre-
sentative by not following and enforcing brokerage firm's supervisory policies and proce-
dures, by not enforcing non-solicitation bans, and by not stopping broker's fraudulent
solicitations. Id. The brokerage firm was also found to have failed to supervise the branch
manager. Id.
84. See, e.g., Louis R. Trujillo, Exchange Act Release No. 26635, 43 S.E.C. 690 (March
16, 1989). Trujillo, an administrative branch manager of Merrill Lynch, discovered some
broker misconduct and reported it to the branch manager, but his supervisory record was
"less than exemplary," since a more thorough investigation would have revealed addi-
tional misconduct. Id. Nevertheless, emphasizing that the statute requires only "reason-
able supervision under the attendant circumstances," and the limited scope of Trujillo's
authority, the SEC Commissioners held that the SEC staff had failed to prove that "Tru-
jillo's overall performance with respect to the activities of the broker amounted to a failure
to supervise." Id. The SEC found that Trujillo had made reasonable and diligent efforts
to inform the branch manager. Id. The SEC also noted the Trujillo had gone over the
branch manager's head to place the matter in the hands of higher ranking officials in Mer-
rill Lynch. Id. The SEC concluded:
while we believe that Trujillo could and perhaps should have taken such
steps sooner, our standard is that a manager (of any stripe) 'must respond reason-
ably when confronted with the indication of wrongdoing.' Trujillo's responses as
an 'administrative manager' were not unreasonable, and we should not ignore the
fact that his actions were a major factor in the broker's dismissal.
Id.
85. Exchange Act Release No. 27963, 1990 SEC LEXIS 808 (April 30, 1990).
86. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act provides:
The Commission, by order, shall censure .... or revoke the registration of
any broker or dealer if it finds .... that such censure .... is in the public interest
and that such broker or dealer .... has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view
to preventing violations of the [securities laws], another person who commits
such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(E)15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
87. Chambers, 1990 SEC LEXIS 808 at *2. Pursuant to an offer of settlement, the SEC
entered an order against the Compliance Director of a regional firm finding that he failed
to adequately supervise two account executives who had churned investor accounts, en-
gaged in unsuitable transactions, and made oral misrepresentations to investors. Id. The
SEC found that the Director had been given the responsibility to ensure that the firm
adopted and enforced adequate supervisory and compliance procedures. Id. The firm's
Compliance Manual did not clearly vest responsibility in any supervisor, and thus, the SEC
found that the Director had failed to fulfill his responsibilities. Id.
88. In re Huff, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. Law Rep. (CCH) 84,719 (March
28, 1991).
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PaineWebber Inc., for the alleged failure to supervise a retail salesman
and his branch office manager. 89 Huff assisted the entire firm in estab-
lishing compliance criteria, while the firm looked to its branch managers
to directly supervise its sales staff in all sales activity. Thus, Huff did not
directly or indirectly supervise the activities of the retail salesman who
committed the underlying fraud. Notwithstanding this, the SEC filed
charges alleging Huff had supervisory responsibility for the salesman
and his branch manager.90 An administrative law judge found that Huff
had failed to exercise reasonable supervision over both the salesman
and the salesman's manager. 9 1 On appeal, four SEC Commissioners
unanimously voted to dismiss the proceeding, but in doing so took two
different approaches.
In one opinion, Chairman Breeden and Commissioner Roberts as-
sumed that Huff had the responsibility of supervising the salesman and
the branch manager. 92 They then examined whether Huff in fact exer-
cised supervision over the two in accordance with section 15(b)(4)(E).
The Commissioners determined that Huff satisfied the reasonableness
standard in his compliance efforts over the salesman because he had
previously recommended termination of the salesman after analyzing
the salesman's customer accounts. The Commissioners dismissed the
charge against Huff concerning his alleged deficient supervision of the
manager.93 In deciding this issue, Breeden and Roberts stated that "the
'failure to supervise' by a subordinate is not in and of itself a substantive
violation of the securities laws and, therefore, cannot be the predicate
upon which a superior can be sanctioned for a second-tier 'failure to
supervise.' 9 4 In their concurring opinion, Commissioners Lochner and
Schapiro agreed on the latter issue.9 5 Thus, a majority of four SEC
commissioners held that an individual with supervisory responsibilities
cannot be disciplined for failing to exercise reasonable supervision over
another person who did not personally violate the securities laws, but
rather was merely sanctioned for failure to supervise his or her
subordinate.
While the Breeden-Roberts opinion merely assumed that Huff was
responsible for supervising the salesman, the Lochner-Schapiro opinion
squarely addressed the issue of staff supervision verses line supervision.
Though not adopting a clear staff/line test, the two commissioners
noted that in order for section 15(b)(4)(E) to govern a particular situa-
tion, a "supervisory relationship" must exist. 96 With the exception of
"line supervisors," who have the power to hire, fire, reward or punish,
there is difficulty in determining whether one has the supervisory re-
89. Id. at 81,395.
90. Id. at 81,394.
91. Id. at 81,396.
92. Id. at 81,397.
93. Id. at 81,398.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 81,399.
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sponsibility of another. According to Lochner and Schapiro, in the con-
text of staff (non-line) supervision, such a relationship is found only
when, inter alia, it should have been clear to the supervisor that he was
responsible for the activities of another and that the supervisor had the
ability to take effective action to fulfill this responsibility. 9 7 In effect the
two commissioners had announced a definition of the term "supervisor"
for purposes of section 15(b)(4)(E). In their view a "supervisor" is a
person who "has been given (and knows or reasonably should know he
had been given) the authority and the responsibility for exercising such
control over one or more specific activities of a supervised person ... so
that such person could take effective action to prevent a violation" of the
securities laws or rules.
9 8
Thus, in Huff, the SEC established that deficient supervision by a
subordinate does not in and of itself provide a statutory basis for sanc-
tioning a superior. Absent a clear indication of personal involvement
and affirmative wrongdoing on the part of those to whom responsibility
is delegated, the SEC will not automatically place liability on senior
managers where a violation occurs at a level far removed from them.9 9
The SEC's position clearly restricts exposure to liability.
3. Secondary Liability Restricted for "Controlling Person" and
Respondeat Superior
Investors not only sue brokerage firms under primary liability for
inadequately supervising their registered representatives, but in addi-
tion they frequently pursue the firm for secondary liability. A brokerage
firm faces secondary liability under a number of different theories. In
Lafferty the plaintiff alleged that the brokerage firm was secondarily liable
both as a controlling person and under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior for the primary violations of its registered representative, Foulke.
Because secondary liability is so well established, courts rarely ques-
tion its basis' 0 0 even though federal security statutes do not expressly
prescribe such liability with the limited exception of "controlling per-
son" provisions. 1 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet engaged in a
97. Id.
98. Id. at 81,401. Under Lochner and Schapiro's analysis, Huff was not the sales-
man's supervisor because Huff: (1) was not in a position to control the salesman's activi-
ties through the traditional methods of reward or punishment and (2) was never clearly
given, by his own superiors, authority or responsibility for the salesman's conduct.
At the same time, these Commissioners strongly cautioned that a firm itself may vio-
late the statute if it "fails clearly to assign such supervisory authority and responsibility to
specific individuals" as part of its statutory responsibility. Id.
99. Id. at 81,402.
100. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws - Aiding
and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and The Statutory
Scheme, 14J. CORP. L. 313, 315 (1988).
101. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1990); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1990). A few express provisions for secondary liability
under an aiding and abetting theory also exist. For example, section 209(e) of the Invest-
ment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1990), and for broker-dealers, section
15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1990).
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detailed analysis of the application of secondary liability concepts to the
federal securities laws. 10 2 However, it has witnessed such an applica-
tion. '0 3 In order to find secondary liability the plaintiff must prove that
the primary violator performed the central act proscribed by the statute
or rule.' 0 4 The secondary violator acquires liability because he assisted
or supported the primary violator's act.' 0 5 or through a relationship
with the primary violator. Secondary liability from a relationship can be
based on either common-law respondeat superior liability or statutory
liability for "controlling persons."' 0 6 Although there are some differ-
ences between the principal-agent relationship in agency law and the
control relationship in the statutory provisions, the imposition of liabil-
ity under the two concepts of respondeat superior and control person is
quite similar.
Under the common law of agency, a principal may be liable for the
conduct of his agent. The doctrine of respondeat superior provides: "A
master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment."' 1 7 Under securities laws
there are two provisions which hold controlling persons liable to the
same extent as the persons they control. Section 15 of the 1933 Act' 0 8
and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act' 0 9 both hold that a person in control
of another who violates the securities laws shall be jointly and severally
liable with the violator.
Although the two concepts are quite similar, a critical difference ex-
ists regarding good faith. The control person provisions expressly pro-
vide relief from liability for proof of good faith;" 0 agency principles
102. Keuhnle, supra note 100, at 316-17. The Court expressly reserved decision about
aiding and abetting in Hochfelder. "[W]e need not consider whether civil liability for aiding
and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule, nor the elements necessary to
establish such a cause of action." Hochfilder, 425 U.S. at 191-92 n.7
103. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 316-17.
104. ld at 318.
105. See supra notes 132-57 and accompanying text for discussion of aider and abettor
liability.
106. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 348.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
108. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1990) states:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or
more other person by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls
any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
109. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
110. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673-74 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, remanded in part,
625 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980); Carpenter v. Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
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under the doctrine of respondeat superior do not relieve the principal
from liability even when he acts in good faith."I ' The principal's liabil-
ity is, however, limited to the acts done within the scope of the agent's
employment. 1 2 The conflict between the two doctrines concerning
good faith has divided the courts over whether the two federal securities
provisions are exclusive of common law agency principles. 1 13 The ma-
jority of circuits hold that Congress did not intend to supplant agency
law with the controlling person provisions, but enacted the provisions to
provide an additional basis of secondary liability.' i4 In fact, the major-
ity of courts hold that respondeat superior has concurrent liability with
controlling person liability. 15 Nevertheless, under both provisions, lia-
bility is derivative. Absent an underlying violation by the controlled per-
son (registered representative), no claim against the controlling person
(brokerage firm) may be maintained.
116
Thus, in order for the plaintiff in Lafferty to succeed in an action
against the brokerage firm she must have shown: (1) a primary securi-
ties violation by the registered representative; and (2) control of that
representative by the brokerage firm."
7
Conversely, substantial disagreement exists between courts regard-
ing the correct operation of "control" in control person liability. The
dividing issue is whether the federal provisions apply only to individuals
who actively control the primary violator (culpable participation), or
whether the provisions also apply to individuals who have a general,
rather than a direct, relationship of control over the violator. Courts
that mandate culpable participation require the controlling person to
have control over the primary violator and to directly exercise that con-
111. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) (holding em-
ployer who exercised utmost care still liable for acts of employees while acting in scope of
employment).
112. See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980. See also
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Il1. 1989) (refusing to
impose liability on basis of respondeat superior where broker sold municipal bonds in
manner contrary to firm's rules and where transactions were "anything but regular");
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding investment banker not liable for acts of employee/tippee because trading
on inside information not within the scope of employment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § § 228-29 (1958) (defining acts within the scope of employment).
113. See Kuehnle, supra note 90, at 349-54. "The circuits are divided, with the clear
majority holding for agency liability and against exclusivity." Id. at 349.
114. Id. at 350.
115. Gerald F. Rath & David C. Boch, Selected Issues in Broker/Customer Litigation, 751
A.L.I.- A.B.A. Course of Study 557 (1992)[hereinafter Issues]. This carefully documented
work examines each circuit for their rulings on this issue and generally finds none that
have expressly denied concurrent liability, with the possible exception of the Third. Id.
For the Securities and Exchange Commission's view see the amicus brief in Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Appeal No. 87-3887 (9th Cir. file Nov. 9, 1989). See also Recent SEC Amicus
Brief Supports Respondeat Superior Liability in Private Action, 4 INSIGHrs 1 (Jan. 1990) (respon-
deat superior liability should be imposed concurrently with the statutory liability of section
20(a) to protect the public).
116. Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); Rob-
erts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Baum v. Philips, Appel & Walden, 648 F.
Supp. 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
117. Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165 (D. Conn. 1988).
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trol with the intent to bring about a violation. Courts not mandating
culpable participation do not require participation by the controlling
person in the violation," 8 but some relation between control and the
violation is required. The circuit courts' positions suggest that some are
inclined to support secondary liability based merely on relationship,
while others impose liability based on action.' 19
In those jurisdictions requiring active or culpable participation, the
investor-plaintiff must show the controlling person's real control over
the violator. This may be shown from the relationship in general-as in
showing that the primary violator was an employee of the defendant cor-
poration. The plaintiff must then show that the scope of control in-
cluded the conduct that was the basis of the primary violation-as in
showing that the employee's particular violative conduct was within the
scope of the corporation's control. The plaintiff need not show, how-
ever, that the control was exercised to cause the violation.
This approach appears to comport with the intent of the statute.'
20
It requires the plaintiff to prove the ability to exercise control without
having to make the more difficult proof of the actual exercise of the con-
trol in this particular violation-a matter within the knowledge of the
defendant and relevant to the good faith defense. Thus, in courts fol-
lowing this approach the plaintiff must establish culpable participation
before the defendant addresses the good faith defense. 12 1 In those
courts not following the culpable participation approach, however, when
the plaintiff establishes the defendant had control over the primary vio-
lator the "control" element is satisfied and the burden immediately
shifts to the defendant to establish the good faith defense.
12 2
The Tenth Circuit appears to have rejected culpable participation.
It has imposed liability on brokerage firms for their representative's un-
derlying violation without reference to culpable participation.
123
Therefore, in Lafferty, had Ms. O'Connor been able to establish an un-
derlying violation by Foulke, the burden would shift to Lafferty to estab-
118. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir. 1981)
("Neither this [regulatory] definition nor the statute appears to require participation in the
wrongful transaction.")
119. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 354-55 n.21 1. Kuehnle found the following differ-
ent circuit treatments: three circuits appear to require culpable participation (Ninth, Sec-
ond and Third); five have rejected culpable participation either expressly or impliedly
through their analysis of the control elements in a way that is inconsistent with culpable
participation (Tenth, Eighth, Seventh, Sixth and Fifth); and the issue is unclear or has not
been decided in the remaining circuits (Fourth, First and D.C.). Id.
120. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
121. Orloffv. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1987); Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d
761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976); Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1086 (2d Cir. 1974);
122. See San Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co., 765
F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1985); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d
1111, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
123. See, e.g., Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 659-60 (10th Cir. 1987); San Francisco-
Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp., 765 F.2d at 964-66; Richardson v. MacArthur, 451
F.2d 35, 41 (10th Cir. 1971).
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lish the good faith defense, because of its control of Foulke. 12 4
Both statutory provisions make available to the brokerage firm the
good faith defense. 125 To prove good faith:
it is necessary for the controlling person to show that some
precautionary measures were taken to prevent an injury caused
by an employee. . . . It is required of the controlling person
only that he maintain an adequate system of internal control
and that he maintain the system in a diligent manner.
126
The precise standard of supervision required of the brokerage firm to
establish the good faith defense is uncertain. 12 7 However, where the
registered representative completes the violative transaction through
the employing brokerage and the firm receives a commission on the
transaction, the burden of proving good faith is on the brokerage. 12
8
The brokerage must show that no negligence has occurred in supervi-
sion of the registered representative,' 29 and that it has maintained and
enforced a reasonably reliable system of supervision and internal con-
trol over such personnel.130 Thus, Lafferty could have defended against
the secondary liability claim by proving it had maintained and reason-
ably enforced a proper system of supervision over Foulke-in other
words, by establishing the good faith defense.
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not, however, provide
such a defense. Under this doctrine the primary focus concerns the
scope of employment and whether an employee's acts can fairly be con-
sidered within the scope of employment. 13 1 Here, the only defense
available to Lafferty is where Foulke acts beyond the scope of his em-
ployment. Obviously, whenever a court restricts the scope of primary
liability, it in effect restricts any derivative secondary liability. Again, as
a result of the Tenth Circuit's restricting the scope of primary liability
for the registered representative in Lafferty, the scope of secondary liabil-
ity for the brokerage firm was also restricted.
124. As a matter of law, a brokerage firm is a controlling person with respect to its
registered representatives. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir.
1990).
125. See Carpenter v. Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673-74 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, 625 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980) (analogous statutory provisions interpreted similarly).
126. Carpenter, 594 F.2d at 394. Accord Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564
(9th Cir. 1990) (stating that to prove good faith broker-dealer must show "supervisory
system was adequate and that it reasonably discharged its responsibilities under the sys-
tem"); Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [ 1984-85 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 91,936 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that defendant was not in
compliance with duty of good faith). See generally, Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative
Liability Under Section 20(a) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1019, 1037
(1973) (and cases cited therein).
127. See Marbury, 629 F.2d at 716.
128. Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
129. SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 54 (2d Cir. 1976); Gordon, 506 F.2d at
1085-86.
130. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 1975).
131. Marbury, 629 F.2d at 716.
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4. Secondary Liability Restricted for Aiding and Abetting
The case of Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 132 offers further
evidence of a Tenth Circuit trend to restrict liability in Rule 1Ob-5 cases.
During the period 1979 until 1986, Patrick Powers and his related enti-
ties (collectively Powers) offered and sold over fifty limited partnerships.
The limited partners. who invested in the offerings claimed that Powers
defrauded investors in 58 limited partnerships by making numerous
misrepresentations while the partnerships were nothing more than
"worthless shells" w-ithout value.133 The plaintiffs further claimed that
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company (Peat Marwick), the accounting firm
that audited Powers, became "involved in the fraud" in April, 1981,
when it agreed to certify the Powers' financial statements, which it knew
to be "materially false and inaccurate." 134 The disgruntled limited part-
ners brought suit against the accounting firm for, inter alia, aiding and
abetting.135 The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims for failure to allege fraud with particularity under Rule
9(b).' 3 6 The court noted that the allegations failed to specify which
plaintiffs had dealt directly with Peat Marwick, from which persons the
plaintiffs had purchased their interests, and on which occasions the mis-
representations were made and how they were directed to plaintiffs.1
3 7
Employers and.others, including agents such as accountants and at-
torneys, can be held liable under an aiding and abetting charge.
Although the federal securities laws generally do not provide for such
liability' 3 8 and the U.S. Supreme Court has reserved ruling on the is-
sue, 139 courts almost universally infer liability for aiding and abetting by
utilizing the joint tortfeasor language in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 140 In order to establish aider and abettor liability under Rule lOb-
5, the facts must show a violation by the primary violator, knowledge of
that violation by an aider and abettor, and "substantial assistance" by
the aider and abettor.'
4 '
132. 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992).
133. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 985.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 986.
136. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with par-
ticularity." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
137. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 987-89.
138. There are a few provisions of the federal securities laws that expressly provide for
aiding and abetting liability. See, e.g., Investment Advisors Act § 209 (e), 15.U.S.C. § 80b-
9(e) (1990). Broker-dealers are subject to administrative sanctions for willfully aiding and
abetting violations of the federal securities laws. Id. See also Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1990)(allowing the Commission to censure,
place limitations on activities, suspend or revoke the license of broker dealers who willfully
aid or abet violation).
139. See Hochfetder, 425 U.S. at 191 n.7.
140. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 321-22.
141. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 98,792 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983) (aiding and abetting churning allegation against
stockbroker sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss); Board of Trustees v. Liberty Group,
708 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See generally, Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauder-
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The second and third elements of aiding and abetting liability pres-
ent the greatest difficulty. The first element, a violation by a primary
violator usually has been decided by the time aiding and abetting liabil-
ity is being considered. The two difficult elements demand a determina-
tion of the level of assistance and knowledge required in order to apply
liability for aiding and abetting. In determining the level of assistance
required courts turn again to the Restatement, which imposes liability
when one person breaches a duty and another gives "substantial assist-
ance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself."' 4 2 While
the defendant may be aware a violation is occurring, unless he acts to aid
the violation or fails to act when he had a duty, no liability attaches.
143
The Restatement measures assistance essentially under the principles of
causation.144 An "[aictor's negligent conduct [will be] the legal cause of
harm to another if ... his conduct is a substantial factor in the bringing
about [of] the harm .... ,,145 Thus, in determining whether substantial
assistance has been given by the aider and abettor, one must find a sub-
stantial causal connection between the assistance and the violation.
That causal connection can arise from either the aider's action or inac-
tion, as long as the action or inaction caused the harm. 146 In determin-
ing the causal connection, and thus the degree of assistance,
consideration is given to the number and effect of other variables, and to
whether the conduct was harmless until acted upon by other forces or
was part of a continuous stream of forces leading to the resulting
harm. 1
4 7
dale, 765 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir.
1983); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Rochez
Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Hemming v. Alfin Fragrances,
Inc., 690 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977).
143. Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978)
(holding "mere knowledge of a violation alone, without assistance or a duty to disclose the
violation, is not an actionable wrong").
144. The cmt. for clause b of § 876 states: "In determining liability, the factors are the
same as those used in determining the existence of legal causation when there has been
negligence ... or recklessness .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b), cmt. d
(1977). See also Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (finding there must be substantial causal connection between conduct of al-
leged aider and abettor and harm to plaintiff).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430, cmt. d (1977).
It is not necessary that it be the cause, using the word 'the' as meaning the
sole or even the predominant cause. The wrongful conduct of a number of third
persons may also be a cause of the harm, so that such third persons may be liable
for it, concurrently with the actor.
lId (emphasis in original).
146. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 342.
[L]iability for nonaction requires a showing of the breach of a duty or a show-
ing of conscious intent. A breach of duty can constitute causal assistance. If one
owed a duty to the plaintiff and the failure to fulfill the duty permitted the harm to
occur, the person owing the duty could be said to have assisted the violation. The
duty, the breach of which could be said to be a cause of the harm, could arise
from a statutory obligation under the securities laws or from another, indirect
basis of duty including custom, practice, contract, or special relationship.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
147. See, e.g., Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 282-83 (9th Cir. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1977). Kuehnle states:
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In determining the level of knowledge required for an aider and
abettor, the Second Circuit in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co. ,148 con-
sidered whether the Rule lOb-5 standard of knowledge matched the sci-
enter needed for primary lOb-5 liability. The court concluded that "the
basic holding of Hochfelder, that scienter is an element of the section
10(b)/Rule lOb-5 cause of action, also establishes the standard for aid-
ing and abetting liability."' 14 9 Considering whether recklessness consti-
tutes scienter for an aiding and abetting violation, the Second Circuit
concluded that "at least where, as here, the alleged aider and abettor
owes a fiduciary duty to the defrauded party, recklessness satisfies the
scienter requirement." 15o
Although the issue of recklessness for Rule lOb-5 liability is not
fully resolved, it has almost universal acceptance as constituting scienter
for primary lOb-5 violations. However, recklessness is not as well ac-
cepted for secondary aider and abettor liability. Some courts allow reck-
lessness to satisfy the scienter requirement for aider and abettor liability
without any special circumstances.' 5 1 Other courts recognize reckless-
ness as an appropriate standard only under special circumstances. For
example, courts requiring special circumstances have allowed reckless-
ness to satisfy the scienter requirement in aider and abettor liability
where a fiduciary relationship exists between the victim and the aider
and abettor, 15 2 where the aider and abettor could reasonably foresee
that the plaintiff would rely upon his actions 1 53 and where the aider and
Activity that is otherwise harmless does not constitute assistance where the
activity has been made harmful by the intervention of other, corrupting forces.
Thus, where an accountant prepares interim financial statements for a company
and informs the company of deficiencies in the company's books, the accountant
is not liable for the subsequent alteration of those statements and their use in a
prospectus by another.
Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 340 n.154. But see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-
42 (2d Cir. 1973)(giving opinion letter on securities issue makes securities lawyer partici-
pant in stream of events leading to securities transaction; letter may be legal causal factor
constituting substantial assistance even if flow of events takes several turns).
148. 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1977).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding circuit law is
either scienter or recklessness is sufficient to fulfill requirement); Edward J. Mawod & Co.
v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979) (prevailing rule is willful or reckless behavior
satisfies scienter requirement).
152. See Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11 th Cir.
1985) (holding severe recklessness satisfies scienter requirement in aiding and abetting
case, at least where alleged aider and abettor owes duty to defrauded party); Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) (owing fiduciary duty to plaintiff makes reckless-
ness sufficient for liability for aider and abettor); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d
Cir. 1980) (noting that fiduciary duty is recognized as special consideration allowing reck-
lessness as satisfaction of scienter requirement for aider and abettor liability); Rof, 570
F.2d at 48 (alleged aider and abettor owing fiduciary duty allows recklessness to satisfy
scienter requirement); Hudson v. Capital Mgmt. Int'l, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 615, 624 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (ruling that recklessness only suffices fiduciary or analogous relationship binds
defendant to plaintiff).
153. See Woods, 765 F.2d at 1011 (following precedent applying "'recklessness standard
to alleged aiders and abettors who have issued statements or certifications foreseeably
relied upon by investors"); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp.
1314, 1356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating although courts generally don't regard accountant-
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abettor receives a benefit from the fraud.15 4
Still other courts developed and utilized a sliding scale approach
linking the level of knowledge required to the degree of assistance ren-
dered. 15 5 This approach scales the level of knowledge upward or down-
ward depending upon the amount and type of assistance rendered. A
stronger showing of knowledge is required where the assistance is re-
mote or routine. 15 6 In 1979 the Tenth Circuit followed the less restric-
tive approach toward aiding and abetting liability and stated "[t]he
prevailing rule would appear to be that... reckless behavior satisfies the
scienter requirement" for aiding and abetting.1
5 7
However, in Farlow, the Tenth Circuit, following the trend of re-
stricting the scope of liability, also stated that it is not the law that whis-
tle-blowing to protect investors is necessitated whenever an accountant
discovers his client to be in financial trouble. 158 The failure to disclose
material information is actionable only where a duty to disclose arises,-
when one party has information that the other party is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them.159 The duty to disclose does not arise from the relation-
ship between the parties merely because one party has an ability to ac-
quire information.
The court in Farlow, like the Lafferty court, affirmatively addressed
an issue that did not direct its decision. The facts in Farlow permitted
the court to dismiss the case for failing to specifically plead fraud pursu-
ant to Rule 9(b). 160 Yet, the court stepped forward and restricted the
scope of Rule lOb-5 liability by refusing to adopt the whistleblower or
client relationship as fiduciary, recklessness standard applies where accountant's mislead-
ing audit or opinion letter leads to foreseeable reliance); Morgan v. Prudential Group,
Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that reliance on attorney's tax opin-
ion is foreseeable, and where foreseeability of reliance is apparent recklessness standard
may be applied); Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 550, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ruling recklessness sufficient to establish scienter where plaintiff/third
party reliance on accountant's audit or opinion letter is reasonably foreseeable).
154. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976)
(knowledge requirement less strict where alleged aider and abettor derives benefits from
wrongdoing).
155. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1988)(ex-
plaining previously adopted test that establishes scienter by relating level of assistance to
level of intent); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding knowledge
and assistance factors vary inversely relative to one another; where evidence of substantial
assistance is slim requirement of knowledge or scienter is enhanced); Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at
923.
156. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975) ("scienter
requirement scales upward when activity is more remote").
157. EdwardJ. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979).
158. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 988.
"That [whistleblower liability] would be an extreme theory of accountants'
liability, and it is one we decline to embrace as an interpretation of the common
law of Illinois, having in previous cases specifically rejected it as a possible theory
of Rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability."
Id. at 988 (citing Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.
1986) and LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1988).
159. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
160. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 984-89.
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financial Good Samaritan theory of liability for accountant liability,
thereby refusing to expand the duty to disclose.
16'
III.CONCLUSION
Although the Tenth Circuit is not a hot bed for securities litigation,
it nonetheless is subject to the trend to restrict the scope of Rule lOb-5
liability. Without articulating its position, the Tenth Circuit has illus-
trated through three decisions last year its reluctance to expand securi-
ties fraud liability. Indeed, the court addressed questions restricting
Rule lOb-5 liability when such questions were never posed. The Tenth
Circuit now requires specific allegations of the who, what, where, when
and how in pleading a lOb-5 violation in order to defeat an opposing
motion for summary judgment or dismissal. The court also requires the
element of control for unsuitability claims based on fraud by conduct
and no whistleblower or financial good Samaritan theory of liability ex-
ists in the Tenth Circuit. One may argue that these imposed require-
ments illustrate the Tenth Circuit's willingness to take affirmative steps
to reduce securities fraud litigation by restricting liability. Evident from
their voiced concerns, the business sector shares an attitude that securi-
ties fraud litigation has grown beyond an acceptable limit and affirma-
tive steps need to be taken to reduce liability. This attitude is already
apparent in the courts, as witnessed from their application of securities
fraud issues. What remains uncertain is whether Congress agrees with
this attitude. The answer to that question shall remain a matter of spec-
ulation until Congress hears the Senate and House bills in 1993.
BrentJ Gregoire
161. Cf The Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act H.R. 4313, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1992) (Whistleblower Act) introduced by Rep. Ron Wyden, (D-OR), approved by
the full House Energy and Commerce Committee July 28, 1992 and opposed by AICPA.
American Banker-Bond Buyer, a Div. of Thomson's Int'l Bank Accountant, 2 U.S. BANK
AcCouN rING LEDGER 38, at 6 (October 12, 1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library The bill
would authorize the SEC to direct independent auditors to investigate their clients for
fraud and other wrongdoing. Id. The proposal would require auditors to report manage-
ment fraud to company officials, and also set forth procedures for auditors to follow if they




In contrast to the diversified and significant nature of the federal tax
cases that came before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 199 1,1 the
court labored through a rather bland and uneventful 1992. While 1992
presented the court with an opportunity to clarify some matters of inter-
est, for the most part the year passed without any major developments.
Perhaps as a result of a recessionary economy, or a growing discontent
among the taxpaying public, an increasing percentage of the court's
time in the tax area seems dedicated to disposing of matters related in
one fashion or another to the enforcement of the federal tax laws and
the resolution of procedural or administrative disputes between taxpay-
ers and the government, rather than to the interpretation of more sub-
stantive tax issues. As more and more citizens encounter difficulties in
meeting the tax obligations imposed upon them in a soft economy, the
court's opinions increasingly center on challenges - sometimes suc-
cessful, more often not - to the propriety of the assessment, collection,
foreclosure, levy and seizure activities of the Internal Revenue Service.
Taxpayers appear more aggressive in attempting to hide their assets,
hence an increase in fraudulent conveyance determinations. Tax protes-
tors regularly bring specious constitutional or similar arguments to the
court, ultimately claiming that no living human being is subject to fed-
eral taxation. These arguments are just as regularly dismissed by the
court, occasionally with the imposition of sanctions. Tax issues im-
pacting the distribution of bankruptcy estates occur with more fre-
quency. While the Tenth Circuit addressed many matters meeting these
descriptions, virtually no opinion of substantive importance evolved
from the court's activities in 1992.
This Survey first examines in detail some of the more noteworthy
federal tax cases - noteworthy at least on a relative basis - disposed of
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1992.2 This Survey then con-
cludes by summarizing other opinions handed down by the court in the
tax area during the year just past.
* B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver, 1977; Masters in Taxation, Univer-
sity of Denver, 1978; J.D., Stanford University 1981; Lecturer in Law, University of
Denver.
1. See James Serven, Eighteenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Taxation, 69 DENV. U. L.
REv. 1037 (1992).
2. This Survey examines opinions handed down or otherwise first made available by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1992, in the area of federal income, estate, and gift
taxation.
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I. TIMELY MAILED NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY IS VALID IF RECEIVED
TAXPAYER IN MANNER NOT WORKING PREJUDICIAL DELAY,
EVEN THOUGH IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED: SCHEIDT
V. COMMISSIONER 3
A. Background
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue must make an assessment of taxes, if at all, within three
years after a taxpayer files a return.4 If the Commissioner determines
that there is a deficiency 5 in respect of any tax, the Commissioner is
authorized to send a statutory Notice of Deficiency to the taxpayer by
certified or registered mail,6 informing the taxpayer of the deficiency
proposed to be assessed by the Commissioner. The mailing of the No-
tice of Deficiency is a prerequisite to the making of the assessment.
7
The taxpayer to whom the Notice of Deficiency is sent may then file a
petition with the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the
deficiency set forth in the Notice.8 Such a petition must be filed within
ninety days after the date of mailing of the Notice of Deficiency. 9 Dur-
ing this ninety day period, the Commissioner is precluded from entering
an assessment against the taxpayer in respect of the deficiency proposed
in the Notice of Deficiency. 10 However, if the taxpayer fails to timely file
a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court within the ninety day
statutory period, the Commissioner is directed to assess the deficiency
following the expiration of the ninety days. I I The Commissioner may
thereupon commence collection activities against the taxpayer and his
assets.
3. 967 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992).
4. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1988). Under certain circumstances, the three-year statute of
limitations is extended. For example, if the return omits items of gross income that exceed
twenty-five percent of the amount of gross income otherwise reflected in the return, the
statutory limitations period is increased to six years. Id § 6501(e)(1). In addition, the
statute of limitations is completely open-ended where there has been a false or fraudulent
return with the intent to evade tax, where there has been a willful attempt to defeat or
evade tax, or where no return has been filed. Id. § 6501(c).
5. A "deficiency" is defined in the context of income tax by I.R.C. § 6211 (a) to mean,
"(1) the excess of the statutorily imposed tax over the total of the amount shown on the
taxpayer's return, (2) plus previous assessments, (3) less abatements, credits, refunds, or
other prepayments." Keado v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1209, 1210 n.l (5th Cir. 1988).
6. I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1988).
7. Id. § 6213(a).
8. Id. The Tax Court is the only forum available for the litigation of tax cases which
does not require the prepayment of the deficiency. "If the taxpayer fails to timely file a
Tax Court petition, but still desires to contest the merits of the deficiency, he must pay the
deficiency in full and sue for a refund in a United States District Court or the United States
Claims Court." Keado, 853 F.2d at 1212, n.10. The Notice of Deficiency, also known as
the "90 day letter," has been described as the taxpayer's "ticket to the Tax Court." Del-
man v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968).
9. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
10. Id. If the taxpayer does file a timely petition with the Tax Court, the Commis-
sioner is further precluded from assessing the deficiency "until the decision of the Tax
Court becomes final." Id.
11. Id § 6213(c). An " 'assessment,' essentially a bookkeeping notation, is made
when the Secretary or his delegate establishes an account against the taxpayer on the tax
rolls." Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 170 n.13 (1976).
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The running of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during
the time that the Commissioner is precluded from assessing a deficiency
- that is, for the ninety days following the mailing of the Notice of Defi-
ciency - and for sixty days thereafter. 12 Whether or not a Notice of
Deficiency has been validly delivered to the taxpayer so as to be suffi-
cient to toll the statute of limitations can be a question of crucial impor-
tance to the Commissioner, particularly where the Notice is sent just
prior to the expiration of the three-year period. In the case of an in-
come tax deficiency, the Internal Revenue Code provides the Commis-
sioner with a safe harbor which states that a Notice of Deficiency will be
deemed sufficient if it is mailed by certified or registered mail to the
taxpayer at his "last known address."' 3 Thus, if the Commissioner
mails the Notice by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer's last
known address,' 4 the Notice will operate to suspend the statute of limi-
tations as to the taxpayer, despite the fact that the taxpayer may never
receive the Notice and may therefore be unaware of the proposed as-
sessment.' 5 Such a Notice provides a form of deemed notification to the
taxpayer.
If the Notice of Deficiency is not sent to the taxpayer's last known
address, the safe harbor will not operate to toll the statute of limitations.
However, it may happen that the taxpayer, in fact, ultimately receives
the Notice, even though it was improperly addressed, such as where the
Notice is simply forwarded through the mails to the taxpayer's current,
correct address. In such circumstances, the safe harbor will be unavaila-
ble to the Commissioner. The courts have generally held, however, that
when the Commissioner has been successful in providing the taxpayer
with actual notice of the proposed assessment, even though the Notice,
although timely mailed, was not sent to the taxpayer's last known ad-
dress, the Notice is sufficient to suspend the statute of limitations as of
the date of mailing if there has been no delay in the taxpayer's receipt of
the Notice that would prejudice the taxpayer's ability to timely file his
petition with the Tax Court.' 6
12. I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1). The statute of limitations is further tolled during the pen-
dency of court proceedings, if a Tax Court petition is timely filed. Id.
13. Id. § 6212(b)(1).
14. The Internal Revenue Service is required to use "reasonable diligence" to ascer-
tain the taxpayer's correct address. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 664
(10th Cir. 1985). See also Gullen v. Barnes, 819 F.2d 975, 977 (10th Cir. 1987).
15. In a 1992 decision that was not officially reported, the court of appeals upheld a
determination by the district court that a Notice of Deficiency had been timely mailed to
the taxpayer's last known address, and thus, the district court had no jurisdiction to hear
the taxpayer's action to enjoin the Service from imposing liens and levies against his prop-
erty. Howell v. United States, No. 92-3016, 1992 U. S. App. LEXIS 32709 (10th Cir. Dec.
11, 1992).
16. See, e.g., Borgman v. Commissioner, 888 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir. 1989) (Notice of
Deficiency was mailed to the taxpayer in Chicago, then immediately forwarded to him at
correct address in Acton, Massachusetts, so as to be received five days after mailing and
two days prior to the date the statute of limitations would run. The court stated that: "[a]
notice of deficiency that is actually received without delay prejudicial to the taxpayer's
ability to petition the Tax Court is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as of the date
of mailing."); McKay v. Commissioner, 886 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[Ihf mailing
results in actual notice without prejudicial delay... it meets the conditions of § 6212(a) no
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B. Facts
William and Wanda Scheidt filed their 1978 federal income tax re-
turn on June 15, 1979. On June 9, 1982, six days before the expiration
of the three-year statutory limitation period, the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue mailed a Notice of Deficiency to the Scheidts, proposing a
deficiency with respect to their 1978 return. 17 The Notice was sent by
certified mail, addressed to the Scheidts at Post Office Box 20711,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At that time, however, Box 20711 was not
the correct mailing address for the Scheidts. Sometime during 1981, the
Scheidts had relinquished Box 20711, and had begun renting Box
20748. Both boxes were located at the Village Branch of the Post Of-
fice. On December 31, 1981, the forwarding order from Box 20711 to
Box 20748 expired.
On May 19, 1981, the Scheidts had informed the Internal Revenue
Service' 8 that all notices and other correspondence from the Service to
the Scheidts should be sent to their home address.' 9 Pursuant to a
Power of Attorney granted on Form 2848 to their accountant, Robert J.
Drewell, and filed with the Commissioner, the Scheidts also directed the
Commissioner to send copies of all such correspondence to Mr.
Drewell. 20 The Commissioner did not send duplicate originals of the
Notice of Deficiency to the Scheidts home address, to Box 20748, or to
Mr. Drewell.
On or aboutJune 10, 1982, the Village Branch Post Office received
the Notice of Deficiency. Although a notice was placed in Box 20711
informing the Scheidts of the certified letter, it was not picked up. Sub-
sequently, on July 6, 1982, the letter was placed in Box 20748. William
Scheidt then picked up the letter and signed for it on that date.2 1 Mea-
sured from July 6, 1982, the Scheidts, therefore, did not receive the No-
matter to what address the notice successfully was sent.") (quoting Clodfelter v. Commis-
sioner, 527 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 979 (1976)). See also Lakota
v. Commissioner, No. 90-1796, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 2833 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 1991) (mis-
addressed Notice mailed on February 21, 1989, was actually received by taxpayer some-
time in March, well before the May 22 date by which his Tax Court petition would need to
be filed; held, the Notice was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations); Pugsley v. Com-
missioner, 749 F.2d 691 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (taxpayer not prejudiced when a Notice of Defi-
ciency misaddressed to Tampa, Florida, was immediately forwarded to taxpayer's correct
address in St. Mary, Georgia). For an extreme case, see Boccutto v. Commissioner, 277
F.2d 549 (3rd Cir. 1960) (Notice mailed on November 13, 1959, and returned undelivered
is nevertheless sufficient when personally handed to the taxpayer at Internal Revenue Ser-
vice office on January 21, 1960). Cf Sicker v. Commissioner, 815 F.2d 1400 (11 th Cir.
1987) (misaddressed notice of deficiency not sufficient to toll statute of limitations where
notice not received by taxpayer until eighty-seven days after its mailing and eight days
prior to expiration of ninety-day period for filing petition with Tax Court).
17. The Notice also proposed a deficiency arising out of the Scheidts' 1979 federal
income tax return.
18. The Internal Revenue Service is sometimes referred to herein as the "Service."
19. Scheidt v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1501 (1985).
20. Id. Mr. Drewell began renting Box 20711 after it was relinquished by the
Scheidts. Mr. Scheidt and Mr. Drewell had "office shared" since May of 1981. Id.
21. The record is unclear as to how the letter found its way to Box 20748. Presuma-
bly, personnel at the. Village Branch Post Office were aware of the Scheidts' new box and
simply placed the letter there.
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tice of Deficiency until twenty-one days after the expiration of the three-
year statute of limitations, twenty-seven days after the mailing of the No-
tice, and sixty-three days prior to the date that the Scheidts would be
required to file a timely petition with the Tax Court to contest the pro-
posed assessment, assuming the Notice was valid.
On September 4, 1992, the Scheidts timely filed a petition with the
Tax Court with respect to the 1978 deficiency. The Scheidts then filed
a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for
summary judgment, on the theory that the Notice of Deficiency was not
timely mailed to them and that the Notice, therefore, did not toll the
three-year statute of limitations. If the statute of limitations had not
been tolled, the Notice must then be considered untimely, and there
could be no valid assessment of the proposed deficiency relating to
1978.
C. Result in the Tax Court
In a 1985 memorandum opinion,2 2 the Tax Court denied both mo-
tions filed by the Scheidts, holding that, although the Notice of Defi-
ciency had not been mailed to the Scheidts' last known address and the
constructive notice safe harbor did not apply, nevertheless, the Scheidts
did in fact receive the Notice in time to file a timely petition with the Tax
Court. Thus, because the Notice had been timely mailed by the Service
and received by the Scheidts with ample time to file their Tax Court
petition, the Scheidts were not prejudiced by the delay. Therefore, the
Notice served to toll the three-year statute of limitations.
D. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax
Court.23 Citing cases decided in the other circuits, 24 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted the established rule that where the taxpayer re-
ceives actual notice of a proposed assessment in the form of a Notice of
Deficiency that was timely mailed prior to the expiration of the three-
year statute of limitations to an address other than the taxpayer's last
known address, the Notice will nevertheless operate to toll the statute of
limitations if there has been no delay prejudicial to the taxpayer result-
ing from the fact that the Notice was not sent to his last known address.
Here, the court felt - and the taxpayers had in fact stipulated 2 5 - that
the Scheidts were not prejudiced by having sixty-three days to prepare
and file their Tax Court petition prior to the expiration of the ninety day
statutory period.
On appeal, the Scheidts attempted to convince the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals that a Notice of Deficiency is not sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations unless: (1) the Notice is mailed prior to the expira-
22. Scheidt v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1501 (1985).
23. The three-judge panel consisted ofJudge Moore, Judge Engle, and Judge Tacha.
24. See supra note 16 for the cited cases and additional cases.
25. Scheidt, 967 F.2d. at 1451, n.5.
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tion of the three-year statute of limitations, and (2) the Notice is received
by the taxpayer in "the due course of the mail."' 26 The Scheidts fash-
ioned their two-part test in reliance upon language appearing in prior
cases that apparently relied in part upon the fact that the misaddressed
letter was delivered in "due course."' 2 7 The Scheidts argued that be-
cause the Notice was not received by them until twenty-seven days after
its mailing, it was not received in the due course of the mail. The Tenth
Circuit was not persuaded, noting that the statute only requires the No-
tice of Deficiency to be mailed in a timely fashion, and does not explicitly
tie the effectiveness of the Notice to its receipt by the taxpayer. The court
thus declined to accept the Scheidts' invitation to "graft an additional
prerequisite to the tolling of the limitations period based on whether a
taxpayer receives the notice of deficiency in the due course of the
mails."
28
The Scheidts also argued that a constructive "remailing" of the No-
tice of Deficiency had occurred through the act of the Notice having
been voluntarily placed in the Scheidts' new Post Office box by the Pos-
tal Service. If that theory were correct, the date of mailing of the Notice
could no longer be considered as June 9, 1982, and would have to be
considered as the date the Notice was placed in the new Post Office box.
That later date fell outside the three-year statute of limitations. Accord-
ing to the Scheidts, such a "remailing" was, therefore, not timely, and
did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals was not impressed by the Scheidts' argument of "con-
structive remailing" and simply noted that, in fact, the Commissioner
had mailed the Notice only once.
29
26. Id. at 1451.
27. In the Tax Court, the Scheidts had relied on language in Frieling v. Commis-
sioner, 81 T.C. 42 (1983), to the effect that -[t]he notice [at issue in that case] complied
with section 6212(a) because petitioners received it in due course through the Postal Service
and filed a timely petition in this Court." Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added). The Scheidts also
relied upon Sicker v. Commissioner, 815 F.2d 1400 (11 th Cir. 1987), discussed supra note
16, as support for their two-part test. See also Zikria v. Williams, 535 F. Supp. 481, 485
(W.D. Pa. 1982) ("[W]here the notice is sent to the wrong address but delivered to the taxpayer
in due course, there is no prejudice to the taxpayer and the notice is valid.") (emphasis in
original).
28. Scheidt, 967 F.2d at 1451. The Tax Court, in response to the Scheidts' reliance on
Frieling, had stated that it did not read the Frieling opinion "as requiring a two-step test to
be met." Scheidt v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1501, 1504 (1985). The Tax Court
concluded that Frieling stands only for the proposition that "petitioners must not be
prejudiced by the misaddressing, and must be able to timely file a petition with the Tax
Court." Id. "The significant factor in the Frieling case, as in the instant case, is that peti-
tioners eventually received the notice and were afforded ample opportunity to file a peti-
tion." Id. at 1504-05. In response to the Scheidts' reliance upon the Sicker case, supra note
16, the Tenth Circuit found it easy to distinguish that case (where the taxpayers were
afforded only eight days to prepare their Tax Court petition) with the instant case (where
the Scheidts had sixty-three days to file such a petition). Scheidt, 967 F.2d at 1451.
29. The Tax Court opinion noted that "[d]uring the period from June 25, 1982, to
July 6, 1982, it is unclear what happened to the certified letter." Scheidt, 49 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1503. The Scheidts had attempted to fill this gap by contending that the letter was in
fact returned to the Commissioner, who simply deposited it back in the mail. As to this
"proposed scenario," the Tax Court noted that the taxpayers had the burden of proof, but




The crux of the Scheidts' complaint centers around the fact that
employees of the Village Branch of the Postal Office apparently took it
upon themselves to locate the Scheidts' correct Post Office box and
placed the misaddressed Notice of Deficiency in it, rather than return
the Notice to the Commissioner. It would have been true that, had the
Postal Service returned the certified letter to the Commissioner follow-
ing the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations,3 0 and had the
Commissioner then remailed it to the proper address, the Notice would
by that time have been untimely and the statute of limitations for the
1978 tax year would have passed in the Scheidts' favor. The Scheidts
thus felt aggrieved that they were placed in a worse position than tax-
payers who are mailed misaddressed Notices of Deficiency that are re-
turned to the Commissioner after the limitations period has passed.
While conceding that such a distinction among taxpayers does exist, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the distinction was "rea-
sonable," 3' 1 noting that:
Given Congress' decision that the date of mailing tolls the limi-
tations period, a clearly rational distinction exists between
those taxpayers that receive a notice mailed before the three-
year period expires and those who do not.
3 2
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Scheidt shows
the court to be in accord with the views espoused in other circuits, as
well as existing precedent in the Tenth Circuit. Where a taxpayer is not
prejudiced by a delay in receiving a Notice of Deficiency that has been
timely mailed by the Commissioner, the Notice will operate to toll the
applicable statute of limitations, despite the fact that the Notice was mis-
addressed, and regardless of the manner in which the Notice ultimately
finds its way into the hands of the taxpayer.33
30. The taxpayers argued that the Postal Service, pursuant to Postal Service regula-
tions, should have sent the Notice of Deficiency back to the Commissioner rather than
place it in their new box. Normally, the Post Office leaves three notices for the patron, and
if the letter remains unclaimed after fifteen days, the letter is returned to the sender.
Scheidt, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1503.
31. Scheidt, 967 F.2d at 1452.
32. Id.
33. The Scheidts fared appreciably better in 1992 with the malpractice action they
brought against the tax attorney who represented them in connection with their participa-
tion in the ill-fated International Monetary Exchange tax shelter litigation. See Scheidt v.
Klein, 956 F.2d 963 (10th. Cir. 1992).
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II. TENTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES RELIEF AVAILABLE IN QUIET TITLE
ACTIONS AND ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS UNDER STATUTORY
EXCEPTION TO ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT: GUTHRIE V.




The statutory provisions of the Internal Revenue Code governing
the manner in which a taxpayer is informed of the existence of a pro-
posed assessment against him have been summarized above.3 6 The
main purposes of a Notice of Deficiency are to apprise the taxpayer of
the proposed assessment, and to provide the taxpayer with the opportu-
nity to file a petition with the Tax Court to obtain a redetermination of
the deficiency giving rise to the assessment. Such a petition must be
filed within ninety days of the date of mailing of the Notice of Defi-
ciency.3 7 If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court, the
Internal Revenue Service may immediately assess the deficiency against
that taxpayer upon the expiration of the ninety day statutory period.
3 8
On the date of assessment, a general tax lien arises in favor of the
United States, against all the real and personal property of the
taxpayer.
3 9
The Internal Revenue Code requires that the Commissioner must
provide the taxpayer with a Notice of Assessment and Demand for Pay-
ment within sixty days after entering an assessment against the tax-
payer. 40 The notice and demand states the amount of the assessment,
and makes demand upon the taxpayer for payment. If the deficiency is
not paid, the Internal Revenue Service may pursue collection activities
against the taxpayer, including asserting the government's rights under
its general tax lien, described above. The government is also authorized
to levy upon and seize the taxpayer's property to recover the assess-
ment, after mailing a notice of intent to levy to the taxpayer.
41
Taxpayers often find themselves in the position of desiring to chal-
lenge the collection activities of the Internal Revenue Service, although
the ninety-day period for filing a petition with the Tax Court may osten-
sibly have already passed. Among other grounds, the taxpayer may
claim (1) that the assessment and collection were invalid because the
Notice of Deficiency was defective or never sent; (2) that the tax assess-
34. 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992).
35. 970 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1992).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 4-16.
37. See supra text accompanying note 9.
38. See supra text accompanying note 11.
39. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988).
40. Id. § 6303(a).
41. Id. § 6331, which authorizes the Service to "levy upon all property and rights to
property... belonging to such person .... " including salaries and wages. The notice of
intent to levy must be provided by the Service thirty days prior to levy. Id. § 6331(d)(2).
Strict compliance with the statutory requirement that a notice of intent to levy be sent to
the taxpayer is a prerequisite to the validity of a levy. See United States v. Potemkin, 841
F.2d 97, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1988).
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ment was never entered or was otherwise procedurally infirm; (3) that
the Service never mailed the Notice of Assessment and Demand for Pay-
ment to the taxpayer, or there were other defects in the notification pro-
cess regarding the assessment; (4) that there were defects or
irregularities in- the tax lien or the Service's procedures in enforcing the
lien; or (5) that the Service never mailed a notice of intention to levy or
there were other procedural defects in the levy process. To be able to
obtain a forum for litigating such claims, the taxpayer must bring suit
under a statute that waives the sovereign immunity of the United
States.4 2 Generally speaking, the Anti-Injunction Act 4 3 prohibits suits
restraining the assessment or collection of federal taxes.
44
In the tax area, there are two major exceptions to the general bar of
the Anti-Injunction Act. First, the Anti-Injunction Act itself specifically
recognizes that suits may be brought under I.R.C. § 6213(a), which au-
thorizes an injunction prohibiting an assessment or levy when the tax-
payer has not received a notice of deficiency. 4 5 Second, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2410 authorizes civil actions against the United States to, inter alia,
"quiet title to . . . real or personal property on which the United States
has or claims a mortgage or other lien."
'4 6
Beyond this, there remains some uncertainty as to the nature and
scope of the challenges that may be mounted by a taxpayer bringing an
action pursuant to these two statutes, and as to the relationship between
them. For example, in a quiet title action under section 2410, may a
taxpayer challenge the sufficiency of the Notice of Deficiency? The
courts are in disagreement. In Elias v. Connett,4 7 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that it did not have jurisdiction under section
2410 to consider the taxpayer's claim that the Commissioner's Notice of
Deficiency was defective, as that claim went to "the merits of [the tax-
payer's] assessment rather than the procedural validity of the lien."
4 8
On the other hand, the Third Circuit in Robinson v. United States4 9 al-
lowed the lack of a Notice of Deficiency to be challenged in a quiet title
42. See generally United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
43. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1988). With certain exceptions, this Act provides that "no suit
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such
tax was assessed." Id.
44. In addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act specifically prohibits declaratory judg-
ments in matters relating to federal taxes. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
45. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1988) provides, in part, that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions
of section 7 421(a), the making of [an assessment of a deficiency] or the beginning of [a
levy or proceeding in court for the collection of a deficiency] during the time such prohibi-
tion is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court."
46. See I.R.C. § 6212(c)(1) (1988) for the other statutory exception to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act. In addition, if the evidence shows that the government could not ultimately pre-
vail and if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists because of extraordinary circumstances,
injunctive relief may be available to protect a taxpayer from collection activities. See
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). See also Overton v.
United States, 925 F.2d. 1282, 1284 (10th Cir. 1991); Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d
1440, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990).
47. 908 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990).
48. Id. at 527.
49. 920 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1990).
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action, apparently concluding that the taxpayer had no other forum in
which to raise the issue, and thus a failure to extend jurisdiction would
block the taxpayer's access to the courts and "impugn the procedural
validity of the assessment. "50
The Robinson opinion indicated that a taxpayer may be required to
show the lack of a remedy at law to invoke the statutory exceptions to
sovereign immunity, and that injunctive relief will be unavailable if the
taxpayer has such a remedy. The Robinson court noted that an adequate
remedy at law may be provided by the taxpayer's right to pay the defi-
ciency and sue for a refund.5 1 Must the taxpayer show the lack of a
remedy in order to invoke the statutory exception from the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act found in section 6213(a)? The weight of authority answers this
question in the affirmative.
52
The Tenth Circuit's views on these issues are not fully developed.
In Schmidt v. King,5 3 the court considered the scope of relief available to
a taxpayer in a section 2410 quiet title actin. In Schmidt, the court af-
firmed that "[w]hen the taxpayer challenges the procedural regularity of
the tax lien and the procedures used to enforce the lien," sovereign im-
munity is waived under section 2410. 54 On the other hand, the court
concluded that, contrary to the Robinson case, 55 challenges to a Notice
of Deficiency may not be brought in a section 2410 action, as section
2410 is "not to be construed as permitting a collateral attack on the
merits of a tax assessment."' 56 Finally, as to whether the taxpayer may
claim that the tax assessment is procedurally infirm, the court answered
in the negative, stating that "[ls]ection 2410 does not extend to chal-
lenges for procedural irregularities in assessment or collection of taxes"
where the validity of a tax lien is not at issue. 57 The Guthrie v. Sawyer 5
8
and James v. United States5 9 cases provided the Tenth Circuit with an op-
portunity to reconsider these views.
50. Id. at 1161.
51. Id. at 1160. See supra note 8.
52. See Lovell v. United States, 795 F.2d 976, 977 (11th Cir. 1986); Flynn v. United
States, 786 F.2d 586, 591 (3d Cir. 1986); Perlowin v. Sassi, 711 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir.
1983); Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1982); Philadelphia & Read-
ing Corp. v. Beck, 676 F.2d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir. 1982).
53. 913 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1990).
54. Id. at 839 (emphasis added). See also Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531 (9th
Cir. 1992); Stoecklin v. United States, 943 F.2d 42, 43 (11 th Cir. 1991); Arford v. United
States, 934 F.2d 229, 232 (9th Cir. 1991); McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085 (5th
Cir. 1991); Kulawy v. United States, 917 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir. 1990).
55. 920 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1990). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
56. Schmidt, 913 F.2d at 839. See also Pollack v. United States, 819 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1987); Egbert v. United States, 752 F. Supp 1010, 1014 (D. Wyo.), af'd, 940 F.2d 1539
(10th Cir. 1990).
57. Schmidt, 913 F.2d at 839.
58. 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992).
59. 970 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1992).
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B. Guthrie v. Sawyer 60
1. Facts
James and Beatrice Guthrie and Wayne and Dorothy Wells had
been issued Notices of Deficiency to which they had not responded. Fol-
lowing the expiration of the ninety-day statutory period, the Internal
Revenue Service assessed deficiencies against them, and in the context
of the Service's collection activities, asserted tax liens against certain
property they owned. As to the Wellses, levy and seizure activities were
commenced. The taxpayers brought quiet title actions under section
2410 and actions seeking injunctions under section 6213(a), in the
course of which they challenged various aspects of the government's ac-
tions in assessing the tax and pursuing collection. The cases were ulti-
mately consolidated. While some of the taxpayers' claims were clearly
without merit, 6 ' nevertheless, it was incumbent upon the court to deter-
mine whether the court had jurisdiction over the claims under the two
statutes.
2. Results in the District Court
The Guthries had first claimed that they had not been mailed a No-
tice of Deficiency. Contrary to this claim, however, the record indicated
that on March 12, 1986, the Commissioner had mailed a Notice of Defi-
ciency by certified mail to James Guthrie, addressed to a Post Office box
in Jennings, Oklahoma. Although the Guthries alleged that the Internal
Revenue Service had not followed its own procedures in ascertaining
their "last known address," 62 it was essentially uncontroverted that this
Post Office box was in fact the Guthries' last known address. After no-
tices left in the Post Office box were ignored, the Notice was returned to
the Internal Revenue Service, marked "unclaimed," on March 29, 1986.
In a decision not officially reported, 63 the district court ruled that
the section 6213 exception to the Anti-Injunction Act waives sovereign
immunity as to this claim. The district court then held on the evidence
that a Notice of Deficiency had in fact been sent to the Guthries at their
last known address. 64 Thus, the Notice was sufficient to toll the applica-
ble statute of limitations, and the government's assessment was timely.
The Guthries also contended that the tax liens asserted by the govern-
60. 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992).
61. The taxpayers were apparently "tax protestors." For example, in the district
court proceedings, Guthrie raised various constitutional arguments, such as that the as-
sessment was invalid because the federal income tax is a constitutionally proscribed direct
tax on income without apportionment, and that Guthrie was not a "person" required to
pay income taxes. The district court properly rejected these specious arguments. See
Guthrie v. Sawyer, 89-1 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) 9139, at 87,134 (N.D. Okla. 1989). Such
"tired arguments are the repertory of the tax protest movement," and have been labelled
"sanction-bait." United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
62. See supra text accompanying note 13.
63. Guthrie v. Sawyer, 1989-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9139, at 87,134 (N.D. Okla.
1989).
64. Id. at 87,136.
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ment against certain of their property were invalid because the govern-
ment had not adhered to its own written procedures in making the
assessment that gave rise to the liens. 65 Again, the record showed that
this was not the case. 66 The district court ruled that the quiet title stat-
ute waives sovereign immunity as to this claim. 6 7 On the merits, how-
ever, the claim was not successful, and the district court held the
assessment and the liens to be valid.
Finally, the W6lses asserted various claims in connection with the
levy and seizure of their property. The Wellses claimed that the govern-
ment had failed to record the assessment against them, had failed to
issue a Notice of Assessment and Demand for Payment,68 and had failed
to issue a notice of intent to levy. Relying on the above-quoted lan-
guage in Schmidt,6 9 the district court held that the quiet title statute does
not waive sovereign immunity as to these claims, as the validity of a tax
lien was not at issue. The district court granted summary judgment for
the Commissioner.
3. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 70 affirmed the dis-
trict court as to its disposition of the issues concerning the Guthries, but
reversed as to the matters concerning the Wellses. The court of appeals
had no difficulty in agreeing with the district court that the section 6213
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act waives sovereign immunity as to
the Guthries' claims attacking the validity of a Notice of Deficiency, and
that section 2410, the quiet title statute, waives sovereign immunity as to
the Guthries' claims contesting the validity of the government's tax
lien.
7 1
As to the claims raised by the Wellses, however, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's conclusion that no waiver
of sovereign immunity is worked by the quiet title statute.7 2 The matter
was therefore remanded for further proceedings, to allow the Wellses
the opportunity to develop their challenge. 73 In reversing the district
65. Id.
66. The government submitted Certificates of Assessment and Payments on various
Forms 4340, detailing the assessments against the Guthries. Id. Such certificates are "rou-
tinely used to prove that tax assessment has in fact been made." Geiselman v. United
States, 961 F.2d 1, 4 n.1 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). See also Hughes v. United
States, 953 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1992); Gentry v. United States, 962 F.2d 555, 557 (6th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Chila, 871 F.2d 1015, 1017-18 (1 1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 975 (1989); United States v. Miller, 318 F.2d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Nuttall, 713 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Dixon, 672 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (M.D. Ala. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1478
( lIth Cir. 1988).
67. See Geiselman, 961 F.2d 1.
68. See supra text accompanying note 40.
69. See supra text accompanying note 56.
70. The three-judge panel consisted of Chief Judge McKay, Judge Seymour, and
Judge Ebel.
71. Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1992).




court as to the disposition of the Wellses' claims, the court of appeals
was forced to reexamine its determination in Schmidt that "[slection
2410 does not extend to challenges for procedural irregularities in as-
sessment of collection of taxes." 74 Perceiving an "inconsistency" be-
tween other statements in Schmidt and this latter statement, the court of
appeals proceeded to "disapprove the latter statement and specifically
hold that [the quiet title] statute does waive sovereign immunity with re-
spect to procedural violations arising from assessment, levy, and
seizure." 7 5 Thus, "[u]nder our holding today, procedural deficiencies
with respect to recording assessments and issuing notices and demands
for payment may now be brought under section 2410. ' 76 An "alleged
failure of the IRS to assess properly or to send valid notices of assess-
ment and demands for payment are procedural defects cognizable in a
quiet title suit."
77
The court also felt inclined to "take this opportunity to discuss the
interrelationship of the quiet title statute and the statutory exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, and to clarify those challenges that may prop-
erly be brought under each provision."17 8 The court first took issue with
the holding of Robinson and similarly-decided cases which held that a
taxpayer must show a lack of remedy at law to invoke the section 6213(a)
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.7 9 Noting that "[o]ne leading com-
mentator has stated that '[slection 6213 does not require a showing of
irreparable injury as a prerequisite to injunctive relief,' "80 the court
adopted this as the "better view:"
The purpose of the statutory exception is to preserve the tax-
payer's right to litigate his tax liability in the Tax Court before
paying the tax. If the availability of a refund suit after payment
prohibits the taxpayer from obtaining an injunction to protect
his right to litigate first, that right is virtually meaningless.
Under this approach, this right would be available only on a
showing that the taxpayer could not pay the tax. We have diffi-
culty believing that Congress intended to give with one hand
and take back with the other.
8i
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals then noted that, unlike the re-
sult in Robinson, the court in Elias8 2 had not allowed the taxpayer to raise
defects in a Notice of Deficiency in the context of a quiet title action. 8 3
As seen above, this ultimate holding is consistent with the Tenth Cir-
74. Id. at 735.
75. Guthrie, 970 F.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
76. l& at 739. A claim that the Service never sent a notice of intent to levy also falls
within the jurisdictional scope of section 2410. See National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v.
Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1246 n.6 (10th Cir. 1989).
77. Guthrie, 970 F.2d at 737.
78. Id. at 736.
79. Id. at 736-37; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
80. Guthrie, 970 F.2d at 736 (quoting J. MERTENS JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION § 49E.39 (1991)).
81. Id. at 736.
82. See supra text accompanying note 47.
83. Guthrie, 970 F.2d 736.
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cuit's view. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found itself unable to
"agree with that court's apparent position that a taxpayer invoking the
statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act premised on the failure to
receive a Notice of Deficiency must also show the lack of an adequate
remedy at law."' 84 Thus, while in accord with the ultimate holding of
Elias, the Tenth Circuit was not in agreement with its reasoning: "In
sum, we hold that a taxpayer may obtain injunctive relief under section
6213(a) based on the failure to receive a deficiency notice notwithstanding
the availability of a refund suit. '" 8 5 The court reiterated, however, that
"a taxpayer is not entitled to raise [the] procedural defect [of lack of
receipt of a Notice of Deficiency] in a quiet title action because the pur-
pose of a deficiency notice is to enable a challenge in the Tax Court to
determine the amount of the assessment.",
8 6
C. James v. United States
8 7
1. Facts
Ronald James was a self-styled "citizen of the Republic of Wyo-
ming" who therefore believed he was "not a person required to file a
return on I.R.S. form 1040."88 After James ignored Notices of Defi-
ciency mailed to him proposing assessments in respect of tax years 1981
and 1984, the Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency against
him and proceeded to levy against his wages. James brought suit against
the government under section 2410, attempting to quiet title to his
wages, and protesting a variety of government actions in connection
with the assessment and levy.
2. Results in the District Court
James' pro se action raised a host of objections to the Service's as-
sessment and levy activities, including: (1) that no valid Notice of Defi-
ciency had been sent to him; (2) that the Service failed to lawfully assess
the deficiency; (3) that the Service failed to serve a Notice of Assessment
and Demand for Payment on him; and (4) that no notice of intention to
levy was ever sent to him. In an opinion not officially published, the
district court concluded that, fairly read, James' various challenges
amounted to a suit questioning the propriety of the assessment itself -
that is, the validity of the Notice of Deficiency - and in accordance with
Schmidt, dismissed the action in its entirety.8 9
84. Id. at 736-737.
85. Id. at 737.
86. Id.
87. 970 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 754 n.8.
89. 1991-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,347 (D. Wyo. 1991).
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3. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals90 affirmed all as-
pects of the district court's opinion, except that portion which dismissed
James' claim that he had never been sent a notice of intent to levy for
one of the years in question. Citing its very recent opinion in Guthrie,
the court stated that section 2410 "does not waive sovereign immunity
for claims that the taxpayer does not owe the taxes in question" 9 ' and,
therefore, "does not apply to challenges surrounding notices of defi-
ciency."'9 2 However, the court reiterated its conclusion in Guthrie that an
alleged failure of the Service to correctly enter the assessment or prop-
erly send valid Notices of Assessment and Demands for Payment are
procedural defects that may be challenged in a quiet title suit.93
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the bulk of
James' claims were not, in fact, addressed to the procedural validity of
the assessment and levy process, but to the validity of the assessment
itself - that is, the procedural and substantive validity of the Notice of
Deficiency. In order to invoke section 2410, James had argued that the
alleged invalidity of the Notice of Deficiency rendered all following as-
sessment and levy activities infirm, and thus he was in effect challenging
the latter as well as the former. 94 However, the Court of Appeals saw
this argument for what it was, a "domino form of logic" 9 5 that was un-
availing. The court stated that "the bulk of plaintiff's action is based on
the merits of Mr. James' underlying tax liability, not the procedure used
to notify him of the deficiency or the procedure used to collect it." 9 6
In order to give James' pro se action the benefit of the doubt,97 the
Court of Appeals went on to discuss each of James' claims that could
arguably extend to the validity of the Service's assessment and collection
activities, and thus fall within the scope of a section 2410 quiet title ac-
tion.9 8 As to allegations that the Service failed to enter the assessment
properly and failed to send James a Notice of Assessment and Demand
for Payment for each of 1981 and 1984, the court simply noted that the
record and evidence amply demonstrated that no such failures oc-
curred. 99 However, the court determined that James' uncontroverted
testimony that he was never sent a notice of intent to levy with respect to
the levy made to satisfy the 1981 deficiency raised a genuine issue that
90. The three-judge panel was comprised of Judge Logan, Judge Barrett, and Judge
Ebel.
91. James v. United States, 970 F.2d 750, 753 (10th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 755. "In any event, the record establishes that the IRS mailed notices of
deficiency for both 1981 and 1984 to Mr. James." Id. at 755, n.10.
93. Id. at 53.
94. James, 970 F.2d at 753.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 754.
97. Pro se complaints are to be interpreted less stringently than those drafted by law-
yers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
98. James, 970 F.2d at 754-55.
99. Id. at 755.
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precluded summary judgment.10 0 Thus, the district court was reversed
on this point and the case was remanded for a determination whether
the levy for 1981 was valid.' 0 '
D. Summary
The court of appeals' opinions in Guthrie and James provide a wel-
come clarification and expansion of taxpayers' rights in the Tenth Cir-
cuit to challenge various phases of the assessment, collection, levy, and
seizure activities of the Internal Revenue Service. It is now clear that
taxpayers who for one reason or anther may have missed their opportu-
nity to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of their tax defi-
ciency may nevertheless obtain injunctive relief under certain
circumstances from improper government actions without having to pay
the deficiency and sue for a refund. Pursuant to the statutory exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act provided by section 6213, taxpayers may seek
to enjoin assessment and related activities if a defect in the Notice of
Deficiency giving rise to the assessment can be proved. Significantly, a
taxpayer in the Tenth Circuit may seek injunctive relief under section
6213 without the need to show a lack of an adequate remedy at law. The
court of appeals' view on the latter issue places it squarely in the minor-
ity, and creates a conflict among the circuits.10 2
Similarly, taxpayers may contest the following items in a quiet title
action, pursuant to section 2410, without the need to demonstrate the
lack of an adequate remedy at law: (1) the assessment process (includ-
ing claims that the assessment was never entered or that the Notice of
Assessment and Demand for Payment was not properly mailed); (2) the
levy and seizure process (including a claim that the notice of intent to
levy was not properly mailed, or that the seizure and sale procedures
employed by the Service did not comply with statutory and regulatory
requirements);10 3 and (3) the validity of the government's tax lien (in-
cluding claims alleging procedural and substantive defects in the lien).
However, the taxpayer may not raise issues of defect in connection with
the Notice of Deficiency in a quiet title action.
Taxpayers being pursued by the Internal Revenue Service are often
among the persons least likely to be able to afford to pursue their rights
in a refund suit brought in district court or the Claims Court. The fed-
eral government, on the other hand, enjoys virtually unlimited re-
sources. The court's clarification of the right of taxpayers to obtain
equitable relief in the described circumstances serves to somewhat level
the playing field and ameliorate the significant imbalances in personal
and financial resources between taxpayers and the government.
100. Id. at 756.
101. Id. at 757.
102. See supra note 52.
103. See Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.2d 935, 939 (3d Cir. 1976).
For a description of the Service's internal procedures and guidelines concerning liens,




III. TENTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIEs REDEMPTION PERIODS APPLICABLE TO
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
MINNESOTA V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 10 4
A. Background
Under the Internal Revenue Code, the United States is granted 120
days in which to redeem real property sold in foreclosure to satisfy a lien
prior to the government's lien. 10 5 Under Colorado law, the general re-
demption period is only 75 days.' 0 6 Certain notice provisions must be
complied with at both the federal level' 0 7 and at the state level' 0 8 in
connection with redemptions out of foreclosure. The interplay of these
federal and Colorado redemption provisions was at issue in Title Insur-
ance Company of Minnesota.' 0 9
B. Facts
Lynn and Judith Olsen owned certain real property in Adams
County, Colorado. Security Industrial Bank held a first deed of trust on
this property, which was also subject to several junior tax liens, as well as
a junior deed of trust in favor of Dan Savage. On April 26, 1989, Secur-
104. 963 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1992).
105. I.R.C. § 7425(d) (1988) provides that "[i]n the case of a sale of real property ...
to satisfy a lien prior to that of the United States, the Secretary may redeem such property
within the period of 120 days from the date of such sale or the period allowable for re-
demption under local laws, whichever is longer."
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-302(1) (1992 Supp.) provides as follows:
Except as provided in this section with respect to agricultural real estate, within
seventy-five days after the date of the sale of real estate by virtue of any foreclo-
sure of a mortgage, trust deed, or other lien or by virtue of an execution and levy,
the owner of the premises or any persons who might be liable upon a deficiency
may redeem the premises sold by paying to the public trustee, sheriff, or other
proper officer the sum for which the property was sold, with interest from the
date of sale at the default rate if specified in the original instrument or if not so
specified at the regular rate specified in the original instrument, together with any
taxes paid or other proper charges as now provided by law, and a certificate or
redemption shall be executed by the proper officer and recorded, and the public
trustee, sheriff, or other public officer shall forthwith pay said money to the
holder of the certificate of purchase.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-303(1) (1992 Supp.) provides in part:
If no redemption is made within the redemption period provided for in section
38-38-302, the encumbrancer or lienor having the senior lien . . . on the sold
premises ... subsequent to the lien upon which such sale was held may redeem
within ten days after the expiration of the above redemption period by paying the
amount required by section 38-38-302, and each subsequent encumbrancer and
lienor in succession shall have and be allowed a five-day period to redeem, ac-
cording to the priority of his lien.
107. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-4(b)(4)(ii) (1976) states as follows:
Before the expiration of the redemption period applicable under [I.R.C. § 74251,
the district director shall, in any case where a redemption is contemplated, send
notice to the purchaser (or his successor in interest of record) by certified or
registered mail or hand delivery of [the purchaser's] right . . . to request ...
payment in the event the right to redeem under section 7425(d) is exercised...
for a payment made to a senior lienor.
108. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-103(2) (1973) provides as follows: "No lienor or en-
cumbrancer is entitled to redeem unless, within the [75-day] redemption period provided
for in section 38-19-102, he files a notice of his intention to redeem with the public trustee,
sheriff, or other officer making the sale."
109. 963 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1992).
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ity Industrial Bank caused the property to be sold in a public trustee's
sale." 0 The purchasers of the property at the public trustee's sale were
Neal and Judy Goldsmith. On July 26, 1989, Savage redeemed the
property from the Goldsmiths, and received a public trustee's deed on
July 27, 1989.
In mid-August, 1989, Virginia Muwwakkil, a Revenue Officer of the
Internal Revenue Service, telephoned Savage to advise him that the Ser-
vice intended to redeem the property, and inquired about the amount of
money Savage had spent in redeeming and repairing the property. Sav-
age did not provide the requested information, nor did he appear on
August 24, 1989, at a meeting scheduled by Muwwakkil at the offices of
Title Insurance Company of Minnesota for the purpose of delivering a
check to Savage to reimburse him for the money he had spent redeem-
ing and repairing the property. On August 24, 1989, the 120th day after
the April 26, 1989 foreclosure sale, the Service filed a certificate of re-
demption on the property with the office of the Adams County Clerk
and Recorder. The certificate of redemption stated that the Service had
tendered payment to Savage in the amount of $33,645.46 by a check
dated August 23, 1989.
On August 30, 1989, the Service notified Savage of its intention to
foreclose upon the property. Savage instituted proceedings in district
court against the Service on September 25, 1989,111 and then conveyed
his interest in the property to Title Insurance Company of Minne-
sota.'1 2 The title company subsequently joined the action through an
amended complaint, seeking an adjudication and declaration that it was
the owner of the property, free and clear of any lien claimed to exist in
favor of the United States. The title company asked that the govern-
ment be enjoined from asserting any further claim in and to the prop-
erty. Both the title company and the Service moved for summary
judgment. By virtue of the action filed by Savage and joined by the title
company, the validity of the certificate of redemption filed by the Service
on August 24, 1989, was placed at issue.
C. Result in the District Court
In a unreported decision, the district court granted the title com-
pany's motion for summary judgment, while denying the Service's mo-
tion. In so holding, the district court concluded that the Service's
certificate of redemption did not comport with applicable federal and
Colorado statutes, and well as applicable federal regulations." t 3 As a
threshold matter, the district court determined that there was no federal
preemption of the Colorado redemption statutes by the federal redemp-
110. Id. at 298. Security Industrial Bank first provided the Internal Revenue Service
with notice of the foreclosure, as required by I.R.C. § 7425(c) (1989).
111. Presumably pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1978), the "quiet title" statute ana-
lyzed in the Guthrie case, supra notes 60-86.
112. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 299. Title Insurance Company of Minnesota had insured




tion statutes 14 _ that is, there was no ecpress preemption provision con-
tained in the federal statutes or regulations, and further, there was no
implied preemption by federal law arising out of an "actual conflict" be-
tween state and federal law. 1 5 The district court went on to conclude
that, in filing its certificate of redemption, the Service had not complied
either with the Colorado statute that requires the Service to file a notice
of intent to redeem within 75 days of the date of sale, 116 or with the
Treasury Regulations 1 7 that require the Service to send notice of a con-
templated redemption to the purchaser before the expiration of the re-
demption period. 18
D. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment, but differed with the district court's
conclusions of law concerning the interplay of the federal and Colorado
redemption statutes. The court of appeals first addressed the conclu-
sions of the district court concerning the question whether the federal
redemption statute preempted the Colorado redemption statute. The
lower court had concluded that it saw "[n]o conflict [between the re-
spective statutes] which would warrant application of the preemption
doctrine to the state [redemption] statute." 119 However, there was
some confusion as to whether the district court had actually concluded
that, due to the lack of conflict, the 75 day redemption period set forth
in the Colorado statute applied to the Service, and that, therefore, the
Service's notice given 120 days after the foreclosure sale was un-
timely. 120 The court of appeals put this question to rest by noting, as
the parties were forced to concede, that "it would be error if the district
court had in fact held that the 75 day redemption period .... somehow
applied to the IRS."' 2 ' If the lower court had held that the 75 day re-
demption period applied to the Service, "then such would conflict with
the 120 day provision in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(d) and the latter would pre-
vail."' 2 2 Thus, if the issue were simply "whether the 75 day period to
redeem provided by the Colorado statute, or the 120 day period to re-
deem provided by a federal statute controls ..... under the Supremacy
114. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, federal law
preempts and invalidates state law which interferes with or is contrary to federal law. See,
e.g., Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
115. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 300.
116. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-39-203 (1992 Supp.)
117. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-4(b)(ii) (1976).
118. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 301.
119. Id. at 300.
120. Id. at 301. Part of the confusion arose over the fact that CoLo. REV. STAT. 38-39-
102 (1973) applies on its face to the "owner" of the foreclosed property or to any person
who might be liable for a deficiency, and does not apply to a lienor. The Court of Appeals
reserved judgment as to whether the Colorado statute was therefore simply not applicable
to the Service.
121. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 301.
122. Id.
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Clause the federal statute would control."' 123 The 120 day federal re-
demption period, and not the 75 day Colorado redemption period, was
therefore held to apply to the Service.
The court of appeals next addressed the conclusion of the district
court that the Service had not complied with the requirements of the
Colorado statute stating that the redeeming party must file a notice of
intent to redeem within 75 days of the foreclosure sale, 124 and having
failed to file that notice, its later certificate of redemption was defective.
The lower court "apparently concluded that although the IRS may have
120 days under federal law to file its certificate of redemption, under
[the Colorado statute] it nonetheless had to file within 75 days" a notice
of intent to redeem. 12 5 The court of appeals disagreed, noting that:
[One hundred twenty] means, to us, 120 days, and a state stat-
ute ... requiring IRS to file within 75 days a 'notice of inten-
tion' to redeem conflicts with, and impinges upon, the 120 days
provided by federal statute. Under the Supremacy Clause, the
federal statute preempts the state statute. 12 6
The court of appeals did agree with the district court, however, in
its determination that the Service had not complied with applicable
Treasury Regulations 12 7 requiring the Service to send notice of a con-
templated redemption to the purchaser before the expiration of the re-
demption period. On this point, the Service argued that the verbal
notice given by Muwwakkil to Savage in August of 1989 satisfied the
requirements of the Regulation, despite the fact that the Regulation ex-
pressly calls for notice to be given by registered or certified mail. The
court of appeals disagreed, as had the district court. In view of the Ser-
vice's failure to comply with the Regulation, the court of appeals held




The opinion in Title Insurance Company of Minnesota lays to rest any
question as to the proper redemption period applicable to the Internal
Revenue Service when it seeks to redeem property which has been sold
in a foreclosure sale in Colorado. The Service may rely on the 120 day
redemption period provided in the Internal Revenue Code, which
123. Id
124. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-39-203 (1992 Supp.)
125. Title Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 301.
126. Id.
127. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425-4(b)(4)(ii) (1976).
128. Cf. Colorado Proprieties Acquisitions, Inc. v. United States, 894 F.2d 1173, 1174
(10th Cir. 1990), where the foreclosing lending institution gave the Service notice under
I.R.C. § 7425(c)(1) by regular mail, not certified or registered mail as required by the stat-
ute. Despite the fact that the Service conceded it timely received the notice, the notice was
held not to comply with the statute, and was, therefore, invalid. Id. at 1175. Comparing
these facts to the situation faced in Title Insurance Company of Minnesota the Court of Appeals
viewed Colorado Properties Acquisitions as a case where the "shoe was on the other foot." Title
Ins. Co., 963 F.2d at 302.
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preempts Colorado's 75 day period. The Service also need not provide
a "notice of intent to redeem," otherwise required under Colorado law
to be given within 75 days of the foreclosure sale, any earlier than the
120 day period. However, Title Insurance Company of Minnesota points out
that the courts will strictly apply the statutory and regulatory require-
ments imposed upon the Service in the context of redemptions. Persons
seeking to challenge a redemption by the Service should. carefully con-
sider whether the Service has fully, and timely complied with the regula-
tions' requirements.'
29
IV. DEFERRAL OF PARTICIAPTION INTEREST INCOME DID NOT CLEARLY




The Internal Revenue Code provides that a taxpayer must include
and report items of gross income in the taxable year in which the item is
received by the taxpayer, unless under the method of accounting used
by the taxpayer in computing taxable income, such item is to be prop-
erly included in some other tax year. '3 ' A principal method of account-
ing employed by many taxpayers which causes items of income to be
reported in a tax year other than the year of receipt is the accrual
method of accounting.132 Under the accrual method of accounting, "in-
come is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have
occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount
thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."' 3 3 The foregoing
is commonly known as the "all events" test. Under this two-part test,
income is accrued and must be reported when (1) the taxpayer has a
fixed right to receive the income and (2) the amount of the income can
be determined with reasonable accuracy.'
3 4
With certain exceptions,' s 5 the taxpayer is free to choose the
method of accounting that he will utilize in computing taxable income.
However, if the method selected by the taxpayer does not "clearly re-
flect income" in application, the Internal Revenue Service is authorized
to require the taxpayer to compute taxable income using a method that,
129. See generally Treas. Regs. § 301.7425-4 (1976).
130. 965 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1992).
131. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1989).
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1992 amendment). The other principal method of
accounting, which does generally tax items of gross income in the taxable year of receipt,
is the cash receipts and disbursements method. Under the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method of accounting, "all items which constitute gross income (whether in the
form of cash, property, or services) are to be included for the taxable year in which actually
or constructively received. Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable year in which
actually made." Id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i). See also id. §§ 1.451-1(a), 1.461-1(a)(2).
133. Id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (emphasis added); see also id § 1.451-1(a).
134. See Kent Homes, Inc. v. United States, 512 F.2d 395, 397 (10th Cir. 1975); Spring
City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-185 (1934).
135. For example, the accrual method of accounting is required for all taxpayers for
whom the production, purchase, or 'sale of merchandise is a material income-producing
factor. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1989).
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in the opinion of the Service, does clearly reflect income. '3 6 The forego-
ing principles apply not only to the overall method of accounting of the
taxpayer, but also to the accounting treatment of any particular item. 
1 3 7
It is well settled that the Commissioner has broad discretionary powers
in determining whether the accounting method used by a taxpayer
clearly reflects income, and in requiring taxpayers to switch to another
method of accounting that, in the Commissioner's opinion, does clearly
reflect income.1
3 8
In Commissioner v. Hansen,13 9 the Supreme Court held that participa-
tion interest, held back in reserve accounts to guarantee payment of
contingent liabilities, must be reported by accrual basis taxpayers in the
year the paper is sold. In Hansen, three retail automobile and trailer
dealers - accrual basis taxpayers - sold installment paper on a dis-
counted basis to various finance companies. The finance companies
held back a portion of the face value of the paper in a reserve account, as
security for the payment of contingent liabilities arising out of guaran-
tees given to the finance companies. The reserve account was credited
as payments were actually made on the paper. When the balance in the
reserve exceeded certain amounts, additional payments were made to
the dealers. The dealers argued that the presence of the reserve ar-
rangement prevented a conclusion that they had a present and enforcea-
ble right to the future payments, thus failing the first half of the "all
events" test. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the taxpayers
had in fact acquired a fixed right to receive the payments in the future.
The fact that the taxpayer did not have a right to presently recover the
reserve was of no consequence. All the events had occurred to fix the
right to receive the payment, and only the passage of time was necessary
in order for the payments to be received. Focussing on the second half
of the two-part "all events" test, the dealers also argued that the amount
of income could not be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. Again, the
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that because the amounts in the re-
serve would either be paid over to the taxpayers or applied to their guar-
antees, the dealers would under any circumstance receive the benefit of
the amounts held back. Hansen has been widely followed.14
0
In Resale Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner,14 1 the Tenth Circuit was
called upon to review the Commissioner's determination that the tax-
payer's method of accounting for certain "participation interest" earned
in the sale of consumer paper generated by its mobile home sales clearly
reflected income.
136. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1988).
137. Treas. Regs. § 1.446-1(a)(1) (1992).
138. See Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467 (1959); United States v. Hughes
Properties, 476 U.S. 593, 603 (1986).
139. 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
140. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 829 (1962); General Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 293 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 816 (1962); Morgan v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1960); Kli-
mate Master, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 85 (1981).




Resale Mobile Homes 14 2 was engaged in the sale of mobile homes
in Denver, Colorado, under the name "Mobile World," and reported its
income under the accrual method of accounting. Its customers often
purchased mobile homes on credit, signing consumer paper that called
for the payment of the amount financed over a stated period of time, in
installments, with interest. The practice of Resale Mobile Homes was to
immediately sell the paper to one of two finance companies, either Mid-
land Federal Savings and Loan Association of Denver or Advance Mort-
gage Co., who became the servicers of the paper. Under its agreements
with the finance companies, Resale Mobile Homes received the full prin-
cipal amount of the consumer paper sold, and also became entitled to
receive the excess of the total amount of interest scheduled to be col-
lected from the mobile home purchaser during the life of the paper,
over the total amount of interest the finance company charged the tax-
payer based on a "buy rate." This excess was known as Resale Mobile
Homes' "participation."
Each payment received by the finance companies was applied first to
interest, based upon the actual number of days elapsed since the last
payment, on a simple interest basis.' 43 The reminder of the payment
was applied to principal reduction. Under this method, the amount of
interest accrued with respect to each payment depended solely on the
date the payment was actually received by the finance company, and not
on the date the payment was due. Thus, unless one were to assume that
each payment would be made exactly on its due date, the amount of
interest accruing under the consumer paper and the amount of Resale
Mobile Homes' participation interest therein could not be exactly deter-
mined in advance.
The finance companies paid participation interest to the taxpayer
over time, as they actually received the payments giving rise to the par-
ticipation interest. Thus, each time a payment was received, the finance
company would calculate the amount of the payment allocable to inter-
142. The company is referred to as the taxpayer throughout this discussion.
143. This method of applying payments received from the mobile home buyers was
fashioned to conform to CoLo. REV. STAT. § 5-2-210 (1973), as amended by the Colorado
legislature on October 28, 1975, to eliminate the use of the so-called "Rule of 78's" in the
event of the prepayment of a consumer loan. Under the Rule of 78's, the amount of inter-
est allocable to each time period during the term of a loan is determined by multiplying
the total interest payable over the loan term by a fraction, the numerator of which is the
number of periods remaining on the loan at the time the calculation is made, and the
denominator of which is the sum of all time periods during the loan term. Resale Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1085, 1088 n.I (1988). The effect of this method is
to cause a greater amount of interest to be allocated to the initial periods of a loan than
would be the case if interest were economically accrued based on the number of days
elapsed applying the stated interest rate to the then-outstanding principal balance of the
loan. Because the Rule of 78's effectively and artificially retards the rate at which the prin-
cipal amount of the loan is reduced, it works to the disadvantage of a consumer who
desires to pay the loan off early. The 1975 amendment to COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-2 10
precludes the use of the Rule of 78's in calculating the balance due upon the prepayment
of a consumer loan.
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est. After then applying the buy rate to determine how much of that
interest was to be retained by the fiance company, it remitted the re-
mainder of the interest to Resale Mobile Homes. 14 4 On its tax returns
for the years in question, Resale Mobile Homes reported the participa-
tion interest as it was actually paid over to it by the finance companies,
and not as a lump sum amount at the time the paper was sold. On audit,
the Commissioner determined that Resale Mobile Homes should have
accrued all the participation interest in the year the consumer paper was
sold, on the theory that its right to receive the interest was fixed and the
amount was reasonably determinable. Resale Mobile Homes timely filed
a petition for redetermination with the United States Tax Court.'
45
C. Result in the Tax Court
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, 14 6 holding that the
participation interest in respect of a particular piece of consumer paper
should have been accrued and reported by the taxpayer in the year that
the paper was sold to the finance company. As to the first prong of the
two-part "all events" test, the court held that the taxpayer "acquired a
fixed right to receive the participation interest when it sold the con-
sumer paper to the finance companies. While [the taxpayer] could not
compel the finance companies to immediately pay over the participation
interest, such is not the key to the accrual of income." 1 47 The taxpayer
also contended that the second half of the "all events" test was likewise
not satisfied, because the amount of participation interest that would be
paid by the finance companies on any particular piece of consumer pa-
per could not be determined with reasonable accuracy. The Tax Court
responded by noting that "while the word 'accuracy' means exactness or
precision, when modified by the word 'reasonable' it implies something
less than an exact or completely accurate amount."' 148 All that is neces-
sary is that the amount be accrued "on the basis of a reasonable esti-
mate," 14 9 and when the exact amount is determined later upon receipt,
144. The taxpayer's agreement with Advance Mortgage Co. provided that Advance had
the right to maintain a "reserve account" to which the participation interest would be
credited. Once the reserve account reached certain specified levels, the held-back partici-
pation interest would be paid out to the taxpayer over the life of the paper. The purpose
of the "reserve account" was to provide Advance with security for the taxpayer's undertak-
ing to repurchase any paper as to which certain warranties proved to be untrue. Resale
Mobile Homes, 91 T.C. at 1087. The warranties included that the paper complied with fed-
eral, state, and local law; that the paper was free of set-offs, defenses, and counterclaims;
and that the paper was secured by a valid first lien on the mobile home. The arrangement
with Advance provided that once the amount of participation credited to the reserve ac-
count exceeded five percent of the outstanding principal amount of the paper, the excess
would be payable to the taxpayer. d. at 1089. The record indicated, however, that Ad-
vance never exercised its right to maintain a reserve account. d. at 1087-89. No breach of
warranty ever occurred. Id.
145. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
146. Resale Mobile Homes, 91 T.C. at 1093.
147. Id. at 1094.
148. Id. at 1095.
149. Id. In fact, Resale Mobile Homes prepared estimates of the amount of participa-
tion income due under the contracts and reflected the accrued amount in income for finan-
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"any difference may be included in income or deducted, as appropriate,
in the year in which the correct amount is determined."' 5 0 The Tax
Court concluded that:
[T]he amount of deferred finance income payable to [the tax-
payer] was capable of reasonable estimation at the time of sale of
the new consumer paper. The amount of such income could be
calculated through amortization tables .... We recognize that
there my be some variation in the final amounts received by
[taxpayer] due to the default of purchasers or other prepay-
ment of the paper. However, this factor alone does not prevent
[taxpayer] from accruing the amount estimated.... We do not
believe that any variance in amount, due to periodic or late pay-
ments, would be of such significance as to prevent [taxpayer]
from making a reasonable estimate of the amount to be re-
ceived or that any errors in such estimation would stand incapa-
ble of correction in a later year.151
D. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deter-
mination of the Tax Court. 152 In addressing the first half of the "all
events" test, Resale Mobile Homes attempted to distinguish its arrange-
ments with Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association of Denver
and Advance Mortgage Co. from the arrangements present in Hansen
and its progeny. Specifically, the taxpayer argued that in those cases,
funds were actually paid into reserve accounts, and the dealers were as-
sured of receiving the money in the reserve funds once they reached a
-certain level. Resale Mobile Homes contrasted that arrangement with
the one employed in the present case, where no payments were made
into a reserve account, and the taxpayer would not be contractually enti-
tled to receive any participation interest until the mobile home purchas-
ers actually made payments on the consumer paper. The purchasers'
monthly payments were thus argued to be conditions precedent to any
right on the part of Resale Mobile Homes to receive any participation
interest.
The Tax Court had disposed of this argument by noting that the
present arrangement, which reflected a "holding back" of the participa-
tion interest until it was actually received by the finance companies, was
simply an economic equivalent of the reserve fund approach, and served
the same purpose of ensuring that no interest was paid back to the
dealer until the finance company was assured of payment. 153 The Tenth
Circuit agreed with this analysis, concluding that the presence or ab-
sence of reserve accounts made no difference to the outcome. 154 While
cial accounting purposes. The estimates were based upon amortization schedules that
assumed all required monthly payments would be made as scheduled. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Resale Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 965 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1992).
153. Resale Mobile Homes, 91 T.C. at 1094.
154. The taxpayer had argued that, although the documents gave Advance Mortgage
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the court acknowledged that the taxpayer was required to wait for pay-
ment until the finance companies received payment from the mobile
home purchasers, this merely created a technical "condition precedent,"
and in substance the arrangement "is no different from ... agreements
with reserve accounts; [the taxpayer] still will receive participation inter-
est less any amount of interest not actually paid due to prepayment or
default."' 15 5 This delay "in reality is an issue of timing and does not
make the payment of participation interest less certain or genuinely
conditional." 1
5 6
The Tenth Circuit noted that although the exact amounts ultimately
paid over to Resale Mobile Homes might vary based upon the timing of
receipts by the finance companies, as well as prepayments and defaults,
this was no different from the economic effect of the arrangement in
Hansen. The Court of Appeals thus agreed with the Tax Court that the
first half of the "all events" test was satisfied, because:
[The taxpayer's] right to receive participation interest was
firmly established upon sale of the consumer paper to a finance
company. The finance company was legally obligated to pay
the participation interest to [taxpayer] when it bought the con-
sumer paper. Although the duty of the finance company to
make payment was deferred until it received payment from the
purchasers, both the mobile home purchasers and the finance
companies were obligated to make their respective payments.
[The taxpayer] was not required to take any additional action in
order to receive the participation interest.
15 7
Turning to the second prong of the "all events" test, the Tenth Cir-
cuit again agreed with the Tax Court, concluding that the participation
interest was susceptible of determination with reasonable accuracy. The
court acknowledged that the amount of participation interest on each
contract might "vary based on whether mobile home purchasers make
their monthly payments on time, early, or late" and that "[c]ertainly
Co. the option of establishing reserve accounts, Advance never did so, thus taking this case
outside the scope of Hansen. The Tenth Circuit noted that the presence or absence of
reserve accounts "is of no moment" because the "reserve accounts are simply bookkeep-
ing entries, and '[o]n questions concerning the taxability of income, we are to be guided by
facts and not by bookkeeping entries.' " Resale Mobile Homes, 965 F.2d at 823 (quoting
Commissioner v. North Jersey Title Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 492, 493 (3d Cir. 1935)). In any
event, the fact that Advance never exercised the right to require the reserve account was
"evidence that operation without reserve accounts was in substance no different from op-
erating with reserve accounts from [the taxpayer's] point of view." Id.
155. Id. at 824. Prior to the tax years in question, the taxpayer and the finance compa-
nies had operated under agreements that called for the establishment of reserve accounts,
but did not contain any provision for the monthly calculation of participation interest in
the manner called for under the current agreements. The prior agreements had been
replaced by the current versions in response to the new restrictions placed on the use of
the Rule of 78's under Colorado law, see supra note 140. During the years that the prior
versions of the agreements were in place, Resale Mobile Homes had accrued the participa-
tion interest and reported it in its entirely in the year the consumer paper was sold to a
finance company, in accordance with Hansen.
156. Resale Mobile Homes, 965 F.2d at 824.
157. Id. at 823.
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some payments will be early and others late."1 58 However, "on the ag-
gregate [the taxpayer] should be able to reasonably estimate interest
amounts in advance."'
59
The Tenth Circuit thus affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that the
"all events" test was satisfied, and that the Commissioner could require
Resale Mobile Homes to accrue and currently report all participation
interest due over the life of the consumer paper in the year the paper
was sold to a finance company. The Commissioner was, therefore,
found to be correct it his determination that the procedure used by Re-
sale Mobile Homes to report the participation interest did not "clearly
reflect income," and more specifically, that such procedure was an im-
proper application of the accrual method of accounting.
E. Summary
The decision in Resale Mobile Homes represents yet another example
of the courts' willingness to elevate substance over form when attempt-
ing to classify transactions for federal income tax purposes. Although
there were indeed some differences in the finance company agreements
present in Resale Mobile Homes and those in Hansen, the differences were
properly seen to be merely of a technical nature, and not cause for draw-
ing a distinction between the two. Resale Mobile Homes is also reflective of
the great deference that is paid by the courts to the Commissioner in
reviewing determinations by the Commissioner in the tax accounting
area. As noted, the Commissioner has broad discretion in determining
that an accounting method used by a taxpayer does not "clearly reflect
income" or has otherwise been improperly applied, 160 and these deter-
minations are widely honored by the courts.
V. PAYMENTS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATION ARE "INVOLUNTARY" AND CAN BE APPLIED
BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS IT MAY SEE
FIT: IN RE FULLMER
16 1
A. Background
It has for some time been the position and practice of the Internal
Revenue Service that when a taxpayer makes a "voluntary" payment on
a tax liability, the taxpayer may designate how he wants the payment to
be applied. 16 2 The courts agree that a taxpayer can direct how volun-
tary payments are to be applied.163 When the payment is "involuntary,"
however, or if the taxpayer fails to designate how the payment is to be
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying note 137.
161. 962 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
162. See Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83.
163. Wood v. United States, 808 F.2d 411,416 (5th Cir. 1987); O'Dell v. United States,
326 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1964).
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applied, the Service will allocate the payment as it chooses.' 64 In distin-
guishing between voluntary and involuntary tax. payments, the Tax
Court, in Amos v. Commissioner,165 described an involuntary payment as
"any payment received by agents of the United States as a result of dis-
traint or levy or from a legal proceeding in which the Government is
seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file a claim therefor."' 66
Whether or not payments made by a debtor in the context of a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization are to be considered voluntary or
involuntary is a question that has not received a consistent response
from the courts. The question usually arises in response to attempts by
debtors to designate class seven 16 7 tax payments, first, to the "trust
fund" portion of employment taxes, and then to other taxes, including
the "non-trust fund" portion of employment taxes.
Employment taxes generally fall into one of two categories, "trust
fund" taxes and "non-trust fund" taxes. Amounts withheld by an em-
ployer from an employee's wages, such as the employee's withheld in-
come taxes and the employee's share of social security taxes, are
considered to be held -by the employer in trust for the government
pending their payment over to the Internal Revenue Service. 168 Such
taxes are generally referred to as the trust fund portion of employment
164. Muntwyler v. United States, 703 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 1983).
165. 47 T.C. 65 (1966)
166. Id. at 69.
167. The priority of certain federal tax liabilities under the Bankruptcy Code may be
briefly summarized as follows:
A taxpayer's prepetition federal income tax liability is afforded class seven priority in the
distribution of the bankruptcy estate if (i) the liability arose in respect of a taxable year that
ended on or before the date of the filing of the petition, and the last due date of the return
for such year occurred not more that three years immediately before the petition date, (ii)
the claim is for a tax assessed within 240 days before the filing date of the petition, with
enlargements of that time if an offer in compromise was pending, or (iii) the claim is for
certain nondischargeable taxes not assessed prior to the commencement of the case, but
still assessable. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A) (1988). Also afforded class seven priority are
taxes required to be collected or withheld and paid over, and employment taxes on prepe-
tition compensation earned from the debtor for which a return is last due after three years
before the petition filing date. Id. § § 507(a)(7)(C) and (D). Penalties relating to any of the
foregoing which compensate for an actual pecuniary loss also receive class seven priority.
Id. § 507(a)(7)(G).
Claims for postpetition federal income taxes incurred by the estate during the period of
administration are asserted through a request for payment of administrative expenses.
They share the priority afforded to administrative expenses generally, which are entitled to
class one priority in the distribution of the estate. Id. §§ 503(b)(1) and 507(a)(1). Prepeti-
tion taxes, and prepetition taxes only, are excluded from class one priority by virtue of
having been relegated to class seven priority. United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1984). Penalties accruing on postpetition debt may also be asserted
against the estate as a class one priority. II U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(C). Likewise, interest ac-
cruing on such debt receives class one priority. United States v. Cranshaw (In re Allied
Mechanical Serv., Inc.), 885 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ledlin (In re
Mark Anthony Constr., Inc.), 886 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Friendship College, Inc., 737 F.2d 430, 433 (4th Cir. 1984).
Tax liabilities incurred following confirmation of the plan of reorganization are those
of the debtor, not the bankruptcy estate, and generally are not affected by the bankruptcy
filing.
168. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (1992).
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taxes. 169 The employer's matching share of social security taxes, as well
as federal unemployment taxes, constitute the non-trust fund portion.
When a corporation fails to pay its trust fund taxes, the United
States Treasury suffers the loss, because the employees from whose
wages the amounts were withheld nevertheless are credited in full for
the withheld amounts even though they are not paid over to the govern-
ment. To remedy this situation, section 6672 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that persons who are required to collect, truthfully ac-
count for, and pay over any tax - such as the trust fund portion of
employment taxes - and who willfully -fail to do so, are liable to the
government for the full amount of the amounts not collected, accounted
for, or paid over. 170 The people determined to be those required to
collect, truthfully account for, and pay over the taxes are referred to as
"responsible persons." The section 6672 penalty, also known as the
"100 percent penalty,"' 7 is frequently asserted by the Service when
withheld trust fund taxes are left unpaid by a corporation. The penalty
is usually assessed against officers, directors, and shareholders of a cor-
porate employer, plus others with check-signing authority.
Voluntary payments made by an employer and designated to be ap-
plied to the trust fund portion of employment taxes will be so applied by
the Service. However, where the payment is involuntary, or where the
taxpayer otherwise fails to request a specific allocation, the Service will
allocate employment tax payments to the non-trust fund portion that it
would otherwise never collect. 172 This way, the Service maximizes the
likelihood that the overall employment tax liability will be satisfied, as
the Service remains free to pursue the principals of the corporation for
the trust fund portion, in the form of the 100 percent penalty.
173
As noted, a corporate debtor that is the subject of a Chapter 11
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code will often attempt to pro-
pose a plan of reorganization that, among other things, seeks to apply its
class seven tax payments first to the trust fund portion of employment
taxes, and then to the non-trust fund portion and other taxes. Its goal in
proposing this allocation is to maximize the amount of trust fund taxes
169. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1978).
170. I.R.C. § 6672 (1988).
171. Although these exactions are frequently termed a penalty, such description "does
not alter their essential character as taxes." United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275
(1978).
172. "Once the corporation is out of business, the United States can kiss goodbye any
non-trust fund taxes owed it but not paid." United States v. Schroeder, 900 F.2d 1144,
1146 (7th Cir. 1990).
173. It has been held that the pendency of a corporate bankruptcy does not prevent the
Service from pursuing the principals of the corporate debtor to collect the 100 percent
penalty, as the latter is a "separate and distinct" obligation. United States v. Huckabee
Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1986). However, the courts are in disagreement
as to whether the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to determine the section 6672 liability
of the principals of a corporate debtor, when they themselves are not "debtors" in the
bankruptcy. Compare In re Brandt-Airflex Corp, 843 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1988) and Huckabee,
783 F.2d at 1546 with Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 895 F.2d
921 (3d Cir. 1990).
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that would be paid off in the bankruptcy proceeding for which the
debtor's principals might be held personally liable under section 6672 if
the reorganization proves unsuccessful. 1
74
The questions whether the Bankruptcy Court has equitable jurisdic-
tion to confirm a plan that provides for such an allocation, 175 and
whether the debtor otherwise has the right to request such an allocation,
have deeply divided the courts. The reported opinions reveal the courts
to be in complete disagreement over several important issues bearing on
the question, including: (1) whether a Chapter 11 reorganization is "a
legal proceeding in which the Government is seeking to collect its delin-
quent taxes or file a claim therefor;"' 176 (2) a proper resolution of the
conflicting interests of the "fresh start" policy manifested in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the tax collection goals reflected in the Internal Revenue
Code, and the need to protect innocent creditors; and (3) identifying the
"realities of bankruptcy" that impact the question.
Several courts have held tax payments made in the context of a
Chapter 11 reorganization to be involuntary. In In the Matter of Ribs-R-
Us, Inc.,1 7 7 the corporate debtor filed a proposed Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization providing that the government's class seven priority tax
claims would be paid in full over the statutory maximum six-year pe-
riod.' 78 The plan further provided that all payments in class seven
would be applied first to reduce the trust fund portion of the debtor's
employment taxes. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan over the
government's objection that such payments were involuntary and could
be applied by the Service in any manner the Service determined. The
Bankruptcy Court disagreed with the government, holding the payments
to be voluntary. The district court, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision in In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning,179 affirmed. As discussed
174. The corporate debtor may not obtain a discharge for unpaid trust fund employ-
ment taxes. Such taxes are class seven priority obligations, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(C)
(1988), which are not dischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, id. § 523(a)(l)(A). The non-trust portion is nondischargeable as well, if the return
was last due, including extensions, after three years before the date of the bankruptcy
petition. Also nondischargeable are (1) taxes entitled to class two priority (so-called "in-
voluntary gap" claims), id.; (2) tax debts with respect to which a return was never filed, id.
§ 523(a)(1)(B)(i); (3) tax debts with respect to which a return was field late, and within two
years of the petition, i § 523(a)(l)(B)(ii); and (4) taxes as to which the debtor made a
fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat the tax, id. § 523(a)(1)(C). Pen-
alties that accrue on nondischargeable federal income tax obligations are also nondis-
chargeable. See id § 523(a)(7). Interest on nondischargeable tax obligations is likewise
nondischargeable. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 360 (1964); Allen v. Romero,
535 F.2d 618, 623 (10th Cir. 1976).
175. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court is empowered to confirm a
plan of reorganization that "include[s] any... appropriate provision not inconsistent with
the applicable provisions of" the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). See also id.
§ 1129. More generally, the court is empowered to "issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of" the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
§ 105(a). See also id. § 505 (1988 and Supp. III 1992) (granting the Bankruptcy Court the
power to determine the validity and amount of taxes).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
177. 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988).
179. 823 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 486 U.S. 1002 (1988).
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below, the Eleventh Circuit in A & B Heating & Air Conditioning held that
the allocation question is one best left to judicial determination on a
case-by-case basis. On appeal in Ribs-R-Us, the Third Circuit reversed
the district court, specifically breaking with the Eleventh Circuit and
holding that the payments were involuntary. In doing so, the Third Cir-
cuit stated its strong preference that the question be determined strictly
as "a question of law rather than an issue for the exercise of discretion.
A uniform federal rule is preferable so that debtors, creditors, and the
Internal Revenue Service will be able to know in advance whether the
debtor can make such a designation and guide their decisions
accordingly." 180
The debtor in Ribs-R-Us had argued that payments made in the
Chapter 11 setting do not fall within the scope of the payments de-
scribed in the Amos definition, 18 in view of the flexibility afforded to
reorganizing debtors to propose and implement the amount and timing
of payments. The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that, given the broad
powers granted to the Bankruptcy Court over the debtor in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy and considering that once a plan of reorganization is con-
firmed the debtor operates under an express judicial order, the Amos
standard was met.1
8 2
The Third Circuit in Ribs-R-Us viewed any contrary holding as "in-
consistent with the realities of bankruptcy."' l8 3 That reality, according
to the Third Circuit, is that:
[d]ebtors who file under any chapter of the bankruptcy code
have few, if any, options. As a practical matter, they file bank-
ruptcy because it is a last chance for a relatively ordered finan-
cial liquidation or rehabilitation rather that the out-of-control
financial debacle facing them on the eve of bankruptcy.
184
Finally, the debtor in Ribs-R-Us argued that certain provisions of the
180. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 202. The debtor argued that the success of the reorganiza-
tion depended on the participation of two of the corporation's principals, who would not
be willing to make a proposed cash infusion into the debtor if the trust fund taxes were not
extinguished. In response, the Third Circuit pointed out that since the classification of the
payment was being determined as a matter of law, the court's decision did not "depend
upon whether a particular reorganization could have been effected without permitting the
debtor to designate taxes. In any event, the proposed reorganization plan was not contin-
gent upon the court's approval of the designation." Id. at 204.
181. Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65, 69 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes
165-66.
182. See also In Re Frost, 47 B.R. 961, 965 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985):
In order to determine whether a payment to the IRS is voluntary or involuntary, it
must be determined whether or not the payment was received through court or
administrative action which resulted in an actual seizure of the property or
money. The instant bankruptcy proceeding filed by the debtors is a legal action in
which the IRS has filed a claim for delinquent taxes. The payments to be made by
the debtors are under the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and are made pursuant
to a plan which must comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy code.
Thus, we conclude that payments made by the debtors to the IRS are not volun-
tary and the IRS has the right to allocate the payments as it sees fit.
183. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203.
184. Id. at 203 (quoting In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 68 B.R. 463, 469
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (Volinn, Bankr. J., dissenting)).
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Bankruptcy Code evince congressional intent as "essentially
subordinat[ing] the federal policy for protection of the revenue [as set
forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6672] to the competing federal policy of promoting
successful Chapter 11 reorganizations."'18 5 Discerning no support in
the legislative history for this contention, 'and finding no specific authority
in the Bankruptcy Code for directing payments in a way that would con-
travene the policy underlying section 6672, the Third Circuit disagreed.
In In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc. ,186 prior to filing a Chapter
11 plan of reorganization, the debtor filed a motion seeking permission
to make payments to the Service designated to be in reduction of its
trust fund liability. The debtor "readily acknowledge[d] that by
designating application of the payments first to the trust fund portion of
its liability, it [was] attempting to reduce the personal liability of its re-
sponsible persons" under section 6672.187 The government opposed
the motion. The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion, and the bank-
ruptcy appellate panel affirmed in a split decision.18 8 The government
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In the meantime, the debtor had paid the
trust fund portion in full and the plan had been confirmed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "[flederal courts
have struggled with the voluntary/involuntary distinction in the bank-
ruptcy context and have come to different conclusions."'' 8 9 The court
went on to reverse the bankruptcy appellate panel, holding that "pay-
ments made by a debtor-in-possession after filing a petition for reorgan-
ization under Chapter 11, but prior to confirmation of a reorganization
plan, are involuntary and the bankruptcy court does not have equitable
jurisdiction to order otherwise."190 The debtor first argued that a bank-
ruptcy proceeding is not the kind of "legal proceeding" contemplated
by the Amos standard, in that the payments were not due to any enforced
collection procedures or the participation of the government in the
bankruptcy proceedings. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. After reviewing
various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code highlighting the extent of the
court's involvement and the nature of the protections afforded to the
debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization, the court concluded that:
by filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11, TKO used
the authority of the court to keep its creditors at bay while it
reorganized and regained financial stability. TKO is not free to
abuse this system by designating its payments in a way that ben-
efits only its responsible persons, and possibly harms other
creditors, including the IRS, without the scrutiny of the court
or other creditors.'
9'
The debtor also argued that the equity jurisdiction of the Bank-
185. Id. at 203.
186. 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987).
187. Id. at 801.
188. In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 68 B.R. 463 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986). See
Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203.
189. Technical Knockout, 68 B.R. at 801-02 (footnote omitted).
190. Id at 802.
191. Id. at 803.
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ruptcy Court authorized it to order that payments be applied first to the
trust fund taxes. 192 Again, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that, to
the extent that the Bankruptcy Court's order rested on its equitable ju-
risdiction, "[s]uch a decision is not within the bankruptcy court's equita-
ble jurisdiction" and to allow the bankruptcy court to designate how
payments are to be applied as between trust fund and non-trust fund
taxes without notice to creditors or court approval "would subvert the
Bankruptcy Code."' 9 3 The court thus held that "the IRS is entitled to
apply TKO's payments as the IRS sees fit" to preserve the right of the
IRS to pursue the responsible persons under section 6672.194
Under facts similar to those present in Ribs-R-Us, the Bankruptcy
Court in DuCharmes & Co. v. Michigan (In re DuCharmes & Co.), 19 5 con-
firmed the debtor's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization only after striking
out provisions that would have allocated payments first to trust fund
taxes. The district court reversed, holding that such payments were vol-
untary and could be allocated any way the debtor preferred. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, stating in a brief opinion
that "we agree with the Third and Ninth Circuits that payments made to
the IRS on pre-petition tax liabilities by a Chapter 11 debtor ought to be
considered 'involuntary payments' that may not be allocated to pay the
debtor's trust fund liabilities first."' 9 6
Other courts have held tax payments made in the context of a Chap-
ter 11 proceeding to be voluntary. In In re A & B Heating & Air Condition-
ing,19 7 the corporate debtor had proposed a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization that provided for payment of the debtor's federal tax lia-
bility over the statutory six-year period, with payments to be first applied
to trust fund taxes. It was recognized that "[b]y paying off the trust fund
taxes, the corporate president and sole shareholder would be relieved of
his separate liability under [section 6672] for these trust fund taxes." 
19 8
The plan was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, over the govern-
ment's objection.' 9 9 The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Elev-
192. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that, in fact, the bankruptcy court had not specifi-
cally ordered the Service to apply the payments to the trust fund liability, but rather to
apply the payments as the debtor requested. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 852 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988).
196. Id. at 196.
197. 823 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded for consideration ofmootness ques-
tion, 486 U.S. 1002 (1988).
198. Id. at 463.
199. In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 53 B.R. 54 (Bankr, S.D. Fla. 1985). The
bankruptcy court stated:
Court involvement in the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization case is not the
type which results in seizure of property or money as in a levy. Unlike a taxpayer
faced with a government instituted collection proceeding which may lead ulti-
mately to levy upon the taxpayer's assets, a Chapter 11 debtor enjoys a great
latitude in how and if a'plan is proposed and thus how and when the IRS will be
paid.... The debtor propounding a plan has a number of options with respect to
treatment of a claim by the IRS and it is the freedom afforded by theses options
which dictates the conclusion that payments to the IRS pursuant to a confirmed
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization are voluntary.
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in turn, holding that "the
allocation question in a Chapter 11 case . . .should be left to judicial
discretion to be decided on a case-by-case basis."
'20 0
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the conflicting results of prior
decisions, describing them as:
[A] direct result of the conflicting policies behind the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code. On the one
hand, Congress, by enacting [section 6672,] intended to im-
pose liability upon corporate officers who allow trust fund taxes
to be used for any purpose other that the payment of withheld
taxes.
On the other hand, Congress has enacted a detailed Bank-
ruptcy Code which sets forth an orderly process by which credi-
tors of a bankrupt entity are entitled to be repaid. In doing so,
Congress "has provided bankrupts with extensive protection
from their creditors and a reasonable opportunity for rehabili-
tation not only for their benefit but for that of the public as
well."... The Code expresses a preference toward reorganiza-
tion rather then liquidation; a viable reorganization plan typi-
cally provides greater payment to creditors while preserving
the economic life of the entity.
20 1
The Eleventh Circuit found the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to
outweigh that of the Internal Revenue Code. That policy, in turn, was
undermined by classifying the tax payments as involuntary, which in
many cases would be "detrimental to the reorganization plan" because
the incentive of the corporate officers to support the plan would be re-
duced, and "[firequently, the efforts put forth by these officers during
the reorganization is the corporation's only hope for future viability."
'20 2
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[p]ermitting the Internal Revenue
Service to allocate tax payments in all Chapter 11 proceedings runs con-
trary to" the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, and "decline[d]
to accept that argument of the IRS that all payments made under a
Chapter 11 reorganization are involuntary and thus property allocated
by the IRS."
' 20 3
Rather than hold the tax payments to be voluntary as a matter of
Id. at 57.
200. In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 465, (quoting In re B & P Enter-
prises, Inc., 67 B.R. 179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986)).
201. Id. at 464-65 (citation omitted).
202. Id. at 465. Citing to a law review article, the court noted that:
If corporate officers are pressured to pay the taxes out of their own pockets, the
incentive to continue successful reorganization is reduced, and it becomes more
likely that the responsible officers will convert to Chapter 7 liquidation. Under
Chapter 7, as in Chapter 11, taxes have priority; the government will be paid in
full whether sufficient funds remain for other unsecured creditors or not. The
responsible officers are guaranteed that no tax penalty will be assessed against
them personally.
Id. (quoting Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 1279, 1299-1300 (1986)).
203. Id. (emphasis added).
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law, however, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the equitable jurisdiction of
the Bankruptcy Court and held that the allocation question "should be
left to judicial discretion to be decided on a case-by-case basis. ' 20 4 The
court of appeals remanded to the district court "with directions that the
bankruptcy court weigh the impact the proposed allocation would have
upon the debtor, Internal Revenue Service, and other creditors.1
20 5
In In re Lifescape, Inc.,206 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado held employment tax payments made in a Chapter 11 reor-
ganization to be voluntary, concluding that "[t]he fact that payments are
made pursuant to a plan which must comply with the requirements of
the Bankruptcy Code does not rise to the level of court action equivalent
to a levy, judicial order, execution or judicial sale" implicating the Amos
definition.
20 7
In United States v. Energy Resources Co. ,208 the question of whether the
Bankruptcy Court has the equitable power and jurisdiction to order that
payments made under a proposed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization be
allocated against the trust fund portion came before the Supreme Court.
The case actually consisted of two separate debtors whose appeals were
consolidated by the court of appeals. In one of the cases, a plan of reor-
ganization was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court over the govern-
ment's objection, providing that tax payments would be applied to
extinguish all trust fund taxes prior to the commencement of payment of
the non-trust fund portion. The district court affirmed. In the other
case, the Service refused to comply with the debtor's request to apply a
post-confirmation payment to the trust fund portion. In response, the
debtor obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court directing the Ser-
vice to so apply the payment. The district court reversed, holding that
the Bankruptcy Court did not have the power to do so.
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the cases
and accepted the government's contention that the tax payments were
involuntary. 20 9 However, the Court of Appeals went on to hold that,
notwithstanding the classification of the payments as involuntary, the
204. Id. (quoting In re B & P Enterprises, Inc., 67 B.R. 179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1986)). Relying in large part on factors set out in B & P Enterprises, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the Bankruptcy Court is to consider the "equitable reasons warranting such
allocations" and should look to the history of the debtor; the absence or existence of
prebankruptcy collection or enforced collection measures of the Service against the corpo-
ration and "responsible persons;" the nature and contents of the Chapter 11 plan (e.g.,
whether it is a reorganization or a last resort liquidation); the presence, extent, and nature
of administrative and/or court action; the presence of pre- or post-bankruptcy agreements
between the debtor and the Service; and the existence of exceptional or special circum-
stances or equitable reasons warranting the allocation. See B & P Enterprises, Inc., 67 B.R. at
184. "Most importantly, the bankruptcy judge should consider whether the proposed plan
is merely a stop gap scheme to hold the taxing authorities at bay with little chance that the
debtor will fulfill its obligation under the plan." A & B Heating &Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d
at 466.
205. A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d at 466.
206. 54 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
207. Id. at 529.
208. 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
209. In re Energy Resources Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989).
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Bankruptcy Court had the authority to order the Service to apply such
payments to the trust fund portion of employment taxes if the Bank-
ruptcy Court concluded that this designation was necessary to ensure
the success of the reorganization. 2 10 The First Circuit thus struck a po-
sition consistent with that of the Eleventh Circuit, but opposed to that of
the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. Noting this conflict, the Supreme
Court granted certiori. The Supreme Court then affirmed the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in a brief opinion authored by Mr. Justice White.
After observing that several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
2 11
'are consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy
courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-
debtor relationships,, '2 12 the Supreme Court addressed the govern-
ment's contention that other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code reflect a
policy that the Service be paid in full as to the debtor's tax liabilities, and
thus impose limitations on the Bankruptcy Court's equity power that
had been exceeded in these cases. 213 The government argued that if
payments can be allocated first to. the trust fund portion, it would be "at
risk" for the non-trust fund portions, which cannot be recovered from
the responsible persons. 2 14 On the other hand, if the Service is allowed
to apply tax payments to the non-trust fund portion first, it stands a bet-
ter chance of collecting the entire amount owed because the debt that is
not "guaranteed" by responsible persons in the form of the section
6672 penalty will be paid off before the guaranteed portion. The
Supreme Court responded by stating that:
[wihile this result might be desirable from the Government's
standpoint, it is an added protection not specified in the [Bank-
ruptcy] Code itself: whereas the Code gives it the right to be
assured that its taxes will be paid in six years, the Government
wants an assurance that its taxes will be paid even if the reor-
ganization fails - i.e., even if the bankruptcy court is incorrect
in its judgment that the reorganization plan will succeed.
21 5
The Supreme Court further noted that the order of the Bankruptcy
Court causing payments to be first applied to the trust fund portion does
not remove section 6672 from the field of play: "As the Government
concedes, § 6672 remains both during and after the corporate Chapter
11 filing as an alternative collection source for trust fund taxes." 21 6 The
Supreme Court thus held that the Bankruptcy Court "may order the IRS
to apply tax payments to offset trust fund obligations where it concludes
210. Id. at 234.
211. See supra note 174.
212. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. at 551.
213. The government noted that the Bankruptcy Code affords class seven priority sta-
tus to the tax claims at issue, see supra note 167, and makes them nondischargeable, see
supra note 173. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court is required to assure itself that the reor-
ganization plan will succeed, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11), and therefore, that the Service will
in all likelihood collect the tax debt owned. Energy Resources Co., 495 U. S. at 551.
214. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. at 551.
215. Id. at 549.
216. Id. at 551.
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that this action is necessary for a reorganization's success."
2 17
B. Facts
In In re Fullmer,2 18 the Internal Revenue Service had filed a proof of
claim in the taxpayer's Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding. After
confirmation of the plan of reorganization, the taxpayer paid the Service
the amount of the claim, apparently designating the payment to be ap-
plied to his postpetition tax obligations rather than his prepetition tax
debt. The Service refused to honor this designation, and applied the
payments to the prepetition debt. The Bankruptcy Court sided with the
Service, and the district court affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit opted to join the Third,
219 Sixth, 2 20
and Ninth Circuits2 2 1 and held that payments made by a debtor pursu-
ant to a Chapter 11 proceeding are involuntary. In its brief discussion of
the issue, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "[t]o interpret such pay-
ments otherwise would be inconsistent with the realities of bankruptcy
where a debtor is required to make such payments pursuant to an ex-
press judicial order. Thus, we conclude that Mr. Fullmer was not enti-
tled to direct the application of his payments to any particular tax
liability."' 222 The Service was, therefore, free to apply the payment as it
saw fit.
D. Summary
Although not arising in the context of a dispute over employment
taxes, the Fullmer decision would seem to have equal applicability to a
debtor's attempts to designate payments against the trust fund portion
of employment taxes to which the "100 percent penalty" imposed under
section 6672 applies, particularly since the Tenth Circuit, in reaching its
decision, relied entirely on the previously discussed cases arising under
section 6672 that were decided by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.
However, the decision of the Supreme Court in Energy Resources Co. 
2 2 3
seems clearly to cast doubt on the rationales expressed by the Third,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in support of their respective conclusions, and
renders those opinions somewhat doubtful authority.
It is to be kept in mind, however, that the Supreme Court in United
States v. Energy Resources Co. never reached the question of whether a
Chapter 11 debtor's tax payments are properly characterized as volun-
tary or involuntary. There remains a split among the circuits on this
217. Id.
218. 962 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
219. See supra note 177.
220. See supra note 195.
221. See supra note 186.
222. In re Fullmer, 962 F.2d at 1468.
223. 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
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question, with the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits viewing such
payments as involuntary, and the First and Eleventh Circuits viewing
them as voluntary. The Supreme Court did hold that the Bankruptcy
Court has the power in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction under
the Bankruptcy Code to order that tax payments are to first be applied
to the trust fund portion of employment taxes, and to confirm a plan of
reorganization that so provides, even if the payments are properly con-
sidered involuntary. To the extent that a Chapter 11 debtor in the
Tenth Circuit attempts to designate the application of tax payments
without the aid of a court order or an express provision in the plan of
reorganization supporting such an application, Fullmer indicates that the
debtor will not be successful. Given the decision of the Tenth Circuit in
Fuilmer, Chapter 11 debtors are well advised to propose plans of reor-
ganization that provide specifically for the allocation of class seven tax
payments, first, to the trust fund portion of the debtor's employment tax
liability, so as to maximize the possibility that the debtor's "responsible
persons" will not find themselves personally liable for the trust fund
portion. Payments made outside the context of a confirmed plan of
reorganization should be supported by a court order specifying this allo-
cation, if the debtor is still under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy
Court.
In light of the fact that the Bankruptcy Court will issue orders or
confirm plans of reorganizations calling for such a designation of tax
payments only in the discretionary exercise of its equitable powers,
Chapter 11 debtors in the Tenth Circuit must be prepared to demon-
strate that such exercise of equitable jurisdiction is justified under this
circumstances. It is likely that factors such as those discussed by the
Eleventh Circuit in In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning will influence
the Bankruptcy Court's determination.2 24 It remains to be seen how
much flexibility will be afforded debtors in the Tenth Circuit in propos-
ing allocations of their tax payments.
VI. SUMMARY OF OTHER CASES DECIDED BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT
IN 1992
A. Some Decisions of Note
In Hall v. United States, 22 5 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the mitigation
provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 apply only in the context of the fed-
eral income tax, and therefore do not apply to the windfall profit tax.
2 26
The taxpayers owned a five percent overriding royalty interest in a fed-
eral oil and gas lease in Wyoming being operated by Amoco Production
Company. In 1986, the Bureau of Land Management of the Department
of the Interior reduced the number of the participating acres in the area,
224. See supra note 204.
225. 975 F.2d 722 (10th Cir. 1992).
226. The windfall profit tax was set out in I.R.C. §§ 4986 to 4990 prior to its repeal in
1988. See § 1941 of the Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1322 (1988).
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the effect of which was to reduce the Hall's net revenue interest to 1.923
percent. The reduction of participating acres was made retroactive to
1976. Amoco unilaterally recouped from the Halls the amount of excess
royalty payments made to the Halls prior to 1986 based upon the reduc-
tion in participating acres, and issued "corrected" Forms 6248, Annual
Information Return of Windfall Profit Tax, to the Halls for 1980 thor-
ough 1985. These forms, of course, indicated that as a result of the
reduction of participating acres and the Halls' interest therein, the Halls
had overpaid their windfall profit tax for each of those years. The tax-
payers successfully filed tax refund claims with the Service for each of
the years 1983 through 1985. However, as to the years 1980 through
1982, the Service disallowed the Halls' refund claim on the ground that
they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 22 7 The Halls,
understandably aggrieved at the resulting "whip-saw" being worked
upon them by two branches of the federal government, brought suit in
district court seeking to invoke the mitigation provisions of sections
131 1-1314.228 The district court allowed the claim, and entered judg-
ment for the Halls in the amount of $72,300. On appeal, however, the
Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the mitigation provisions do not
apply to the windfall profit tax. The court noted that sections 1311-
1314, the mitigation provisions, are found in Subtitle A of Title 26,
U.S.C., which relates solely to income taxes. On the other hand, prior to
their repeal the windfall profit tax provisions were found in Subtitle D of
Title 26, U.S.C., which relates to "Miscellaneous Excise Taxes." After
reviewing the legislative history of the mitigation provisions, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the government that these relief provisions could
not be invoked by the Halls. The Hall decision thus puts the Tenth Cir-
cuit on record as limiting the mitigation provisions of sections 1311-
1314 to the income tax sphere.
2 29
In Pottorf v. United States,230 the plaintiffs were shareholders in Pot-
227. I.R.C. § 6511 (a) (1988) requires tax refund claims to be filed within two years of
the payment of the tax or within three years from the filing of the relevant return, which-
ever is later.
228. Briefly summarized, the provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 are aimed at mitigating
the harsh effect of applicable statutes of limitation by recognizing that certain determina-
tions relating to a tax year, such as court determinations or final dispositions of refund
claims, may create "errors" such as the double inclusion or exclusion of income or the
double allowance or disallowance of deductions or credits in time-barred years. For exam-
ple, a Tax Court determination that a particular item of income is includable in a given
"open" year may create an accounting "error" if the taxpayer had actually included it in a
prior "closed" year and paid tax on it. The mitigation provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314
allow for a correction of the error through certain prescribed adjustments, despite the fact
that the prior year is closed by the statute of limitations.
229. But see Chertkof v. United States, 676 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1982). In Chertkof, the
Fourth Circuit invoked the mitigation provisions of § 1311-1314 to avoid a taxpayer whip-
saw that had both income tax and estate tax implications. See also the dissent filed in Hall
by Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele, Senior District Judge for the District of Arkansas sitting
by designation, voicing agreement with the "well-reasoned opinion of the district court in
this case" and the reasoning in Chertkof. Hall, 975 F.2d at 727.
230. Nos. 91-3365, 91-3366, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32797 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 1992).
The decision is reflected in an unpublished Order and Judgement. Such Order has no
precedential value and may not be cited or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit,
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torf Farms, Inc., a Kansas corporation that forfeited its Articles of Incor-
poration when it failed to pay applicable state franchise taxes. Following
the forfeiture, the Internal Revenue Service filed notices of tax liens
against the corporation's real property in the local real property records.
When the real property was subsequently condemned, the IRS success-
fully claimed the condemnation proceeds in a state court proceeding. In
this appeal, the shareholders of Pottorf Farms, Inc., argued that once
the corporation had lost its charter, title to the corporation's property
passed by operation of law to the shareholders, and thus, the IRS's later-
filed lien was invalid. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out,
however, that under Kansas state law2 3 ' a corporation may continue to
act for three years following its dissolution for the purpose of winding
up its affairs. Although the corporation had forfeited its Articles of In-
corporation, it continued to exist as an entity for the purposes of paying
its debts and disposing of its assets. The condemnation proceeds were
therefore determined to be the property of the corporation, not the
shareholders, and the IRS's lien was held valid.
B. Bankruptcy
In In re Bates,23 2 the debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.
The debtor had owned and operated a Wyoming lumber business as a
sole proprietorship. it was determined that the debtor owed the gov-
ernment $61,212.89 in federal employment taxes. Of this amount,
$39,714.72 were "trust fund" taxes and $21,498.17 were "non-trust
fund" taxes. 233 The IRS perfected its general tax lien2 3 4 for these
amounts by filing prepetition notices of lien. The value of debtor's as-
sets available to satisfy this lien amounted to $21,950, leaving the gov-
ernment unsecured as to most of the debt.23 5 ' The debtor presented a
Chapter 13 plan that proposed to classify the unpaid trust fund portion
as a class two priority claim that would be paid in full, and to classify the
remaining, non-trust fund portion as an unsecured claim that would be
paid pennies on the dollar. The debtor's presumed goal in proposing
this classification was to obtain a discharge for most of the non-trust
fund portion. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
determination that the trust fund portion was to be classified as a se-
cured claim, and that the non-trust fund portion was to be classified as a
class seven priority claim. 23 6 Due to the fact that priority tax claims in
bankruptcy are not dischargeable, 23 7 the effect of the court's classifica-
except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collat-
eral estoppel. 10th CiR. R. 36.3.
231. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6807 (1988).
232. 974 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1992).
233. See generally the discussion of the Fullmer case which appears supra notes 218-22.
234. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) provides that a claim secured by a lien on property is
considered "secured" to the extent of the value of the property, and "unsecured" to the
extent the amount of the creditor's interest exceeds the value of the property.
236. See supra note 168.
237. See supra note 174.
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tion was to deny debtor a discharge for any portion of the employment
taxes.
In In re Cassidy, Jr. ,238 the Tenth Circuit held that the ten percent
penalty imposed under I.R.C. § 72(t) on premature withdrawals from
pension plans, profit sharing plans, and IRA's 23 9 is not to be afforded
priority under the Bankruptcy Code.2 40 The first question addressed by
the court was whether the ten percent exaction was a "tax" that could be
afforded class seven priority.2 4 1 The court acknowledged that the ten
percent exaction is in fact labelled a "tax" under the Internal Revenue
Code, but concluded that "Congress' labelling of the section 72(t) exac-
tion as a tax is not determinative of its status for priority in bank-
ruptcy." 242 The court then went on to hold that, in view of the
ambiguous legislative history of section 72(t)243 and the acknowledged
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to priorities,2 4 4 the
ten percent exaction is properly characterized as a penalty and not a tax,
and is not to be afforded priority.2 4 5 The court further concluded that
the penalty was not entitled to class seven priority as "compensation for
actual pecuniary loss."
'246
238. 983 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1992).
239. I.R.C. § 72(t) (1988).
240. The question whether the 10 percent penalty is dischargeable in bankruptcy is left
open. If the penalty is not determined to be imposed in connection with a tax that is
nondischargeable, or if the withdrawal occurred more than three years prior to the date of
the bankruptcy petition, the penalty would be dischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)
(1988).
241. Il U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988) states as follows:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent
that such claims are for -
(A) a tax on or measure by income or gross receipts.
242. Cassidy, Jr., 983 F.2d at 163. This conclusion places the Tenth Circuit in apparent
conflict with the Sixth Circuit, which has indicated its inclination to defer to Congress'
designation of a "tax" as such under the Internal Revenue Code. Id; see aLso United States
v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991).
243. A "tax" has been judicially defined to mean (1) an involuntary pecuniary burden,
regardless of name, laid upon individual or property; (2) imposed by, or under authority of
the legislature; (3) for public purposes, including the purposes of defraying expenses of
government or undertakings authorized by it; (4) under the police or taxing power of the
state." In re Lorber Industries of California, Inc., 675 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Tenth Circuit viewed the application of the third test as problematic. On the one
hand, it is possible to divine a "public purpose" underlying section 72(t), in that the exac-
tion could be argued to recapture a measure of tax benefits afforded under the qualified
retirement plan rules, and to promote savings. However, the legislative history of section
72(t) was equally susceptible of being read to indicate that the purpose of section 72(t) was
simply to penalize early withdrawals. Cassdy, Jr., 983 F.2d at 164.
244. This purpose of allowing priority claims is to compensate for a pecuniary loss
actually suffered, and not to afford priority to claims not reflecting a pecuniary loss, as the
latter would have the effect of depleting rather than conserving the bankruptcy estate and
punish innocent creditors. See Matter of Unified Control Systems, Inc., 586 F.2d 1036,
1038 (5th Cir. 1979).
245. Cassidy, Jr., 983 F.2d at 165.
246. Id. 11 U.S.C § 507(a)(7)(G) provides class seven priority for any "penalty related
to a claim of a kind specified in this paragraph and in compensation for actual pecuniary
loss."
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C. Tax Shelters
In Jackson v. Commissioner,24 7 Nickeson v. Commissioner,24 8 and Cannon
v. Commissioner,249 taxpayers were denied deductions for losses incurred
in tax shelter transactions found by the Tax Court2 50 to have been en-
tered into without a profit motive. 25 1 In Jackson, the taxpayer purchased
"territorial distributorships" from U.S. Distributors, Inc., entitling them
to distribute the jewelry products of American Gold & Diamond Corpo-
ration within designated territories. Based upon their initial investment
of $15,000, and the fact that theJacksons had executed documents obli-
gating them to pay $720,000 on a nonrecourse basis for territorial distri-
bution rights, theJacksons were encouraged by the tax shelter promoter
to deduct $60,000 on their 1982 federal income tax return. Believing
the arrangement to be an abusive tax shelter, the Jackson's accountant
refused to file the return on this basis, and instead deducted only the
Jackson's 1982 out-of-pocket expenditures incurred in acquiring the dis-
tribution rights. Relying heavily upon its 1985 opinion in Moore v. Com-
missioner25 2 involving the identical tax shelter arrangement, the Tax
Court concluded that the arrangement was so lacking in economic sub-
stance as to be a sham, and disallowed this deduction.2 53 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court "that the transaction was a
sham and that the Jacksons are not entitled to their claimed deduc-
tions."'2 54 Noting that either lack of a profit motive or lack of economic
substance can render a transaction a sham,2 55 the Tenth Circuit found
that various factors supported this conclusion, such as the lack of oper-
ating history of the promoting entities and their lack of goodwill, the
emphasis placed by the operative documents on the tax benefits repre-
sented to be available, the unrealistic financing arrangement, and the
fact that there was no demonstrated source of product. As to the profit
motive of the taxpayers, the Tenth Circuit determined that the Tax
Court was justified in finding that the taxpayers had no genuine expecta-
tion of profit, particularly considering the fact that the contract assigned
unspecified territories to them2 56 and the fact that theJacksons made no
247. 966 F.2d 598 (10th Cir. 1992).
248. 962 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1992).
249. 949 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1991).
250. Jackson v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2806 (1991); Cannon v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (1990); Brock v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 826
(1989), aff'd sub nom. Nickeson v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1992).
251. Whether a taxpayer enters into a transaction in pursuit of economic profit is a
question of fact. The trial court's findings on that issue are not to be disturbed on appeal
unless they are "clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 5 2 (a). The Supreme Court has in-
structed that: "[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction
that the mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
252. 85 T.C. 72 (1985).
253. Jackson, 161 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2810.
254. Jackson, 966 F.2d at 601.
255. See Bohrer v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 344, 348 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991); Casebeer v.
Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990).
256. Jackson, 966 F.2d at 601. The territories were assigned on a lottery basis after the
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attempt to research the industry or the companies.
The Jackson court cited Nickeson as support for its conclusions. 2 5 7 In
Nickeson, the Tax Court had disallowed the taxpayers' deductions under
I.R.C. § 17 4(a) (1988) for research and development expenses incurred
in developing an automatic meter reading device. 258 The taxpayers had
deducted the amount of money and the face amount of certain promis-
sory notes delivered to George Risk, the promoter of the arrangement
and a principal of George Risk Industries, Inc, of Kimball, Nebraska.
The offering documents stressed the tax benefits of participating in the
arrangement, which included a touted 4-to-1 write-off based on the ini-
tial cash investment, but gave no particulars concerning the manner in
which the technology was to be developed or any other economic as-
pects of the project. Recognizing that a taxpayer's entitlement to deduc-
tions under section 174 depends upon whether the taxpayer is engaged
in a "trade or business," 2 59 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that this
required an "initial inquiry into whether the 'activity was undertaken or
continued' in good faith, with the dominant hope and intent of realizing
a profit, i.e., taxable income, therefrom."' 260 Applying various tests, in-
cluding the nine factors listed in the "hobby loss" regulations under
I.R.C. § 183261 and the so-called Rose test, 262 and after reviewing past
decisions evaluating the presence or absence of profit motive in research
and development programs and related activities,2 63 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the taxpayers "did not meet their burden to show they
entered the . . .program with a good faith intent to profit; rather, the
[arrangement] was 'the naked sale of tax benefits.' 264
investment was made, and the taxpayers seemed unconcerned about which territories were
assigned to them. Id.
257. Id. See also Kubler v. Commissioner, No 90-9019, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS (10th.
Cir. April 24, 1992) (Nickeson reasoning applied to deny deductions under I.R.C. § 174 for
development of components of variable opacity glass.) The Order and Judgment in Kubler
was unpublished, see supra note 219.
258. Nickeson v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1992).
259. I.R.C. § 174 (1988) allows the taxpayer to deduct "research or experimental ex-
penditures which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his
trade or business as expenses." Id. (emphasis added).
260. Nickeson, 962 F.2d at 976 (citations omitted).
261. I.R.C. § 183 (1988) precludes the deduction of so-called "hobby losses," that is,
activities "not engaged in for profit." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1972) outlines nine fac-
tors indicative of a good faith intent on the part of the taxpayer to recognize a profit.
Paraphrased, the factors are (1) the extent to which the taxpayer carries on the activity in a
businesslike manner, (2) the taxpayer's expertise or his reliance on the advice of experts,
(3) the time and effort the taxpayer expends in carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation
that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value, (5) the taxpayer's success in similar
activities, (6) the taxpayer's history of income or loss in the activity, (7) the amount of
occasional profits, if any, (8) the taxpayer's financial status, and (9) the elements of per-
sonal pleasure or recreation. Id.
262. In Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386 (1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989),
the Tax Court developed a two-step "generic tax shelter" and "economic substance" test
to determine the validity of deductions and credits derived from activities where the tax
benefit requires that the taxpayer's activities constitute either a trade or business or be
undertaken for the production of income, as required by I.R.C. § 162 & 212 (1988).
263. Nickeson, 962 F.2d at 977.
264. Id. at 977-978 (quoting Brock v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 836 (1989)).
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Finally, in Cannon v. Commissioner,2 65 the taxpayer had invested over
$800,000 in a Mexican gold and silver mining venture that never turned
a profit. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner 26 6 that the ex-
penditures were nondeductible under section 183.267 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals2 68 reviewed the application of the nine
hobby loss factors 269 to the taxpayer's investment activities in Mexico.
While it concluded that some of the factors supported the taxpayer and
others supported the government, "[taking all facts and circumstances
into account, we cannot say that the Tax Court's application of the [fac-





In Long v. United States,2 7 ' the Tenth Circuit held that the Service
did not unlawfully disclose tax information concerning the taxpayers by
sending notices of liens and levies to various financial institutions,
county recorders, the Colorado Department of Revenue, and the Social
Security Administration in an effort to collect a $138,961 jeopardy as-
sessment 27 2 against the taxpayers. The taxpayer had filed this action
against the Service claiming damages arising from the disclosures.
2 73
The Tenth Circuit held that disclosures made to the Colorado Depart-
ment of Revenue were statutorily authorized 2 74 under the Service's writ-
ten Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration.2 75 Despite the
265. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (1990), aft'd, 949 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3030 (1992).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 170. On appeal, the taxpayer objected to the invocation of I.R.C. § 183 by
the Tax Court, because that section had not been explicitly raised or considered by the
Service or the taxpayer. According to the taxpayer, only sections 162, 212 and 616 were at
issue and had been raised by the parties. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that
section 183 "is interrelated to sections 162 and 212, profit motive being the common
underlying theme." Cannon v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1991). "In
determining whether the mining activity met the requirements of sections 162 or 212, the
court naturally applied section 183. Section 183 is often used in analyzing 'for profit'
issues, both in the context of hobby losses and in the context of trade or business ex-
penses." Id. Thus, "the Tax Court's application of section 183 was routine and predict-
able, not extraordinary." Id. at 349.
268. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 352.
269. See supra note 261.
270. Cannon, 949 F.2d at 352.
271. 972 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1992).
272. See I.R.C. § 6861(a) (1988).
273. I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1) (1988) provides that "[i]f any officer or employee of the
United States knowingly, or by reason of negligence, discloses any return or return infor-
mation with respect to a taxpayer ... such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages
against the Untied States in a district court of the United States." The confidentiality of
return information is protected by I.R.C § 6103(a) (1988).
274. I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (1988) authorizes disclosures by the Service to state agencies
if certain conditions are.satisfied, including that the disclosure be made "only upon written
request" of the agency, and only "to the representatives of such agency ... designated in
such written request." Id.
275. The IRS has entered into Agreements on Coordination of Tax Administration
with each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The Agreement is in standard
form, and prides, inter alia, that "[tihis agreement constitutes the requisite authorization
[Vol. 70:4
TAXATION
taxpayer's arguments to the contrary, 27 6 the court further held that dis-
closures to financial institutions, county recorders, and the Social Secur-
ity Administration were clearly authorized under the Internal Revenue
Code2 77 and the Income Tax Regulations.
2 78
In Diandre v. United States,2 79 the district' court held that a Special
Agent of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue
Service improperly disclosed tax return information concerning the tax-
payer and his business. The agent had sent a "circular letter" to the
business' banks and customers requesting information concerning trans-
actions between the business and the recipients of the letter. The letter
informed the banks and customers that the Service was investigating the
taxpayer and the business, and disclosed certain information about the
taxpayer, such as his name, address, and status as a director of the com-
pany.2 80 As a result of the information obtained, summons were subse-
quently issued to all the banks. The district court held that the
information was disclosed in violation of I.R.C. § 6103.281 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the determination of the
district court. The major area of disagreement between the parties was
pursuant to § 6103(d)(1) of the Code for IRS to disclose to, and permit inspection by, an
agency representative of Federal returns and Federal return information." Long, 972 F.2d
at 1178.
276. The taxpayer's arguments essentially amounted to a challenge to the sufficiency of
the assessment, and not to the disclosure procedures. The Service produced a certified
copy of Form 4340, "Certificate of Assessment and Payments," which was acknowledged
by the Tenth Circuit to be "sufficient evidence that an assessment was made in the manner
prescribed by § 6203 and Treas. Reg. 301.6203-1," which establish the applicable statu-
tory and regulatory requirements. Long, 972 F.2d at 1181. See supra note 65.
277. Under I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (1988), tax return information may be disclosed in the
course of an investigation if three requirements are met: (1) the information sought is
"with respect to the correct determination of tax, liability for tax or the amount to be
collected, or with respect to the enforcement of another provision" of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, (2) the information sought is "not otherwise reasonably available," and (3) it is
necessary to make disclosures of return information in order to obtain the additional infor-
mation sought.
278. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-(1)(b)(6) (1980) authorizes disclosures of tax return
information when necessary to "establish or verify the financial status or condition and
location of the taxpayer whom collection is or may be directed, [and] to locate assets in
which the taxpayer has an interest" in connection with "the establishment of liens against
... assets [in which the taxpayer has an interest], or levy on, or seizure, or sale of, the
assets to satisfy [the taxpayer's tax] liability."
279. 968 F.2d 1049 (10th Cir. 1992).
280. The letter stated:
The Internal Revenue Service is conducting an investigation of Metro Denver
Maintenance, Inc., Lakewood, Colorado, for the years 1983 through 1985. Mr.
DiAndrea is an officer of Metro Denver Maintenance whose address is 6800 West
6th Avenue, Lakewood, Colorado, 80215.
During the course of our investigation, we noted transactions between you and
Metro Denver Maintenance, Inc. and/or Mr. DiAndrea for [the] previously men-
tioned period. As part of our investigation, we need to verify the purpose of
these transactions. Your assistance is needed in determining all payments made
to or on behalf of Metro Denver Maintenance, Inc. and/or Mr. DiAndrea for the
previously mentioned period. We would appreciate you furnishing the informa-
tion indicated on Attachment 1, for use in a Federal tax matter.
Id. at 1051. The Attachment referred to "the date, check number, amount and form of all
payment(s) .. .made in cash, money order, etc." The Attachment specifically referred to
"payments made in the form of cash." Id.
281. See supra notes 273-78.
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whether the requirement of section 6103 that the information be "not
otherwise reasonably available" had been satisfied. The court of appeals
held that, because the letter requested information about possible cash
payments made by the recipients to the taxpayer or his business, and
because this information could not reasonably be obtained from any
other source, the statutory requirement was met. The court of appeals
also admonished that "[tihe district court strayed beyond the parame-
ters of section 6103 when it sought to determine lthe agent's] subjective
intent and when it concluded that insufficient justification was shown to
warrant delving into whether cash payments were made."12 8 2 The court
of appeals noted that:
section 6103 does not provide a vehicle to test the probable
cause or any other level of justification to investigate .... The
plain language of section 6103 does not limit in any way what
information the IRS may seek in the course of an investigation.
Section 6103 merely imposes certain restriction on the IRS's
ability to make disclosures in seeking that information. 283
In United States v. Dawes,2 84 the Tenth Circuit joined the Sixth 28 5
and Ninth 2 86 Circuits, as well as several district courts, 28 7 in holding
that a taxpayer's conviction for failure to file federal income tax returns
is not precluded by the fact that the Treasury Regulations and the in-
structions accompanying the tax forms do not carry an Office of Man-
agement and Budget 2 88 control number.28 9 Donald and Phyllis Dawes
had each pled guilty to three counts of willful failure to file federal in-
come tax returns2 90 for 1981, 1982, and 1983, but preserved for appeal
the question whether the lack of OMB control numbers excused their
failure to file. Relying on the reasoning of the other courts that previ-
282. DiAndrea, 968 F.2d at 1053.
283. Id.; see Barrett v. United States, 795 F.2d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the court does
not inquire whether the information sought is necessary"); United States v. MacKay, 608
F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating that the Service is not required to have probable
cause to issue a summons). On the other hand, the Service must use its summons author-
ity in good faith, and the courts may refuse to enforce a summons if it was issued to harass
the taxpayer or if it is unclear or overly broad. United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437
U.S. 298, 313 (1978); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964); United States v.
Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 686 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
284. 951 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1991).
285. United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 38 (6th Cir. 1990).
286. United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1358-60 (9th Cir. 1991).
287. See United States v. Stiner, 765 F. Supp. 663 (D. Kan. 1991); United States v.
Burdett, 768 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Brewer v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Crocker, 753 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-16 (D. Del. 1991).
288. Hereinafter referred to as the "OMB."
289. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812
(1980), the OMB is assigned the task to review all federal forms constituting "information
collection requests," 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (1988), and assignment of a control number to all
forms approved by the OMB. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3512, "no
person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to maintain or provide information to any
agency if the information collection request ... does not display a current control number
assigned" by the OMB. The taxpayers had argued that because the Income Tax Regula-
tions and the instructions do not contain OMB control numbers, they could not be penal-
ized for failing to file their income tax returns.
290. See I.R.C. § 7203 (1988).
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ously addressed the issue,2 9 1 the Tenth Circuit concluded that this argu-
ment was without merit.
2 92
In United States v. Gosnell,2 93 the taxpayer transferred all his assets to
a purported business trust. The Tenth Circuit determined that "the Dis-
trict Court properly ordered the foreclosure on the government's lien
after it determined that the transfer was fraudulent, '29 4 and rejected
various tax protest claims.
29 5
E. Annual Round-up of Tax Protestors, and Other Matters
During 1992, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of vari-
ous tax protestor cases and other matters in a similar vein. These are
summarized in the following paragraphs.
In Fox v. Commissioner,2 96 the court affirmed the dismissal of a Tax
Court petition filed by a tax protestor who claimed "that she was 'brain-
washed' by one Sy Prog, apparently a tax protestor, into proceeding
before the Tax Court in the manner she did,"'2 9 7 and now wanted a
"second chance to produce evidence in the Tax Court. '298
In Pleasant v. Lovell,2 99 members of the National Commodity and
Barter Association, a national tax protest organization,3 0 0 sued certain
291. The analysis of each of the courts that has previously addressed the issue has va-
ied, but all the courts have come to the same conclusion. The reasoning has included that
the requirement to file a tax return is mandated by statute, not regulation, so the taxpayer
was not convicted of violating the regulations, see United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 38
(6th Cir. 1990); that the explicit statutory requirement to file a tax return places the regu-
lations and instructions beyond the scope of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, United
Sates v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1991); and that the regulations and instructions
cannot be viewed independently and classified as "information collection requests" as de-
fined by the statute - they are merely subsidiary to the income tax forms, and assist
taxpayers in completing the return, Crocker, 753 F. Supp. at 1216. The Tenth Circuit was
most persuaded by the latter analysis. Form 1040, the personal income tax return form,
and its associated forms do carry OMB control numbers.
292. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189. Subsequent 1992 Tenth Circuit cases following Dawes in-
clude United States v. Jump, No. 91-5183, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 27779 (10th Cir. Oct.
19, 1992) and Gassei v. Dep't ofJustice, No. 91-6400, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15381 (10th
Cir. June 25, 1992).
293. 961 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992). For other 1992 decisions by the Tenth Circuit
relating to fraudulent conveyances, both decided to the same effect, see United States v.
Jensen, No. 91-4224, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 34732 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 1992) and United
States v. Neilson, No. 91-4175, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 34823 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1992).
294. Gosnel, 961 F.2d at 1520.
295. Gosnell's appeal was determined to be frivolous, and sanctions in the amount of
$1,500 were awarded to the government. Gosnell, 961 F.2d at 1521. See Casper v. Commis-
sioner, 805 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1986).
296. 969 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1992).
297. Id. at 952. Fox's petition asserted various claims that the Tenth Circuit acknowl-
edged to be "blatantly frivolous and groundless." Id.
298. Id.
299. 974 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1992).
300. The National Commodity and Barter Association "is an organization formed in
1979 which 'espouses dissident views on the federal tax system and advocates a return to
currency backed by gold and silver.'" United States v. National Commodity & Barter
Ass'n, 1990-1 U. S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,284 (quoting Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402,
405 (10th Cir. 1985)). The NCBA is especially active in the Tenth Circuit. The NCBA has
been described as an organization whose members "advocate dissident political views con-
cerning the tax and monetary policy of the United States Government," Kroll v. United
19931
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 70:4
government agents alleging violations of the group members' First
Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of association, and
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.3 0,
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of these
claims.
30 2
In Fostvedt v. United States,3 03 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's reliance on the Anti-Injunction Act and the tax exception provi-
sion of the Declaratory Judgment Act 3° 4 to dismiss a taxpayer's suit
seeking to "declare the actions of the [Service] to be arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion and unconstitutional, and [to] enjoin the
agency from further action against"30 5 him until the Service complied
with his request to submit his grievances to the National Office for tech-
nical advice, abate the Notice of Deficiency, and hold an appeals confer-
ence. The taxpayer also sought a declaration that the Service violated
his constitutional rights by keeping records classifying him as a tax pro-
testor. The court viewed the taxpayer's action as "an attempt to delay
and/or prevent the IRS from assessing and collecting the income tax
deficiencies and penalties due because of [taxpayer's] failure to file in-
come tax returns for the years in question.
°3 0 6
In United States v. Parsons,30 7 an individual30 8 filed false Form 1099's
with the Service, reflecting that he had paid taxable compensation to
various public and private officials with whom he had disagreements, in
an attempt to trigger tax audits or investigations of those individuals. 30 9
States, 573 F. Supp. 982, 984 (N.D. Ind. 1983), in response to what the organization "per-
ceives to be an unconstitutional and oppressive monetary and taxation system. The lead-
ership of the NCBA advocates and promotes opposition to federal income tax laws."
United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1989). Among other services, the
National Commodity Exchange, which has been described as the "service wing" of the
NCBA, is "operated by NCBA members as a private or warehouse bank" which the Service
views as a vehicle designed, among other things, to obscure the paper trail surrounding
the financial affairs of its members. Aspinall v. United States, 984 F.2d 355 (10th Cir.
1993) (quoting National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172, 1173
(10th Cir. 1991)); Heinold Hog Mkt., Inc. v. McCoy, 700 F.2d 611, 612 (10th Cir. 1983).
Reported opinions involving the NCBA and its members are legion, numbering in the
dozens.
301. In an earlier decision, Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 792 (10th Cir. 1989), the
Tenth Circuit had reversed in part a grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs,
holding that material issues of fact existed concerning the availability of a qualified immu-
nity defense. On remand, the district court ruled that no constitutional violations had
occurred, and alternatively, that qualified immunity protected the government agents.
This determination was at issue in the current appeal.
302. Parallel litigation was pursued by the NCBA. See National Commodity & Barter
Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1989) (remanding to the district court on First
and Fourth Amendment claims); National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 1992-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,334 (D. Colo. 1991) (on remand, dismissing the action).
303. 978 F.2d 1201 (10th Cir. 1992).
304. See supra notes 43-44.
305. Fostvedt, 978 F.2d at 1202.
306. Id. at 1203.
307. 967 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1992).
308. Among other things, Parsons was a member of the National Commodity and Bar-
ter Association. See supra note 300.
309. For other examples of the use of this "strategy," see United States v. Olson, No.
91-2109, 1992 U. S. App. LEXIS 7244 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 1992) (following her conviction
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed Parson's conviction on thirteen counts of
willfully making a false statement to a United States agency3 1 ° and one
count of knowingly making and presenting a false claim.
3 1 '
In United States v. Cutler,3 1 2 the taxpayer opened various stock bro-
kerage accounts and undertook substantial trading activity using false
names, phone numbers, and social security numbers. Based on the false
account information, the brokerage firm prepared and filed Forms 1099-
B reflecting the stock transaction information. The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed Cutler's felony conviction that was based on six counts of aiding
and assisting in the preparation or presentation of false documents aris-
ing under the internal revenue laws. 3 13 In United States v. Payne,3 1 4
under facts similar to those present in Cutler, the taxpayer's conviction
for tax evasion3 1 5 and false representation of social security numbers
3 1 6
was upheld.
In Van Skiver v. United States,3s 7 a tax protester3 1 8 brought an action
alleging wrongful levy and unauthorized disclosure of tax return infor-
mation, and seeking to quiet title to personal property. After the district
court dismissed the action, the Van Skivers filed a self-styled "Motion to
Reconsider." Finding no support in the Federal Rules of Evidence to
authorize such a motion, and finding various other defects in the motion
and the taxpayers' claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
action.
on a minor traffic matter, New Mexico resident filed false 1099's reflecting she had paid
over $400,000 in taxable compensation to the municipal judge who presided at her trial
and to various jail and police personnel; conviction affirmed); United States v.
Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1992) (farmer filed false Form 1099's on various indi-
viduals that were connected with the bank seizure of his farm; conviction affirmed); United
States v. Citrowske, 951 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1991) (farmer filed false Form 1099's on 36
individuals; conviction affirmed).
310. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
311. See id. § 287.
312. 948 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1991).
313. I.R.C. § 7206(2) (1988) makes it a felony to willfully aid or assist in, or procure,
counsel, or advise "the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any mat-
ter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other docu-
ment, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter."
314. 978 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1992).
315. See I.R.C. § 7201 (1988).
316. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (1991 Supp.).
317. 952 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1991).
318. Raymond and Alma Van Skiver are no strangers to the federal courts. For an
example of the bizarre tenor of the Van Skivers' views on the internal revenue laws, see
United States v. Van Skiver, 1991-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,017 (D. Kan. 1990).
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
In its 1992 session, the United States Supreme Court decided seven
cases originating from the Tenth Circuit.' This survey discusses two
cases, United States v. Williams and United States v. Felix, involving impor-
tant sections of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution that will have
direct impacts on prosecutorial actions and defendants' Fifth Amend-
ment protections. Both decisions make it easier for prosecutors to bring
suspects to trial. In Williams, the Supreme Court negated the Tenth Cir-
cuit's requirement that prosecutors present possible exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury.2 In Felix, the Court, again reversing the Tenth
Circuit, held (1) that admission of evidence of a crime at one trial does
not bar subsequent prosecution of that crime3 and (2) that conspiracy to
commit a crime and the actual crime itself are separate offenses for
double jeopardy purposes.
4
I. UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS: AN OTHERWISE VALID INDICTMENT MAY
NOT BE DISMISSED SOLELY BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT DID
NOT PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE
GRAND JURY
A. Introduction
The grand jury was first established in the 12th century by King
Henry II, to give him a means to enforce his dealings with the state and
to gain greater control over the administration ofjustice. 5 However, the
idea of the grand jury as a protector did not develop until the late 17th
century, when King Charles II tried to use the grand jury to indict the
Earl of Shaftesbury and Stephen Colledge for treason. These two men
were well-known Protestants who were, with popular support, trying to
1. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992); Barnhill v.Johnson, 112 S. Ct.
1386 (1992); United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) [Felix II]; McCarthy v. Madigan,
112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992); Dewsnup v. Timm,
112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); United States v. lbarra, 112 S. Ct. 4 (1991). For a discussion of
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, a landmark water pollution law case, see Cynthia McNeill, Comment,
The States Square off in Arkansas v. Oklahoma: And the Winner Is... the EPA, 70 DENY. U. L.
REV. - (1993).
2. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742.
3. Felix 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1382. References to the Tenth Circuit disposition of this
case, United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992),
are also Felix II. References to United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1989) are
Felix I.
4. Felix 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1383.
5. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTrrU-
TION ON TRIAL 6-7 (1977); Douglas P. Currier, Note, The Exercise of Superuisory Powers to
Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment-A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIo ST. L.J.
1077, 1078 (1984).
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prevent the King from reestablishing the Catholic Church in England.
The grand jury refused to act under the King's orders and did not issue
an indictment. 6 English colonists brought the concept of the grand jury
to the new world. The framers of the Constitution incorporated it into
the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, 7 intending that the grand
jury should act as a shield against improper indictment. 8 Today, how-
ever, the grand jury acts as both a shield and a sword. 9 In the criminal
justice system, the function of the grand jury is to issue indictments.'
°
This function has become a powerful tool in the hands of prosecutors, a
tool that has great potential for abuse because of lack of control by the
courts over prosecutors' actions. I The lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court have shown little propensity to permit judicial supervi-
sion of grand jury proceedings, fearing the generation of collateral pro-
ceedings and disruptive delaying tactics by the defense. 12 For instance,
in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,13 the Court held that federal courts
may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings ab-
sent a showing of prejudice to the defendant. 14 In United States v. Wil-
liams, the Court decided only the narrow question of whether
prosecutors should present exculpatory evidence to grand juries, hold-
ing that there was no duty for prosecutors to do this.' 5 However, the
broader effect of Williams will be to functionally negate the entire idea of
judicial supervision. 6
B. Facts
John H. Williams, Jr. was an investor and businessman in Tulsa,
Oklahoma.' 7 Between September 1984 and November 1985, Williams
obtained loans and loan renewals from four banks in Tulsa. With each
request for a loan or renewal, Williams provided the banks with two
6. FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 5, at 9; Currier, supra note 5, at 1078.
7. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Anne Bowen Poulin, Supervision of the Grand Jury: Who Watches the Guardian?, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 885 (1990).
9. Id. at 885-86.
10. Currier, supra note 5, at 1078.
11. Poulin, supra note 8, at 886-87; Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and
the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463,
549-54, 565-69 (1980).
12. Poulin, supra note 8, at 887-89.
13. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
14. Id at 263. Cf. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989)
(defendant may not appeal trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for
alleged violation of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 71 (1986) (a postconviction appeal of a violation of Rule 6(d) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must be reviewed under a harmless-error stan-
dard); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (no dismissal of indictment
based on illegally seized evidence because accused may challenge evidence at trial); Cos-
tello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (no dismissal of indictment based solely on
hearsay evidence). See generally Poulin, supra note 8; Currier, supra note 5.
15. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992).
16. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
17. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
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types of financial statements: a "Market Value Balance Sheet" and a
"Statement of Projected Income and Expenses."' 8
The "Market Value Balance Sheet" contained a category labeled
"Current Assets."' 9 Williams included as current assets $5 million to $6
million in notes receivable from three venture capital companies in
which he had invested. Each of the companies had a negative net worth
.at the time. However, Williams' financial statements carried a disclaimer
that these assets were carried at cost rather than at market value.2 0 The
second type of financial statement, the "Statement of Projected Income
and Expense," listed as a source of income the interest income payable
on these notes receivable. However, it did not indicate that these inter-
est payments were entirely funded by Williams' own loans to the venture
capital companies.
2'
In May 1988, after a six-month investigation, a federal grand jury
indicted Williams on seven counts of knowingly making false statements
or reports for the purpose of influencing the actions of a federally in-
sured financial institution, 22 in violation of the Crimes and Criminal
Procedures Act.23 The indictment accused Williams of supplying the
banks with "materially false" statements that willfully overvalued his
current assets and interest income.
24
Shortly after his arraignment, Williams filed a motion to compel the
government to disclose any evidence that tended to exculpate him.
2 5
The government indicated that it would comply with its duty under
Brady v. Maryland26 to provide exculpatory evidence, but failed to do so.
The district court then ordered the government to provide any exculpa-
tory material. The government agreed to provide Williams with edited
portions of the grand jury transcripts and to provide the unedited tran-
script to the court.
2 7
After reviewing this material, Williams filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment, claiming that the government failed to present substantial
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, citing prior Tenth Circuit prece-
dent in United States v. Page.28 In Page, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
rule that prosecutors must reveal to the grand jury substantial exculpa-
18. Id.
19. The label "current assets" describes assets that will be realized in cash within one
year. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1735
(1992).
20. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
21. Williams, 898 F.2d at 899.
22. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
24. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
25. Id.
26. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.'83, 87 (1963) (requiring the government to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused when the evidence is material to either guilt or
punishment).
27. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
28. 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987) (holding that when
substantial exculpatory evidence is discovered during an investigation, it must be revealed
to the grand jury).
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tory evidence discovered during an investigation, or risk dismissal of the
indictment. 29 The rationale for adopting this rule was the promotion of.
judicial economy. The Tenth Circuit, in adopting this rule, chose to fol-
low decisions of the Second and Seventh Circuits3 0 rather than decisions
of the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits which held that prosecutors need
not present exculpatory evidence. 3 1 Williams argued that his financial.
records (consisting of ledgers, tax returns and financial statements) and
his deposition from a contemporaneous Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy pro-
ceeding showed that his methods of accounting and financial reporting
were consistent with the financial statements he had provided to the
banks.3 2 This evidence of consistency, Williams argued, this "exculpa-
tory evidence," would have exonerated him. The district court denied
the motion to dismiss the indictment.
33
Williams then entered a motion to reconsider this dismissal. Upon
reconsideration, the district court dismissed the grand jury indictment
without prejudice. The court found that the evidence " 'raises reason-
able doubt about the defendant's intent to defraud' ,,34 and that the lack
of this evidence "rendered the grand jury's indictment 'gravely
suspect.' -35
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether the gov-
ernment had presented all the necessary evidence required under Page.
The government argued that "under its theory" of the case (that Wil-
liams intended to influence the banks' actions), the government had
presented "all relevant evidence" to the grand jury.3 6 The Tenth Cir-
cuit thoroughly discussed the district court's findings with respect to this
contention. In first reviewing the district court's findings under a
"clearly erroneous" standard,3 7 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
district court's choice among more than one permissible view of the evi-
dence could not be clearly erroneous. 38 The Tenth Circuit then re-
viewed the materials on which Williams based his argument that the
government should have presented exculpatory material to the grand
jury. These materials consisted of Williams' financial records and his
29. Id.
30. Unites States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1068 (1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979).
31. United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193
(1985); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v. Civella, 666 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1981).
32. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737-38.
33. Williams, 899 F.2d at 900.
34. Id. (quoting the District Judge's Order).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 901.
37. Id. at 900. See United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that the rule of civil procedure that questions of fact are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard may be applied to certain issues in criminal proceedings).
38. Williams, 899 F.2d at 900 (citing Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 851
F.2d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 1988)).
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deposition given in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's goal was to determine whether the government should have
presented this material to the grand jury as part of proving one of the
essential elements of its case-whether Williams intended to influence
the banks' action by use of false statements.
39
The Tenth Circuit followed the district court in separating the ques-
tionable evidence into two categories: (1) the bankruptcy deposition and
(2) the financial statements and tax records prepared by Williams and
his accounting firm.40 The Tenth Circuit found that although the state-
ments Williams made in his bankruptcy depositions were "irrelevant and
self-serving" under the government's theory of the case, they were not
necessarily so under a different theory that the grand jury could have
reasonably adopted. 4 1 Because there could be more than one view of
this evidence, the district court's finding that the deposition contained
exculpatory evidence was not clearly erroneous. 4 2 After examining the
financial statements, the Tenth Circuit found that a grand jury could
reasonably conclude that Williams had a different understanding of
"current assets" than the government or the banks and that because of
these different meanings, Williams did not intend to mislead the banks.
The government urged the court to review the grand jury transcript,
arguing that this evidence was presented to the grand jury by the testi-
mony of its witnesses. The Tenth Circuit was unable to review the grand
jury transcript, however, because the government did not designate it as
part of the record. 43 The court was therefore forced to conclude that
the district court's finding that the government withheld exculpatory ev-
idence was not clearly erroneous.
4 4
The Tenth Circuit then briefly discussed whether Williams was
prejudiced by the failure of the government to present the exculpatory
evidence and whether the district court abused its discretion by dis-
missing the indictment. The court found that by withholding the excul-
patory evidence, the government " 'substantially influence[d]' " the
grand jury's decision to indict, or at least raised a " 'grave doubt that the
decision to indict was free from such substantial influence.' 45 This
met the Bank of Nova Scotia standard for errors that prejudice the defend-
ant: whether the violations substantially influenced the grand jury's de-
cision to indict.4 6 These circumstances were sufficient for the Tenth
Circuit to find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dis-
missing the indictment.
4 7
39. Id. at 901.
40. Id. at 901-03.
41. Id. at 902.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 903.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 903 (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263
(1988)).
46. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263.
47. Williams, 899 F.2d at 904.
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D. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the 5-4 opinion for the Supreme Court revers-
ing the Tenth Circuit decision. The opinion held that district courts
may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the government
failed to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
4 8
The holding extended a line of cases confirming the Court's reluctance
to challenge the validity of grand jury indictments and curtailing judicial
supervision of grand juries.
49
The Court considered two issues: (1) whether certiorari had been
properly granted and (2) whether prosecutors should present exculpa-
tory evidence to grand juries. The Court first considered whether it
properly granted certiorari, since the government (the petitioner) did
not previously argue that Page was wrongly decided. Traditionally, a
question not "pressed or passed upon below" is not reviewed by the
Supreme Court.50 This rule ensures the development of the factual rec-
ord and gives the Justices the full benefit of competing arguments.5 1
Justice Scalia determined, however, that the Tenth Circuit had indeed
"passed on" the prosecutor's obligation to tell the grand jury about ex-
culpatory evidence in its decision in United States v. Williams. 52 Two pre-
vious cases established that an issue not pressed could be reviewed so
long as it had been passed upon.5 3 Justice Scalia then stated a new rule
to permit the Supreme Court to review a question even though it was
not contested below:
It is a permissible exercise of our discretion to undertake re-
view of an important issue expressly decided by a federal court
where, although the petitioner did not contest the issue in the
case immediately at hand, it did so as a party to the recent pro-
ceeding upon which the lower courts relied for their resolution
of the issue, and did not concede in the current case the cor-
rectness of that precedent5 4
The Court next considered the substantive issue: whether a district
court may dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the govern-
ment failed to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. Justice Scalia first considered whether the supervisory power of
the federal courts extends to the grand jury. The federal courts possess
the authority to establish procedural rules not specifically required by
the Constitution or the Congress, 5 5 but Justice Scalia found that this
48. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992).
49. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
50. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1738.
51. David 0. Stewart, Advantage Government: Is It Easier for the Government to Win in the
Supreme Court?, 78 A.B.A. J. 46 (1992).
52. 112 S. Ct. at 1740 n.4; See Williams, 899 F.2d at 900.
53. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2761 (1991); Stevens v.
Department of Treasury, 111 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1991).
54. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1740-41 (footnote omitted).
55. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
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authority applies only to the court's power to control its own proce-
dures. 56 Even though Bank of Nova Scotia made it clear that this supervi-
sory power could be used to dismiss an indictment because of
misconduct before the grand jury,57 this power only applies to miscon-
duct that violates "clear rules .. . drafted .. .by this Court and by
Congress." 58 Stressing the grand jury's "operational separateness"
from the courts, 59 Scalia held that the supervisory power of the courts
cannot be used to prescribe prosecutorial misconduct before a grand
jury.6 0
Justice Scalia then considered whether Fifth Amendment "common
law" justified the Tenth Circuit's ruling in order to preserve the effec-
tiveness of the grand jury's constitutional role as an " 'independent and
informed' " body.6 ' He concluded that "requiring the prosecutor to
present exculpatory ... evidence would alter the grand jury's historical
role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body." 62 For
a balanced presentation to be made in this situation, the person under
investigation should be the one to present such evidence, not the prose-
cutor; yet this conflicts with more than 200 years of grand jury prac-
tice.63 Also, the grand jury itself can decide not to hear more evidence
when it believes it has enough to bring an indictment, even though the
prosecutor offers more. If the grand jury is not required to hear excul-
patory evidence, the prosecutor should not be obliged to present it.
64
The Court concluded that a prosecutor has no duty to present exculpa-
tory evidence to a grand jury, reversing the Tenth Circuit.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, sharply differed with both
holdings of the majority. In arguing that certiorari should have been
denied, Justice Stevens said that the Tenth Circuit did not "pass upon"
Page in its opinion; it simply restated Page and applied it as settled law.
65
In addition, the government not only failed to challenge Page in the
Tenth Circuit case, but actually urged the court to follow Page's holding
and find that the evidence was not exculpatory. 66 The government did
not actually challenge Page until it petitioned the Supreme Court for cer-
tiorari. The majority's holding that the Supreme Court can grant certio-
rari in such circumstances, Justice Stevens concluded, may result in a
significantly expanded caseload. 67 More important, it gives an unfair
56. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741.
57. Id. (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988)).
58. Id. (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986)).
59. Id. at 1743.
60. Id. at 1742.
61. Id. at 1744 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1744-45.
64. Id. at 1745.
65. Id. at 1747-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 1747.
67. Id. at 1748.
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advantage to the United States because the United States is the most
frequent litigant in federal courts. This advantage, warned Justice Ste-
vens, will compromise the Court's duty to act impartially. 68
Justice Stevens also objected to the majority's substantive holding.
Unlike the majority, the dissent maintained that the courts have the
power to supervise grand juries. The dissent found considerable sup-
port for the idea that the grand jury, although independent, is and has
always been subject to the control of the Court.69 The dissent also
found previous recognition by the Supreme Court of its authority to cre-
ate and enforce limited rules applicable to grand jury proceedings, even
though the Court has declined exercise this authority. 70 The applica-
tion of this supervisory power is necessary to curb prosecutorial miscon-
duct, which is varied and not infrequent. 7 1 Justice Stevens considered
this conduct intolerable because the prosecutor represents a sovereign
that is obliged to govern impartially.7 2 Justice Stevens advocated adopt-
ing the standard of the United States Department of Justice. This stan-
dard holds that "when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is
personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt
of a subject of an investigation, the prosecutor must present or other-
wise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an
indictment."
73
E. Analysis and Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Tenth Circuit, extended its
reluctance to question the validity of grand jury indictments. In effect,
the language of the decision foreclosed any meaningful judicial supervi-
sion of the grand jury in any context, not just that of an incomplete
presentation of evidence. By stressing the traditional independence of
the grand jury from the courts, 74 and by affirming that the procedural
rules formulated by courts apply only to the courts' own procedures, 75
68. Id. at 1748-49.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974); Brown v. United
States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled on separatepoint by Harris v. United States, 382 U.S.
162, 167 (1965); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 283 (1919); Falter v. United States,
23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 590 (1928).
70. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988); Calandra, 414 U.S.
at 343; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor
failing to inform grand jury of its authority to subpoena witnesses); United States v.
Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor presenting perjured testimony);
United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 162 nn.6-7 (D. Md. 1980) (prosecutor misstat-
ing the facts on cross-examination of a witness); United States v. Roberts, 481 F. Supp.
1385, 1389 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (prosecutor misstating the law); United States v. Gold,
470 F. Supp. 1336, 1346-51 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (prosecutor operating under a conflict of
interest); United States v. Phillips Petroleum, Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 615-17 (N.D. Okla.
1977) (prosecutors failing to inform grand jury of exculpatory evidence obtained from a
witness questioned outside the grand jury).
72. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1750 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 11, 9-
11.233 (1988) (amended 1990).
74. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1743.
75. Id. at 1741.
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the Supreme Court cut the grand jury loose from any hobbles applied by
the lower courts. A grand jury indictment may be dismissed only when
the prosecutor violates a constitutional or statutory restriction. 76 At
bottom, the Court fears that greater supervision 77 will lead to collateral
proceedings and disruptive delaying tactics by the defense, consuming
"valuable judicial time" 78 and "run[ning] counter to the whole history
of the grand jury institution."' 79 The grand jury, moving far from its
traditional role as an accusatory body, will become an adjudicatory
force. Criminal investigations will be impeded.8 0
As a practical matter, prosecutors will find it even easier to convince
the grand jury to indict. Defendants, having lost the protection given by
Page and similar decisions,8 ' can depend only on other rules that may
influence prosecutors, such as the rule of the Department of justice that
requires United States attorneys to disclose substantial exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury or face reprimands.8 2 Justice Scalia accepted
the government's argument that such rules would indeed act to curb
overzealous prosecutors.8 3 It remains to be seen whether Congress will
agree with the Court's decision, or find it necessary to enact statutory
restrictions governing prosecutors' failure to present exculpatory evi-
dence to grand juries.
8 4
II. UNITED STATES V. FELIX: ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF A CRIME Is
NOT THE SAME AS PROSECUTION OF THAT CRIME AND DOES NOT
ESTABLISH A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION; SUBSTANTIVE CRIME AND
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THAT CRIME ARE NOT THE SAME OFFENSE FOR
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PURPOSES
A. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment states in part: "No person shall ... be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
.... -85 It is unfortunate that a concept so basic8 6 and with so long a
history8 7 should have become such a quagmire in modern jurispru-
76. Id. See also Steven A. Shaw, It's "No Holds Barred' in the Grand Jury Room, TEx. LAW.,
July 13, 1992, at 10.
77. See Poulin, supra note 8; Currier, supra note 5.
78. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1746.
79. Id. at 1744.
80. See Arenella, supra note i1, at 566-67 (discussing the ramifications of requiring
prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence).
81. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. SeeJustices Hear Debate on Government Duty to Give GrandJury Exculpatory Evidence, 60
U.S.L.W. 1128 (1992) (summarizing the government's argument before the Supreme
Court).
84. For a discussion on this point, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., End the Grand Jury Charade,
AM. LAW., June 1992, at 32.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the double
jeopardy clause; thus, its prohibitions apply to state prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
86. Eli J. Richardson, Matching Tests for DoubleJeopardy Violations with Constitutional Inter-
ests, 45 VAND. L. REV. 273, 274 (1992).
87. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting)
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dence.88 The sticking point is the phrase "same offence." Courts in
literally thousands of decisions8 9 have struggled to define this phrase.
The Supreme Court has struggled in the same way and to much the
same result. United States v. Felix9 ° represents the Court's most recent
attempt to clarify a very small piece of this very large fogbank.
The basic functions of the double jeopardy clause are at least clear.
Double jeopardy protects defendants in four ways: (1) it provides final-
ity; (2) it prevents prosecutorial harassment; (3) it preserves the jury's
prerogatives to resolve factual issues; and (4) it bars successive prosecu-
tions (resulting from several proceedings) and multiple punishments
(resulting from one proceeding). 9 1 Discussions of "same offense"
sprang from the constitutional bar against successive prosecutions and
multiple punishments. Blockburger v. United States9 2 enunciated the first
test of whether double jeopardy exists in the context of multiple punish-
ments. This test, however, was later seen to be insufficient for the analy-
sis of successive prosecutions. 93 Two recent cases, Dowling v. United
States 94 and Grady v. Corbin,9 5 attempted to clarify the steps to be taken
in analyzing this problem by adopting conduct-based standards. Grady,
however, marked a break from the Court's earlier double jeopardy juris-
prudence 9 6 and cannot be reconciled with the Dowling decision, because
evidence ruled admissible in Dowling would be barred by Grady.9 7 Also,
the lower courts have applied the Grady standard inconsistently,9 8 or
have failed to apply it in the manner the Supreme Court envisioned. 99
(explaining that the guarantee against double jeopardy dates back to the days of Demos-
thenes, who stated that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same is-
sue") (quoting 1 Demosthenes 589 (J. Vance trans., 4th ed. 1970)). See generally George C.
Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition,
71 IowA L. REV. 323, 325 (1986) (noting that the law of double jeopardy dates back to
ancient Greek, Hebrew and Roman law).
88. Justice Rehnquist has described law in the double jeopardy area as "a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator," Al-
bernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981), and as a "Gordian knot," Whalen, 445
U.S. at 702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
89. Thomas, supra note 87, at 330.
90. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) [Felix II].
91. Tat Man J. So, Double Jeopardy, Complex Crimes and Grady v. Corbin, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 351, 352 (1991).
92. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Blockburger established the standard that where the same act
may violate two different statutes, the two statutory offenses are not the same if each re-
quires proof of a fact that the other does not. Id. at 304.
93. Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2092 (1990).
94. 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (admission. of testimony from a previous prosecution in
which defendant was acquitted does not violate the collateral-estoppel component of the
double jeopardy clause).
95. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). "[T]he Double jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prose-
cution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the
Government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted." Id. at 2087.
96. Id. at 2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1381 n.2 (1992) [Felix II].
99. Id. at 1382 ("we think that this is an extravagant reading of Grady"); id. at 1384
("we decline to read the language so expansively ... because of difficulties which have
already arisen in [Grady's] interpretation.").
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For instance, the Second and Tenth Circuits bar conspiracy prosecu-
tions if the defendant has already been prosecuted for the substantive
offenses supporting the conspiracy charge, while the First and Fourth
Circuits allow such prosecutions. 10 0 The Court used Felix both to clarify
the meaning of Grady and to reconcile it with Dowling.
B. Facts
Sometime in the spring of 1987, a meeting between Frank Dennis
Felix and unindicted co-conspirator Paul Roach resulted in an agree-
ment that Felix would supply Roach with financing, chemicals and
equipment in exchange for Roach's instructions on how to manufacture
("cook") methamphetamine. 1° 1 Felix then bought the chemicals and
equipment needed from George Dwinnells, a United States Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) confidential informant, who sold
chemicals and equipment to Felix on a number of occasions. 10 2 Felix
told Dwinnells he was trying to make "dope."' 0 3 In May 1987, Roach
and Felix set up a methamphetamine laboratory in a trailer parked on an
oil lease near Beggs, Oklahoma, in which they manufactured
methamphetamine four to six times'04 from June 1 to July 13, 1987.105
Felix paid Roach $4000 for Roach's part of the laboratory work.
On July 13, 1987, DEA officials seized the unattended Beggs trailer
while a "cook" was in progress. 10 6 They seized methamphetamine oil,
illegal precursor chemicals, manufacturing equipment and other evi-
dence, some of which inculpated Felix.' 0 7 Felix himself escaped capture
in a time-honored way-he hid in the woods.10 8
Shortly thereafter, Felix telephoned Dwinnells and arranged a
meeting at a Tulsa, Oklahoma, bar. 10 9 At this meeting on August 26,
1987, Felix gave Dwinnells a matchbook cover with a list of chemicals
and equipment for making methamphetamine. Felix also gave Dwin-
100. The Second Circuit barred conspiracy prosecutions when the defendant had pre-
viously been prosecuted for a conspiracy where the actions entirely encompassed the ac-
tions of the second conspiracy. United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990).
Later, the Second Circuit held that a conspiracy prosecution is barred if overt acts support-
ing the conspiracy charge involve substantive offenses for which the defendant has already
been prosecuted. United States v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 54 (1992). The Tenth Circuit followed the Gambino reasoning in its decision in Felix
11, 926 F.2d 1522 (1991).
In contrast, the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have come to the opposite conclu-
sion, that subsequent conspiracy prosecutions are not barred. United States v. Rivera-Feli-
ciano, 930 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1676 (1992); United States v.
Clark, 928 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1991).
101. United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1377
(1992) [Felix 11]. Roach later became a government witness at Felix's trial.
102. United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) [Felix I].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Felix IH, 926 F.2d at 1524 n.l.
106. Id. at 1524.
107. Id. A car owned by Felix was seized at the laboratory. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070
n.3.
108. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070.
109. Felix 11, 926 F.2d at 1524.
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nells a down payment of $7500, told him to get a trailer to transport the
items and gave him directions and a phone number so the items could
be delivered."I0 DEA agents observed this meeting."I ' In a later tele-
phone conversation, Felix told Dwinnells to deliver the items to the Jop-
lin, Missouri, Holiday Inn; Dwinnells informed the DEA of this
arrangement. 112
The DEA arranged a controlled delivery to be made by Dwinnells in
Joplin on August 31, 1987, with DEA agents and the Missouri Highway
Patrol providing surveillance. Dwinnells drove his vehicle from Tulsa to
Joplin with the trailer attached. Felix met Dwinnells at the Joplin Holi-
day Inn, where Felix, after checking the trailer's contents, attached new
locks to its rear doors and hitched it to his car. The DEA arrested Felix
shortly thereafter.' 13
C. The Federal District Court Decisions
1. The Missouri District Court
On September 15, 1987, a federal grand jury indicted Felix in Mis-
souri and charged him with one count of attempting to manufacture
methamphetamine between August 26 and 31, 1987,114 in violation of
the Controlled Substances Act. 1 5 Felix's defense was that he never had
criminal intent, but believed that he was working in a covert operation
for the DEA. 1 16 To support its case that Felix had the requisite intent,
the government introduced the evidence of Felix's earlier activities in
Oklahoma 117 under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 1 18 In his instruc-
tions to the jury, District Judge Russell G. Clark carefully cautioned the
jury that this evidence should be considered only to determine Felix's
state of mind with respect to his Missouri activities, not to determine his
guilt with respect to that evidence. 1 9 The judge's instructions were in
accordance with the Eighth Circuit's relevant pattern instruction.
120
110. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070.
111. Felix!1, 926 F.2d at 1524.
112. Id. at 1525.
113. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1070-71. Felix did not tell the arresting officers at this time that
he was working as a covert operator for the DEA, even though he used this as a defense at
trial. Id. at 1071.
114. Id.
115. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988) and Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970) (cur-
rent version at 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988)). Section 841 (a) provides: "Except as authorized by
this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally" (1) to man-
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, a controlled substance ...."
Section 846, since amended, provided: "Any person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or
both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the com-
mission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
116. Felix 1, 867 F.2d at 1074.
117. See supra notes 10 1-07 and accompanying text.
118. "Evidence of prior acts is admissible to show 'motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-
ration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' " Felix H, 112 S. Ct.
at 1380 (quoting FED. R. Evin. 404(b)).
119. Felix I, 867 F.2d at 1075.
120. Id.
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The jury convicted Felix, and he was fined and sentenced to seven years
in prison. 12 1 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. 
1 22
2. The Oklahoma District Court
On February 16, 1989, the government charged Felix in Oklahoma
with violations of the Controlled Substances Act and named him in eight
counts of an eleven-count indictment. 123 Count 1 charged Felix and
others with conspiring from about May 1, 1987, to August 31, 1987, to
manufacture methamphetamine. Two of the overt acts supporting this
charge were based on conduct that was the subject of the Missouri pros-
ecution.1 24 Counts 2 through 6 charged Felix with substantive crimes
(manufacturing methamphetamine and phenylacetone, possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and maintaining a place for
manufacturing methamphetamine), and Counts 9 and 10 charged Felix
with interstate travel with intent to promote the manufacture of
methamphetamine. 1
25
Before the April, 1989, trial, Felix moved to dismiss the indictment
on double jeopardy grounds.' 2 6 The trial court denied this motion. Fe-
lix was then convicted on all counts after a jury trial.'
2 7
D. The Tenth Circuit Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Felix raised only one issue: that the
Oklahoma district court trial subjected him to double jeopardy because
the evidence introduced at the Oklahoma trial was identical to that used
to prosecute him in the Missouri trial. The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion
written by William J. Holloway, Jr., Chief Judge, agreed, affirming in
part and reversing in part.'
2 8
The Tenth Circuit began by determining that Grady v. Corbin applied
in this situation.' 29 Grady held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an
essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already
121. Id. at 1070.
122. Id.
123. Felix H, 926 F.2d at 1524 (10th Cir. 1991). See supra note 115 for the text of the
Controlled Substances Act.
124. Overt act 17 charged that "loin August 26, 1987, Frank Dennis Felix, while in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, provided money for the purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary
in the manufacture of methamphetamine." Overt act 18 charged that "[oln August 31,
1987, Frank Dennis Felix, while at a location in Missouri, possessed chemicals and equip-
ment necessary in the manufacture of methamphetamine." Felix I1, 112 S. Ct. at 1380.
125. Felix 11, 926 F.2d at 1524 n.l.
126. Id. at 1525.
127. Id. at 1524.
128. Id. at 1531.
129. Id. at 1528.
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been prosecuted." 13 0 In a Grady analysis, the focus is on the defendant's
conduct, not on the evidence the government uses to prove that con-
duct. The Tenth Circuit, applying this standard to the counts listed in
the Oklahoma district court indictment,' 3 ' found that for Counts 1
through 6, the duplication of the conduct proved in the Missouri trial
and the Oklahoma trial was extensive; thus, the counts could not
stand.' 3 2 The Tenth Circuit's opinion actually expanded the protec-
tions given by Grady by holding that presenting evidence at one trial bars
a subsequent prosecution on other charges using the same evidence.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Tenth CircuitJudge Stephen H. Anderson wrote a vigorous dissent.
The majority, he wrote, expanded Grady far beyond the interpretation
intended by the Supreme Court, even "dangerously" beyond. 133 The
dissent claimed that the majority ignored the plain meaning of Grady.
The majority interpreted Grady to establish a "same conduct" test. But
in Grady, the dissent pointed out, "conduct" meant only that conduct
"that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted."' 134 The majority failed to analyze Felix's conduct in this
way. In addition, the majority confused "conduct" with "evidence."
Although the majority said it was applying a same conduct test, it pro-
ceeded to analyze, not the conduct proved, but the evidence presented at
each trial. Grady explicitly made a distinction between previously prose-
cuted conduct and evidence used to prove that conduct.'
3 5
The dissent also warned that the majority's interpretation "eviscer-
ates" Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because, by the majority's analy-
sis, introduction of Rule 404(b) prior bad act evidence to prove intent is
the same as prosecution for that bad act. Thus, Rule 404(b) evidence
could never be used when the defendant had already been prosecuted
for that bad act, nor could this evidence, once used, be used in the same
way in another trial.' 3 6 The Supreme Court never intended that Grady
should be interpreted in this way.1
3 7
E. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court moved decisively in a unanimous decision to
130. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990).
131. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
132. Felix II, 926 F.2d at 1529-31. Counts 9 and 10, charging interstate travel to pro-
mote the manufacture of methamphetamine, did not prove the same conduct as the Mis-
souri trial, and Felix's convictions of these counts were affirmed. Id. at 1531.
133. Id. at 1532 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1533 (citing Grady, 495 U.S. at 521).
136. Id. at 1534.
137. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically said in Grady that "the presentation of spe-
cific evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the government from introducing that
same evidence in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 1534 n.5 (quoting Grady, 495 U.S. at
521-22 (1990)).
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quash the Tenth Circuit's expansion of the Grady test' 3 8 and to clear up
a difference in the circuits on the application of Grady to conspiracy
prosecutions.' 3 9 The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, first considered whether the Tenth Circuit had erred in over-
turning Felix's convictions on substantive Counts 2 through 6140 on the
basis that he was prosecuted for the same conduct in both the Missouri
trial and the Oklahoma trial. The Court determined that there was no
common conduct linking the crimes for which Felix was prosecuted in
Oklahoma and Missouri. 14 1 Even though evidence of the Oklahoma
conduct was introduced at the Missouri trial, Felix was never prosecuted
in Missouri for any crimes other than those he committed in Missouri.
The Tenth Circuit was mistaken in making the assumption that offering
evidence of one crime in a trial for another crime barred a subsequent
prosecution for the former crime. 1 4 2 Dowling v. United States 143 implied
that the introduction of evidence of misconduct is not the same as prose-
cution for that misconduct, and Grady v. Corbin endorsed this princi-
ple. ' 4 4 The Court specifically declined to accept a rule that admission of
evidence under Rule 404(b) constituted prosecution of that crime
14 5
and stated that such an interpretation of Grady was "extravagant."'1
46
The Court then considered whether the Double Jeopardy clause
barred Count 1 of the Oklahoma indictment, the conspiracy charge.
The various circuits interpreted Grady differently with respect to conspir-
acy charges, 14 7 and Rehnquist conceded that the Grady language 148 cast
some doubt on Felix's conspiracy conviction when taken out of context
and read literally.' 49 But previous decisions of the Supreme Court are
at odds with Grady and its interpretation that conspiracy prosecutions
are barred by the Double Jeopardy clause. These decisions determined
that a conspiracy to commit an offense and the offense itself are distinct
and that, for double jeopardy purposes, the offenses are separate.
150
The Felix Court chose to follow this established line of cases rather than
use Grady to determine whether double jeopardy applies. Thus, Felix
establishes that the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar prosecution of
a conspiracy when the defendant has already been convicted of the sub-
stantive crimes that resulted from the conspiracy.
138. Felix II, 112 S. Ct. at 1381.
139. See id. at 1381 n.2.
140. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
141. Felix I, 112 S. Ct. at 1382.
142. Id.
143. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
145. Felix!!, 112 S. Ct. at 1383 n.3.
146. Id. at 1382.
147. See supra note 100.
148. See supra text accompanying note 130.
149. Felix!!, 112 S. Ct. at 1383.
150. E.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947) ("the agreement to do the
act is distinct from the act itself"); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (a
"substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses ...
[aind the plea of double jeopardy is no defense").
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F. Analysis and Conclusion
In reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court firmly put to rest
any attempts to expand Grady beyond its facts and established a small bit
of solid ground in the murky world of double jeopardy analysis. The
Court closely followed Judge Anderson's analysis in the Tenth Circuit
dissenting opinion. 15 1 The Court preserved the use of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) 15 2 by holding that overlapping proof does not establish
a double jeopardy violation.' 5 3 The Court's holding resolved conflict-
ing circuit decisions on the use of Grady in conspiracy prosecutions and
affirmed that conspiracy is not the same offense as the substantive crime
for double jeopardy purposes. Felix shows that the Court intended that
Grady should be narrowly interpreted; Grady does not hold that offering
evidence of misconduct in one prosecution bars a subsequent prosecu-
tion for that misconduct. The Felix decision put an end to the idea that
Grady requires a same evidence test. However, Felix does nothing to de-
fine the scope of the same conduct test that it affirms. Double jeopardy
analysis remains "enmeshed in .. .subtleties."'
154
CONCLUSION
Williams confirmed the reluctance of the Supreme Court to super-
vise the activities of grand juries, and made it clear that prosecutors
must fear only the threat of reprimands and sanctions by administrative
agencies, absent some action by Congress to prescribe limitations on
their behavior. Felix, by affirming a narrow interpretation of Grady, made
the prosecutor's task easier. Felix allows a more generous interpretation
of what evidence is admissible without jeopardizing subsequent prose-
cutions and ensures the separation of conspiracies and the substantive
crimes attached to them. Both decisions support the opinion that the
Court is joining in the efforts of other governmental powers in the war
on crime1 5 5 by eroding constitutional protections relied on by potential
151. Felix II, 926 F.2d at 1532 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 1534 (stating that rule 404(b) will be "eviscerated" because the Tenth
Circuit's decision holds that introduction of prior bad act evidence to prove intent is the
same as prosecution for that bad act); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 526 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (the Court's decision "casts doubt on the continued vitality of Rule 404(b)");
Richardson, supra note 86, at 303-05 (if the Court chooses to interpret Grady narrowly, rule
404(b) will not be diluted).
153. Felix 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1382.
154. Id. at 1385. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 86; Thomas, supra note 87; So, supra
note 91, at 370-71. But seeJames M. Herrick, Note, Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes Home: The
"Same Conduct" Standard in Grady v. Corbin, 79 Ky. L.J. 847,866 (1990-91) ("[Grady] allevi-
ate[s] the confusion in [this] doctrinal area ....").
155. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.):
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
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156. For instance, the narrow interpretation of Grady supported by the Felix decision
will prevent Grady from being applied in a RICO context. For a discussion of Grady's effect
on RICO criminal prosecutions, see Ramona L. McGee, Criminal RICO and Double Jeopardy
Analysis in the Wake of Grady v. Corbin: Is This RICO's Achilles Heel?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 687
(1992).
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